SOURCE: Bleich, J. David. “Life and Works,” “Gersonides's Discussion of Providence.” In Providence in the Philosophy of Gersonides, pp. 9-17, 30-43. New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1973.

[In the following excerpt, Bleich compares Gersonides's writings on providence with those of Maimonides.]

Gersonides, a leading personality of the medieval period, was certainly one of the most significant figures to arise in Jewish philosophic thought after the death of Maimonides and may be described as the greatest of the post-Maimonidean Aristotelians. Although known to us primarily as a philosopher his written works reflect broad scholarly interests. Gersonides was somewhat of a polymath and indeed is famous not only as a philosopher, but received renown as well for his contributions in the fields of mathematics, astronomy, philology, Biblical exegesis, and as an author of Talmudic novellae and Halakhic responsa. In addition, he was well versed in the natural sciences and apparently earned his livelihood through the practice of medicine.

Levi ben Gershon,¹ known variously in rabbinic literature as Gershuni or RaLBaG. (compounded from the initial letters of Rabenu Levi ben Gershon), cited in the Latin translations of his works as Leo de Balneolis, and referred to as Leo Hebraeus or Maestro Leon de Bagnols by Latin and French writers,² was born in the Provence in the city of Bagnols in 1288, and died April 20, 1344.³ Levi ben Gershon was the scion of a family of scholars, as is evidenced by the numerous occasions in his writings on which he cites both his father, known to us as the purported author of a scientific and philosophical treatise entitled Sha‘ar ha-Shamayyim, and grandfather, Levi ha-Kohen.⁴ Bagnols, the city of his birth, is located in what was at the time the county of Orange, an area now incorporated in the Department of Gard. During the early period of his life this region was under the rule of the counts of Provence, who were also the kings of Naples. The reigning count during this period was Robert of Anjou, who is known to have been kindly disposed toward scholars and scholarly pursuits.⁵ Gersonides' entire life was spent in various parts of Provence, including Orange, Perpignan, and Avignon, the latter being the seat of the papacy from 1309 to 1376, spanning the period of Gersonides' residence.

Robert of Anjou encouraged translations of philosophical, astronomical, and mathematical works. Though there is no evidence that Gersonides was employed by him, Robert of Anjou is known to have commissioned Jewish scholars for this purpose.⁶ Both the dukes of Anjou and the popes, under whose rule these areas fell, treated their Jewish subjects more tolerantly than did the secular rulers of Spain and northern France. Though Gersonides himself, so far as is known, led a life of peace and tranquility, and suffered no interference in the pursuit of his studies, he complained bitterly of the sufferings of his co-religionists. In his commentary on the Pentateuch he refers specifically to the turbulent circumstances surrounding the expulsion of the Jews from France by Philip the Fair in 1306.⁷ Although he does not seem to have been affected personally, Gersonides writes in the introduction of the Milhamot of “the upheavals of the times which deter all meditation,” which is an indication of the deep sympathy he felt for the plight of his fellow Jews.

All the known works of Gersonides are composed in Hebrew. While Gersonides was undoubtedly proficient in Provencal there is some question as to whether he was familiar with either Latin or Arabic, although both Joel⁸ and Renan⁹ conclude that Gersonides had at least some acquaintance with the Arabic language. This deduction is made on the basis of a number of philological comments scattered throughout his Biblical commentaries in which Hebrew and Arabic words are compared. Since he speaks of Latin as being the “language of the Christians,” and refers in at least one instance to a work which he had read in a translation prepared from the original Latin¹⁰ they conclude that he was unfamiliar with the tongue.¹¹ Weil,¹² Steinschneider,¹³ and Marx,¹⁴ on the other hand, are of the opinion that he knew Latin well, but had little or no knowledge of Arabic.¹⁵ It is noteworthy that apparently no scholar maintains that Gersonides had a working knowledge of both languages. However, regardless of whether or not he was able to read Arabic or Latin works in the original, Gersonides could certainly have mastered the major works of Greek and Arabic philosophy, and might have acquired a thorough scientific education on the basis of works written in Hebrew and from Hebrew translations of the original sources.¹⁶ Indeed, Gersonides' knowledge of Aristotle is more accurate than that of so illustrious a personage as Maimonides, which is quite understandable, since the commentaries of Averroes were available to Gersonides (both in the original, if he was able to make use of them, or in Hebrew translation), while Maimonides seems to have depended upon the writings of Alfarabi and Avicenna for his knowledge of the Greek philosophers.¹⁷

In any event, lack of familiarity with foreign languages certainly did not hamper Gersonides' prolific scholarly activity. ‘The great prince, our master Levi ben Gershon, was the author of many valuable works. He wrote a commentary on the Bible and the Talmud, and in all branches of science, especially in logic, physics, metaphysics, mathematics and medicine, he has no equal on earth.”¹⁸ Gersonides' concrete achievements more than substantiate this statement. Gersonides indeed made a number of significant contributions to scientific knowledge, particularly in the fields of mathematics and astronomy. His proficiency in the natural sciences is not surprising, since Gersonides was a physician by profession, and during the medieval period physiology and the various other natural sciences were as yet not established as independent disciplines. Accordingly, the medical practitioner was, as a result of his training, usually well versed in other aspects of science as well.¹⁹ An unpublished manuscript entitled Meshiha, containing a description of a remedy for gout, gives evidence of Gersonides' contribution to the field of medical knowledge as well.²⁰

Gersonides' earliest mathematical work, entitled Ma‘ase Hosheb (The Work of the Reckoner) is based in part on Books VII to IX of Euclid, which he no doubt read in the Hebrew translation of Moses ibn Tibbon. One of the purposes of the work is to provide arithmetic proofs for Euclid's axioms; the work also contains much original material in the sections dealing with combination and permutation.²¹

Toward the end of his life Gersonides published a short treatise entitled De Numeris Harmonicis, attempting to prove a certain law pertaining to the “harmonic numbers.” This work was complied at the behest of Philip of Vitry, later Bishop of Maux. The material was undoubtedly written in Hebrew, but is extant only in a Latin translation which was published by Joseph Carlebach in his work entitled, Levi ben Gerson als Mathematiker (Berlin, 1910), pp. 129-144. He also wrote a commentary on the first five books of Euclid's elements in which he endeavored to demonstrate the validity of Euclid's axioms thereby eliminating their axiomatic character. Sometime later, Gersonides devised a geometry free of axioms.²²

Gersonides' contributions to the field of astronomy are perhaps even greater. It is certain that he either invented or made significant improvements upon an astronomical instrument used as a device for measuring angles and distances. The instrument consisted of a movable cross-piece sliding on a graded rectangular staff which he called simply Makkel, and came to be known in Latin as Baculus Jacob (Jacob's Staff).²³ This quadrant was employed by Gersonides for the purpose of obtaining more exact results in observing eclipses of the sun and moon, since he had found the calculations of his predecessors incorrect in many respects. In connection with these calculations, it occurred to him to pass the light of a star through a small aperture, thereby throwing the light upon a screen in a dark rom. In so doing he discovered, or rationalized, the principle of the camera obscura, the dark chamber. The combination of the two devices was called the Megalleh ‘Amukot or Revelator Secretorum.²⁴

In addition, Gersonides was the author of a comprehensive treatise containing 136 chapters devoted to his astronomical work which he incorporated into his philosophic masterpiece, Milhamot ha-Shem (Wars of the Lord). This entire section is missing in most of the manuscripts and was omitted in printed editions as being out of place in a philosophic work.²⁵ In this treatise, Levi describes his instruments, offers an original plane geometry, includes astronomical tables based upon his own observations and also criticizes the systems of Ptolemy and al-Bitrūjī, accusing Ptolemy of having neglected actual observation in favor of theoretical deduction.²⁶

In the same work, written some two centuries before Copernicus, Gersonides gives serious consideration to the possibility of a heliocentric universe. With a detailed presentation of pertinent arguments he rejects the notion that the apparent motions of heavenly bodies are due to the actual motion of the earth.²⁷

The chapters dealing with plane trigonometry and those containing a description of his astronomical instruments were translated into Latin—while the author was still alive—at the request of Pope Clement VI of Avignon, to whom the work is dedicated. The dedication, which contains a greeting addressed to the pope in the name of all Christendom and speaks of the incarnation of Christ, led some scholars to believe that Gersonides had become an apostate. Though purporting to be the words of the author himself, there is no doubt that the dedication is, in fact, the work of the translator, Peter of Alexandria, an Augustinian monk.²⁸ Some thirty-five years later the entire treatise was translated into Latin, and attained acclaim among Christian scholars.²⁹

Like so many scholars of the Middle Ages, Gersonides was also adept at astrology. Indeed, during this period there was no sharp point of demarcation between astronomy and astrology. Gersonides remarked, however, that astrological influences are difficult to understand because they are so numerous and cannot be isolated.³⁰ He further believed that man is capable of circumventing such astral forces. The degree to which this is possible varies in accordance with the individual's spiritual achievement.

Gersonides' greatest achievements, and those for which he achieved the greatest renown, were, of course, in the field of philosophy. He was probably the foremost Peripatetic of his time, and undoubtedly the greatest of the Jewish Averroists. In addition to his most important work, the Milhamot ha-Shem, he wrote numerous supercommentaries on the Aristotelian commentaries and epitomes of Averroes, in which he does not hesitate to differ with both Averroes and Aristotle. There is also extant an independent work on logic entitled ha-Hekkesh ha-Yashar, which has been translated into Latin under the title Liber Syllogismi Recti. His significance as an Aristotelian is underscored by the fact that Gersonides' works on Isagoge, Categories, and Interpretation were incorporated together with the commentaries of Averroes in Latin editions of Aristotle published during the sixteenth century. These works were translated into Latin by Jacob Mantinus.³¹ With these exceptions, all of Gersonides' Aristotelian commentaries remain unpublished.

In his magnum opus, Milhamot ha-Shem, Gersonides undertakes, in a thoroughly scholastic manner, an exposition of those problems in philosophy and theology which he felt were not treated adequately or resolved properly by Maimonides. Although his knowledge of Aristotle was apparently derived solely from Hebrew translations of Averroes' commentaries, Gersonides demonstrates in this work a knowledge of Peripatetic philosophy deeper than even that of Maimonides, and gives expression to an Aristotelianism even more thorough-going than that of his predecessor. He is certainly more rationalistic in view and more outspoken in presentation than Maimonides.

The Milhamot is not an attempted formulation of a complete and self-contained philosophical system, but rather a treatment of certain specific problems to which he wished to address himself. The work is divided into six treatises, each dealing with a separate problem, or set of problems. The problems discussed in the various treatises include: (1) immortality of the soul and the nature of the human intellect; (2) dreams, divination, and prophecy; (3) Divine omniscience and human freedom; (4) Providence; (5) astronomy, the Active Intellect, and Divine attributes; (6) creation of the world and miracles. With regard to each of the topics under discussion Gersonides gives a history of the opinions of his predecessors and enumerates long lists of arguments pro and con with rigorous logical precision. The principal views cited by Gersonides are those attributed to Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Averroes, and Maimonides. After carefully reviewing the opinions of his predecessors he states his conclusion, often doing so with remarkable independence. His method is first to analyze the theories of his predecessors, pointing out both the weaknesses and the strong points of the opinions quoted, and then to propound his own views, at the same time attempting to show that his own theory is invulnerable to attack. Although a follower of Maimonides, Gersonides frequently clashes wiith his more famous predecessor; at other times his discussions include additional material intended as a complementary exposition of Maimonides' views. Many of the same problems are also discussed in Gersonides' supercommentaries on Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle and in his commentaries on the various books of the Bible. In particular, the question of Providence is dealt with at length in his commentary on the Book of Job and his discussion therein supplements his treatment of this problem in the fourth treatise of the Milhamot.

The Aristotelian nature of Gersonides' philosophy, his heavy reliance upon Maimonides, and the great debt owed to the Guide by the Milhamot naturally invites a comparison of these two monumental works. Despite similarities of thought and style, the Guide of Maimonides and the Milhamot of Gersonides were each written with a different design in mind. Maimonides, living in a cultural atmosphere in which scholars of diverse religions and philosophic traditions were aware of and in contact with one another, endeavored to remedy a situation which endangered commitments of faith. The cultural milieu of twelfth-century Spain was such that many students and scholars became familiar with Aristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophy through non-Jewish sources. Such individuals found themselves trapped in a dilemma in which the rational conclusions of philosophy seemed to be in conflict with the revealed truths of religious belief. Maimonides' answer was a guide for the “perplexed” addressed “to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with religion,”³² which has as its purpose the refutation of untenable philosophic conclusions and the reconciliation of various philosophical positions accepted by the author, with the teachings of religion. Thus, the impetus which led to the composition of this work was polemic in nature. This is at least partially the reason for Maimonides' failure at times to analyze completely all ramifications of the issues discussed, his assumed purpose being merely to dispel perplexity.

It may well be said that virtually all subsequent Jewish philosophy is a reaction—pro or con—to Maimonides' Guide. Certainly Gersonides, living in Provence, the center of the anti-philosophic tradition of the post-Maimonidean era and apparently not subject to the direct influence of non-Jewish thinkers and writers, was not responding to a challenge similar to that faced by his illustrious predecessor. Gersonides' concern was purely a theoretical one; he endeavored to present an analysis of philsophic doctrines, particularly those of Maimonides, not as an apologist combatting a pressing danger, but as a scholar seeking truth solely for its own sake. Nevertheless, the net result achieved by both is very much the same: a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Jewish orthodoxy.

The question of Providence is presented by Maimonides as one, and indeed a typical, instance of perplexity, an area in which the beliefs of “the multitude of our scholars” are challenged by a number of different and conflicting philosophic positions. Since belief in “reward and punishment,” as well as “individual guardianship,” are viewed by Maimonides as not only true doctrines, but as “principles of faith,” he deemed it necessary to make these views philosophically tenable to the “perplexed.” The issue is resolved by Maimonides in the espousal of a view which, while admitting those philosophic arguments he deemed to be compatible with the beliefs of his co-religionists, was yet fraught with difficulties, since Maimonides' position with regard to the nature of Providence is apparently dependent upon acceptance of Divine knowledge of particulars—a doctrine rejected by Gersonides. The discussion of Providence offered by Gersonides is essentially an elucidation of the Maimonidean theory and the presentation of this theory in a manner compatible with the denial of Divine knowledge of particulars.

Gersonides also composed learned commentaries on many of the Books of the Bible containing much philological as well as philosophical material, and indeed he is recognized as a leading medieval exegete.³³ A brief extract from his commentaries containing a summary of the moral and philosophical conclusions to be derived from the lessons taught by each Scriptural section was published separately under the title, To‘aliyyot.³⁴ The Biblical commentaries, marked by an intermingling of philosophy and exegesis, serve as a most important, though often neglected, source of interpretation of Gersonides' philosophical theories; they may indeed be viewed as a supplement to the Milhamot, and this may well constitute their primary value.

It is axiomatic that Gersonides' acceptance as a philosopher whose views must be reckoned with by Jewish scholars would have been an impossibility had he not been a Talmudic scholar of distinction. Though none of his writings in the area are extant, Gersonides himself refers to a commentary on the tractate Berakhot, of which he was the author, and a number of Halakhic responsa have been ascribed to him.³⁵ It is noteworthy that his competence as a rabbinic scholar was accepted by even his most vociferous opponents.

The views advanced by Gersonides concerning creation, the active intellect, Divine knowledge, and Providence aroused great controversy. While Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410), his foremost opponent, differed with him on philosophiical grounds, Don Isaac Abravanel (1439-1508) wrote that merely listening to Gersonides' views on these subjects is sinful and intimates that accepting them as valid constitutes heresy.³⁶ Isaac ben Sheshet, while paying tribute to his vast Talmudic knowledge, also considered Gersonides' philosophical ideas to be heresies.³⁷ Most devastating is the play on words advanced by Shem Tob ibn Shem Tob, in which he interpreted the title of Gersonides' work, Wars of the Lord, as meaning Wars Against the Lord.³⁸ This pejorative manner of referring to the Milhamot was also adopted by Isaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494)³⁹ and Menasseh ben Israel,⁴⁰ while Messer Leon Judah (1511-1648) and Judah Mercato (1589-1594) actually forbade the study of Gersonides' commentaries on the Bible.⁴¹ Mercato, in a play on Numbers 1:49, writes, “Only thou shalt not number the tribe of Levi, neither bring his commentaries among the children of Israel.”⁴² The first editor of Milhamot, the physician, Jacob ben David Marqaria, added a cautious preface, lest he be himself accused of heresy. Nevertheless, the odium theologicum surrounding the opinions held by Gersonides seems to have been mitigated by his deep personal piety in matters of religious practice.⁴³ This, coupled with his great reputation as a Talmudist and Halachic authority, no doubt modified the effects of the reproach he suffered and assured his works their rightful place in the continuum of philosophical development.

.....

Gersonides in his presentation follows the pattern set by Maimonides in introducing his discussion of Providence with an opening statement enumerating the views of the various schools of thought regarding Providence. His list parallels that of Maimonides in part, but differs significantly in that the existence of an Epicurean position and of Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite doctrines regarding Providence are noted only in passing, and are then dismissed as being patently false.⁴⁴ Accordingly, Gersonides felt an elucidation and discussion of these positions to be superfluous and unnecessary. Though here cryptic in his rejection of the doctrines of the Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite sects, Gersonides, in his commentary on Job, adds the remark that these opinions were not formulated as the result of an investigation of Providence, but emerge as necessary corollaries of the premise propounded by the Kalam philosophers regarding creation.⁴⁵

I presume that Gersonides is here referring to the argument demonstrating creation ex nihilo, based upon the theory of Determination. The basic premise of this argument is that the fact that a thing has been determined in its composition, size, place, accident, and time is a proof that a being exists which freely chooses and determines those diverse relations, since alternate possibilities can clearly be conceived with regard to each of these properties. Each particular quality must then have been determined by God.⁴⁶ Maimonides does not elaborate further on this Kalam doctrine. Gersonides, however, views this doctrine as leading to the further conclusion that everything is dependent upon the will of God.⁴⁷ The argument is that, since nothing can escape determination, in the manner previously indicated, everything must be subject to Divine Providence. This conclusion is virtually inescapable: the universe is in a constant state of flux. Accordingly, there must be a source not only of existence, but also of change; God not only assigns the original qualities, but is the causal agent determining the changes which appear constantly.

Of even greater significance is Gersonides' unequivocal statement that “the third opinion,” paralleling Maimonides' theory in the Guide, constitutes an independent position in contradiction to that of the “multitude of adherents to our Torah.” We have seen that Maimonides originally presented his own views in the Guide as a sort of emendation or modification of the belief of “the multitude of our scholars” without establishing this position as an independent one by means of numerical identification.⁴⁸ Gersonides underscores the disparity of the two views by flatly stating that, while according to the former opinion Divine Providence extends to every individual of the human species, according to the latter it “extends to some individuals but not to all.” In doing so, he labels as the crucial point of difference between Maimonides and “the multitude of adherents to our Torah” not the qualitative nature or medium of Providence, which is really the crux of the divergence, but rather the scope of Providence. This formulation accents Maimonides' view as occupying a position midway between that of Aristotle, who viewed Providence as being restricted solely to the governance of the heavenly spheres and to merely assuring the permanence of species in the sublunar world, and the “fundamentalist” opinion of the “multitude of the adherents of our Torah,” who viewed Providence as being unlimited in application with regard to members of the human species.

Gersonides' analysis of this “fundamentalist” position is much broader than that of his predecessor, and he cites a number of independent ramifications of this basic opinion. Though all subscribing to this view accept the basic premise that Providence extends to each and every human being, the question of whether or not all particular events befalling these individuals are subject to the governance of Providence remains open. Accordingly, “the multitude of adherents to our Torah” may be divided into two groups: one group maintaining that, while many events in the life of the individual are indeed directed by Providence, those benefits and misfortunes which occur to man without order and justice are to be attributed to some cause other than Providence; the other group believing that all happenings occurring to the individual, barring none, are subject to the governance of Providence. While the latter position views Providence as being all-encompassing, we find in the former an independent position which contains, in at least one important sense, an intimation of the view later accepted by both Maimonides and Gersonides. The notion that Providence may be limited to certain select aspects of human well-being may easily be enlarged to show that with regard to some individuals Providence may be withdrawn in those areas as well.

Since Gersonides' discussion of Providence in the Milhamot must be studied and analyzed in conjunction with his commentary on the Book of Job in which much of the same material is discussed, it is perhaps in place to note briefly the divergent views of Maimonides and of our author with regard to the philosophic structure of the Book of Job.

Both Maimonides and our author find representation of the conflicting views of Providence in the positions taken by the principal figures in the Book of Job. Both are agreed that Job himself is an Aristotelian spokesman, believing that his misfortunes and sufferings are the result of the natural workings of universal law. Job is depicted as believing that God regards man as being too insignificant to merit the protection of His Providence, and hence his fate is sealed without regard to his personal merit. They further agree in ascribing the “correct” theory to Elihu, although differing with regard to precisely what is maintained in that theory.

The positions of Eliphaz, Zophar, and Bildad are, however, the subject of wide disagreement between them. Gersonides sees in the words of Eliphaz an espousal of the position that, while all individual human beings are subject to the governance of Providence, nevertheless, not all that befalls man is the result of providential intervention. He accordingly views Eliphaz as arguing that those events which do not proceed in accordance with order and justice are not to be attributed to Divine Providence, but to a different cause, such as simple-mindedness or folly. Maimonides, who makes no such distinction in his formulation of the fifth theory, the opinion of the “multitude,” asserts that Eliphaz maintained that the fate of Job was strictly in accordance with justice, believing that Job was guilty of sins for which he was deservedly punished.

Bildad and Zophar are described by Gersonides as sharing the attitude that all events in man's life are regulated by Providence—and indeed Maimonides seems to have interpreted the opinion of “the multitude” in this manner as well. Addressing themselves to the question of Divine Justice, each finds a different solution. According to Zophar, righteousness is relative and, with regard to any individual, is to be measured in accordance with that person's moral and intellectual capacity. Those who lack innate ability for greater achievement are to be deemed righteous; those who are endowed with greater potential which they, however, fail to develop are to be deemed wicked, even though their conduct would be deemed exemplary in persons of lesser potential. We cannot judge righteousness and wickedness, however, since we have no means of assessing natural potential. Bildad takes the position that we are incapable of evaluating benefits and misfortunes; an apparent benefit may lead to ultimate suffering while a temporary misfortune may result in ultimate good.

Maimonides views both Zophar and Bildad as rejecting the fifth theory. The position of Zophar he identifies with the third theory, that of the Ash‘ariya, who believed that everything is the result of Divine Will; hence, no other reason or cause can or need be sought. The fourth theory, that of the Mu‘tazila, who maintained that Providence extends equally to human beings and to members of the animal species, and that a righteous man is often punished for the purpose of repaying him in the world to come, is ascribed by Maimonides to Bildad. Gersonides, as has been noted, rejects these doctrines of the Ash‘ariya and Mu‘tazila as being unworthy of discussion and apparently believed that the author of the Book of Job concurred in this evaluation. Gersonides refers to this disagreement of interpretation in his commentary on Job and remarks:

I think that what moved him [Maimonides] to set down the opinion of Bildad in this manner is that he found various opinions of men famous in his time with regard to Providence and because he saw some relationship between the opinion of Bildad and the opinion of the Mu‘atazilite sect. He ascribed, therefore, the opinion of the Mu‘atazila to Bildad. In general, if the opinions of the individuals mentioned by Maimonides were in accordance with the number of conflicting divisions which can be found with regard to that which is being sought, it would be proper that the words of these individuals be interpreted in such a manner that they agree with those opinions even though the literal meaning of their words would not clearly indicate that they possess that opinion. … It is not proper that opinions such as those [of the Mu‘atazila and the Ash‘ariya] be counted among the conflicting divisions since even at the outset, the mind will not accept opinions such as those, and true philosophical investigation will reject them. …⁴⁹

Neither Maimonides nor Gersonides finds a presentation of the first theory, ascribed to Epicurus, in the Book of Job. This causes no wonder, since the basic premise of the discussion therein is the existence of an omnipotent God—a postulate which Epicurus denies.

Gersonides does not limit his discussion to a mere presentation of conflicting theories and a statement of his own view, as was the case with Maimonides; on the contrary, he cites all arguments which could possibly be brought to bear in support of each of these theories, and takes pains to indicate how they may be refuted.

The arguments of the Peripatetic philosophers bolstering their denial of Providence include the selfsame arguments advanced by them to demonstrate God's ignorance of particulars. Since knowledge of individuals is a sine qua non of individual Providence, any argument demonstrating the impossibility of the former ipso facto serves to disprove the latter. These arguments are discussed in detail by Gersonides in the Third Treatise which is devoted to the question of Divine knowledge. In addition to this reference to the Aristotelian argument adduced in the previous discussion, two additional arguments are advanced: First, if it is indeed the case that Divine Providence extends to each individual, it follows that temporal benefits and misfortunes should be meted out in a fair and equitable manner. But empirical observation of the conditions of human life, which so often entail affliction for the righteous and prosperity for the wicked, demonstrates the absence of individual Providence. Secondly, it is unthinkable that a supreme and perfect Being would deign to concern himself with the affairs of an inferior being such as man.

Despite these arguments, Gersonides finds the Aristotelian position untenable in its complete denial of Providence. Basing himself upon arguments advanced in the Second Treatise in establishing the veracity of prognostication by means of dreams, magic and prophecy, Gersonides argues that this phenomenon would be impossible other than through the medium of Providence. Moreover, Averroes, in his epitome of the De Sensu, interprets the views expressed by Aristotle in a manner such that Aristotle is portrayed as granting the authenticity of such prognostic experiences. Logically, this should have led Aristotle to the acceptance of individual providence as well, since it is Providence which makes prognostication possible.

The belief of the “adherents of the Torah,” i.e., that Divine Providence extends to all individuals, is supported by another set of arguments. First, it does not befit a good and just sovereign to neglect his subjects or to be unmindful of their conduct. Therefore, God—most perfect of sovereigns—interests Himself in all individuals, takes note of their actions, rewards the just, and punishes the wicked. Secondly, we are constantly aware of the singular solicitue with which God guards and protects us. Human beings are constantly exposed to the malevolent designs of the wicked and are subject to the diabolical schemes of evildoers. It is only the unceasing protection and vigilance of God which thwarts the evil intentions of the wicked and preserves the well-being of human beings. Thirdly, experience teaches us that evildoers are punished measure for measure. The frequency with which this occurs precludes attribution of this phenomenon to chance. The fact that the punishment received fits the crime committed is evidence of Providential design as the source of such punishment.

Despite the high incidence of appropriate punishment and its correlation with the transgressions committed, experience nevertheless indicates that the wicked often prosper and the righteous frequently meet with much adversity. This accounts for a difference of opinion among these “adherents of the Torah.” Some resolve this problem by asserting that, although all human beings are recipients of Providence, not all human occurrences are providentially designed; some events are directly attributable to Providence, while others are the result of man's own simple-mindedness and folly.

Such was the opinion of Eliphaz as recorded in the Book of Job. Since such occurrences are the result of man's unimpeded actions and are not of Divine authorship questions of justice and beneficence do not arise. This solution is rooted in the fact that experience presents us with contradictory evidence: at times benefits and misfortunes are obviously assigned with order and justice, and at others the opposite is just as obvious. This state of affairs suggests that the two types of occurrences can be attributed to different origins.

Others assert that all occurrences are the result of Providence. The aforementioned problem is then resolved in one of two ways: The absence of order and judgment in the apportionment of benefits and misfortunes is explained by them as apparent rather than actual. This was the position espoused by Bildad, who argued that what appears to us as misfortune may, in reality, be a means toward an as yet unperceived beneficence, e.g., a successful sea journey which leads to repeated voyages culminating in drowning or loss of material possessions, and, conversely, an undeserved benefit may lead to some form of adversity, e.g., illness which prevents one from embarking upon a journey which would have led to disaster. This is paralleled in nature in such phenomena as hunger pains which have the beneficial effect of causing the person experiencing such pains to seek nourishment, and in the sweet taste of some foods which has the adverse effect of causing people to partake of them in larger quantities than is healthful. Or, as was the opinion of Zophar, we may be in error with regard to our judgment of who is wicked and who is virtuous. Righteousness and wickedness are measures of development of individual potential, and are dependent upon subjective physical and intellectual capacities. A person cannot be judged on the basis of deeds alone, but on the basis of his deeds as related to his temperament and disposition. Temperament and disposition, as related to spiritual potentiality, can be known to God alone. Accordingly, individuals who are ostensibly virtuous may merit punishment for minor infractions because of their enhanced resources of spiritual propensity. On the other hand, fear, anxiety, or mental anguish may be sufficient punishment for even serious transgressions on the part of those deficient in such qualities or capabilities. Since these afflictions are mental in nature, and are frequently not so severe as to be noticed by others, the observer, being unable to perceive them, may be unaware that punishment has been meted out. This accounts not only for what we deem to be the adversity of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked, but also for instances in which we regard the benefits accruing to the righteous to be insufficient in relation to the meritorious deeds performed by them, and instances in which we regard the misfortune occurring to the wicked to be an insufficiently severe punishment for their misdeeds.

Gersonides counters that the contention of the “adherents of the Torah” that Providence extends to all individuals is readily refutable on the threefold basis of philosophical argument, experience, and the authority of Scripture itself. The contention that God rewards and punishes individuals through the manifestations of Providence is deemed untenable by Gersonides, since it is predicated upon Divine knowledge of particulars, a thesis rejected by Gersonides in the Third Treatise. According to Gersonides, God knows things only as ordered by the heavenly bodies by virtue of His knowledge of the genera. He also knows that man, exercising freedom of will, may prevent events ordained by the constellations from actually taking place. That God rewards and punishes on the basis of deeds as destined by heavenly bodies is unthinkable. This would constitute a base injustice, because such retribution would result in punishment for misdeeds not actually committed, since, according to this hypothesis, man, through exercise of free will, can contravene the dictates of the heavenly bodies. Nor can God reward and punish on the basis of deeds actually performed, since this would require that He have knowledge of them as particulars, and Gersonides denies that God has such knowledge.

Furthermore, this thesis, in maintaining that God punishes the evildoer for his sin, attributes evil to God directly. But forms serve only as the source of benefit and perfection, therefore, God, Who is pure form and as such the most perfect of all forms, can be the source only of the greatest possible benefit and perfection. Evil comes only from matter; misfortunes which befall man are rooted either in man's corporeal nature, the result of accidental occurrences, or in man's failure to be guided by his intellect.

Experience also demonstrates the falsity of the various ways in which this position was developed. Eliphaz resolved the problem of the adversity of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked by attributing them to a cause other than Providence. Yet his explanation does not account for the failure of the righteous to receive rewards or the wicked to experience punishment deserved by them. Nor can the adversity of the righteous always be attributed ot simple-mindedness and folly, since quite often misfortunes are found to occur to the righteous, despite exemplary endeavors on their part, while, on the other hand, the wicked are found to enjoy prosperity, despite rash and foolish courses of conduct. Eliphaz attempts to obviate this difficulty by stating that when an evildoer escapes retribution punishment will be meted out to his children. But this solution is clearly unsatisfactory because, while attempting to avoid attributing one form of injustice to God, it ascribes to Him a different form of injustice, since it is certainly unjust that one person be punished for another's sin.

The theory advanced by Zophar to the effect that righteousness and wickedness are relative in nature, depending upon individual disposition and potential, and that degrees of reward and punishment are indeed commensurate with propensity for good and evil, is also shown by experience to be false. We often observe that the same individual suffers afflictions and misfortunes when disposed toward good actions, and prospers at such times as he is engaged in evildoing, despite the fact that we are dealing with one person, and hence a single temperament and potential. A similar objection may be raised with regard to Bildad's view. The prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous are, in general, exactly what they seem to be. It is but rarely that they serve as a medium for achieving the opposite effect.

Moreover, argues Gersonides, Scripture itself teaches that God does not extend His providential care to all individuals. In speaking of “hiding the face” and “forgetting” as punishments, the Torah means that, rather than judge them on the basis of their misdeeds and bring adversity upon them in a degree commensurate with their actions, God abandons the wicked to the chance occurrence of time, and permits the occurrence of that which is ordained by the heavenly bodies.

Having refuted both the view that Providence does not extend to any individual, and the opposite view that Providence extends to all individuals, the intermediate position, that Providence extends to some individuals and not to others, emerges as the only tenable theory. This is perfectly reasonable, since, as pointed out by Aristotle in De Animalium,⁵⁰ Providence accorded to lesser species also varies in degree according to closeness in stature to the Active Intellect. Preservation of the various species is assured by providing members of the genus with various organs and natural instincts to safeguard their existence; the more noble the genus the more numerous their means of preservation. Human perfection consists in effecting a closeness with the Active Intellect. Divine solicitude increases in direct correlation with the closeness of this bond. Those individuals who do not develop this capability are provided for only as members of the species. Moreover, all ideas are actually known by God, while man has the capacity of coming to know them in some manner. Accordingly, it may be said that these ideas exist in man potentially, and in his coming to know them that which previously existed in potentiality is brought into actuality. But this transition from potentiality to actuality requires the causal action of something existing in actuality. It is therefore, God, in Whom these ideas are actual, Who leads man from potentiality to actuality. Since the agent, or efficient cause, becomes united in some way with that which is acted upon, man, in realizing his intellectual potentialities, becomes in some way united with, or attached to, the Active Intellect, and at such times may be said to be the recipient of Divine Providence. This view does not conflict with the thesis that God does not know particulars as such. Providence safeguards animal species by providing them with horns, hoofs, and teeth for protection and for the capture of prey, and has instilled in them natural instincts, such as fear in the presence of predatory animals, and the migratory instinct in the case of birds. Instincts present in members of the human species are even more highly developed. Some human beings are privileged to receive knowledge of future benefits and misfortunes in a similar manner so that they may guard against misfortunes and direct themselves to benefits. This knowledge is conveyed through intuition, dreams, divination, or, at its highest level, prophecy, or in some manner of which the individual is not conscious. The extent of this form of Providence varies directly with the individual's closeness or attachment to the Active Intellect. The closer the affinity of the individual with the Active Intellect, the greater and clearer is his knowledge of the ideas present in the Active Intellect. Accordingly, Providence does not extend to the individual as a conscious act of God, but is directly due to the intellectual and spiritual perfection of the recipient. It is, as it were, as if the individual were “reading God's mind,” albeit in a completely unconscious or instinctual manner at the lowest level of Providence advancing both in clarity of perception and consciousness through successive levels, culminating in the clearest and most conscious level, that of prophecy. This form of Providence clearly does not entail God's knowledge of the individual recipients.

Gersonides takes pains to point out that this prescience is not accorded the righteous by way of reward. True reward consists of “spiritual success,” rather than of the ability to ward off physical pain and discomfort, or of the ability to place oneself in proper proximity with regard to mundane benefits. Therefore, the imparting of such information by those possessing such prescience to those lacking meritorious accomplishments or the acquisition of such knowledge through dreams or magic cannot be deemed unjust. In the latter case this knowledge is imparted by means of Providence extending to the species, rather than to the individual. Furthermore, foreknowledge derived through the media of dreams and sorcery is extremely imperfect. Hence, benefits derived thereby are not comparable to those achieved through the foreknowledge which is the result of the guardianship of Providence. Imperfect knowledge of future events may, on the contrary, have adverse effects. Gersonides points out yet another manner in which it is possible that the benefit of Providence might accrue to the wicked. Though themselves not the recipients of advance knowledge of future events, nothing prevents those who are privileged to possess such knowledge from sharing the foreknowledge with wicked individuals. The benefits would then be identical with the benefits made available to worthy recipients of such prescient knowledge. Gersonides replies that such possibilities present no difficulty, since the prophetic writings are replete with references to instances of individuals who refused to be credulous of such predictions.

The prosperity of the wicked is attributed by Gersonides to astrological influences, rather than providential activity. The absence of providential prescience renders the individual subject to the general occurrences of fate which are ordained by the constellations without consideration of the worthiness or merit of individuals affected thereby. Nor are the righteous beneficiary to this Providence when engaged in the pursuit of sensory pleasure. At such times as they interrupt their intellectual pursuits, their affinity with the Active Intellect is severed and hence there are no channels of communication through which such providential foreknowledge might be transmitted to them. It is to this intermittent severance of the bond between themselves and the Active Intellect that the adversity of the righteous is to be attributed. By the same token, the contingency of an evildoer of high intellectual capability achieving such prescience does not arise, since base actions necessarily disrupt intellectual activity and prevent contemplation, and result in a greatly diminished attachment to the Active Intellect.

While Gersonides' thesis accounts for individual instances of prosperity of the wicked and adversity of the righteous without ascribing to God actions incompatible with the concept of Divine Justice, this view merely causes the identical problem to arise on a more fundamental level. That is, since God permits a state of affairs in which such situations arise, the seemingly inevitable conclusion is that He is lacking either in justice or in the omnipotence requisite to establish an alternate order which would encompass within itself provisions obviating such malapportioning of benefits and misfortunes.

Gersonides mitigates the severity of this problem by arguing that physical or sentient benefits and misfortunes are outside the pale of reward and punishment. In a section which closely parallels Aristotle's discussions of “human excellences,” in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Gersonides argues that reward and punishment must be “human” in nature, i.e., presented through the medium of a distinctively human faculty. Therefore, only benefits and misfortunes affecting the soul spiritually or intellectually can be viewed as veritable forms of compensation and retribution. The latter, of course, are directly correlated with the meritorious nature of individual activity. Since the question of unjust reward and punishment is irrelevant, the issue is reduced to the question of whether a more propitious world order might not have been feasible. Gersonides answers that, although the human intellect is incapable of full comprehension of the perfection of the world, nevertheless, it is the case that the natural order has been established in the most perfect manner possible. Many apparent evils are beneficial in the sense that mankind is chastised by such misfortunes and prompted to righteous conduct. Those few misfortunes which do occur by virtue of the general nature of this order are insignificant, in comparison with the wondrous benefits made possible by it. Furthermore, man is capable of escaping the effects of such ordained misfortunes through proper exercise of free will and by virtue of Providence which follows from his own efforts.

Similarly, the adversity of the righteous, according to Gersonides, results from one of four causes: (1) The pursuit of sentient pleasures which entail an encroachment upon their affinity with the Active Intellect. (2) Adverse physical, economic, and social conditions not of the individual's own making. Having been born with hereditary and environmental disadvantages, which themselves result from antecedent conditions brought about by the natural order, only a high degree of individual Providence will enable the particular individual to overcome these disadvantages. This, of course, requires a high degree of intellectual development and tenacious attachment to the Active Intellect—all of which is within the power of man. (3) In some few instances the purpose of such misfortune is to spare the righteous from more severe adversity. (4) Adversity may also assume the guise of admonition. Having committed minor infractions, such misfortune may cause the afflicted person to take heed and correct himself, thus preserving him from ultimate punishment which is intellectual or spiritual in nature. …

Notes

1. This is the name by which he is mentioned in virtually all sources and the way in which he refers to himself in his Biblical commentaries; in the introduction to the Milḥamot and in a fourteenth-century work entitled Sha‘are Zion by one Isaac de Lattes he is referred to as Levi ben Gershom. Vide Nima H. Adlerblum, A Study of Gersonides in His Proper Perspective (New York, 1926), p. 26.

2. Alexander Marx, “The Scientific Works of Some Outstanding Jewish Scholars,” Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. Miller, ed. Israel Davidson (New York, 1938), p. 158; Isaac Husik, “Gersonides,” Philosophical Essays of Isaac Husik, ed. Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss (Oxford, 1952), p. 172; George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore, 1947), III-1, 595.

3. Mortiz Steinschneider, Hebraeische Bibliographie (Berlin, 1865), VII, 83-84; Ernest Renan, Les écrivains juifs français du XIV^e siècle (Paris, 1893), pp. 240 ff; cf., Abraham Zacuto, Yuḥasin, ed. Zvi Filipowski (London, 1857), p. 224, who states that Levi ben Gershon died in Perpignan in 1370. Renan, pp. 245-246, dismisses this assertion, as does Sarton, p. 595.

4. Regarding Gersonides' alleged relationship to Nachmanides, and for identification of his father and grandfather, see sources cited in Max Seligsohn, “Levi ben Gershon,” The Jewish Encyclopedia (London, 1905), VIII, 26. Cf., Adlerblum, p. 28, and p. 28, notes 7 and 8. The title page of Sha‘ar ha-Shamayyim (Warsaw, 1876) bears a legend attributing the work to “Rabenu Gershon ben Shlomo, father of the Ralbag and son-in-law of the Ramban (Nachmanides).”

5. Renan, p. 241.

6. Loc. cit.

7. Cf., M. Joël, “Lewi ben Gerson als Religions-philosoph,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie (Breslau, 1876), p. 7.

8. Joël, p. 5. Cf., also, p. 5, notes 1 and 2.

9. Renan, p. 249.

10. Vide Milḥamot ha-Shem (Leipzig, 1866), p. 41.

11. Vide also, Isaac Husik, Judah Messer's Commentary on the Vetus Logica (Leyden, 1906), p. 11; and Husik, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1946), p. xx and p. 319.

12. Isidore Weil, Philosophie Religeuse de Levi ben Gerson (Paris, 1868), p. 15, and p. 15, note 2.

13. Moritz Steinschneider, Die Hebraeische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher (Berlin, 1893), p. 66.

14. Marx, p. 154.

15. The evidence that Gersonides had no knowledge of Latin is refuted by J. Teicher, “Studi preliminari sulla dottrina della conosoenza di Gersonide,” Rendinconti della Reale Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, Ser. VI, Vol. VIII (1932), pp. 500-510. The work of which Gersonides speaks as having been translated from Latin is Aristotle's De Generatione Animalium. Two Hebrew translations of this work are known to have been made—one by Jacob ben Makhir, based upon Averroes' Arabic text, the other a translation from Latin by Michael Scot. Since Gersonides himself wrote glosses on Jacob ben Makhir's translation of the Arabic version, it is puzzling that he should here refer to the translation from the Latin. … For further evidence bolstering this interpretation Teicher goes to the content of the passage itself. After declaring it to be impossible that natural heat might form limbs of animals, Gersonides adds, “unless to this [natural heat] be added a divine power, which is the intellect, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] has mentioned according to what we have found in that which has been translated for us from his language (or, “from his words,”…) by the Christians.” The words “unless to this be added a divine power, which is the intellect” (De Gener. II, 3) are lacking in the Hebrew translation from the Arabic and in the standard Latin translation which is also a translation of the Arabic. They are, however, very much present in the Greek versions and in a rarer and less widely used Latin translation prepared by William of Moerbeke directly from the Greek. Hence Gersonides' emphasis upon the translation “by the Christians”—Latin, of course—from his language, i.e., specifically that translation based upon the Greek. In addition to the evidence cited by the above mentioned authors, see also, Israel Davidson, Parody in Jewish Literature (New York, 1907), p. 23:

    “… the Megillat Setarim of Levi ben Gershon … opens with a parody of the first Mishna of Abot, giving the Drunkard's Chain of Tradition, as the original gives the chain of Jewish tradition: ‘Habakbuk received the Law from Karmi and handed it down to Noah and Noah handed it down to Lot, and Lot to the brothers of Joseph, and they handed it down to Nabel the Carmelite, and he to Ben-hadad, and Ben-hadad to Belshazzar, and Belshazzar to Ahasuerus, and Ahasuerus to Rabbi Bibi.’ In note 51, commenting on the significance of ‘Rabbi Bibi,’ Davidson states, ‘that is: Rabbi Drunkard.’ Comp. Latin ‘bibere’”

    … The question of possible Scholastic influences upon the work of Gersonides has recently been examined by Professor Shlomo Pines in an essay entitled Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas and His Predecessors, published in Hebrew as Vol. I, No. 11 of the Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (Jerusalem, 1966). Pines cites parallelisms between the discussions and arguments presented by Gersonides and the Scholastics, particularly Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, regarding the question of Divine omniscience and knowledge of future contingents (pp. 4-17), the nature of time as related to the problem of whether it is possible to speak of present time as distinct from past and future time (pp. 7-10), Divine attributes (pp. 24-28) and astrological determination of terrestial events (pp. 68-71). The similarities, according to Pines, are strong enough to warrant the conclusion that these authors either influenced the work of Gersonides directly, or that they share with Gersonides the common influence of earlier Latin sources.

    Husik, p. 172, agrees that Gersonides was unfamiliar with Arabic. Cf. also, Isaac Husik, “Gersonides,” Encyclopedia Judaica (Berlin, 1931), VII, 324: “… die arab. Sprache … die G[ersonides] jedenfalls nur ungenügend kannte.”

16. For a list of such translations available to Gersonides, see Encyclopedia Judaica, VII, 328-329.

17. Husik, p. 172. O'Leary, who speaks of Maimonides as a “follower of Ibn Rushd and the one who did most to establish an Averroist school, and so passed on his work and influence to Latin Christendom” is in error. Vide DeLacy O'Leary, Arabic Thought and Its Place in History (London, 1939), p. 265. For further discussion of Maimonides' knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of Averroes' philosophic works, see “Translator's Introduction,” The Guide of the Perplexed, Shlomo Pines (London, 1963), p. cviii; and Harry A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, 1929), p. 323.

18. Isaac de Lattes, Sha‘are Zion, ed. Buber (Jaroslau, 1885), quoted by Renan, p. 243; and Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 26.

19. Isak Münz, Die jüdischen Ärtzte im Mittelalter (Frankfurt a.M., 1922), p. 164, note 277.

20. Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 28.

21. Marx, p. 156; Husik, p. 173; Encyclopedia Judaica, VII, 28.

22. Marx, p. 156; Husik, p. 173; Encyclopedia Judaica, VII, 325. An axiomless geometry of course appears to be quite preposterous, and Sarton indeed indicates that in attempting to rid geometry of Euclid's axioms Gersonides unwittingly introduced other axioms of his own or based his conclusions upon philosophical and mechanical conclusions. Vide Introduction to the History of Science, III-1, 597.

23. Marx, p. 158; Husik, p. 175; Sarton, pp. 600-601. Sarton's discussion is accompanied by an illustrative diagram of this instrument. The term Baculus Jacob is a reference to Genesis 32:10, and is so alluded to by Gersonides in one of his poems. Cf., Sarton, p. 601; Marx, p. 158.

24. Marx, pp. 158-159; Husik, p. 175; Sarton, p. 602. The name Megalleh ‘Amukot is derived from Job 12:22.

25. Husik, p. 174.

26. Marx, p. 159; Sarton, p. 599.

27. Husik, p. 176.

28. Husik, pp. 174-175. Cf., Marx, p. 157.

29. Marx, p. 159; Sarton, p. 598.

30. Marx, p. 160; Sarton, pp. 602-603. Sarton adds the observation, “His point of view was somewhat comparable to that of the modern meteorologist, who claims a theoretical knowledge of the weather, but disclaims a practical one because of the infinite complexity of the factors which have to be considered all at once.” For a discussion of conflicting medieval attitudes regarding astrological pursuits, vide Salo W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (New York, 1958), VIII, 175 ff; and Maimonides, Epistle to Yemen, ed. Abraham S. Halkin (New York, 1952), Editor's Introduction.

31. Steinschneider, Hebraeische Übersetzungen, p. 68, and p. 145; Husik, pp. 176-177; Sarton, p. 603.

32. Friedlander, p. 21.

33. Husik, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, p. 329; Sarton, p. 604.

34. Riva di Trento, 1550 and 1564.

35. Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 26; Encyclopedia Judaica, VII, 338.

36. Don Isaac Abravanel, Commentary on Joshua (Jerusalem, 1956), chap. 10, p. 54.

37. Isaac ben Sheshet, She‘elot u-Teshubot Bar Sheshet (Wilna, 1818), responsum 45, p. 20.

38. Shem Tob ibn Shem Tob, Sefer ha-Emunot (Ferrara, 1556), IV, 19, p. 45b.

39. Akedat Yizhak (Warsaw, 1885); cited by Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 32. For further references to Arama's critique of Gersonides, vide Sarah Heller Wilensky, R. Yizhak Arama u-Mishnato (Jerusalem-Tel Aviv, 1956), p. 44, notes 146-149.

40. Nishmat Hayyim (Warsaw, 1876); cited by Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 32.

41. Isaac Broyde, The Jewish Encyclopedia, VIII, 32.

42. Kol Yehuda (commentary on Judah Halevi's Kuzari [Wilna, 1905]), p. 23.

43. Joël, “Lewi ben Gerson,” p. 10, and p. 10, note 1.

44. In the two other instances where Maimonides enumerates the positions of various philosophic schools, i.e., regarding creation (Guide, II, 13) and prophecy (Guide, II, 32) he dismisses the Epicurean view as brusquely as does Gersonides in this instance, deeming it to be patently false and unworthy of serious discussion. In view of the fact that in his summary of the views regarding Providence, investigated in III, 23, the opinion of Epicurus is omitted, while a sharp distinction is drawn between the views of “the multitude of scholars” and Maimonides' own opinion, a distinction not presented in so clear-cut a manner in the preliminary presentation contained in III, 17, it has been suggested that the Epicurean theory was presented only for the purpose of presenting a superficial congruity in the elucidation of five divergent theories in each instance. In the first instance Maimonides does not present his view as an independent theory, but that of the Epicureans is included; in the second instance Maimonides presents his views as an independent theory, and numbers it accordingly. In this latter presentation the Epicurean position is deleted. The result is that in each instance five views are presented (vide L. Strauss, “Der Ort der Vorsehungslehre nach der Ansicht Maimunis,” M.G.W.J., 1937, p. 99, note 20). Cf., above, chap. 2, note 47.

45. Commentary on the Bible (New York, 1958), Job, chap. 9, p. 48. …

46. This is cited as “The Fifth Argument” by Maimonides in the Guide, I, 74. The Ash'arites accept a modified atomic theory believing that the universe consists of extensionless particles which are identical in every respect, and indistinguishable from one another. These atoms, unlike the atoms of Democritus and Lucretius, are not eternal. Physical entities are conglomerates of these primary particles endowed with accidents and qualities. God, the sole cause of existence and change, continuously recreates both the atoms and their accidents. (Vide H. A. Wolfson, “An Unknown Pseudo-Democritean Fragment and the Muslim Unextended Atoms,” Festgabe für Eric Voegelin [Munich, 1962], pp. 593-606.)

47. The Ash‘ariya were of the opinion that such determination proceeds from the Divine Will in an arbitrary manner. The Mu‘tazila were led to much the same conclusion, but viewed such determination as contingent upon Divine Reason, rather than upon the capricious result of Divine Will.

48. Cf., Shem-tob's commentary on the Guide, III, 17, where he initially questions whether there is any disparity between these two views and upon clarifying the points of divergence states that this matter “was hidden from the commentators.” The discussion in III, 23, is of course much clearer on this point.

49. Commentary on the Bible, Job, chap. 8, p. 48.

50. See below, Part II, chap. 4, note 1.