SOURCE: Kellner, Menachem Marc. “Maimonides and Gersonides on Mosaic Prophecy.” Speculum 52, no. 1 (January 1977): 62-79.

[In the following essay, Kellner compares Gersonides's understanding of the nature of the prophecies of Moses with Maimonides's interpretation of them.]

Gersonides¹ and Maimonides² shared many ideas concerning the possibility and nature of prophecy. This is hardly surprising; not only were they both Jewish Aristotelians, but Gersonides clearly implies that the problems he raises in his major philosophic work, Milhamot Hashem, are those problems and only those problems to which Maimonides failed to provide adequate solutions.³ In this essay I want to examine Gersonides' understanding of prophecy in general and his conception of Mosaic prophecy in particular. This issue is of considerable importance. By examining Maimonides' and Gersonides' opinions concerning the prophecy of Moses, we can better understand their opinions concerning the immutability of the Torah and the Election of Israel. The case of Gersonides is particularly interesting since his novel approach to the question of Mosaic prophecy, I will suggest, is an important key to understanding his atypical and forward-looking world view. To provide background and context for this discussion, I will first describe Maimonides' views on this subject.

Maimonides' views concerning prophecy generally are found in his Guide of the Perplexed.⁴ His views concerning the special nature of Mosaic prophecy are found in his Mishneh Torah.⁵ In the Guide Maimonides notes that among theists there are three opinions concerning prophecy (Book 2, chapter 32; pp. 360-363). The first and most popular view is that God chooses His prophets without reference to their intellectual attainments: he whom God wishes to be a prophet will prophesy. The second opinion according to Maimonides is that of the philosophers: “It affirms that prophecy is a certain perfection in the nature of man” (p. 361). A superior individual who perfects his rational and moral qualities as well as his imaginative faculty will, provided certain other preparations are made, necessarily become a prophet. “The third opinion,” Maimonides says,

is the opinion of our law and the foundation of our doctrine. It is identical with the philosophic opinion except in one thing. For we believe that it may happen that one who is fit for prophecy and prepared for it should not become a prophet, namely, on account of the divine will. To my mind this is like all the miracles and takes the same course as they. For it is a natural thing that everyone who according to his natural disposition is fit for prophecy and who has been trained in his education and study should become a prophet.

(p. 361)

Prophecy, Maimonides tells us, (2.36, p. 369), results from an overflow from God through the Active Intellect to the rational faculty and then to the imaginative faculty.⁶ “This,” he says,

is the highest degree of man and the ultimate term of perfection that can exist for his species; and this state is the ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty. This is something that cannot by any means exist in every man. And it is not something that may be attained solely through perfection in the speculative sciences and through improvement of the moral habits, even if all of them have become as fine and good as can be. There is still needed in addition the highest possible degree of perfection of the imaginative faculty in respect of its original natural disposition.

The function of the imagination here is important. It is one of the five faculties of the soul, “retaining things perceived by the senses, combining these things, and imitating them” (p. 370). It functions both as what we would call memory (retaining the images perceived by the senses) and as what we would call imagination (combining these images—as when we imagine a unicorn—and imitating them—as when we call to mind what something looked like). When God, through the Active Intellect, causes a certain overflow to reach the rational faculty and thence to overflow to the imagination, prophecy or true predictive dreams result. The difference between such dreams and prophecy is one of degree, not one of kind. A highly perfected imagination will perceive this overflow as if it were caused by an actual sense perception, not as the dream or vision it really is.

Maimonides lists three prerequisites for prophecy (2.36). The first is the perfection of the rational faculty through study. To attain this a person must have a brain suited by its natural disposition (substance, size, position, and inter-relation of its parts) for study, and relatively independent of the hindrances caused by other parts of the body. The second prerequisite is the natural perfection of the imagination. This is an inborn characteristic which cannot be acquired. Last, the prophet must perfect his morals by turning away from the pleasures of the senses (especially the sense of touch as exemplified in activities like eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse), and by turning away from the desire to dominate and rule his fellow men. Since men can have these three prerequisites for prophecy in different degrees, it follows (and is confirmed by the evidence of the Bible and the Tradition) that there can be different degrees of prophecy. In sum:

Now there is no doubt that whenever—in an individual of this description—his imaginative faculty, which is as perfect as possible, acts and receives from the intellect an overflow corresponding to his speculative perfection, this individual will only apprehend divine and most extraordinary matters, will see only God and His angels, and will only be aware and achieve knowledge of matters that constitute true opinions and general directives for the well-being of men in their relation with one another.

(p. 372)

Maimonides notes one further important prerequisite for prophecy. In the Mishneh Torah he says:

The prophets did not prophesy whenever they pleased, but had to concentrate their minds, resting, joyous and cheerful, in solitude. For the spirit of prophecy does not descend upon one who is melancholy or indolent, but comes as a result of joyousness.⁷

This, Maimonides explains in the Guide (2.36, p. 373), is the reason that prophecy has ceased since the destruction of the Temple and the Exile: How can anyone be joyous?

Maimonides is careful to distinguish prophecy from related phenomena. Philosophers, he says, are those people who receive an intellectual overflow from the Active Intellect which does not in turn overflow to the imagination. Prophets are those who receive an overflow to both the rational and imaginative faculties (where the imaginative faculty is as perfect as it can be) (2.37).

In the Guide (2.34-35) Maimonides alludes to the uniqueness of Moses and to the special nature of his prophecy. He does not discuss the issue in detail there, other than emphasizing its importance, and refers to his other writings on the subject. He does, however, point out that prophetic revelation came to every prophet but Moses through the intermediation of an angel (p. 367). He says that the use of the word “prophet” is amphibolous; that is to say, it is the same word but it used with reference to two totally distinct and fundamentally dissimilar phenomena. In the same vein he insists that the miracles associated with Moses are different in kind from the miracles associated with the other prophets.

In the introduction to his commentary to the tenth chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin (perek Helek), Maimonides lists his famous thirteen articles of faith. The introduction to the seventh principle goes as follows:

The seventh principle of faith. The Prophecy of Moses our Teacher. This implies that we must believe that he was the father of all the prophets before him and that those who came after him were all beneath him in rank. He was chosen by God from the whole human kind. He comprehended more of God than any man in the past or future comprehended or will comprehend. And we must believe that he reached a state of exaltedness beyond the sphere of humanity, so that he attained to the angelic rank and became included in the order of the angels. There was no veil which he did not pierce. No material hindrance stood in his way, and no defect, whether small or great mingled itself with him. The imaginative and sensual powers of his perceptive faculty were stripped from him. His desiderative power was still and he remained pure intellect only. It is in this significance that it is remarked of him that he discoursed with God without any angelic intermediary.⁸

Maimonides goes on to describe a number of ways in which Moses' prophecy differs from that of the other prophets. He elaborates this list in the Mishneh Torah: Moses received his prophetic messages while awake and standing; all the other prophets did so in dreams or visions. Moses received his messages directly from God, clearly and without parables or riddles; all the other prophets received their messages from angels, in riddles or parables. Moses, unlike the other prophets, suffered no fear or consternation during the receipt of his prophetic messages. Further, Moses prophesied at his pleasure, not needing the special preparations (such as isolation, concentration and special joy) of the other prophets. He was able to do this because he totally abstained from sexual intercourse and similar satisfactions, “never going back to his tent.” Thus, his mind was always on God and was always ready for prophetic inspiration. Last, and in consequence of his abstinence, the Divine Glory never left him.⁹

To summarize, we may say that for Maimonides non-Mosaic prophecy is the result of a divine influence or emanation working through the intermediation of the Active Intellect upon the rational and imaginative faculties of certain individuals. Any person having the requisite moral, intellectual and native abilities necessary for prophecy will become a prophet unless a special act of God, akin to a miracle, intervenes. The prophecy of Moses is different in kind from that of all other prophets; God communicated with Moses directly, through no intermediary, in a way which was unique and will never be repeated.

Gersonides' understanding of the nature of prophecy generally and of Mosaic prophecy in particular is, in its broad outlines, similar to that of Maimonides. Gersonides does, however, differ from Maimonides on some crucial points. We will concentrate on these differences. Our first question must be: Why does Gersonides examine the issue of prophecy at all? We noted above that Gersonides addresses only those questions in the Milhamot which he feels were insufficiently treated in the Guide of the Perplexed. What is it about Maimonides' discussion of prophecy, then, which Gersonides rejects? As is the case with so many issues in the Milhamot, the answer, I think, relates to Gersonides' theory of God's knowledge of particulars.

Gersonides devotes Book Three of the Milhamot to a detailed and difficult discussion of God's knowledge of particulars. His conclusion is that God knows that particulars exist, but that He does not know them as individuals.¹⁰ We may readily see that Gersonides could not accept Maimonides' claim that God can withhold prophecy from an otherwise qualified individual if He so chooses. Further, there are many questions about the various forms of prognostications which Maimonides fails to answer: What sort of information may be conveyed, to whom exactly, and how?

Gersonides introduces his discussion of prophecy and related phenomena with the following problem: Given the fact that cases of prognostication are more than just lucky guesses (and this is the evidence of our senses), and given the fact that prognostication rarely occurs with respect to necessary events, it follows that events predicted in this manner are contingent. But for these events to be predictable they must be fixed and ordered in some way (i.e., predetermined) and this ordering must be known by the agent causing the predictions. But if this is true then all these so-called contingent events are really determined! And if this is true, there can be no free will! Gersonides goes on to say:

Now, if we assume that contingent events occurring to individual men are not ordered and fixed, how can we understand the knowledge given to men about them, for this very knowledge makes it necessary that these events be ordered and fixed? Because of this problem Averroes concluded that prognostication cannot occur with reference to contingent events. But experience testifies to the opposite, as we have noted. I have many times experienced this form of prognostication in dreams, with respect to contingent events. It is not proper that we contradict experience because of these problems; rather, we should investigate how these prognostications may be made with respect to chance events.

(Milhamot, Book 2, chapter 2, p. 95)

Gersonides' solution to this problem depends upon his acceptance of astrology. He maintains that the Active Intellect, through the instrumentality of the heavenly bodies, orders and determines human affairs. It is thus possible that predictions may be made concerning human events. Gersonides preserves human choice by asserting that man, through its exercise, can change the fate determined for him by the stars (2.2, pp. 96-97). Generally speaking, God has so ordered the world to make the greatest maximization of good possible. Thus we find that evil men rarely accomplish their wicked intentions and that civil society is organized very efficiently. It is still possible, however, that individual men might maximize their own good better than can the pre-ordained cycle of events. For this reason God endows men with the power of choice and with an intellect to guide that choice.

In the third chapter of Book Two Gersonides argues that it must be the the Active Intellect—the intelligence of the lunar sphere which governs the sublunar world, endowing it with the intelligence and purpose visible in its processes and evolutions and actualizing man's potential for knowledge—which is the cause of the order we find in what we call contingent events. He argues from this that it must be the Active Intellect which is the agent causing the prognostications of future contingent events to be made known to men. This is so because it is the Active Intellect which knows the order of the sublunar world as a whole, the heavenly bodies being its tools.¹¹

Gersonides explains that the various forms of prognostication function as forms of divine providence, helping man to avoid evils ordained for him by the stars (2.5, p. 104).

In his sixth chapter Gersonides raises eight questions relating to the activity of the Active Intellect with respect to prophecy. The answers to the third, sixth, and eighth questions contain material which helps to elucidate Gersonides' understanding of prophecy.

In the third question, Gersonides asks how it is possible that the Active Intellect makes known some future event to an individual person as an act of providential care if the Active Intellect does not know individual human beings (2.6, p. 105). Gersonides solves this problem by pointing out, first, that a particular individual will be more concerned with his own problems than with the problems of some other person. So he will concentrate on them, and be most prepared to receive a divine overflow with respect to or concerning that problem. But secondly, and more fundamentally, Levi points out that the Active Intellect does not send messages, as it were, to particular men. Rather it is constantly overflowing information about the general order of the sublunar world in order to provide providential care for men. Just as the Active Intellect providentially endows individual men with limbs and capabilities which protect them, without knowing them as individuals, so too, it emanates information concerning the order of events as an act of providential care and guidance which is made without knowledge of the individuals who will benefit by it.

This point will become clearer if we briefly examine Gersonides' doctrine of providence. He maintains that there are two types of providence. There is a “providentia generalis,” a general providence, extending to the entire world. This is manifested in the good order we find in nature. A more specific providence is extended to the righteous, who, through the unification of their intellects with the Active Intellect, are able to foresee events ordained by the order of the stars and take appropriate pre-emptive measures. In order to protect the righteous, therefore, the Active Intellect is constantly emanating information about the disposition of future events. Anyone with adequate preparation can benefit from this providential activity.¹²

Gersonides phrases his sixth question as follows: “Why does this information come to some men clearly and to some men in riddles and parables? Isn't the cause one and the same?” (2.6, p. 105). Here is his answer to this problem:

Even though the agent of these prognostications is one, this differentiation is caused by differences among the recipients, in one or both of two ways. First, because the material soul is perfectly prepared to receive the perception. In such a case the person receives the information clearly. Another person, however, may not have the ability to receive the perception perfectly; what does reach him comes only in the form of a riddle or parable. Riddles and parables are open to many interpretations. It is necessarily the case, then, that information which comes in this fashion is deficient. The issue here is similar to the case of two people, one having good vision, the other having poor vision, both of whom see the same sight. The first will see it as it is, while the second will only perceive its type. That is to say, he will see that it is red or green, but will not see the degree of its redness or greenness. So it is with this information: the person who receives this emanation perfectly will perceive the order [determined] for this man or this nation in that [he perceives the order determined] for any man or nation having this ordering …¹³ a vision will result in which this class is depicted in such a way that it could be any one of the species in that class. This depiction is the riddle or parable. … [The second reason for differences among those who receive prognostications] relates to the perfection or deficiency of the imagination,¹⁴ not to the excellence or lack thereof of perception. When the imagination is perfectly prepared to copy what the material intellect perceives it will copy that ordering as it is. But when it is not thus perfectly prepared it will not copy it as it imagines it to be. This is [the source of] parables.

(2.6, pp. 108-109)

Gersonides' eighth problem relates to the fact that prognostications of various sorts come to fools and children much more frequently than to better educated men, who, it might be supposed, would be better prepared to receive intellectual emanations, having a greater degree of unification with the Active Intellect (2.6, p. 105). Gesonides' answer is important to us since in it he distinguishes between prophecy on the one hand and (predictive) dreams and divination on the other.¹⁵

Gersonides commences his answer to this problem (p. 111) by pointing out that it is well known that prophecy, unlike (predictive) dreams and divination, requires perfection of the intellect. He then lists four differences between prophecy on the one hand and (predictive) dreams and divination on the other. First, he observes, the ability to prophesy is a capacity which must be developed through training and apprenticeship. He points to the many biblical references to the “sons of the prophets,” whom he takes to be apprentice or student prophets. There is no training or apprenticeship associated with dream predictions or divination.

Second, “one of the conditions of prophecy is wisdom, unlike the case in dreams and divination, which often occurs among children and fools, indeed, more often than it occurs among educated people” (p. 111).

Third, everything which the prophet says is true. If he predicts evil and it fails to occur this is no impeachment of the truth of his prophecy, since it is possible that the subject of the prophecy escaped the evil fated for him through intelligent (or lucky) application of his freedom of choice. It is certainly the case, however, that at the time of the prophecy the heavenly bodies did ordain what the prophet predicted. When the prophet predicts that something good will happen, however, it comes about without fail. Since man's ability to choose was given him that he might maximize his good, it is not possible that the exercise of that choice would undermine some benefit ordained for him by the heavenly bodies. Gersonides closes this discussion by pointing out that one finds much falsehood in divination and (predictive) dreams, and that this is confirmed by our experience (p. 111).

Fourth, the point of prophecy is to guide men to human perfection. This is not the case with (predictive) dreams and divination.

Gersonides continues this answer to the eighth problem by making explicit something to which he had earlier alluded. Prophecy, he says, results from the direct action of the Active Intellect on man's (material) intellect.¹⁶ This differs from (predictive) dreams and divination which are the result of the action of the Active Intellect on man's imagination. “It is impossible that the recipient of the divination and dreams should be the material intellect,” he argues, “since if it were they [the dreams and divination] would differ in degree in accord with the level of the recipient, such that he whose intellect was more perfect would be more ready to receive this emanation. But if this were the case we would find these prognostications among educated people more often than among fools and children. But this is the opposite of our experience” (p. 113).

Gersonides goes on to point out that the Active Intellect does not act directly on the imagination (which, unlike the material intellect, does not receive emanations from it) but only through the intermediation of the separate intelligences. Each of these agents through its heavenly body orders one part of the sublunar world. Information gleaned from them is thus less complete than information obtained from the Active Intellect which unifies in itself the laws governing the entire sublunar realm. This is why dreams and divination are often false, while prophecy is always true.

When the imagination is separated from the other human faculties (both intellectual and sensual) it is better able to receive emanations from the heavenly bodies. This separation is more easily achieved in fools and children than in educated adults.

Gersonides summarized his views on the various forms of prognostication in the eighth and last chapter of Book Two of the Milhamot (pp. 118-119). He says:

The more perfect a person's intellect, and the greater ease with which he can separate it [from his other faculties] the more perfect will he be in prophecy. The varying degrees of these qualities accounts for the different degrees of prophecy. Men receive these prognostications about different subjects in accord with their natures: the more a man directs his thought to a subject, the more will he receive prognostications about it. This is common to both the diviner and the prophet. Thus, it is found that some diviners predict certain kinds of events exclusively, such as those who direct their thoughts—either naturally or by custom—to the matching of men and women, as is common among female diviners. He who directs his thoughts exclusively to the success of the intellect will single out those matters conducive to the success of the intellect and those matters which direct one to it.

We may conveniently summarize this material by developing a metaphor originally suggested by Norbert Samuelson.¹⁷ The Active Intellect may be likened to a powerful radio transmitter that broadcasts constantly without knowing who, if anyone, is tuned in to its broadcasts. Some people have excellent radio receivers with very high antennae; they pick up the broadcasts very clearly. These are the prophets who are “tuned in” to the Active Intellect. The Active Intellect, however, is not the only broadcasting station and the prophets are not the only people with “radios.” Everyone is equipped with a radio and there are many smaller broadcasting stations the transmissions of which often compete with and interfere with those of the Active Intellect. These are the senses. There are different ways in which people lacking prophetic radios can pick up the emanations (“broadcasts”) of the Active Intellect. Some of them live in areas where there are few competing stations. These are the blind, among whom there are many diviners. Some people pick up the broadcasts at night when the smaller stations are off the air. These are the people who receive the emanations of the Active Intellect in dreams. Some people have excellent “tuning equipment” which helps them to block out the “static” caused by the smaller broadcasting facilities. These are the people who can separate their imaginations from their other faculties. Everyone who lacks the superior equipment of the prophet, however, will receive inferior broadcasts: they will be garbled and hard to make out. Thus, divination and dreaming usually convey information in the form of parables and riddles.

It is immediately clear that Gersonides' conception of non-Mosaic prophecy accords with the second view described by Maimonides, that of the philosophers. The philosophic conception of prophecy holds that prophecy is a human perfection, attainable, in principle, by all men. Any man who achieves a certain level of intellectual and moral perfection will prophesy. This is clearly Gersonides' view. Maimonides' own position is a modification of the philosophic conception. He agrees that in order to be a prophet a person must perfect himself in certain ways. He denied, however, that every person who so perfects himself will prophesy: God can miraculously withhold prophecy from him. Gersonides could not possibly adopt this view since he denied that God knows individuals as individuals. Whether or not a person has reached the level of prophecy is not something which is in the province of God's knowing. The implications of Gersonides' “philosophic” conception of prophecy can be clarified through a discussion of his understanding of the special nature of Mosaic prophecy.

Gersonides discusses the special nature of Mosaic prophecy in three places. In Milhamot, Book 2, Chapter 6, he says that knowledge about nontheoretical matters is generally received while the subject is asleep because

it needs the separation of the intellect from the imagination or the separation of the two of them [the intellect and the imagination together] from the rest of the perceiving faculties. This is most often accomplished in sleep, since, while one is awake, the senses are busy with their activities. This [prognostication] occurs occasionally during wakefulness for one of three reasons: (1) because of the perfection of the subject's receiving ability; (2) the ease with which the other perceiving powers of the soul are subjugated to the ability to receive [emanations]; (3) because of the weakness of the senses. …¹⁸ It would appear that Moses, our Teacher, peace upon him, received prophecy while he was awake for the first two reasons. By that I mean that his ability to receive [emanations from the Active Intellect] was absolutely perfected. For this reason he achieved a degree of prophecy greater than the degrees [of prophecy achieved] by all the other prophets. This is just as the Torah testified about him: “And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses …” [Deut. 34.10]. Also, his other perceiving faculties were easily subjugated to the faculty of his soul which received [emanations]. For this reason he was able to prophesy every time he wanted to as when he said: “Stay ye, that I may hear what the Lord will command concerning you” [Numbers 9.8]. Due to the ease with which his other perceiving faculties were subjugated to the faculty of his soul which received [emanations] he did not undergo trembling or consternation when prophecy came to him as was the case with the other prophets, peace upon them, who could not so easily separate this receiving faculty from their other perceiving faculties. …

(2.6, pp. 110-111)

In chapter eight (p. 119) Gersonides says:

In Moses, our Teacher, peace upon him, were combined all three [elements conducive to prophecy]: very great perfection of the intellect, ease of separation [of the intellect from the other faculties] and concentration on nothing but the success of the intellect. Because of this his prophecy was distinguished from that of the other prophets, peace upon them. It is very difficult to combine these three qualities in their highest possible human degree in one man. For this reason the Torah testified that no prophet like Moses has arisen in Israel.

[Deut. 34.10]

In its general outlines, Gersonides' description of Mosaic prophecy seems to be similar to that of Maimonides: both emphasize the unique nature of Moses' prophecy, and both explain it with reference to the special attributes of Moses. There are, however, important differences. Maimonides asserts that the prophecy of Moses is absolutely unique, coming to him directly from God without any intermediaries. He asserts that Moses was more than human—indeed, that he became an angel. He further asserts that Moses was chosen by God from among all humanity. From all these it follows that the revelation of the Torah through Moses was an absolutely unique event which can never be repeated.

In the Milhamot Gersonides does not make any of these claims, and indeed, cannot, if he is to be consistent. Gersonides absolutely rejects the idea that God, acting through the Active Intellect, chooses His prophets. Prophecy is a human perfection: anyone reaching a certain level of moral and intellectual perfection will prophesy. Gersonides gives absolutely no indication here that he thinks that the situation is different with Moses. It is the perfection of Moses' character which makes him Moses, our Teacher, not God's choice. Similarly, for Gersonides, Moses' prophecy is unique, but it is contingently unique, not necessarily unique. By that I mean to say (to adopt a Gersonidean locution) that it is theoretically possible that there might arise another Moses. Gersonides says, “It is very difficult (kasheh me'od) to combine these three qualities in their highest possible human degree in one man” (emphasis added).¹⁹ “Very difficult,” but not impossible. Gersonides cannot be sure that no other prophet like Moses will ever arise. Indeed, as we shall shortly see, he maintains in his Bible commentary that another prophet like Moses, a “new Moses,” as it were, will arise: King Messiah.

Gersonides' discussion to this point raises many interesting and important questions. If a new Moses can arise it would seem, then, that there might be a new Torah. The Torah, after all, is the record of the content of Moses' prophecies, including the supreme prophecy on Sinai. Since, in Gersonides' conception, Moses' prophecy is the result of his intellectual attainments and represents his superior ability to receive the emanations of the Active Intellect, it follows that any new Moses will be able, in fact will bring a new Torah, the content of his prophecies. (That he will make his prophecies known, i.e., that he will reveal his Torah, follows from the fact that prophecy exists to guide people to human perfection. The prophet, as the tool of this process, will not, cannot hide his prophecy.)

Now it might be argued that if a new Moses were to arise his message would be identical with that of the original Moses: he would not really be bringing a new Torah. It is certainly true that on Gersonides' account the substance of the two messages would be identical. This is so because what Moses apprehended in his prophetic inspiration were the eternal truths known by the Active Intellect and constantly emanated by it. These truths do not change. But their applications in our world can. Thus, the messages of the two Moseses, though identical in substance, will not be identical in form. The new Moses will not cast the account of the revelation vouchsafed to him in terms of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, will have no reason to make any reference to the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, will institute different holidays, etc.

There follows from Gersonides' conception of Mosaic prophecy another problem. To the extent that the election of Israel is grounded in the covenant at Sinai (rather than in the covenant with Abraham) it would seem that with the new Moses there could be a new chosen people.

Gersonides himself seems to recognize that a new Moses might arise. Indeed, as we shall see immediately, he maintains not only that a new Moses might arise, but that one will, and that he will be King Messiah. The doctrine that the Messiah will bring a new Torah, a new teaching, a specific “hilkhita d'Meshikha” (special messianic law) is not unknown in Judaism.²⁰ But Gersonides' problem is not that on his account the Messiah might be a new Moses but that there is no reason to assume that no other new Moses will come before the Messiah. To argue that if such a prophet were to arise he would, ipso facto, be the Messiah, is to remove from God the power to decide when the Messiah will come.²¹

Maimonides avoids these problems in his account of Mosaic prophecy in a number of ways. First, he rejects the opinion of the philosophers that prophecy is nothing more than a human perfection. This makes it possible for God to withhold the gift of prophecy from any person who, unlikely as it may be, turns out to be as gifted as Moses. Thus he preserves the uniqueness and immutability of the Mosaic revelation. Second, he simply posits that Moses was a case apart, not really a prophet, but something more, in fact an angel, specifically deputed by God to bring His Torah. Gersonides could not possibly adopt positions such as these. They are inconsistent with his understanding of God's knowledge of particulars and depend for their acceptability upon Maimonides' “negative theology” which Gersonides uncompromisingly rejects.

In reading his commentary to Deut. 34.10 it becomes clear that Gersonides was aware of the problems we have just noted. The description of Moses and his prophecy given there is considerably more “orthodox” than that given in the Milhamot. It is not possible to judge whether or not Gersonides was aware of the disparity, but it clearly exists. He says:

It is known that the Torah says that no prophet of Torah²² arose and none will arise other than Moses. No prophet will be trusted [if he attempts] to add or detract from it [the present text of the Torah] in such a way as to make of these changes a [new or different] Torah to be followed by all generations. Certainly, then, no prophet will be trusted if he wants to replace the Torah with another teaching. … It [the Torah] mentioned that which distinguished Moses from every other prophet to arise to prophesy to Israel. From this it is clear that another prophet like him [Moses] will arise to prophesy to Israel and the other nations. … For, were such not the case, the mention of “in Israel” [“And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses …”] would be a superfluous conditional statement. This prophet who will prophesy to Israel and the other nations is the King Messiah. …

(emphasis added)

Gersonides goes on in his commentary to this verse to distinguish between the prophecy of Moses and that of the other prophets. First, God knew Moses face to face, “one intellect emanating directly to another.” Second, the signs and demonstrations which Moses performed were done both before great multitudes of people and were seen across vast territories. None of the other prophets performed signs and demonstrations in this manner.²³ Third, Moses' signs and demonstrations persisted through long periods of time, such as occurred with the manna in the wilderness.²⁴ His commentary continues:

Moses is differentiated in these ways from all other prophets both in quality and in quantity. Thus, it is written: “And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders, which the Lord sent him to do in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to all his land; and in all the mighty hand, and in all the great terror, which Moses wrought in the sight of Israel.”

[Deut. 34.10]

These comments do not solve the problems we noted above. Granted that Moses is different from the other prophets, what is there is stop the coming of a second Moses? At the end of each section of the Pentateuch (parashah) Gersonides gives a list of advantages (to'aliyot) to be learned from the section.²⁵ In the fifteenth to'elet to V'Zot HaBrakha, the last parashah in Deuteronomy, Gersonides takes explicit note of this problem of a possible second Moses:

… all this comes to clarify the great difference between Moses and all other men. For someone might ask: “Why is it not possible that there be another prophet, a prophet of Torah like Moses? How then could the Torah decree that no changes ever be allowed in it? If this would be the case, the ability [of the new prophet to be a prophet of Torah] is null!” Here is the answer: There is no other who is equal to Moses in this matter. For his Torah prophecy is given in a wonderful [miraculous] way. No other prophet qua prophet has this ability, except for a miracle. For God, may He be exalted, has made it clear that it is not His will either to make another Torah, nor to add or detract from this present Torah ever. …

(emphasis added)

Even here Gersonides continues to emphasize that Moses is a man. A very special man, a man through whom was worked a unique miracle, God's revelation on Sinai. But, in the final analysis, Gersonides' position is very little different from that of Maimonides: both basically appeal to the mysterious will of God.²⁶

This, given Gersonides' consistent attempt to rationalize everything in Judaism, is little short of amazing. To my knowledge it is the only place in which Gersonides is forced to retreat from his consistent and thoroughgoing rationalism. In this regard it is apposite to quote here from Gersonides' own criticism of Maimonides:

We say that it would appear that this view of the Rabbi, the Teacher, may his memory be blessed, concerning the knowledge of God, may He be blessed, did not result from speculative foundations. This is because Philosophical Thought rejects this (position) as I shall explain. Rather, it would appear that the Torah put great pressure on him in this matter. …²⁷

Now what are we to make of this? It is possible that “the Torah put great pressure” on Rabbi Levi ben Gerson in this matter and that he was simply being inconsistent. But he could be inconsistent in one of three different ways. First, it is possible that Gersonides was being inconsistent without being aware of it. Second, we may say that the doctrine of prophecy expounded in the Milhamot is Gersonides' true opinion and the ideas expressed in the commentary were meant for public consumption only and did not truly represent his thought. Last, we may say that the more orthodox position is truly his and that he failed to make it explicit in the Milhamot.

The first theory is open to serious criticism. If he is unselfconsciously contradicting himself here it is, to my knowledge, the only place in all his writings where he does so. Also, he wrote the commentaries and the Milhamot simultaneously.²⁸ It is not likely that he would allow such an egregious contradiction to escape his notice.

The second theory claims that the contradiction is purposeful. It implies that he had a “secret doctrine” which he was trying to hide from the masses who were likely to read his commentary to the Bible but were hardly likely to read the difficult and abstruse Milhamot. But this theory, too, is not without its problems. In the Introduction to the Milhamot Gersonides explicitly notes that contradictions are one way of obfuscating a text which he will avoid assiduously. Self-conscious contradictions, he argues, are intellectually and consequently morally evil. More important, I think, is the fact that the other explicit doctrines he defends in the Milhamot, like those relating to God's knowledge and providence, are at least as daring as his doctrine of Mosaic prophecy which depends upon them. Why should he try to hide the latter and not the former? He is, furthermore, quite explicit in his commentary to Job about the limits of God's knowledge and providence. If he is explicit in one part of the Bible commentary, why not in another?

The third theory suffers from the fact that it makes Levi ben Gerson much more “orthodox” in this one place than he is in any other place. Why should he be more concerned with orthodoxy here than in his discussions of God's knowledge of particulars or of divine providence?

On balance I would say that the first explanation offers the fewest problems. This is, I think, one place where Gersonides simply contradicted himself without being aware of it. This approach is consistent with what I take to be an important if little-noted aspect of Gersonides' thought. He seems to have been a man caught between two worlds. In many ways he is clearly and emphatically medieval—his method, his style, his sources, the questions he asks, all mark him as such. On the other hand, I would like to suggest, he should in some senses be understood as a pre-Renaissance thinker, straining towards the future. His thought is marked by many ideas and motifs ordinarily associated with post-medieval thinking.

For example, he emphasizes the importance and power of man. He reasserts the centrality of man as opposed to the typically scholastic claim of man's insignificance. Gersonides is forced to choose in Book Three of the Milhamot between human freedom on the one hand and divine knowledge of particulars as such on the other. He chooses human freedom. In our own discussion we have seen how he understands prophecy to be a human perfection, not a gift of God's grace. He constantly emphasizes that Moses was a man—a special man, it is true, but no more than a man.

Gersonides' ideas about history, too, contain within them conceptions which were later to mark Renaissance thought. We saw above that he rejects the idea that the generations are continuously diminishing in moral and intellectual value. In chapter fifteen of part 1 of Book Six of the Milhamot he argues that the world must have been created; for were it not, man would surely have progressed much further than he has in the infinite time in which he has existed. This is a clear and startling application of what is often considered the post-medieval idea of linear progress. In the following chapter he makes the optimistic and hardly medieval claim that the world, once created, can never be destroyed.

All of these arguments are made clearly and explicitly in the Milhamot. I would argue that the “retreat from rationalism” noted above was not an attempt at fooling his readers but was an unselfconscious accommodation to what Gersonides understood to be the demands of traditional Jewish teaching. Had he realized that he was contradicting himself I don't think that he would have. Not only does he constantly attack Maimonides for what he implies is “intellectual dishonesty” in contradicting himself in this way, but he explicitly argues in the Introduction to the Milhamot that the Torah does not contradict the findings of human reason:

Let not the reader think that the Torah moves us to find true what we conclude in this book without respect to its being true in itself. It is clear, as the Rabbi, the Guide, elucidated, that it is appropriate that we believe that, the truth of which has been made clear by speculation (iyun). If this should contradict the simple meaning of the words of the Torah, it is appropriate that we interpret these words to accord with speculation.

It seems clear, therefore, that Gersonides would not have consciously perverted the truth of reason in order to make it accord with what seems to be the teaching of the Torah.

Notes

1. Levi ben Gerson, 1288-1344 (also known as Ralbag).

2. Moses ben Maimon, 1135-1204 (also known as Rambam).

3. Milhamot Hashem (Wars of the Lord) (Leipzig, 1866), Introduction, p. 4 (all page references are to this edition); also available in an edition published at Riva di Trento, 1569 (recently photoduplicated without place or date). Gersonides' views on prophecy are contained primarily in the Milhamot, Book 2, and Book 6, part 2, chs. 12-13, and at the end of his commentary on the Pentateuch (Venice, 1650), pp. 247a-248a. A photo-duplicated version of the Pentateuch commentary (no place or date) has recently been issued in two volumes under the title, Perush HaRalbag al HaTorah (Ralbag's Commentary on the Pentateuch). Books one through four of the Milhamot have been translated into German by Benzion Kellerman (Die Kämpfe Gottes von Lewi ben Gerson. Berlin, 1914). In the first footnote of my essay, “Gersonides, Providence, and the Rabbinic Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 42 (1974), 673-685, I provide an extensive bibliography of scholarly writings on Levi ben Gerson. That bibiliography should be supplemented with the following: Léon Alègre, Levi ben Gerson (Bagnols, 1880). J. David Bleich, Providence in the Philosophy of Gersonides (New York, 1973). Seymour Feldman, “Platonic Themes in Gersonides' Cosmology,” Salo Whitmayer Baron Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem, 1975), 383-405. Harris Fletcher, “Milton and ben Gerson,” The Journal of English and Germanic Philology 29 (1930), 41-52. Bernard Goldstein, The Astronomical Tables of Rabbi Levi ben Gerson (Hamden, Connecticut, 1975). Bernard Goldstein, “Levi ben Gerson's Lunar Model,” Centaurus 16 (1972), 257-284. Benjamin Grüll, Die Lehre Vom Kosmos bei Maimuni und Gersonides. (Lemberg, 1901). Manuel Joel, “Notizen zu Levi ben Gerson,” Monatsschrift fur Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums (1860). Menachem M. Kellner, “Gersonides and his Cultured Despisers: Arama and Abravanel,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6 (1976), 269-296. Joshua O. Leibowitz, “Cardiological Comments on Geriatrics in Ecclesiastes by Levi ben Gerson, 1328,” Dapim Refuiim (Folia Medica) 25 (1966), no. 9, 3-15 (Hebrew). Alexander Marx, “The Scientific Work of Some Outstanding Jewish Scholars,” in Israel Davidson, ed., Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller (New York, 1938), pp. 117-170. Shlomo Pines, “Scholasticism after Thomas Acquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and his Predecessors,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, vol. 1, no. 10 (Jerusalem, 1966). N.L. Rabinovitch. “Rabbi Levi ben Gershon and the Origins of Mathematical Induction,” Archives for the History of the Exact Sciences 6 (1970), 236-248. Norbert Samuelson, “On Knowing God: Maimonides, Gersonides, and the Philosophy of Religion,” Judaism 18 (1969), 64-77. Yosef Shatzmiller, “Gersonides and the Jewish Community of Orange in His Day,” Studies in the History of the Jewish People and the Land of Israel, ed. B. Oded (Haifa, 1972), pp. 111-126 (Hebrew). David Silverman, “Dreams, Divination, and Prophecy: Gersonides and the Problem of Precognition,” The Samuel Friedland Lectures: 1967-1974 (New York, 1974), pp. 99-120. Moritz Steinschneider, “Zu Levi ben Gerson,” Magazin fur die Wissenschaft des Judenthums 16 (1889). J. Teicher, “Studi preliminari sulla dottrina della conoscenza di Gersonide,” Rendiconte della Reale Accademia Nazionale de Lincei, Series 6, vol. 8 (1932), 500-510. Charles Touati, Le pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris, 1973). Charles Touati, “Les idées philosophiques et théologiques de Gersonide (1288-1344) dans ses commentaires bibliques,” Revue des Sciences Religieuses 28 (1954), 335-367. Moise Ventura, “Belief in Providence According to Gersonides,” in Minha l'Avraham (Hommage a Abraham, recueil litteraire en l'honneur de Abraham Elmaleh) (Jerusalem, 1959), pp. 12-21 (Hebrew).

4. Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed 2.32-48. All page references will be to the edition translated by Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963).

5. Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, ch. 7, Halakha 6. All page references will be to the edition translated by Moses Hyamson (Jerusalem, 1965). The literature on Maimonides' theory of prophecy is not large. Some of the more important studies are: Samuel Atlas, “Moses in Rambam, Spinoza, and Maimon,” Hebrew Union College Annual 25, 369-400. Zvi Diesendruck, “Maimonides' Lehre von der Prophetie,” Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams (New York, 1927), pp. 74-134. Alvin J. Reines, “Maimonides' Concept of Mosaic Prophecy,” Hebrew Union College Annual 40-41 (1969-1970), 325-361. This article was criticized by Norbert Samuelson in “Comments on Maimonides' Concept of Mosaic Prophecy,” Central Conference of American Rabbis Journal (January 1971), pp. 9-25. Leo Strauss, Philosophie und Gesetz (Berlin, 1935). Harry Austryn Wolfson, “Hallevy and Maimonides on Prophecy,” Jewish Quarterly Review, N.S. 32 (1941-42), 345-370, and 33 (1942-43), 49-82. Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts,” Harvard Theological Review 28 (1935), 69-133. Wolfson, “Maimonides on the Internal Senses,” Jewish Quarterly Review, N.S. 25 (1935), 441-467.

6. Maimonides' understanding of the nature and activity of the Active Intellect may be discovered by noting his relatively few references to it in the Guide. All the important references are in Book Two. In chapter 4 he characterizes the Active Intellect as the tenth of the separate intellects, “whose existence is indicated by the facts that our intellects pass from potentiality to actuality and that the forms of the existents that are subject to generation and corruption are actualized after they have been in their matter only in potential …” (p. 257). In chapter 6 (p. 264) he identifies the Active Intellect with “the angel and prince of the world constantly mentioned by the Sages.” In chapter 36 (p. 369) Maimonides characterizes prophecy as an overflow from God, through the intermediation of the Active Intellect first to man's rational and then to his imaginative faculty. In short, Maimonides held that the Active Intellect gives forms in the sublunar world, actualizes our potential intellects, and is the intermediary between God and the prophets.

7. Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, chapter 7, Halakha 4, p. 42b.

8. I have here quoted from the translation of Louis Jacobs in The Principles of the Jewish Faith (New York, 1964), p. 206. A more idiomatic is somewhat less literal translation of the same passage may be found in Isadore Twersky, ed., A Maimonides Reader (New York, 1972), p. 419.

9. Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, chapter 7, Halakha 6, p. 43a.

10. This is sound aristotelianism, but it does raise many difficult theological questions. It is on this point that Isaac Husik says: “Levi ben Gerson's solution, whatever we may think of its scientific or philosophic value, is surely very bold as theology, we might almost say it is a theological monstrosity …” (A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy [New York, 1930], pp. 345-346).

11. Levi uses many arguments to establish, first, that it is the Active Intellect which is the agent behind the various forms of prognostication and, second, that it is the Active Intellect which is the cause of the order in the sublunar world. One interesting argument in support of the first claim is that the ordering of contingent events was established in order providentially to guide humankind. Since it is the Active Intellect which is the immediate source of providence for man, it follows that the Active Intellect is the cause of that ordering (p. 98). It should not be inferred from Gersonides' claim that the heavenly bodies are the tools of the Active Intellect that the latter can manipulate them. This would be absurd, since, as Gersonides points out repeatedly (e.g., Book 6, part 2, chapter 12, p. 456) the Active Intellect is but an effect of the heavenly bodies and could not, therefore, manipulate them. The point here is that the Active Intellect makes use of what is determined by the heavenly bodies to regulate this world, not that they are its instruments.

12. For a more detailed examination of Gersonides' views on Providence see my essay in JAAR 42 (1974), 673-685, and J. David Bleich, Providence in the Philosophy of Gersonides (New York, 1973).

13. That is, he perceives the future determined for any entity governed by this particular arrangement of the heavenly bodies.

14. I have emended the text here to read ‘imagination’ (medameh) for ‘degree’ (madregah). Both the Riva di Trento and the Leipzig editions have the same (apparently incorrect) reading.

15. This is a convenient spot to note an important difference between Maimonides and Gersonides. Gersonides is here trying to distinguish qualitatively between predictive dreams and divination on the one hand and prophecy on the other. This is the general problem to which he addressed himself in Book Two. Maimonides, on the other hand, addresses another problem: how qualitatively to distinguish Mosaic from non-Mosaic prophecy. This concern so dominates his thinking that in the Guide (2.45) he even lists predictive dreams as one of the degrees of non-Mosaic prophecy.

16. Gersonides holds that each person is endowed with a material (hylic) intellect which consists in the potential to acquire knowledge. The knowledge which a person actually gains is called the acquired intellect. It is the immortal element in man. The perfection of the material intellect through learning is intellectual success and the appropriate goal for man. It is the Active Intellect which acts to realize this human potential for knowledge, and through knowledge, eternity. Gersonides develops these ideas in the first book of the Milhamot.

17. Norbert Samuelson, “The Problem of Free Will in Maimonides, Gersonides, and Aquinas,” CCAR Journal (January 1970), 2-20, 14.

18. As is the case, for example, with the blind.

19. Book 2, chapter 8, p. 119. Note that Gesonides is here taking oblique exception to Maimonides' claim that Moses transcended his human nature.

20. For an examination of the various texts relevant to this issue, see W. D. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or Age to Come, Journal of Biblical Literature Monograph Series 8 (Philadelphia, 1952).

21. That Maimonides relates the uniqueness of Moses to the uniqueness and immutability of the Torah is evident from the fact that he places the laws relating to false prophets (who wish to add to or detract from the Torah) immediately after his discussion of the special nature of Mosaic prophecy (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, chs. 7 and 8). The doctrine of “hitkatnut hadorot” cannot be used to help Gersonides here. This is the claim, found frequently in halakhic literature, that each generation since Sinai has been and will continue to be somewhat inferior—morally and intellectually—to the generation that preceded it. If we had evidence that Gersonides accepted this doctrine we could argue on its basis that no person living after Moses could ever achieve his level of perfection. Not only is there no evidence that Gersonides accepts this idea, but there are grounds for claiming that he actually rejects it. In his introduction to the Milhamot, for example, he says that just because preceding generations (including and especially Maimonides) were not able to determine whether or not the world was created ex nihilo is no reason to assume that he will not be able to determine it.

22. Hebrew: Navi Torah.

23. As, for example, with the plagues in Egypt. In the Milhamot (Book Six, part two, chapter 12, p. 455) Gersonides explains the significance of the fact that Moses' miracles persisted for a long period of time and extended over a wide area. In general, he says, since this world was created in the most perfect manner possible, and since miracles always occur in order to work some improvement for man, it is not possible that miracles should permanently change the accustomed order of nature. But the miracles of Moses, while not effecting permanent changes were very general indeed and were thus much greater than those associated with lesser prophets.

24. These considerations are important since the publicity and duration of Moses' miracles are among the prime warrants for the truth of his prophecy.

25. Gersonides includes these to'aliyot in line with his claim (made at the beginning of his introduction to his Pentateuch commentary) that the Torah was given to guide man to perfection and true (i.e., intellectual) success. He tries to show, therefore, what guides to success (or scientific truths—the apprehension of which aids man in uniting his intellect with the Active Intellect) are included in each parashah of the Torah.

26. There is very little profit to be had from analyzing Gersonides' conception of miracles in the hope that it will clarify his position. Isaac Husik notes: “Miracles loom large in the Bible and no rationalist could afford to ignore them. Gersonides, therefore, devotes considerable space to a discussion of these troublesome phenomena. His method here too is that of the systematic rationalist. He generalizes on the basis of the descriptions of these phenomena in the Bible. Since miracles are performed for a purpose they are not chance events. And since they come only rarely and are of no value in themselves, but only as a means to an end, their author must be someone less than God. As they come through prophetic inspiration, the author of miracles must be the same as the inspirer of prophets, and we have seen that this is the active intellect. … By what process a miracle happens at all Gersonides does not tell us, except that a miracle is not different from the natural process of generation and destruction, and the active intellect which is in charge of sublunar nature can shape it to suit its purposes.” Husik, “Gersonides,” in Philosophical Essays [of Isaac Husik], ed. Strauss and Nahm (Oxford, 1942), pp. 172-185, 184 (emphasis added).

27. Milhamot 3.3 (p. 132). This book of the Milhamot has been translated into English by Norbert Samuelson in his dissertation, “The Problem of God's Knowledge in Gersonides,” Indiana University, 1970. I have used his translation of this passage (p. 33).

28. He constantly refers one to the other. See footnote 2 in my essay in JAAR 42 (1974), 673-685.