SOURCE: “Berkeley's World View III: The Existence of Unperceived Objects,” in Berkeley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1977, pp. 163-79.

[In the following essay, Pitcher examines Berkeley's ideas regarding the existence of unperceived objects.]

Although Berkeley believes that he must deny that we ever perceive so-called physical objects (e.g., trees and houses) and maintains that we perceive only our own ideas, he sometimes says things that imply that we do, after all, perceive things like trees and houses. Consider this passage from the Principles:

Sensible objects may likewise be said to be without the mind, in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.

(PHK [Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge] I 90; see also PHK I 3 and 48)

If ‘the things I saw may … exist … in another mind,’ then those things cannot be my own ideas of sense, for my ideas cannot exist in any other mind: so by ‘the things I saw,’ here, Berkeley must mean so-called physical objects. We should not charge Berkeley with contradicting himself, however, for we can interpret him to be implying only that we mediately perceive natural objects.

It is yet another non-conciliatory feature of Berkeley's world view, as he understands it, that all the things we immediately perceive, and hence all the things we really perceive, have only a fleeting existence. Since they are nothing but our own ideas, they cannot go on existing after we stop perceiving them. Must the same be said of the so-called physical objects that according to Berkeley we only mediately perceive?

In Berkeley's system, as we know, God causes all of our ideas of sense, and ordinary natural objects are nothing but collections, or families, of such ideas. This provides some kind of account of the nature and existence of those objects when they are actually being observed by a finite spirit. But what about all those indefinitely many times when they are not being so observed? Is Berkeley forced to hold that trees and frogs pop into, and out of, existence as finite spirits begin to, and cease to, perceive them? The standard view of what Berkeley thinks about this has been that he believes that natural objects do not behave in any such bizarre way; rather, they exist continuously from the time of their creation to the time of their destruction, and they do so because God continuously perceives them, thus maintaining them in existence as ideas in His mind. Recently, however, Jonathan Bennett has disputed the standard view.¹ His position is summarized in the following passage:

Berkeley does not regularly assume that objects exist when no human perceives them; he is not much interested in whether they do; and the continuity argument, which assumes that they do, is absent from the Principles and occurs in the Dialogues only in the two-sentence passage which I have quoted. That passage is right out of line with everything else Berkeley says about the continuity of objects, and should be dismissed as a momentary aberration.

(Bennett (2), p. 171)

I propose to proceed as follows. First, I shall try to determine what Berkeley ought to say about God and the continuous existence of natural objects—that is, to determine what view best accords with Berkeley's fundamental principles. Then, I shall turn to the question of what Berkeley's view on these matters really is.

We can understand what Berkeley's attitude toward the continuity of sensible objects ought to be only if we keep firmly in mind exactly what his conception of such objects is. They are, as we know, collections, or families, of ideas of sense. But it is important to realize, now, that there are vastly more possible ideas of sense that would, if they were actual, belong to the family of such ideas that constitute what we call a single object, than there are actual ones. Suppose, for example, that you are alone in a field, looking at a fig tree. At any given time, you have merely one visual idea of sense of the tree. But at that very moment, we normally assume that there is also a back side to the tree, a very complicated insides, a root system, and so on—none of which is being perceived by anyone. Is Berkeley forced to say that these things don't exist at that moment? Certainly not. He can say that if, at that moment, you had been looking at the tree from the other side, you would have had such-and-such ideas of sense; if, at that moment, you had opened up the tree, you would have had such-and-such other ideas of sense—and so on. There are thus indefinitely many non-actual, possible, ideas of sense that give an extra degree of reality to any object. To say that there are possible ideas of sense is, of course, not to say that there are (actual) ideas of sense that belong to (or are perceived by) no finite mind; it is, rather, to say that God stands ready to cause those ideas of sense—to make them actual—in case any finite mind should be in a position to perceive (have) them. (Since minds are not really located in space, ‘position’ cannot be construed spatially here. A finite mind, M, is ‘in a position to perceive [have] an idea of sense x’ just in case M is in a certain state or has performed certain volitions, and in case one of God's rules of action is to cause in any mind that at time t is in such a state or has performed such volitions, an idea of type x soon after t.)

We can now see how Berkeley ought to understand the question of temporal continuity—the enduringness—of what we, in our bumbling way, call a single object, e.g., a fig tree. In particular, we can see that he should not be especially concerned about the reality of what we call an object during those times—and there will always be a huge number of such times—when no finite mind is perceiving ‘it.’ The reason he should not be concerned is that a so-called ‘object’ is nothing but a family of ideas of sense spread out over time; and just as a genuine family does not go out of existence when one of its members dies, thus leaving an unoccupied post in the family tree, so an ‘object’ does not go out of existence when there is an unoccupied position in its ‘family tree’—i.e., when there happens not to exist any idea of sense belonging to that ‘object.’

But the simple analogy with a family does not provide the whole story. For consider: the reason why a family does not cease to exist when one of its members dies is that there are other members of the family still in existence. A family exists only as long as at least one member of it is alive. But in the case of unobserved objects, there are no members of the family still ‘alive.’ So if the whole story about an object were that it is nothing but a family of ideas of sense, one would have to say that it ceases to exist every time that it is unobserved. But this is not the whole story, according to Berkeley; there is God to consider. It is not the case that there is just nothing in reality answering to an object at those times when it is unobserved: on the contrary, there is a readiness, indeed a positive intention, on God's part, to create whatever members of the family would have been required if various circumstances had existed. We may, therefore, call an object a metaphysically grounded family of ideas of sense. Such a family can survive the ‘death’ of all its members without going out of existence. This may be seen quite clearly if we consider what a genuine going out of existence—i.e., an annihilation—really amounts to. For example, suppose that a fig tree is blasted to smithereens by a bomb. After that catastrophe, no one, no matter what he does or where he goes, and no matter how hard he tries, can have an idea of sense that belongs to the family of such ideas that constitutes the tree. But that is not true of a fig tree, growing quietly in a field, to which nothing happens more drastic than that a lonely observer goes away, or blinks his eyes, leaving it for a time unobserved. Thanks be to God, innumerable ideas of sense of that tree continue to be available at any time, and no doubt many of them are eventually had by future observers. So no annihilation, no going out of existence, has occurred.

This way of accounting for the reality of the unobserved parts of observed objects and for the reality of unobserved objects can easily strike one as inadequate. One wants the object itself to be totally actual at all times and this would mean, for Berkeley, that there must at all times be actual ideas of sense belonging to the object. The temptation to think along these lines is entirely understandable—but also unjustifiable. Unjustifiable, that is, on Berkeley's conception of an object. When we demand something actual at all times, we are thinking of objects in a Lockean way—that is, as being entities that exist in their full reality (in three dimensions, with backs, insides, etc.) at every moment. An entity of that sort admittedly would not exist at any time during which there is nothing actual answering to it. But since that is not Berkeley's conception of an object, the same demand for continuous actuality cannot be made of him. Berkeley, by providing the aforementioned intention on God's part to cause ideas of sense, provides, as we have seen, enough reality to carry an object, as conceived of by him, across periods of not being observed.

To summarize: for Berkeley, what we ordinarily call a (single) physical object—e.g., a fig tree—is actually a huge metaphysically grounded family of ideas of sense. Some of these are actual ideas of sense, but most of them are non-actual, possible, ideas of sense. The series of actual ideas of sense that belong to the family that constitutes any given object is almost certain not to be temporally dense—that is, there will be moments at which none of them occurs. These are the moments when the object is unobserved. But Berkeley's system by no means entails that the object lapses into non-existence at such moments.

Still, the temptation to want something more, during periods of no observation, than God's readiness to provide ideas of sense is almost overwhelming. There is, moreover, an obvious move that looks as though it were open to Berkeley that would satisfy this felt need—namely, to say that God perceives all objects, and indeed all parts of all objects (even their insides), all the time. Ideas in God's mind would then yield existence to unobserved parts of observed objects and to all parts of unobserved objects: or we may say instead that God would be the perpetual observer of all parts of all things, thus maintaining them continuously in being.

Many readers of Berkeley think that he actually takes this step. In my opinion, however, it would be both pointless and impossible for Berkeley to try to make God into a kind of cosmic observer. It would be pointless, because what can ideas in God's mind do for the reality of unobserved objects that cannot be done by an intention on His part to cause suitable ideas of sense in the minds of finite observers, should the need have arisen? Ideas in God's mind are no more real, and provide no more reality, than such an intention on God's part provides. So nothing is to be gained by the proposed move.

But even if there were some advantage to be gained by the move, Berkeley in any case cannot make it. Whatever kind of act or process perception may be, it must at the very least be caused in part by something other than the perceiver. If this feature is missing, there may be hallucination, dreaming, fantasy, delusion, or whatever, but there will certainly not be the perceiving of anything. (Recall that for Berkeley ideas of sense are just those that are caused in us by God; he thus tacitly acknowledges that human perception, anyway, requires a cause external to the perceiver.) But nothing in Berkeley's system can fill the required causal role: ‘no external being can affect [God]’ (3D [Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous] III (W [The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne] II 241; A [Berkeley's Philosophical Works, edited by D. M. Armstrong] 203; T [George Berkeley: Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence, edited by C. M. Turbayne] 186)). There could not be, in his world view, anything to act on God, for that would render God partially passive, whereas He must be ‘an impassive, … purely active being’ (3D II (W II 214; A 176; T 155)). So Berkeley's God cannot be a cosmic perceiver of anything.

It might be objected that although human perception requires a cause external to the perceiver, divine perception of things can be achieved by God's causing appropriate ideas of them in His own mind. But this proposal, too, makes God partially passive. It also suffers from being altogether ad hoc. God has ideas of all things, both actual and merely possible, in His understanding and He stands ready to cause ideas of sense of the actual things in finite minds; what conceivable motive could He have for wanting to cause perceptual ideas of actual things in His own mind?

This concludes my discussion of what I think Berkeley ought to say about God and the continuous existence of sensible objects. On my view, his system allows him to hold that the unobserved parts of observed objects, and all parts of unobserved objects, exist though not perceived by any finite mind; he has no reason to appeal to God's perception of sensible objects for this purpose, and there are anyway strong considerations preventing him from making any such appeal. It is time, now, to see what Berkeley himself actually says about these matters.

In the Philosophical Commentaries, we can see Berkeley wrestling with the problem of unobserved objects. It is fascinating, and instructive, to watch his dialectical labors. He begins with this view: ‘Bodies etc do exist even wⁿ not perceiv'd they being powers in the active Being’ (PC 52). At first glance, one might think that this is precisely the position that I have been saying Berkeley ought to adopt—but not so. If an object (e.g., a fig tree) is identified with God's powers when no finite spirit is observing it, then there is no avoiding the conclusion that the object is identical with those powers at all times; and then Berkeley would be forced to hold that our ideas of sense of the fig tree do not constitute the tree, but are mere appearances of the real fig tree (namely, the powers in God's mind), and he would thus be saddled with a view that is as fraught with skeptical consequences as the Lockean system is.

Berkeley soon shifts to a different account that makes no mention of God:

The Trees are in the Park, that is, whether I will or no whether I imagine any thing about them or no, let me but go thither & open my Eyes by day & I shall not avoid seeing them.

(PC 98; for another entry in the same vein, see PC 185a)

This is more promising: indeed, it could easily be elaborated into the very position I would have Berkeley adopt. But he takes a different line. He evidently supposes that what he has said implies that objects have a ‘gappy’ existence through time—i.e., that they do exist when they are being perceived, but do not exist when they are not being perceived—for when he next addresses himself to the problem, he writes:

On account of my doctrine the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determin'd time and place of beginning to exist. the existence of our thoughts (w^ch being combin'd make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings, & endings.

(PC 194)²

We can now, I think, detect an unfortunate assumption that Berkeley is making. He is assuming that the only way one can give God a rôle to play in the continuing existence of objects is by identifying objects with God's powers. I have suggested that there is another, far more satisfactory, way; but Berkeley evidently does not acknowledge that possibility. He rightly shrinks from holding that objects are divine powers, but then, seeing no other way for God to provide the continuity of objects, he leaves Him altogether out of the account and reasons that since objects are nothing but families of ideas of sense, and since these are in virtually every case gappy, the existence of objects is therefore gappy—they have ‘divers beginnings, & endings.’

Notice, in PC 194, that there is no apparent panic in face of the gappiness in the history of objects; Berkeley just calmly contemplates it. Nevertheless, he must have felt some uneasiness about it—not surprisingly—for he soon reverts to the idea that objects are divine powers, although now he gives that view a new twist:

Bodies etc do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense. Collections of thoughts & collections of powers to cause those thoughts. these later exist, tho perhaps a parte dei it may be one simple perfect power.

(PC 282; see also PC 293)

This is not, however, a view that Berkeley can live with: it is nothing but a version of the hated Lockean dualism, with God's powers substituted for Lockean material objects.

His next effort is much better:

Bodies taken for Powers do exist wⁿ not perceiv'd but this existence is not actual. wⁿ I say a power exists no more is meant than that if in y^e light I open my eyes & look that way I shall see it i.e. y^e body &c.

(PC 293a)

As the final ‘&c’ suggests, Berkeley does not want to restrict his explication of what it means to say that a power exists to just the first person nor to just vision: to say a power (of the kind here at issue) exists at a time t is to say that any suitable perceiver could perceive (see, hear, touch, etc.) the object at t. Although he does not explicitly say so, Berkeley is no doubt assuming that God is the metaphysical ground of the power he attributes here to bodies. With these qualifications, PC 293a comes as close as one could wish to the view that, in my opinion, Berkeley should adopt. (A similar view is implicit in PC 408.)

Later, however, Berkeley seems to lose faith in this view. He apparently becomes unwilling to accept the notion that when objects are not being perceived, there are no suitable ideas to constitute their existence; in the published works, anyway, he abandons the view of PC 293a and presents a different one. To be sure, traces of the PC 293a view remain. There is, for example, such a trace in this passage from the Principles:

I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.

(PHK I 3)

If we correct the undue emphasis on the first person, what this passage says is that the existence of perceived objects consists in their being perceived, and the existence of unperceived objects consists in the fact that if, contrary to fact, there were suitable perceivers, they would perceive those objects.

There is another trace of the PC 293a view in the Three Dialogues where Berkeley attaches the following sense to the biblical account of the creation of the world:

Philonous. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the Creation, I should have seen things produced into being; that is, become perceptible, in the order prescribed by the sacred historian.

(3D III (W II 251; A 214; T 199))

But these are mere remnants of an abandoned view; a new, and quite different, view replaces it in the published works.

The seeds of this final view are to be found in the Philosophical Commentaries. In the Principles, Berkeley merely hints at it, and it is not until the Three Dialogues that we find the final view clearly and confidently voiced. Let us trace these steps.

The beginnings are contained in these passages from the Philosophical Commentaries:

You ask me whether the books are in the study now wⁿ no one is there to see them. I answer yes. you ask me are we not in the wrong for imagining things to exist wⁿ they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses. I answer no. the existence of our ideas consists in being perceiv'd, imagin'd thought on whenever they are imagin'd or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mention'd or discours'd of they are imagin'd & thought on therefore you can at no time ask me whether they exist or no, but by reason of y^t very question they must necessarily exist.

(PC 472)

But say you then a Chimaera does exist. I answer it doth in one sense. i.e. it is imagin'd. but it must be well noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception. & that I use the word Existence in a larger sense than ordinary.

(PC 473)

Here, Berkeley copes with the problem of unperceived objects by a tactical maneuver: ‘Just try to give me an example of an unperceived object that does not exist,’ he dares his opponent, ‘and you will refute yourself in the very attempt.’ Berkeley does not employ this maneuver in his published writings to solve the problem of unperceived objects that is posed by his own system. (He uses it, rather, as we saw, in his attack against Locke.) But PC 472 and 473 nevertheless point the way to his final solution of that problem. What this final solution is may be seen—at last—if we consider this passage:

The propertys of all things are in God i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no Blind agent & in truth a blind Agent is a Contradiction.

(PC 812)

The following is the view—what I claim to be Berkeley's final view—about the existence of unperceived objects that Berkeley will later construct from these materials found in PC 427, 473, and 812 God must be considered to have in His understanding ideas of all things, including ideas of all objects in the world. He certainly could not be thought to cause our ideas of sense without being guided by ideas of the relevant objects; for ‘He is no Blind agent.’ But if God has ideas of all the objects of the world in His understanding, then they may be said to exist in His mind—just as a chimaera exists in a person's mind when he thinks of one. This is not the usual, first-class kind of existence that belongs to things that are actually perceived, of course—a chimaera is not as real as the desk one can see before one's very eyes—but if, as Berkeley is determined to do, we ‘use the word Existence in a larger sense than ordinary,’ we may say that any object has existence just in virtue of the fact that God thinks of it (i.e., has ideas of it). Here, then, is a way for Berkeley to hold that unperceived objects continue to exist: they continue to exist in the mind of God, since He always has ideas of every object.

This is the view that I claim to be Berkeley's considered (or final) view about the existence of unperceived objects. I shall try to justify this claim by examining the relevant passages from the published works; but first I have to remark that I think the doctrine is by no means an attractive one. Anyone who wants to, or does, believe that objects continue to exist when no finite creature is observing them—and this includes at least all of mankind who are sane—should not be satisfied with the statement that they merely continue to exist in God's mind. It is, in the first place, little more than a bad joke to claim that a thing exists simply in virtue of the fact that someone has an idea of it in his understanding—i.e., is thinking of it. Imagine, for example, what your response might be to someone who asserted that there is a purple man with three heads, and who explained his remark by saying ‘Yes, he exists in my daughter's mind, since she is thinking about such a man.’ The truth is, of course, that to say a purple man with three heads exists in someone's mind is just another way of saying that there is no such creature. And why should this situation be any different when we shift from an idea in a finite understanding to an idea in an infinite one (God's)? The weakness of Berkeley's position can be seen, too, if we remember that God must have ideas of all possible worlds in His mind, in addition to ideas of this actual world. The kind of existence that Berkeley accords to unperceived objects of this world, then, is precisely the kind that objects in merely possible, but non-actual, worlds have—e.g., the kind and amount that a purple man with three heads has. No one, I say, should be satisfied with so little.

The obvious way to remedy this defect in Berkeley's position, it might naturally be thought, would be to have God not merely think about unperceived objects, but actually perceive them. But this cure, I have argued, is not available; and we shall find, when we turn to the texts, that Berkeley wisely avoids taking that course. Rather than connecting the existence of unperceived objects to ideas in God's understanding, or to perceptual ideas in God's mind, Berkeley would do far better to tie their existence to God's will; this would be a move in the direction of the view I have suggested Berkeley ought to adopt. As a matter of fact, in the Three Dialogues Berkeley flirts briefly with the idea that there is an essential connection between the existence of unperceived objects and God's will, when he suggests that the creation of the world might have consisted in God's decreeing that objects ‘should become perceptible to intelligent creatures’ (3D III (W II 253; A 216; T 201)). But this is just a brief interlude, unhappily; the main thrust of Berkeley's remarks about the existence of unperceived objects, in the published works, lies in the direction of what I have been calling his final, or considered, view.

It might be thought that the final, or considered, view is open to the following objection: On the final view, God has in His understanding ideas of all objects. But His ideas must be of the objects as they really are. Since God's ideas must be totally different from ours, it looks as though we do not perceive objects as they really are.

The answer to this objection is that although God's ideas of objects are no doubt quite different from ours, and perhaps even in certain respects incomprehensible to us, there is still no reason why the final view must therefore lead to skepticism—for the view can maintain, altogether plausibly, that these ideas of objects in God's mind are ideas of how objects will appear to us, or how they will be perceived by us, in all possible circumstances. Or perhaps it would be better to put it this way: they are rules for the production of suitable ideas of sense in finite perceivers. These general rules in God's mind would constitute what Berkeley calls the archetypes of objects: ‘And … so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external, I mean, to your own mind; though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all things’ (3D III (W II 248; A 210f; T 195); see also Berkeley's second letter to Johnson (W II 292)).

Let us turn, now, to Berkeley's texts. I propose to go through the Principles and then the Three Dialogues, picking out the most important passages that deal with the existence of unperceived objects. The first relevant passage is the one from PHK I 3 that was quoted and discussed above (p. 169f). It is a remnant of an earlier view that must still have had some appeal for Berkeley, but which is for the most part abandoned in the published writings. It will be instructive to consider together all the other relevant passages in the Principles; surprisingly, there are only three:

a. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.

(PHK I 6)

b. [I]t will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows, things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is some body by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created [PHK I 45]. … If we consider it, the objection proposed in Sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles, that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.

(PHK I 48)

c. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from within, by the mind it self, but imprinted by a spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be without the mind, in another sense, namely, when they exist in some other mind. Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind.

(PHK I 90)

An extraordinary feature of these statements is the studied refusal to make a firm commitment to the existence of unperceived objects. Objects not perceived by me or any other created spirit ‘either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit’ (passage a), ‘It does not follow’ from Berkeley's principles ‘that bodies … exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them’ (passage b), ‘When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist …’ (passage c). It is a stunning fact that Berkeley should display indecision in this definitive work on a matter of such importance. I want to suggest the following hypothesis to explain this fact: Berkeley, in the Principles, is between theories, as it were, and really does not know what to think about the status of unperceived objects. The view that I have called the PC 293a view must still have some hold on him, for we find a trace of it in the passage from PHK I 3 referred to at the beginning of this paragraph. But on this view, there are no actual ideas to constitute the reality of unperceived objects, and this feature doubtless leads Berkeley, by the time he writes the Principles, to regard the view with suspicion, at least, and in fact to think that it probably ought to be rejected. It seems perfectly clear, on the other hand, that in the Principles he has no other view to put in its place. The result is that Berkeley is unable to cope with the problem at all: he cannot decide whether or not unobeserved objects, in his system, should be said to have any existence at all. The possibility of his final view, which offers a solution to the problem, has occurred to him, as we can tell from passage a; but he obviously has not even begun to adopt it as his considered position, for he mentions it nowhere else in the Principles, and even in passage a it is put forward merely as one side of a disjunction. In the Principles, then, Berkeley takes no definite stand on the question of whether unobserved objects exist or not, for he does not know what stand best to take.

If it is asked how Berkeley can publish a work when this issue has not been resolved in his own mind, the answer may very well be that although we consider the issue to be of great importance, and although Berkeley gives some thought to it in the Philosophical Commentaries, nevertheless in the Principles he considers the matter to be of only secondary importance. He thinks, remember, that mere practical considerations account for the fact that our language contains the names of so-called physical objects (cf. 3D III (W II 245; A 207; T 191) and NTV [An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision] 49); and he implies that the existence of these names produces the confused belief that they signify some kind of entity. In the Principles, as I have already remarked, Berkeley is in a decidedly non-conciliatory mood, and so doubtless feels no need to speculate about the continuous existence of these alleged entities.

Let us turn, now, to the more conciliatory Three Dialogues. Here, Berkeley does finally come forward with an explicit theory about the existence of unobserved natural objects. It is not perfectly clear, however, precisely what theory he offers. There are only these two possibilities: first, that God preserves them in existence by continuously perceiving them, and second, that God preserves them in existence by thinking of them—i.e., by having ideas of them in His understanding. I shall call the first, the Perception Theory, and the second, the Conception Theory. The standard interpretation of Berkeley has him espousing the Perception Theory, whereas I think he embraces the Conception Theory.

It seems to me that there are three kinds of relevant passages in the Three Dialogues: (I) those that either explicitly state the Conception Theory or else are most plausibly read as asserting it, (II) those that are neutral as between the Conception Theory and the Perception Theory, and (III) those that seem to state the Perception Theory, but that can be read, without any, or any undue, forcing, in such a way as to be consistent with the Conception Theory. In view of the type-I passages, and in view of the fact that the Perception Theory, as I have argued, is not open to Berkeley, I think that we ought to read the type-III (and, of course, the type-II) passages in the way required by the Conception Theory.

Let us dispose quickly of the type-II passages. Here they are:

1. To me it is evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other mind wherein they exist. As sure therefore as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent spirit who contains and supports it.

(3D II (W II 212; A 174f; T 153))

2. Take here in brief my meaning. It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes, exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure, what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me.

(3D II (W II 214f; A 177; T 156))

I take it as obvious that these passages are consistent with both the Perception Theory and the Conception Theory.

There are four type-I passages—i.e., passages that seem to require the Conception Theory:

3. Mark it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will, of an infinite spirit.

(3D II (W II 215; A 178; T 157))

4. Hylas. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible, that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

Philonous. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true, with regard to all other finite created spirits; it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules as he himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature.

(3D III (W II 230f; A 193; T175))

5. Hylas. But be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the fellow, whether yonder tree has an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

Philonous. The same that I should my self, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree existing without his mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, exists in) the infinite mind of God.

(3D III (W II 234f; A 197; T179f))

6. And … so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles; external, I mean, to your own mind; though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all things.

(3D III (W II 248; A 210f; T 195))

Passage 3 provides very powerful support for the view that Berkeley accepts the Conception Theory. The others, I suggest, are most plausibly read as supporting that view; for it seems more plausible to think that God's knowing and comprehending objects involves His having ideas of them in His understanding than to think that it is a matter of His perceiving them.

Notice, before we proceed, that in passage 4, Berkeley attempts to demonstrate that God exists as the mind that maintains natural objects in existence when they are not being observed by finite spirits. Bennett calls this the continuity argument for God's existence (Bennett (2), pp. 169-72). I agree with him that the argument is vitiated by Berkeley's conflating these two quite distinct conceptions of an idea's depending on a mind: (a) an idea's being caused by a mind, and (b) an idea's being had by (and hence existing in) a mind. (See Bennett (2), pp. 166-9; the same conflation occurs in passages 1 and 2, above, as well.) My main concern here, however, is not with Berkeley's argument, nor with its validity or non-validity, but rather with the nature of its conclusion: that is, I am trying to determine just how, according to Berkeley, God maintains natural objects in existence when they are not being observed by finite spirits.

To continue: there are three passages of type-III—i.e., passages that seem to require the Perception Theory:

7. Philonous. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God, whereas I on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him.

Hylas. But so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?

Philonous. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, there is a God, therefore he perceives all things: and saying, sensible things do really exist: and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God. This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God.

(3D II (W II 212; A 175; T 153f))

8. The question between the materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.

(3D III (W II 235; A 197; T 180))

9. every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by any finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God.

(3D III (W II 236; A 198; T 181))

Let us consider each of these in turn. In the context of passage 7, there is a hint that Berkeley may be using the word ‘perceive’ loosely. In the passage immediately preceding passage 7, Hylas refers to the belief, held by all who believe in God, that God ‘knows and comprehends all things.’ As I remarked earlier, this expression suggests the view that God has ideas of things in His understanding, rather than the view that He perceives them. But at the beginning of passage 7, Philonous clearly takes himself to be simply repeating the belief just expressed by Hylas, when he says ‘Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God.’ So it would not be implausible to read the ‘perceived’ as meaning comprehended or understood. We can even see why Berkeley should introduce the word ‘perceived’ at this particular juncture. In the later parts of passage 7, Berkeley has occasion to refer several times to the epistemic relationship between God and sensible objects. He does not want to have to use the cumbersome expression ‘knows and comprehends’ to designate this relationship each time; he prefers to use a single term. So when, at the beginning of passage 7, he says ‘all things are known or perceived by God,’ he introduces the word ‘perceived’ as a convenient term to be used in what follows to stand for God's awareness of objects. ‘Perceive’ thus means, in passage 7, no more than have an idea of. Read in this way, passage 7 is consistent with the Conception Theory. I do not, of course, say that it has to be read in this way, but only that it easily and plausibly can be so interpreted. And, since we have strong independent grounds for thinking that Berkeley accepts the Conception Theory rather than the Perception Theory, we have a right to read it in this way.

An exactly similar account can be given of passages 8 and 9. They, like passage 7, are immediately preceded by a passage in which Berkeley speaks of natural objects' being ‘known and comprehended by (that is, exist[ing] in)’ the mind of God. And, as in 7, I think we can reasonably read the ‘perceive’ in 8 and 9 as a convenient term that means no more than ‘have an idea of.’

The most plausible conclusion to be drawn from our review of passages from the Three Dialogues is that Berkeley accepts the Conception Theory, not the Perception Theory.³ This interpretation certainly accords with his last views on the subject, as the following words from Siris conclusively show:

There is no sense nor sensory, nor anything like a sense or sensory, in God. Sense implies an impression from some other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect; but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory. (Siris 289)

The Conception Theory, although better than its rival, is still inadequate, since it gives no more reality to unobserved objects than any merely logically possible object has—for example, no more than a purple man with three heads has. The way to remedy this defect, within the limits of Berkeley's system, is not to augment the reality of unobserved objects by adding perceptual ideas of them in the divine mind (the Perception Theory), but rather to augment it with a dispositional state of God's will—namely, with God's being so disposed that if, contrary to fact, there were any appropriate observers, He would cause them to have suitable ideas of sense. By ‘suitable ideas of sense’ I mean ideas of sense that have the right sort of content, and that are ‘more strong, lively, and distinct than [ideas] of the imagination’ (PHK I 30) and that are coherent (ibid.). God is in such a state with respect to the toothbrush in my unoccupied bathroom, and is not in such a state, as far as I know, with respect to any purple man with three heads. This addition would be a great improvement on the Conception Theory, and the result would be a view that is, in essence, the same as the unhappily abandoned PC 293a view.

Notes

1. Originally, in Bennett (1) and then, more fully, in Bennett (2), ch. 7.

2. I am assuming that the ‘finite substances’ spoken of here are so-called material objects (e.g., tables and fig trees); but it is a real possibility that Berkeley is talking rather about finite minds.

3. After I had written this chapter, George H. Thomas's article appeared, ‘Berkeley's God Does Not Perceive,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy, 14, 1976, 163-8. I was happy to see that he, too, thinks that Berkeley would reject what I have called the Perception Theory.

Abbreviations

Quotations from Berkeley's writings are taken from The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. In referring to passages from Berkeley's works, I use the following abbreviations:

Alciphron x y: Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, Dialogue x, section y

De Motu x: De Motu, section x

NTV x: An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, section x

PC x: Philosophical Commentaries, entry x

PHK Intro. x: Introduction to A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, section x

PHK I X: Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, section x

PO x: Passive Obedience, section x

Siris x: Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Enquiries, section x

TVV x: The Theory of Vision or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity Vindicated and Explained, section x

W x y: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, vol. x, page y

3D x: Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Dialogue x

Note: The three dialogues are each fairly long, and Berkeley does not divide them into smaller numbered or lettered sections; so it is difficult for the reader to find in his own text passages quoted from the work. To help solve this problem, I give page references to three different volumes, using the following abbreviations:

(1) W II x: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Vol. II, page x

(2) A x: Berkeley's Philosophical Works, edited by D. M. Armstrong, page x

(3) T x: George Berkeley: Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence, edited by C. M. Turbayne, page x

For readers who use G. J. Warnock's edition of Berkeley in the Fontana Library I provide a schedule that shows how page numbers from his edition correspond to those from vol. II of the Luce and Jessop edition.

When I refer to works that are not Berkeley's, I usually do so by giving just the author's name (sometimes followed by a number in parentheses). The titles and other bibliographical data are to be found at the end of the book in the section called ‘Works (other than Berkeley's) Referred to in the Text.’

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

	Works II	Warnock
Dialogue I	171-5	149-54
	176-80	154-61
	181-5	161-7
	186-90	167-73
	191-5	173-8
	196-200	178-84
	201-7	184-92
Dialogue II	208-12	193-8
	213-17	198-204
	218-22	204-11
	223-6	211-15
Dialogue III	227-31	216-21
	232-6	221-7
	237-41	227-33
	242-6	233-9
	247-51	239-45
	252-6	245-51
	257-63	251-9

Works (other than Berkeley's) Referred to in the Text

Bennett, J. (1): ‘Berkeley and God,’ Philosophy, 40, 1965, 207-21.

Bennett, J. (2): Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971.

Additional Selected Bibliography

Collections of Berkeley's Works

Armstrong, D. M. (ed.), Berkeley's Philosophical Works, Collier-Macmillan, New York and London, 1965.

Luce, A. A. and Jessop T. E. (eds), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (9 vols), Thomas Nelson, London and Edinburgh, 1948-57.

Turbayne, C. M. (ed.), George Berkeley: Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence, Library of Liberal Arts Book no. 208, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, New York, and Kansas City, 1965.