SOURCE: "Mead's Solution to the Problem of Agency," in Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring, 1988, pp. 139-62.

The thesis of this paper is that George Herbert Mead's pragmatism provides a valuable approach to the topic of agency, avoiding many of the problems that typically surround this issue. The question of agency—do human actors have autonomy and the ability to exercise free and creative choices—is at the center of several important controversies in sociology, such as the stand-off between the positivists and antipositivists, the disputes over structural and astructural theories, and the debates over action and order (Alexander 1984; Skinner 1985; Bosworth and Kreps 1986). For example, interpretive and constructionist sociologists often charge that structural and macro sociologists develop overly deterministic models that leave little or no room for human agency (Blumer 1969; Morrione 1985). But constructionist and interpretive models are often criticized for being overly voluntaristic, neglecting the structure and regularities of the social world (Collins 1981; Turner 1984, 1986). Since deterministic and voluntaristic models are usually conceived of as opposites and mutually exclusive, it is easy for people to polarize arguments about agency; and this often divides sociologists into two camps—those defending agency and those defending science.

Although scientists are often grouped together under the label "positivists," Mead's (1917) analysis of science demonstrates that scientific research does not actually conform to the model developed by the positivists. Mead was critical of positivism for several reasons, and his pragmatic model of science does not include the highly rational and deterministic assumptions associated with positivism. Mead's theory of science provides a middle course between the extreme positions based on either free will or determinism, demonstrating how sociology can construct a scientific (though not positivistic) study of human conduct and society that deals effectively with agency. There are both metaphysical and practical aspects of the problems of agency, and Mead developed methods for solving both types of problems. These methods may help resolve the apparent impasse between positivistic and voluntaristic theories in sociology. Compared with Parsons's vague definitions of voluntaristic action and the unclear implications of his theory for empirical research (Sciulli 1987), Mead's theory is notable for its precise definitions of action in terms of behavior and its unambiguous implications for a program of scientific research.

BEYOND METAPHYSICS

There are several ways of conceptualizing agency. One is to equate agency with free will. Since free will is a metaphysical construct, the debate over the ultimate nature of free will and determinism is based more on belief than on data. Although people may experience a certainty of free will, "[f]reedom is not empirically availableu .. . it is not open to demonstration by any scientific methods" (Berger 1963, p. 122).

Mead (1917, 1929, 1932) argued that we can never answer metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of "reality," thus we can never know whether people "really" have free will or not. Many ancient Greek philosophers and mathematically oriented thinkers assumed the presence of some preexistent ultimate truths beyond the range of our fallible perceptual organs (Mead 1917), and for centuries various influential philosophers sought to reach those transcendental truths through contemplation and logic (Mead 1938, p. 513-514). However, the pragmatiste noted that despite thousands of years of contemplation, philosophers had made no more net advance than the mythical figure Sisyphus did in repeatedly rolling his stone up the same hill. In contrast, science—by abandoning metaphysical puzzles and focusing on careful observation and experimentation—has made enormous advances in understanding the world in the past few centuries. The pragmatists advocated abandoning contemplation and applying the scientific method to all areas of human knowledge, including philosophy. When we do this, the "despairing sense of the philosophic Sisyphus vainly striving to roll the heavily weighted world of his reflection up into a preexistent reality" drops "away and the philosopher can face about toward the future and join in the scientist's adventure" (Mead 1964, p. 389-390).

Much of Mead's work was devoted to reconstructing philosophy and social phychology using the methods of modern science, with no reference to contemplative philosophy or metaphysics. "I have endeavored to present the world which is an implication of the scientific method of discovery with entire abstraction from any epistemological or metaphysical presuppositions or complications" (Mead 1964, p. 210). Among the metaphysical issues to be forgotten is the debate over free will and determinism.

Modern science has both deterministic and voluntaristic aspects, and Mead dealt with these in his discussions of mechanism and teleology. Newtonian physics produced mechanistic, deterministic models of the world that leave no room for purpose, freedom or choice (Mead 1936, p. 250-281). The great success of the mechanistic sciences in developing deterministic laws reinforced the notion that everything might fit such models. "Seemingly, the whole world would be absolutely fixed and determined" (p. 250). However, Mead (1932, p. 101-102; 1936, p. 259, 266, 275; 1964, p. 201-202) pointed out that mechanistic, deterministic assumptions are merely postulates or working hypotheses, and science can never prove them to be absolute truths. In addition, Mead emphasized that mechanistic laws do not adequately deal with certain important aspects of the universe, especially "with the characters which belong to living organisms" (1936, p. 260). Namely, mechanistic theories fail to treat living things as adapting organisms, with purposive qualities (p. 269). For example, a purely mechanistic analysis of the digestive process omits the issue of the function—or purpose—of digestion in maintaining life. "The complete mechanical statement would not take account of the end, of the purpose . . ." that is seen in living systems; "[a]nd that seems to be necessary to our comprehension of the world" (p. 272).

Mead used the term "teleology" to describe the purposeful, life-sustaining processes that were overlooked by purely mechanical analyses of living systems (1936, p. 268ff; 1982b, p. 108ff). However, he clearly dissociated himself from the nonscientific form of teleology espoused by vitalists (1936, p. 292-325). "Sometimes, like the vitalists, we abuse [mechanistic] science because it ignores life. But there is only a short distance we can go on the teleological program" (1982b, p. 171). That short distance is to make the point that life is more than mechanism alone: science needs to have postulates for explaining the self-organizing, purposive qualities of living systems, not just postulates about the mechanical aspects of the universe.

Both mechanism and teleology are postulates, not absolute dogmatic statements about the ultimate nature of "reality" (Mead 1936, p. 264-291). In addition, both mechanistic and teleological accounts can be useful: they are not mutually exclusive and they can complement each other. "In biological science you bring in both these points of view" (p. 269). Mead demonstrated their compatibility with an example of a physician and district attorney analyzing a murder (p. 268-269). The physician explains the mechanism of the murder, how the "bullet entered the body in a certain way and led to a given result" (p. 269). In contrast, the district attorney explains the motives and purposes of the murderer: "That is, he gives a teleological explanation, while the doctor who performs the autopsy gives a mechanical explanation" (p. 269). Since neither teleology or mechanism is a dogma in science, it is easy to see that "[t]here is, then, no real conflict between a mechanical and a teleological account of the world or of the facts of life" (p. 271). "Thus we see that science has gotten away from metaphysical dogma as to what the nature of things is. . . . " (p. 275). Mechanistic, deterministic hypotheses are useful in describing some aspects of nature; and purposive, teleological models are useful in describing other aspects. Neither type of hypothesis warrants conclusions about ultimate metaphysical truths, including issues of free will and determinism.

If we agree with Mead that we can never resolve metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of "reality," we can put aside the metaphysical issue of whether or not humans have free will and ask if there is any other way to evaluate the concept of agency. Mead's pragmatism can again be of help. Mead (1936, p. 351) stated that pragmatism is based on two sources: "behavioristic psychology" and "the scientific technique, which comes back to the testing of a hypothesis by its working." Rather than attempting to reach transcendental "truths," modern psychology has "its sympathies . . . with the presuppositions and method of the natural sciences. . . . Psychology . . . has not been interested in these epistemological and metaphysical riddles, it has been simply irritated by them" (Mead 1964, p. 269). "The behavioristic psychology has tried to get rid of the more or less metaphysical complications involved in the setting-up of the psychical over against the world, mind over against body, consciousness over against matter. That was felt to lead into a blind alley" (Mead 1934, p. 105). Instead, behavioristic psychology seeks to develop a unified science of mind and body in which all facets of conduct are open to scientific investigation (Mead 1922, 1924-25). "But if mind is simply an emergent character of certain organisms in their so-called intelligent responses to their environments, mind can never transcend the environment within which it operates" (1932, p. 118). "Mind can no longer be put outside of nature" (p. 152).

A basic principle of behavioristic psychology is that abstract concepts—such as agency—should be reconceptualized in terms of the actual behaviors from which we infer the abstraction. Topics such as agency—which in the past were treated as abstract, metaphysical concepts—can be reformulated in purely scientific terms, thereby removing them from the arena of metaphysics and pure speculation and allowing them to be studied scientifically.

Mead's type of scientific approach is not a veiled attempt to create deterministic models of human conduct. Mead (1917, 1932) did not anticipate that scientists would ever succeed at constructing fully deterministic theories. All sciences repeatedly confront novel and emergent events that are not completely predictable (Mead 1932, p. 14ff, 35ff, 96-97; 1964, p. 346-347). Although it is true that in the sciences "the emergent has no sooner appeared than we set about rationalizing it . . ." (1932, p. 14), these rationalizations and theories usually have to be modified and reconstructed as later emergents arise. Thus, while science's ability to locate regularities and patterns has allowed the development of increasingly sophisticated empirical generalizations and laws, scientific laws can never become completely finalized and deterministic. "[T]he scientist's procedure and method contemplate no such finality. On the contrary, they contemplate continued reconstruction in the face of events emerging in ceaseless novelty" (p. 101-102).

Mead's rejection of fully deterministic scientific theories is not to be confused with a position on the metaphysical question of free will and determinism. Mead (1917, 1924-25, 1929, 1929-30, 1932, 1934) approved of the scientist's goal of constructing propositions and laws to explain the regularities in our experienced world. In his own approach to psychology, Mead (1934, p. 39) stated: "We are interested in finding the most general laws of correlation we can find." This process builds toward a scientific psychology in which "all the distinctions must be explained by the same general laws as those which are appealed to to account for animal organs and functions" (1964, p. 82). However, he recognized that no theory that we can craft—even in the physical sciences—is likely to ever become completely finalized, fully accurate, or totally deterministic, since novel and unpredictable events continually emerge (1929, 1932).¹ Instead, Mead anticipated only probabilistic theories of emergent events. "[W]hatever does happen, even the emergent . . ." happens under conditions that "lie within probability only" and "these conditions never determine completely the 'what it is' that will happen" (1932, p. 15). "[T]here is also the indeterminateness of what occurs" (p. 96). "And the indeterminate 'what' involves always a possibly new situation with a new complex of relationships" (p. 97). In an indeterminant universe, scientists construct probabilistic laws to explicate the regularities identified to date, without the illusion of describing an ultimate reality. In the social sciences, the development of probabilistic laws allows for general forecasting but not for precise predictions about the future of human conduct and society.

In order to clarify the pragmatic approach to agency, the following sections briefly review Mead's analysis of those behaviors that are generally considered to be central to agency. Mead defined choice and action in terms of their neural and behavioral components—which are open to empirical study—and not in terms of "free will," as metaphysically conceived. Mead's analyses of human conduct never involved hidden assumptions about or attempts to prove any metaphysical position about free will or determinism.

PRECONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF MIND AND SELF

Mead (1924-25, 1932, 1934) took an evolutionary approach to the emergence of consciousness and deliberate action. By comparing the behavior of animals at different phyletic levels, Mead clarified the evolutionary and physiological preconditions for the emergence of the higher forms of human cognition and planned behavior. His evolutionary approach also underscores the fact that human consciousness is part of nature, not transcendental. "The genesis of mind in human society . . . is a natural development within the world of living organisms and their environment" (1932, p. 84). "I have wished to present mind as an evolution in nature . . ." (p. 85). Although some sociologists may question the relevance of biological data in discussions of agency, Mead's entire theoretical system was based on biological data and theories (Baldwin 1986).

Mead (1924-25, 1932, 1934) related the emergence of deliberate choice and self-control to the encephalon during the evolution of the advanced vertebrate cortex. "But the great advance comes with the development of the encephalon" (1932, p. 70). The vertebrate cerebral cortex provides a mechanism that makes possible more reflective and deliberate responses than do the simpler neural systems of lower species. "The mechanism by which this is accomplished is the cerebrum" (p. 126).

Mead discussed several important properties of the advanced vertebrate cortex, clearly revealing his concern for approaching choice, deliberate action and agency from a biological point of view. First, the encephalon "is primarily the nerve center of the important distance senses" (1932, p. 70-71), hence its development makes possible the detailed processing of distant stimuli. Primitive species cannot perceive or respond well to distant stimuli, and they tend to respond without delay to stimuli once they have contact experience with them. With the evolution of the cortex and increased sophistication of the distance senses, "the contact experiences to which [the distance senses] respond are delayed, and possibilities of adjustment and of choice in response are thus increased" (p. 71). Sensing a stimulus at a distance, before contact is made, allows for a time period before a contact response is required; and this time is essential for the reflective processes involved in deliberate choice.

The advanced cortex has neural pathways that "connect every response potentially with every other response in the organism" (1932, p. 125)—which enhances behavioral flexibility and the capacity to select among a variety of alternative responses. "The cerebrum . . . is an organ which integrates a vast variety of responses, including the lower reflexes . . ." (p. 126). Thus, seeing a distant stimulus calls up numerous relevant responses, including reflexes and related emotions, which are integrated into a variety of possible acts that can mutually facilitate or inhibit each other. "In a sense all responses are so interconnected by way of interrelated innervation and inhibition" (p. 125). And inhibition is a second mechanism for creating delay in response. "In the integrative process there are different alternative combinations and corresponding alternatives also for the inhibitions that integration necessarily involves. This introduces delay in response, and adjustment by way of selection of type of response, i.e., choice" (p. 126). Inhibition is not only important in producing the delay needed for selection and choice but also for assuring that inappropriate acts are not performed. "If certain responses are prepotent they ipso facto inhibit all the others" (p. 127).

Third, during the delay period, the organism feels its own incipient responses to the distant stimuli. "In the innervations of the attitudes that distant objects call out the animal feels the invitation or threat they carry with them" (Mead 1932, p. 71). For example, seeing food may call up motor feelings associated with an invitation to approach, but seeing a predator may call up motor feelings associated with avoidance of threat. Thus, the animal feels its own tendencies to approach or withdraw. "His responses to his own tendencies to act provide the control that organizes all his responses into a coordinated act, so that these inner feelings wax in importance in the development of the mechanism [of the encephalon]. . . . It is here that we first meet the stuff of ideation" (p. 71). Rather than the organism's responding in an immediate, undeliberated manner when contacting external stimuli, "[i]ts own [internal] condition determines the objects and influences to which it will respond" (p. 71). Its own internal feelings influence the stimuli it selects to attend to, and in this way they influence its final response. "In this case the animal has become conscious" (p. 72).

Fourth, as the cortex evolved, simple internal feelings of incipient responses became more sophisticated forms of "response imagery" (p. 74). And in advanced species, both "sense imagery" and "motor imagery" play an important role in the performance of the act: ". . . sense imagery . . . controls the selection of stimuli and motor imagery . . . facilitates the response" (1982a, p. 28). Sense imagery makes the organism aware of the stimuli it needs to hunt for or avoid, and motor imagery both reveals the variety of possible motor responses available to choose from and helps the organism prepare for performing the response that is selected. "[T]his imagery arises from past experience . . ." (1964, p. 134). Images of past actions and their results help in anticipating the future consequences of similar actions. "This imagery gives us the result of the act before we carry it out" (1982a, p. 29). Because the cerebrum allows the organism to anticipate the results of the act, the cerebrum has "introduced the future into the mechanism of the act . . ." (1932, p. 132). Imagery of the future phases of various alternative acts and their results allows the organism to select among them and make "purposive responses" (p. 74). "In this manner temporal distance can be organized in the central nervous system. . . . [And] the central nervous system can affect the organism at present with this future act. . . . It is the ability of later responses to play back into immediate responses that gives us our flexibility and power of choice" (1982b, p. 158).

By tracing several important preconditions of choice to the central nervous system, Mead clearly showed an interest in a scientific analysis of choice and related processes. He also demonstrated how to construct biosocial theories that integrate relevant biological data into sociologically important analyses—which is something that few sociologists do as well as Mead did.

SYMBOLIC THOUGHT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Although Mead often discussed the central nervous system as the mechanism for delayed response and choice, he was interested in more than neural mechanisms. "[T]he cortex is not simply a mechanism. It is an organ that exists in fulfilling its function" (1964, p. 282), namely it is "an organ of social conduct" (p. 283). The full emergence of mind and self can occur only through social interaction, especially through the social use of language.

Language provides "word images" (1932, p. 75) that enrich the sensory and motor images used in making choices. "Ideas are closely related to images. . . . Since the symbols with which we think are largely recognized as word images, ideas and images have a very close consanguinity" (p. 75). Words allow us to call up symbolic images of all phases of our acts, along with the interplay of our acts with the environment and other people. They also bring images of the past and the future into our present, and this "[i]deation extends spatially and temporally the field within which activity takes place," leading to an "extended present" that reaches far beyond our immediate perceptual present (p. 88).

The meanings that words carry are a central component of the extended present and the deliberate actions we take in it. By analyzing meaning from a behavioristic perspective, Mead was able to avoid the metaphysical problems associated with traditional views of "ideas" and "meanings." In discussing "the meaning of things," Mead (1934, p. 127) stated: "We are are here avoiding logical and metaphysical problems, just as modern psychology does." Mead explained meaning in terms of his theory of the act, and showed how words can come to stand for the meanings that emerge from the act. First, objects and actions take on meanings based on completions of the acts in which they are involved. "The completions that need to occur before the act is completed are behavioristic meanings" (1982b, p. 143). For example, "the ultimate act of driving a nail is for us the meaning of the hammer" (p. 130). The hammer's capacity for driving the nail establishes its meaning. "When we indicate this pattern of final manipulation we indicate the meaning of the act" (p. 143). Second, words such as "hammer" are symbols that come to stand for the meanings that are based on people's actions, such as using hammers to drive nails.

Beginning in childhood, even before we can talk, our understanding of meaning arises through our behaving and interacting with the physical and social environment, hence meaning can be studied by observing the relevant behaviors and interactions. When parents give a ball to a child and show the child how to play with it, they are helping the child learn the uses—and meanings—of the ball.

The adult, in this process, is constantly indicating to the child the results of his own motions: the ball is something to get hold of and throw. Things done with the object are referred to the child, so that when the child plays he will see the end and learn to pick out the object's ultimate use (Mead 1982b, p. 134).

It is "the results of his own motions" that convey to the child the "ultimate use" of the ball and its meaning. "Through all this the child is busy getting the meaning of things" (p. 134). When the parents couple the word "ball" with the child's activities with balls, the child learns to attach the word "ball" to the meanings that arise from the acts of rolling, bouncing, and playing games with balls.

Not only physical objects, but also social gestures—such as a wink or a smile—take on meanings, based on the results of the acts involving them. "If that gesture does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has meaning. In other words, the relationship between a given stimulus—as a gesture—and the later phases of the social act of which it is an early . . . phase constitutes the field within which meaning originates and exists. Meaning is thus a development of something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and it is not an 'idea' as traditionally conceived" (e.g., by metaphysical or idealist philosophers). Rather, "[t]he gesture stands for a certain resultant of the social act, . . . so that meaning is given or stated in terms of response" (Mead 1934, p. 76). More specifically, Mead stated that social meaning involves a "three-fold relation among phases of the social act," namely, the "relation of the gesture of one organism to the adjustive response of another organism . . . and to the completion of the given act. . ." (p. 76, emphasis added). "The basis of meaning is thus objectively there in social conduct, or in nature in its relation to such conduct" (p. 80). As such it is amenable to scientific study.

"Awareness or consciousness is not necessary to the presence of meaning in the process of social experience" (p. 77). Two snarling dogs are exchanging and responding to meaningful signals in their conversation of gestures, but are not consciously aware of the meanings. "The mechanism of meaning is thus present in the social act before the emergence of consciousness or awareness of meaning occurs" (p. 77). Awareness of meaning emerges only when the "gesture becomes a symbol, a significant symbol" (p. 78), namely a symbol that people use in a conventional manner so that it calls up the same meaning for those users. Meaning "is not essentially or primarily a psychical content (a content of mind or consciousness), for it need not be conscious at all, and is not in fact until significant symbols are evolved in the process of human social experience. Only when it becomes identified with such symbols does meaning become conscious" (p. 80).

"In language, what we have reached is the consciousness of meaning attached to a gesture" (1982a, p. 43). "We do not have the consciousness of meaning except when we can indicate the stimuli, the symbols, to ourselves" (p. 44). Both a human and an animal can see and be perceptually aware of a hammer on the ground; but humans can gain the additional awareness of the meaning of the hammer by verbally describing it and its use. "Mentality on our approach simply comes in when the organism is able to point out meanings to others and to himself. This is the point at which mind appears, or if you like, emerges" (1934, p. 132). This approach to mind introduces none of the mysterious elements present in idealist and metaphysical conceptions of meaning and mind.

We can use words either out loud or quietly to ourselves in the inner conversation we call mind. "[T]he mechanism of thought, insofar as thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner conversation" (1964, p. 146). The inner conversation can be with ourselves, with specific individuals we imagine to be talking with, or with some generalized "they"—as occurs when we ask ourselves "What would they think if I did such and such?" This generalized "they" is what Mead called the "generalized other" (p. 284).

How does Mead's behavioristic approach deal with highly abstract and generalized meanings? In metaphysical and idealistic world views, highly abstract meanings seem to refer to universals at a Platonic or transcendental level. An idealist might think that "this meaning or universal character [is something] with which a behavioristic psychology is supposed to have difficulty in dealing" (1934, p. 82). However Mead disagreed: "It is the possibility of such a behavioristic statement that I endeavor to sketch" (p. 83).

Mead explained "universals" in terms of the behavior seen when any of a variety of different stimuli can call up the same response. When we have to write a brief note, we recognize that many types of pens, pencils or markers will suffice: All members of a certain class of stimuli can call up the response of picking up the object and writing. "[R]ecognition can be stated in terms of a response that may answer to any one of a certain group of stimuli" (p. 83). If a person is attempting to drive a nail and cannot find a hammer, the individual may recognize that "a brick or a stone" will also serve the same function (p. 83). "Anything that he can get hold of that will serve the purpose will be a hammer. That sort of response which involves the grasping of a heavy object is a universal" (p. 83). The brick or stone can function as if it were a hammer; hence all three fall into the same class of objects because they—as hard, heavy objects—are functionally similar in carrying out the behavior of hammering the nail. The recognition of functional equivalence allows the universal "response that answers to a whole set of particulars" (p. 84). "It is this which has been supposed to be beyond the behavioristic explanation or statement. What behavioristic psychology does is to state that character of the experience in terms of response" (p. 84).

Mead attempted to explain the capacity for universal responding in terms of the central nervous system (p. 83ff) and the social practices of the language community (p. 88ff). Although his data on the central nervous system were limited and his argumentation indirect, he concluded: "I see no reason why one should not find, then, in the organization of the attitude as presented in the central nervous system, what it is we refer to as the meaning of the object, that which is universal" (p. 87). In addition, Mead traced the development of universals to the social nature of language use. Verbal communication involves a "co-operative process:" In order to understand each other, we must share in the same "universe of discourse" in which "gestures and symbols have the same or common meanings for all members of that group . . ." (p. 89). Because language use allows an individual to hear his or her own words as if from the perspective of others, it makes possible the "individual taking the attitudes of others toward himself, and of his finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into a single attitude or standpoint which may be called that of the 'generalized other'" (p. 90). This generalized attitude enhances our capacity to grasp universals and abstractions based on the perspectives of the broader community.

Our membership in a verbal community—a culture with symbolic knowledge—helps us acquire a broad range of knowledge about things experienced first by others. We do not have to be swept away by a raging river to learn about the strength and danger of a powerful torrent. "[I]n the community of those who communicate with each other, the force of the torrent has taken on a meaning insofar as each is wont to indicate this to others and so to himself" (1964, p. 336). The consequences of stepping into a powerful torrent establish its meaning as "something to be avoided"; and experienced people can communicate those meanings to individuals who have never had first-hand experience with the torrent and its consequences. This cooperative social process allows individuals to expand their understanding of universals—e.g., adding "the torrent" to the class of stimuli that carry the universal meaning of "something to be avoided"—based on the experience of others.

REFLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

Mead's (1934, p. 90-100) analysis of reflective intelligence reveals his scientific approach to yet another important aspect of agency. When we have several alternative responses open to us in a given situation, we can use significant symbols to heighten our awareness of and reflect on our choices of possible actions before acting. "[R]eflective behavior arises only under the conditions of self-consciousness and makes possible the purposive control ... of its conduct..." (p. 91). Words make us aware of the details of each alternative action and the likely future consequences of each one. People are especially likely to use this type of intelligence in problematic situations (p. 122ff). "This [reflective intelligence] is the most effective means of adjustment to the social environment, and indeed to the environment in general, that the individual has at his disposal" (p. 100).

Mead identified several components of reflective intelligence, all of which are amenable to scientific investigation. "Intelligence is essentially the ability to solve the problems of present behavior in terms of its possible future consequences as implicated on the basis of past experience . . ." (p. 100). When we confront a problem, we can use symbols to imagine several possible solutions to the problem and to evaluate the anticipated consequences of each alternative, based on past experience, before choosing a course of action. People do this when they—either out loud or in their inner conversation—talk themselves through several alternative solutions to a problem and use their memories of past experiences to evaluate the possible future consequences of each alternative.

Mead (p. 91) stated that "[i]t is essential that such reflective intelligence be dealt with from the point of view of social behaviorism." By conceptualizing the components of reflective intelligence in terms of behavior, Mead avoided the metaphysical notions of free will that arise from nonempirical approaches to choice and agency. "What the behaviorist is occupied with, what we have to come back to, is the actual reaction itself, and it is only in so far as we can translate the content of introspection over into response that we can get any satisfactory psychological doctrine" (p. 105).

Mead avoided introspective methods by analyzing reflective intelligence in terms of objective variables, such as neural mechanisms and overt social symbolic interaction. Not only did he demonstrate the role of meaningful words, inner conversation, and taking the role of others in his analysis of reflective processes, he also indicated the importance of the physiological mechanisms that mediate reflective intelligence (1934, p. 98-100). He stressed the fact that "the purposive element in behavior has a physiological seat . . ." (p. 100). "Human intelligence, by means of the physiological mechanism of the human central nervous system, deliberately selects one from among the several alternative responses . . ." (p. 98), and that selection is based on the neural mechanisms that allow future phases of the act to be activated early in an act and influence the performance of the whole act. "[T]he central nervous system can affect the organism at present with this future act. . . . It is the ability of later responses to play back into immediate responses that gives us our flexibility and power of choice" (1982b, p. 158).

Although reflective intelligence is mediated by the mechanisms of the central nervous system, it is not a totally mechanical activity that produces completely predictable outcomes. Rather it is an organic, creative process.

That which takes place in present organic behavior is always in some sense an emergent from the past, and never could have been precisely predicted in advance . . . and in the case of organic behavior which is intelligently controlled, this element of spontaneity is especially prominent by virtue of the present influence exercised over such behavior by the possible future results or consequences which it may have (1934, p. 98-99).

The spontaneous, creative qualities of the organic processes seen in reflective intelligence are important features of agency. Problem solving processes—such as those seen in reflective intelligence—are an especially important stimulant for creativity (Weisberg 1986): As we reflect on the possible solutions of problems, we become aware of novel and unexpected alternatives, reevaluate and reconstruct our memories of past experiences, and reassess the possible future outcomes of the alternatives. From the complicated interaction of the perceptual present with images of the past and future, complex decisions and actions emerge.

Since Mead's time, psychologists have studied the various and complex ways in which people lay out alternative solutions to their problems, draw upon memory resources, apply rational, emotional and intuitive procedures to evaluate each alternative, allocate different amounts of time and effort to problems of differing levels of complexity and import, and so forth (Chase and Simon 1973; Anderson 1982; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). These and related studies have facilitated the development of guidelines and training programs for helping people to improve their skills at reflective intelligence (Meichenbaum 1977; Baron and Steinberg 1986). Rather than devaluing reflective intelligence and creativity by "explaining them away," the scientific study of these activities can help us become more reflective and creative.

THE SOCIAL SELF

As children acquire language and culture, they develop not only minds and reflective intelligence but also selves. "The self is not so much a substance as a process" (1934, p. 178) involving self-observation and self-regulation. Mead's theory of the self—which is perfectly amenable to scientific evaluation and development—helps illuminate several additional features of agency. We will first note the social origins of the self then deal with the contribution of the self to both creativity and self-control.

Mead's theory of self is a social theory. Without a social self, the individual would be isolated in a solipsistic world,² confronted with insurmountable problems of intersubjectivity. "Shut up within his own world . . . he would have no entrance into possibilities other than those which his own organized act involved" (1932, p. 83). Mead rejected the theories of the isolated self that derive from introspective philosophy, Cartesian doubting, and individualistic psychology. He developed a social theory of self that avoided the problems of intersubjectivity that arise when one assumes that thinking and self are primary, arising before or independent of social interaction. "[W]e do not assume that there is a self to begin with. Self is not presupposed as a stuff out of which the world arises. Rather the self arises in the world," especially in the social world (1982b, p. 107). "What I want particularly to emphasize is the temporal and logical preexistence of the social process to the self-conscious individual that arises in it" (1934, p. 186).

Babies are not born with selves. "The self is not present in the early months of life" (1982b, p. 107). Only through symbolic social interaction does the self emerge. "[I]n infancy we can see the beginning of the self arising" (p. 144). "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity" (1934, p. 135). As such, the emergence of self is open to scientific studies of child development; and Mead (1934, p. 144-164; 1964, p. 283-288; 1982b) himself provided the outlines of a behavioristic theory of the origins of the self as the child engages in increasingly complex forms of role taking during language development, play, and games.

Mead stressed that the self is empirically available, and not otherworldly (as metaphysical and idealist theories imply). "[T]he self arises out of the world. . . . [T]hat self is not made up from physical stuff" (1982b, p. 107). "The self is not so much a substance as a process in which the conversation of gestures has been internalized within an organic form" (1934, p. 178). "We are thus tied to the body insofar as we have a self (1982b. p. 148). In the past half century, the scientific study of child development and socialization has advanced considerably; and empirical research on the development of self during socialization helps assure that the self is not conceptualized in metaphysical or idealist terms.

Mead (1934, p. 173-222) divided the self into the "I" and the "me," which allowed him to explain two complementary facets of agency: creativity and control. The "I" and "me" merely reflect two different perspectives on the human actor: The "I' is the subject; the "me" is the object. The "I" is the self that acts; the "me" is the self that we see as an object when we observe ourselves from the role of the other. When we talk, it is the "I" who does the talking. When we hear our own words, we perceive those vocal actions as an object, as a "me." The relationship between the "I" and the "me" can be conceived of as a serial process: The "I" of one moment is perceived the next moment as a "me" and the information about the "me" can influence the next action of the "I"—which is seen as the next "me," which can influence the next "I," and so forth.

We can never directly observe the "I" because every time we attempt to observe the "I," we perceive a "me." "[I]t is only the 'me'—the empirical self—that can be brought into the focus of attention—that can be perceived. The 'I' lies beyond the range of immediate experience" (1964, p. 140). "The 'I' does not get into the limelight; we talk to ourselves, but do not see ourselves" (1934, p. 174). The "I" creates the act of the moment; and as soon as we perceive ourselves acting, we perceive ourselves as an object, therefore as a "me." "The 'I' of this moment is present in the 'me' of the next moment. There again I cannot turn around quick enough to catch myself. I become a 'me' in so far as I remember what I said" (p. 174). "The 'I' appears in our experience in memory" as a "me" (p. 196), but it is not something the person can directly observe. Nevertheless, the "I" is not beyond scientific analysis: The goal of Mead's behavioristic psychology was to explain the processes of the act, including its conscious, unconscious, habitual, and creative facets (1934, p. 7-8, 22-23, 36-41, 126, 163, 214ff; 1964, p. 127ff; 1982a, p. 31), along with the actors own perception of that act—as a "me."

THE "I" AND CREATIVITY

Creativity is an important aspect of agency. The "I" is a facet of the self that is the source of actions—be they creative and unpredictable actions, or habitual and predictable responses.³ Most adults know their own response patterns well enough to predict part of their next actions; but people can never directly observe or fully understand the source of their actions well enough to completely predict their next acts. Thus, the "I" always remains at least partially unpredictable: "[T]he 'I' is something that is more or less uncertain" (1934, p. 176). "[T]he 'I' is something that is never entirely calculable" (p. 178).

Because the "I" is at least partly unpredictable, it is the source of spontaneity and innovation. "The novelty comes in the action of the 'I' . . ." (p. 209). "That action of the 'I' is something the nature of which we cannot tell in advance" (p. 177). "[E]xactly how we will act never gets into experience until after the action takes place" (p. 177-178). Therefore, "[t]he 'I' gives the sense of freedom, of initiative" (p. 177). (This "sense of freedom" leads some people to a metaphysical belief in free will.)

Even if a person tries to be totally predictable in a given situation and "has rehearsed the situation in his own mind," his actual acts may turn out to be different from those he rehearsed (p. 197). As a consequence, the person "astonishes himself by his conduct as much as he astonishes other people" (p. 204).

However carefully we plan the future it always is different from that which we can previse, and this something that we are continually bringing in and adding to is what we identify with the self that comes into the level of our experience only in the completion of the act (p. 203).

Mead (1934, p. 324ff; 1936, p. 405-417; 1964, p. 341, 357) stated that the unique, creative contributions of the individual are the most precious qualities of the individual, both for the individual and the society. "[T]he possibilities of the 'I'" are "in some sense the most fascinating part of our experience. It is there that novelty arises and it is there that our most important values are located" (1934, p. 204). Not only are people fascinated by their own novel, unpredicted and creative acts, these creative acts can be valuable contributions to their own personal experience and to the development of society (p. 324ff).

Although scientific studies may help explain some of the causes of creative and innovative behavior, creativity is one of those emergent aspects of behavior that can never be explained completely. For example, empirical studies on problem solving and creativity help explain some of the preconditions and skills needed for creative activity (Adams 1974; Weisberg 1986); but these theories can make only probabilistic statements about people's future creative acts. Even though scientists cannot develop complete and deterministic models of the creative components of human conduct, creativity is open to empirical investigation; and modern empirical studies of creativity are identifying increasing numbers of the precursors and predictors of creativity.

THE "ME" AND SELF-CONTROL

Although it might be tempting to focus on the unexpected, creative elements of human action—from the "I"—as the essence of agency, such a strategy could make agency seem to be little more than the unpredictable variations in human behavior. The ramblings of a backward psychotic might contain more random and unpredictable elements than the carefully weighed decisions of a Supreme Court justice. Agency is a complex concept that entails more than unpredictable behavior. Agency involves a balance between creativity and responsible self-control—between the freedom to make choices and the responsibility to choose wisely. Whereas the "I" is the source of creativity and a "sense of freedom" (1934, p. 177), the "me" makes possible the exercise of responsible self-control (p. 210, 214).

The "me" is the object we perceive when we observe ourselves from the role of others. Our self-observations of the "me" provide information that can be useful in evaluating our behavior from the perspective of others and deciding how to act in the future. Because we see the "me" from a social perspective, we gain information that can be useful in helping us to reflect on the social consequences of our actions and decide how to act in a socially responsible manner. Although young children have only a rudimentary capacity to understand social values, they acquire broader perspectives of the "me"—reflecting the perspectives of increasing numbers of people—as they grow up and gain social experience. By adulthood, "[t]he 'me' is essentially a member of a social group, and represents, therefore, the value of the group . . ." (1934, p. 214).

Mead (1913; 1924-25; 1934, p. 135-226; 1982a; 1982b) outlined an empirically testable theory to explain the ways in which people acquire the capacity to evaluate the "me" in a socially responsible manner. His theory is compatible with several of the empirically grounded modern theories of moral development. In the early years of life, "little children play at being a parent, at being a teacher. . . . These are personalities which they take, roles they play, and in so far control the development of their own personality" (1934, p. 153). Children often take the role of a parent and either praise or scold their dolls or imaginary playmates, much as they have heard their own parents talk to children. "The child fashions his own self on the model of other selves. . . . The child's consciousness of its own self is quite largely the reflection of the attitudes of others toward him" (1982a, p. 54). The social judgments of adults provide the child with his or her first criteria for self-evaluation and judgment. "At first, the child accepts the judgment of others about himself . . ." (p. 62). Young children (who have had adequate parental contact) are likely to evaluate themselves, then praise or blame themselves, according to the same general criteria that their parents apply to them. "Thus the child can think about his conduct as good or bad only as he reacts to his own acts in the remembered words of his parents" (1964, p. 146).

As they grow up, children spend increasing time playing games and participating in various social institutions (such as schools and churches), which helps them learn to organize their actions to fit into larger groups. "The game is then an illustration of the situation out of which an organized personality arises." While playing games, the child "is becoming an organic member of society" (1934, p. 159). Games have rules that help children learn to structure their behavior to synchronize with others. "For in a game there is a regulated procedure, and rules" (1964, p. 285). "[I]n the game he sees himself in terms of the group or the gang and speaks with a passion for rules and standards" (p. 246).

When playing games, children must learn how all the team players will respond to their actions and adjust their behavior accordingly. "The child must not only take the role of the other, as he does in the play, but he must assume the various roles of all the participants in the game, and govern his action accordingly. . . . Their organized reactions to him" become organized into "what I have called the 'generalized other' that accompanies and controls his conduct" (p. 285). Games help children move beyond taking the role of specific individuals—such as mother or father—and. acquire an awareness of the views of the larger group. "In the game we get an organized other, a generalized other . . ." (1934, p. 160).

The generalized other emerges not only in games, but whenever children engage in structured social interactions. "What goes on in the game goes on in the life of the child all the time. He is continually taking the attitudes of those about him, especially the roles of those who in some sense control him and on whom he depends" (p. 160). Through all of this, "[h]e becomes something which can function in the organized whole . . ." (p. 160). As the child learns to take the role of the group—the generalized other—the child sees a "'me' representing that group of attitudes which stands for others in the community, especially that organized group of responses which we have detailed in discussing the game on the one hand and social institutions on the other" (p. 194).

Over the years, the individual may learn to take the roles of increasing numbers of people, from ever larger portions of society. This broadens the person's conceptualization of the generalized other and allows the person to judge his or her actions from an ever broader perspective. Naturally, some individuals acquire a broader and more accurate conception of the generalized social perspective than others do.

To the degree that we learn to observe and evaluate—e.g., approve of or condemn—ourselves from the group's point of view, we develop socially responsible selves. "We are in possession of selves just insofar as we can and do take the attitudes of others toward ourselves and respond to those attitudes We approve of ourselves and condemn ourselves. We pat ourselves on the back and in blind fury attack ourselves. We assume the generalized attitude of the group, in the censor that stands at the door of our imagery and inner conversations . . ." (1964, p. 288). "[T]his organized reaction becomes what I have called the 'generalized other' that accompanies and controls his conduct" (p. 285). Namely, seeing our own actions from the perspective of the generalized other provides us with the data needed to regulate our behavior the way that society would. "Social control, then, will depend upon the degree to which the individual does assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities" (p. 290), and some people control their behavior in this way more than others do.

When the "me" is perceived from the role of the generalized other, it provides us with society's perspective on our own behavior, which helps us practice socially responsible self-control. "Social control is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I'. It sets the limits, it gives the determination that enables the 'I,' so to speak, to use the 'me' as the means of carrying out what is the undertaking that all are interested in" (1934, p. 210). In the practice of reflective intelligence, we can use the information about the "me" to make carefully weighed decisions about future actions; and the social perspective increases the likelihood the choices will be socially responsible.

It must be pointed out that Mead's view of social control did not imply that people act in blind obedience to the generalized other: It is "not simply the social control that results from blind habit . . ." (1936, p. 377). Responsible decisions are arrived at through the organic and creative processes of reflective intelligence; and in these processes, the social values and control functions of the "me" are counterbalanced by the innovative functions of the "I" (1934, p. 199-200, 214-217). Mead described the "I" and the "me" as functioning smoothly together in the fully developed social self. "Both aspects of the 'I' and 'me' are essential to the self in its full expression" (1934, p. 199). Although emphasis on the "me" alone might make a person "a conventional and habitual individual" (p. 197), the "I" provides the creative and sometimes nonconformist inputs that allow each individual to be a unique contributor, "a definite personality" (p. 200). The "I" provides the source of activity needed for the "reconstruction of the society" (p. 214), for leadership (p. 216), and for accomplishing "important social changes" (p. 217). It is sometimes identified with "genius," as in the work of "the great artist, scientist, statesman, religious leader" and so forth (p. 217).

Mead's views on ethical decision making also help clarify how social responsibility (from the "me") and creative reflective intelligence (from the "I") function together. Ethical problems arise when different values conflict in a particular undertaking. To make a socially responsible ethical choice, a person "must take into account and do justice to all of the values that prove to be involved in the enterprise . . ." (1964, p. 256). A careful decision requires the use of reflective intelligence to evaluate all the possible alternative solutions to the problem, drawing upon the creative capacities of the "I" and the social values available from observing the "me" (from the perspective of the generalized other) as we imagine ourselves carrying out the different alternative acts. Such a complex decision-making process is far from "blind habit." It is, in fact, more akin to the creative and systematic application of the scientific method to moral questions (Mead 1923; 1938, p. 460-465). For example, when two values are in conflict, "[w]e may be able to get both of the values by rearranging our conduct. We can state our ends in that sense in terms of means in reflective thinking" (1938, p. 463). Of course, in reality, there are many values to consider. "In the solution of the problem we must take all relevant values into account." Then "we want to reconstruct our lives so as to take in all the values involved" (p. 461). The moral process involves not only wise decisions, but also changing our behavior—reconstructing our lives.

Mead also saw the individual as active in attempting to reconstruct society. Although Eastern societies suppress the self and social criticism, "we, on the contrary, attack society and try to produce a better society instead of suppressing the self. . ." (1982b, p. 151). When social conditions are problematic, people can reflect "critically . . . upon the organized social structure of the society . . . and . . . reorganize or reconstruct or modify that social structure . . ." (1934, p. 308). "We can reform the order of things; we can insist on making the community standards better standards. We are not simply bound by the community. . . . That is the way, of course, in which society gets ahead . . ." (p. 168). The degree to which people have the political freedom to modify and reconstruct their societies is, of course, open to empirical research.

Modern social psychology has made significant progress in the scientific study of the origins of moral, responsible, and socially constructive behavior, though many details are still unresolved. Researchers working within several different traditions—based on the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, Bandura, Mische!, and others—have established numerous ways in which parents, teachers, media, and other social sources influence the acquisition and practice of creative social responsibility; and this work demonstrates that moral conduct is open to empirical investigation, much as the other facets of agency discussed in this paper are. This lends support to Mead's thesis that we can avoid metaphysical problems and solve both the philosophical and psychological problems regarding creative and morally responsible choice by the scientific study of the relevant social and personal practices.

CONCLUSIONS

The question of agency is central to several important debates in contemporary sociology. Discussions of agency can become embroiled with issues related to free will and determinism. For example, the debate over whether or not we can develop a science of human conduct and society can be linked to issues of free will, since science's goals of prediction and control are not appropriate if people have free will.

Because metaphysical problems (such as those of free will and determinism) have never been shown to be resolvable by any form of logic or empirical study, and because scientific studies (which neglect metaphysics and focus on observables) have proven very successful at establishing pragmatically useful knowledge about countless facets of our world, Mead advocated avoiding metaphysical debates by stating all problems in terms that are amenable to study via scientific method. This paper presents Mead's work relevant to agency, revealing both Mead's method and the details of his theory. First, it shows how Mead followed the basic methods of behavioristic psychology, which require abstract philosophical and psychological concepts to be defined in terms of the actual behaviors involved. A strict focus on behavior helps in avoiding metaphysical impasses when dealing with such "loaded" topics as decision making and choice. Second, the paper presents an overview of Mead's specific theories about awareness, meaning, decision making, choice, creativity, and social responsibility, showing how he analyzed these concepts in terms of the central nervous system, language, inner conversation, taking the role of others, reflective intelligence, the "I" and the "me," and related concepts.

For those who agree that metaphysical questions such as those related to free will and determinism are inherently unanswerable, Mead's approach offers an escape from endless wrangling over unprovable metaphysical beliefs; and it provides a productive way to conceptualize and empirically study the actual behaviors that are the referents of the word "agency." Perhaps Mead's work can help resolve some of the current sociological debate over agency and allow us to move on to more fruitful analyses of human conduct and society.

If Mead's theories are found to be useful, the next task is to modify and modernize Mead's work in light of contemporary data. Mead's writings indicate that he would approve of—and be excited by—the prospects of such a reconstruction of his work. In various places, Mead (1917, 1923, 1929, 1932, 1936, 1938) described how all sciences advance through the process of reconstruction, and he argued that this is the best way to advance our knowledge about any topic. "Research is ready to find a problem at any point in the structure of scientific doctrine, a problem which may invalidate any theory. Indeed it welcomes such outbreaks, and lives its exciting life in their midst" (1964, p. 324). Although metaphysical philosophers sought unchanging eternal truths about the ultimate realities of the world, neither scientific data nor method promise such finality.

It is customary to interpret the independence of data as a metaphysical affirmation of a real world independent of all observation and speculation. There is no necessary implication of this in the scientist's methodology. For the metaphysical affirmation is of a reality that is final, while the scientist's procedure and method contemplate no such finality. On the contrary, they contemplate continued reconstruction in the face of events emerging in ceaseless novelty (1932, p. 101-102).

The attempt to do a scientific analysis of the behavioral components of agency does not raise the specter of a deterministic, mechanical model of agency. No science ever reaches the finalized state needed for deterministic predictions about the future. Novel and unpredictable events continue to emerge and require reconstruction of our best theories (Mead 1932). Thus, the empirical approach to agency should not raise fears that Mead's approach is a method for introducing determinism into sociological theories of agency.

In the decades since Mead wrote, there has been considerable scientific research on cognition, reflective intelligence, creativity, moral processes and other components of Mead's theory. Important empirical contributions have been made from several intellectual traditions. At present it is premature to judge which facets of each tradition will eventually prove most useful; and careful attention to details is warranted in drawing upon the contributions of each.

Although the behavioral tradition has not been well represented in sociology, modern behavioral studies of humans—including social learning theory and cognitive behaviorism—are more similar to Mead's social behaviorism than most sociologists recognize (Baldwin 1981, 1985). In the past several decades, behaviorism has grown to be one of the strongest empirically-based fields within psychology; and it has much to offer contemporary sociology. For example, Bandura (1986) presents the contemporary behavioral data on numerous components of agency, such as cognitive development, self-reflective capacity, goal setting, self-regulation, self-efficacy, perceived self-efficacy, cognitive strategies of problem solving, moral judgment, reciprocal determinism, and more. Bandura's basic behavioristic position is quite similar to Mead's. The major differences between the two theories result from the fact that modern behaviorists have access to more data and empirically grounded theories than were available to Mead. Although I urge sociologists to give serious consideration to modern behaviorism, differences of opinion on behaviorism must not obscure Mead's contribution as a pragmatist philosopher in showing how to escape the impasses of metaphysical philosophy.

NOTES

* I would like to thank Tamotsu Shibutani, Otis Dudley Duncan, and three anonymous reviewers for constructively critical comments on a draft of this manuscript.

¹ "I wish, however, to insist that the essential fallacy in this materialism, lies . . . in the assumption that it is possible to give an exhaustive account of any event that takes place in terms of the conditions of its occurrence" (1932, p. 38). Mead (p. 8, 26, 29, 31) clearly recognized that absolute, perfect and final accounts are beyond human reach.

² From Mead's social point of view, "[s]olipsism is an absurdity" (1982a, p. 55). Also see Mead (1910; 1936, p. 413; 1938, p. 150-153; 1982b, p. 162).

³ Although some psychodynamic and ethological theories suggest that the unconscious part of the self is selfish, hostile or antisocial (Freud 1925; Lorenz 1963), Mead's theory did not describe the "I" as wild or antisocial. It is merely the source of actions—some of which are expected, others not.

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