SOURCE: “Friedrich Schleiermacher on the Central Place of Worship in Theology,” in Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, January, 1998, pp. 59-73.

[In the following essay, Vial proposes that worship is a fundamental tenet of Schleiermacher's theology.]

Suspicion raised by the Neo-orthodox movement concerning Schleiermacher's theological enterprise continues to cast its shadow. Karl Barth framed this suspicion perspicaciously in terms of an “either/or” in his “Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher”:

Is Schleiermacher's enterprise concerned (a) necessarily, intrinsically, and authentically with a Christian theology oriented toward worship, preaching, instruction, and pastoral care? Does it only accidentally, extrinsically, and inauthentically wear the dress of a philosophy accommodated to the person of his time … ? Or is his enterprise concerned (b) primarily, intrinsically, and authentically with a philosophy … indifferent as to Christianity and which would have wrapped itself only accidentally, extrinsically, and inauthentically in the garments of a particular theology, which here happens to be Christian?¹

In other words, Barth raises the question of the relationship of Schleiermacher's theology to the church. Is his theology truly, “intrinsically” ecclesiastical? Barth's relationship to Schleiermacher is complex. He was quick to point out that one cannot understand Schleiermacher fully without first understanding his role as a preacher. In the end, however, Barth's suspicions that Schleiermacher was a wolf in sheep's clothing, a philosopher posing as a theologian, led him to reject Schleiermacher's theological program. Is Schleiermacher's theology based fundamentally on the church or on philosophy, on Jerusalem or Athens? I propose to get at this problem by examining the role worship plays in Schleiermacher's theological enterprise as a whole, and in his dogmatics in particular.

There is at least one obvious sense in which his theology is ecclesiastical. Theology for him serves the goal of training church leaders. It is not a “pure” but a “positive” science, meaning that it is grounded in a historical institution and brings together for a specific practical task elements that would not otherwise be grouped together in a science.² The practical task that creates the theological disciplines is church leadership, by which Schleiermacher means both church government and the minister's role in worship.³ In this sense worship is theology's raison d'etre.

This link between theology and the church may, however, do little to quell Barthian suspicions. The goal of theology may be to train leaders of worship, but what are theology's sources? It could still be the case that Schleiermacher's theology is intrinsically related to philosophy, and only extrinsically to worship. In this case, extra vigilance would be essential, since the very theology being used to train pastors might well be considered a Trojan horse.

I argue that there is an intrinsic link between worship and theology in Schleiermacher's thought. This link has yet to receive full attention in the secondary literature. For Schleiermacher, worship is the source as well as the motivation of theology.

WHAT IS DOGMATIC THEOLOGY?

Schleiermacher subsumes all branches of theology under a threefold structure consisting of philosophical, historical, and practical theology. He uses these terms in ways different from hat is common today, and so one must be careful to understand them in the sense he intended. Accordingly, Schleiermacher defines philosophical theology as the branch of theology that “presents the essence of Christianity, that by which it is a distinctive mode of faith.”⁴ One cannot make judgments regarding the history of theology or the furthering of the church without first understanding what one in studying. Historical theology is the study of the development of Christianity from its origins to the present day. Schleiermacher further divides historical theology into three subdisciplines: (1) exegetical theology (the study of primitive Christianity's normative documents); (2) church history; and (3) the church in its contemporary historical moment, or dogmatic theology (the study of “the present condition of Christianity”). Finally, practical theology formulates a “technique” for using the essence and development of Christianity to further the church.⁵

Dogmatic theology, then, is a branch of historical theology. It is the history of the church in its present moment, or the “coherent representation of doctrine which is current at any given time.”⁶ Dogmatics makes plain the connections that exist among the church's doctrines at the current time. It shows the way they “hang together” (their Zusammenhang).

Doctrines, in turn, are “views of the Christian religious affections presented in speech,”⁷ and they originate in the effect that strong moments of religious affection have on an individual's self-consciousness.⁸ In the Speeches Schleiermacher writes:

When an individual has produced and formulated something in him or herself, it is pathological and most unnatural to wish to close it up inside him or herself. He or she should express and communicate all that is in him or herself in the indispensable community and mutual dependence of action.⁹

When one is affected or moved by religion, “a sense and taste for the infinite,”¹⁰ one necessarily expresses this to others. The more violently he or she is moved and the more deeply his or her essence is penetrated, the stronger that social impulse works.¹¹

Expressing deep religious affections has at least two purposes. First, expression serves a purpose for the speaker him or herself. “[A]fter every flight of their spirit to the infinite they must set down in pictures or words the impressions it made on them as an object so as to enjoy it themselves afresh.”¹² The arousal of a moment can only remain as a memory for the aroused person to reflect and build on if this moment expresses itself in word or deed.¹³ The first purpose of religious speech, then, is to represent a particularly strong moment of the sense and taste of the infinite to the aroused person.

The second purpose of religious expression is a social one. By definition, one can grasp only a part of religion (the sense and taste for the infinite). Those who have experienced intense moments of intuition of the infinite hunger for the representations of others who have also experienced it:

They are conscious of encompassing only a small part of it, and that which they cannot reach directly they will, at least so far as they are able, take in and enjoy through the representations of others who have appropriated it. Therefore they urge themselves to every expression of the same, and seeking their completion listen to every sound that they recognize as religious.¹⁴

It is religious expression that creates religious communities. While doctrines originate in the religious expressions of those who have experienced the infinite, such expressions themselves are not yet doctrines. Schleiermacher distinguishes among types of speech. In the second edition of The Christian Faith he identifies three kinds of religious speech: (1) poetic, (2) rhetorical, and (3) descriptively didactic (darstellend belehrend).¹⁵ Poetic speech is “based originally on a moment of enthusiasm that has come from within.” Its goal is purely representational. This is the most natural form of speech when one is in the grip of an intense moment of awareness of the infinite. Rhetorical speech is the speech of preaching. It is based on “a moment of moved interest whose intensification has come from without,” in other words, the stimulation of hearers eager to learn of another's experience. Its goal is “stimulative,” that is, it aims to have an effect on the hearers, to bring them to the same aroused consciousness as the speaker. Schleiermacher calls both of these forms of speech “original.” The descriptively didactic form of speech, in contrast, “is made up of the other two put together, as a derivative and secondary form.” It is the language of confession rather than preaching, and arises when one needs to make the first two forms of speech as precise and as comprehensible as possible to others. It is the language of instruction. This is the language appropriate to doctrine and to the field of dogmatics, “in which the highest possible degree of definiteness is aimed at.”¹⁶

Dogmatic theology, then, is the science that presents doctrines in such a way that their inner connection is apparent. It shows the systematic arrangement of expressions of second order speech that, in turn, attempt to give the utmost clarity to expressions of first order speech. By expressing doctrines with the utmost clarity and showing how they “hang together,” dogmatic theology accomplishes its task of “purifying” and “perfecting” doctrine.¹⁷ Note that the foundations on which the entire dogmatic enterprise is based are the first order expressions representing particularly intense moments of religious affections. They are the first domino in the chain of religious speech that leads ultimately to dogmatic theology. I turn now to the role of worship in the formation of these, first order expressions of religious affections.

WHAT IS WORSHIP?

Throughout the history of Schleiermacher scholarship, there has been a remarkable consensus regarding his views of worship. Worship is a communal activity undertaken by a group of people who already stand in a redemptive relationship to Christ. The goal of worship, therefore, cannot be conversion. Instead, it represents to the worshipers their own piety, that is, their own particular modification of the religious affections. Alexander Schweizer, for example, wrote in 1834: “He wanted to speak as though to brothers, whose Christian, consciousness he would develop rather than ground; he wanted to prove it in them, demonstrate, purify, reinforce, not to bring it in as something new,”¹⁸ Wolfgang Trillhaas in the 1930s confirmed that, in Schleiermacher's view, the minister does not stand over against his hearers. They all share a desire to come near to Christ. A minister does, however, stand “at a higher stage of the Christian consciousness,” and sees his task as “bringing people to an understanding of their own feeling.”¹⁹ Likewise Christoph Albrecht wrote in 1963: “The increase of religiosity in the individual in worship is possible because the religiosity represented in worship is to a certain degree the same in all who attend worship.”²⁰ Most recently, Dawn DeVries agreed that sermons are addressed to hearers who are already in a redemptive relationship with Christ (through baptism). Because they are already converted, the goal is not to spark conversion experiences.²¹

There is no doubt that these scholars have interpreted Schleiermacher correctly. Yet there is an aspect of Schleiermacher's theory of worship that they have overlooked. While worship does presuppose the religious affections to be represented, it also plays an important role in their genesis. Although Schleiermacher gives more attention to this aspect of worship in some of his earlier writings, in which he concentrates on the formation of individuals and of religious groups, it nonetheless remains a constant theme throughout his life. It is this aspect that I want to address in discussing the importance of worship for theology. I turn now to Schleiermacher himself on worship.

Schleiermacher classifies worship as an art. He defines art as an activity that is representative (darstellend) rather than effective (wirksam): “Let us examine the field of the fine arts in itself: a particular work is in this field insofar as it is a pure work that has no aim, it is nothing other than representation.”²²

Just as works of fine art represent the inner disposition of the artist, worship is the “representative communication and communicative representation of the common Christian affections.”²³ Each of the four parts of worship (liturgy, song, prayer, and religious speech) individually and together as a complete service of worship, represent the particularly Christian (in this case, Protestant) modifications of the religious affections and communicate them to the worshipers.

All this may make worship seem like a pointless exercise. Why represent to oneself religious affections one already possesses? This question seems all the more acute because Schleiermacher insists so adamantly that worship is purely representative. It does not even have an educational function, since education is an effective, not a representative activity. Education is a means to an end, or, as Schleiermacher states, it is a Geschaft, and thus falls outside the realm of art in general and worship in particular. One learns about Christianity from a catechism, from religious instruction in the schools, or from one's family.

While worship, as representational activity, has no further end or goal beyond itself, it is not pointless and does serve two related purposes. First, Schleiermacher believes that impressions that do not somehow find expression eventually die.²⁴ Worship is the arena in which one expresses one's religious affections, the feeling that one has been penetrated or impressed by the infinite, and thus worship makes possible the continuation of this feeling.²⁵

More than merely maintaining religious affections, worship also serves the purpose of edification.²⁶ By that, Schleiermacher means the heightening or strengthening of religious affections already present in the worshiper. The sermon, the high point of Protestant worship for Schleiermacher, serves both to originate and to strengthen faith. The sermon confronts the listener with the picture of Christ.²⁷ Yet a sermon succeeds only if it is pure representation, pure art.²⁸ “[I]f the speaker does not represent the religious moment as his own, it is no longer religious speech; we require that the particular be represented, but in the form that befits the representation of the universal.”²⁹

The religious affections of Christians represented in worship express both a unity and a diversity.³⁰ What distinguishes Christian worship from other communal activities (family or civic) are the common religious affections represented in this community. In worship Christians represent those feelings or inner dispositions to which they unite themselves as Christians.³¹ But while there is unity to the Christian disposition, there is also diversity. These common feelings affect individuals differently depending on their various life experiences.³² The goal of worship is to represent these religious affections in their entirety.³³

Schleiermacher compares worship with popular celebrations (Volksfeste). To take an American example, people participate in Fourth of July celebrations out of a sense of patriotism or national pride and affection. “Top-down” holidays created by the state generally fall flat. “Lively” celebrations must originate in the people themselves. Such a celebration thus presupposes a common “inner disposition” of the participants. A successful celebration is one that elevates the participants' consciousness. Participating in fireworks and parades—representative, not effective activities—arouses and strengthens the feelings with which one enters the celebration.³⁴

Worship is precisely such a celebration, except that the “spirit,” the common affections that are the basis of worship, are not patriotic but are the particular modifications of the religious affections found in a specific church. Worship represents the strongly aroused religious consciousness in such a way that it flows out and strengthens those in whom the religious consciousness is weaker.³⁵ Worship, then, is the mutual “lively circulation” of religious affections among members of a congregation.³⁶ Worship strives not for a mere momentary arousal of affection, but for the nourishment of the Christian disposition.³⁷ If the Christian disposition is sufficiently “nourished” or “elevated,” it will extend beyond the worship service and be in less danger of suppression throughout the rest of the worshiper's daily life.³⁸ More moments of a Christian's life will be “pious.”

Schleiermacher's argument that worship is both representative and edifying appears to contain a contradiction. Albrecht, for example, found a tension between Schleiermacher's claim that art, as pure representation, is not effective activity, and Schleiermacher's judgment that one must count a sermon as a failure that does not succeed in having an effect on the religious affections of the hearer.³⁹ In other words, can Schleiermacher claim both that worship is pure representation and that it has the effect of heightening worshipers' religious affections? Albrecht resolves this tension by falling back on the open acknowledgment of Die praktische Theologie's editor, Jacob Frerichs, that the text is a Verschmelzung (amalgamation) of lecture notes of several of Schleiermacher's students and outlines found in Schleiermacher's hand.

A more satisfactory solution to this tension than the corrupted text argument is at hand, however. In a discussion that is admittedly opaque, Schleiermacher tries to resolve the tension by distinguishing between different kinds of means and ends. In some actions there is an opposition between means and ends: the means lie outside of the ends.⁴⁰ Presumably the actions Schleiermacher has in mind here are effective actions, such as education or business. One undertakes these actions for some goal that stands outside of the actions themselves. For example, one teaches to convey information, or transacts business to make money. But such a means/ends opposition does not exist in worship or in art in general.⁴¹ Schleiermacher does not fully explain what the difference is between means that do or do not stand outside of their ends. In claiming that in worship the means do not stand outside the ends, however, he seems to suggest, for example, that when one preaches (utters first-order accounts of one's own heightened religious affections), one does so simply because people with heightened religious affections naturally express this arousal. Worship is art for art's sake. It is true that works of art sometimes affect their viewers, but that is not (according to Schleiermacher) why one makes them. An effective sermon will elevate or arouse the affections of others, but only through the “pure” representation of one's own affections, not through any external means. it is an end in itself.

Schleiermacher's interpreters have been correct in stressing the representative nature of worship. As I have already indicated, however, Schleiermacher drops a couple of hints that there may be something more complex going on in worship than mere sustaining and edification. First, even common religious affections express themselves in people in different ways because of their different life experiences. Successful worship represents this diversity as well as the unity. The more diverse expressions of religious affections that are represented in worship, Schleiermacher argues, the more fully will each individual be able to develop his or her own distinctive sense of the infinite, and the more completely will the infinite be represented. Second, faith not only gains strength from but has its origin in preaching (and, I would argue by extension, all of worship).⁴² I believe that these two observations are linked. This is the aspect of Schleiermacher's theory of worship that has largely been overlooked.

When Schleiermacher discusses the formation of the individual and the role that religion plays in this formation, he makes it clear that worship does more than merely mirror the congregation's piety back to it, albeit in a mirror that magnifies. He indicates that something more is at stake in the introduction to his first collection of sermons (1801): “The thing [comes] into being again, in that one presupposes it.”⁴³ Worship does presuppose common religious affections, but in so doing it also recreates them.

Schleiermacher addresses the healthy formation of an individual most explicitly in his Soliloquies (first edition, 1800). In this book one sees the complicated relationship of Romanticism to the Enlightenment. On the one hand, Schleiermacher has a deep appreciation of the “discovery of a universal reason.”⁴⁴ And yet he has learned that there is something “still higher” than universal reason: “the unique nature which freedom chooses for herself in each individual.”⁴⁵ He further writes, “It became clear to me that each person should represent humanity in his or her own way, with a particular mixture of its elements, so that humanity reveals itself in each way and all becomes realized in the fullness of space and time.”⁴⁶ One does not see the infinite in human beings expressed in their similarity. The infinite is too big for that. Rather, if one develops his or her individuality to its full potential, he or she will best manifest one expression of the infinite. The more there are who undertake this task, the more completely will the infinite be expressed in humanity. The development of one's individuality is one's highest calling.

One must be aware of one's distinctiveness in order to nurture and not violate it. Whoever would build himself or herself into a distinctive essence must be open to everything that he or she is not.”⁴⁷ Consciousness of unique selfhood requires opposing one's own expression to every other possible self-expression. In other words, individuality can only develop fully in community. Or, as Schleiermacher writes, “How can this exist without love?”⁴⁸

If the individual needs association for his or her full development, this is true a fortiori of spiritual development, in which one relates to the infinite. Schleiermacher claims that contemporary spiritual associations are too often “aimed at some utility,” or “debased in the service of the earthly.”⁴⁹ He appears to have in mind the role of teacher of morals assigned to the church by the Prussian government. The “spiritual bond” should be something greater than this:

[E]ach should grant to the other freedom to go where the spirit drives him or her, and be helpful only where the other feels a lack, not attributing to the other his or her own thoughts. In this way each would find in the other life and nourishment, and that which each could become, he or she would become fully.⁵⁰

One's piety, while internal, can only develop in relationship with others.⁵¹ One of Schleiermacher's favorite metaphors for the representative nature of religious speech is light reflecting different objects, separating into the spectrum, and then reunifying into pure light.⁵² Only in community can one hope to grasp the infinite in something approaching completeness, to see all the possible colors of the infinite's spectrum as it expresses itself in each individual.

In the Speeches, Schleiermacher addresses the development of the full, distinctive individual in the context of the church. As a “sense and taste of the infinite,” religion—by definition—cannot be grasped in its totality by any one individual.⁵³ Piety depends on the mutual support and influence of religious men and women on one another.

The melodies of thought and feeling interchange and support each other, until all are saturated and full of the holy and the infinite. Of such a nature is the influence of religious people on one another, in such a way they create their natural and perfect union. … This divine bond, the most perfect product of the social nature of humanity, cannot be reached until they know themselves in their highest sense.⁵⁴

The essence of the church, for Schleiermacher, is fellowship, and for such fellowship not uniformity but difference is required.⁵⁵ The end of a congregation is “circulation” of religious affections.⁵⁶ Without such circulation or fellowship, the religious affections could not be sustained, nor could they come to their fullest fruition. This fact leads Wilhelm Grab to conclude that it would be a mistake to think of the Christian church only as the starting point from which worship goes forth as self-affirmation. It is only in worship that the circulation of the religious consciousness of the community comes into being.⁵⁷ Grab's point is well taken, I believe, for two reasons. First, the piety of individuals can develop only in fellowship, that is to say, in worship. Second, worship is the origin of the religious affections, in that it constitutes the church community. This community is where one confronts the picture of Christ's religious consciousness. While the sermon represents the religious affections of the speaker, it is also “the place where faith originates.”⁵⁸

Yet, one might ask, are people's religious affections necessarily bound to the church? Are individual experiences of the infinite not possible in isolation? Does not piety also occur in other communities, particularly in the family? Schleiermacher argues that there are individuals who are “true priests of the highest,” who experience the infinite vividly, either through self-training or as a direct gift from God. These individuals are rare, however, and these “ambassadors of God” immediately gather others around them.⁵⁹ In other words, individual expressions of religious affections quickly form churches. A family is the smallest community in which piety can exist, but families, too, naturally clump into larger complexes for worship. Piety in families depends on particular moments, and so families seek to elevate their affections by joining an “order” or “routine.”⁶⁰ Religious affections necessarily gravitate to worshiping communities, and worship is the origin of religious affections.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF WORSHIP TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY?

Dogmatic theology is the systematic ordering of second-order language (doctrines) about first-order language, which in turn expresses heightened religious affections, or heightened awareness of the infinite in some specific form. Dogmatic theology ultimately depends upon these expressions of religious affections. Without them, it cannot exist.

I have argued that these first-order expressions depend on the communal experience of worship. Worship not only presupposes, but is the origin of the particular modification of the religious affections in each Christian that are expressed in word and deed. Without worship, the feelings that give rise to these expressions die out. Even more importantly, religious feelings cannot develop to their fullest, their most distinctive, in isolation. Worship, by definition, is the fellowship of those who seek to share in others' representations of religious affections. In depending on first-order expressions of piety, then, dogmatics depends on worship. Without worship, dogmatics is a house built on sand.

While I have focused on dogmatics, the same argument could be made for any of the theological disciplines as Schleiermacher conceives them. This is clear for practical theology, which is about worship. In the historical disciplines, it is as true of exegetical theology and historical theology as it is of dogmatics.⁶¹ Each of these disciplines examines, in its own way, the first-order expressions of religious affections that depend on worship. Exegetical theology examines the poetic and rhetorical (first-order) expressions of piety embedded in the foundational documents of the Christian church, while historical theology examines the poetic, rhetorical, and descriptively didactic (first- and second-order) expressions as formulated in each era. Furthermore, Schleiermacher argues, to make judgments about the historical expressions of religious affections requires that one employ his or her own religious affections as a basis of judgment. Even philosophical theology, which “stands above” Christianity, requires piety (that is, the elevation of religious affections found in worship). While it may borrow language from other fields, the task of philosophical theology is “to understand the essence of Christianity in its opposition to other modes of faith and to understand the nature of religion and religious communities in connection with the other activities of the human spirit.”⁶² The judgments needed to determine what is, in fact, the essence of Christianity require more than mere reporting. In order to make them, one must have one's own grasp of the truth.

Could not the dogmatician forego worship and simply systematize the doctrines that are the products of others' first-order expressions? Such a person would be unable to judge whether or not the system of doctrines they produce expresses the true connections between the doctrines.⁶³ If one contemplates someone else's feelings, this has nothing to do with religion. The feelings one reflects on or writes about must be one's own (or must somehow relate to one's own).⁶⁴

Thus it appears that, for Schleiermacher, theology is dependent on worship for reasons quite separate from the training of church leaders. Theology has worship not only as its end but also as its source. The link between worship and theology is necessary, intrinsic, and authentic.

Although Schleiermacher borrows language from other disciplines, I maintain that his dogmatic theology, and by extension his entire theological program, has its source in worship, and is therefore intrinsically ecclesiastical. Despite Barth's uneasiness, a close reading of Schleiermacher on worship shows that he and Barth largely agree on the relationship of worship to theology. Barth's charge that Schleiermacher's theological enterprise is only extrinsically related to worship is, of course, part of a broader debate on the relationship of philosophy and theology in Schleiermacher. The charges did not originate with Barth. Friedrich Samuel Gottfried Sack, Schleiermacher's superior in the Prussian church, responded angrily to the first edition of the Speeches, in which Schleiermacher praised Spinoza, that Schleiermacher had been duplicitous in serving in his capacity as a Reformed preacher, since he was in fact a pantheist. This line of attack was taken up by the Ritschlians; and became, under Barth's influence, perhaps the dominant view of Schleiermacher until recently.

As perceptive a reader as Ferdinand Christian Baur argued that Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology was, in important ways, determined by philosophy. According to Baur, it is the idea of redemption that is primary for Schleiermacher. This idea is related only secondarily to Jesus of Nazareth. Schleiermacher's christology depends not on a historical figure, but on a philosophically constructed Christ. For this reason Baur labeled Schleiermacher's christology gnostic.⁶⁵

Schleiermacher adamantly argues, however, that he has “absolutely no idea where a dogmatics would come from, if piety were not already present.”⁶⁶ Piety, that is, the particular modification of the religious self-consciousness found in each religious community, is independent of theology. Both theology and philosophy reflect, in their own way, on this fact of human experience that is given to them.

This does not stop Schleiermacher from using language that can also be found in the works of philosophers. He argues, however, that Christianity has created its own language, in part by appropriating terms from philosophy as well as from other fields. “But these [elements of philosophical speech] are then cut off from their old stems and rooted in new ground so that the strict meaning of the [philosophical] school does not come with them.”⁶⁷ It does not much matter to Schleiermacher where the terms come from. What does matter is that, within the language used to describe Christian piety, “we can distinguish … different levels, among which the dogmatic [level] stands at the top as the sharpest and most precise.”⁶⁸

One may have more reason to be skeptical than was Schleiermacher of this claim that one can make use of terms from other disciplines and yet not be unduly influenced by those disciplines. The interweaving lines of influence between disciplines would have to be separated painstakingly on a case-by-case basis. Nor is this the place to sort out Schleiermacher's use of specific terms. My task has been more modest. Schleiermacher's dogmatic method is based on his argument that dogmatics is precise reflection on the expressions of Christian religious affections peculiar to a specific community. I have argued here that, for Schleiermacher, these religious affections originate in and are shaped by the experience of worship. Insofar as this is the case, Schleiermacher is internally consistent, and this adds plausibility to his claim that one need not look outside the church for the roots of his dogmatic theology.

Notes

1. Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher (Dietrich Ritschl, ed., Geoffrey W. Bromiley, trans.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 275.

2. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammtliche Werke, I/13: Die praktische Theologie nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt (Jacob Frerichs, ed.; Berlin: Reimer, 1850) 8.

3. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 3.

4. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammtliche Werke, I/1: Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen (Berlin: Reimer, 1834) [sections] 24 (13); ET: Brief Outline on the Study of Theology (Terrence Tice, trans.; Atlanta: John Knox, 1966) 25. When English translations of Schleiermacher's works exist, I cite first the German original (by paragraph number and page where appropriate) and then the page number in the translation. Except where noted, translations in this paper are mine.

5. Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung, [sections] 25 (14); ET, 25.

6. Ibid., [sections] 97 (44); ET, 48. See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt (2d ed.; Martin Redeker, ed.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960) [sections] 19 (119); ET: The Christian Faith (2d ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986) 88.

7. Schleiermacher, Christlicher Glaube, [sections] 15 (105); ET, 76.

8. In the discussion of Schleiermacher's theory of religious speech I rely in part on Dawn DeVries's excellent and concise discussion in Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher (Columbia Series in Reformed Theology; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1996) 48-58.

9. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammtliche Werke, I/1: Ober die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern (Berlin: Reimer, 1843) 318. ET On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (3d ed.; intro., Rudolf Otto; John Oman, trans.; New York: Harper & Row, 1958) 148. Schleiermacher's language in the third edition (1821) is the same as in the first (1799). Much of my argument in this paper rests on Schleiermacher's earlier writings, but I quote from the third edition of the Speeches when possible to show that his thought on topics relevant to my argument remains constant as he approaches the publication of his Christian Faith. For the 1st ed., see Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, I/2: Uber die Religion. Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern (Hans-Joachim Birkner et al., eds.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 267; ET: On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (Texts in German Philosophy; introduction by Richard Crouter; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 163.

10. Schleiermacher, Ober die Religion, 188; ET, 39.

11. Ibid., 318; ET, 148. (1st ed., 267; ET, 163.)

12. Ibid., 193 (1st ed.); ET, 82. I use Crouter's translation here.

13. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 188.

14. Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion, 319; ET, 149. (1st ed., 268; ET, 164.)

15. Schleiermacher, Christlicher Glaube, [sections] 15 (107); ET, 78.

16. Ibid., [sections] 16 (107-8); ET, 78-79.

17. Ibid., [sections] 19 (124); ET, 92.

18. Alexander Schweizer, Schleiermachers Wirksamkeit als Prediger (Halle: Kummel, 1834) 13. Schweizer is invariably referred to in the secondary literature as “Schleiermacher's most faithful student.” Schweizer refers in this passage specifically to preaching, as do the other commentators I cite here with the exception of Albrecht, the only one to discuss worship as a whole. Nonetheless, as will become evident, their comments on preaching must also apply more broadly.

19. Wolfgang Trillhaas, Schleiermachers Predigt und das homiletische Problem (Leipzig: Hinrichs' sche Buchhandlung, 1933) 17 and 18, the latter quoting Praktische Theologie.

20. Christoph Albrecht, Schleiermachers Liturgik. Theorie und Praxis des Gottesdienstes bei Schleiermacher und ihre geistesgeschichtlichen Zusammenhange (Veroffentlichungen der evangelischen Gesellschaft fur Liturgieforschung 13; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963) 25.

21. Dawn DeVries, “Introduction” in Friedrich Schleiermacher, Servant of the Word: Selected Sermons of Friedrich Schleiermacher (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987) 2.

22. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 37.

23. “[D]er Cultus ist darstellende Mittheilung und mittheilende Darstellung des gemeinsam christlichen Sinnes” (Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 145).

24. Schleiermacher writes of the liturgy, for example, that it expresses the congregation's consciousness that it is part of an organism larger than a single congregation. If this consciousness is not expressed in worship through the liturgy, it will die out (Praktische Theologie, 157).

25. One might express one's religious affections outside of worship, particularly in the first grip of an unusually strong intuition of the infinite. One will then, however, seek a worshiping community with which to share one's experience, or a community of people will gather around to share one's own experience (which by definition then becomes a worshiping group, or a church). The expression of religious affections finds its way into worship one way or the other, or else religious affections eventually die out.

26. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 216.

27. In fact, Schleiermacher believes that the listener is confronted not only with the picture of Christ in the sermon, but with the very presence of Christ. See DeVries, Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher; compare note 42 below.

28. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 43.

29. Ibid., 119.

30. Ibid., 104.

31. Ibid., 130.

32. Ibid., 104.

33. Ibid., 96.

34. See ibid. (70-71) for Schleiermacher's comparison of worship and public celebrations.

35. Ibid., 78.

36. Ibid., 50.

37. Ibid., 45.

38. Ibid., 131.

39. Albrecht, Schleiermachers Liturgik, 40. Albrecht notes this tension in specific reference to religious speech; but presumably the tension exists in all components of worship, since each is representative action, and each aims to heighten the worshiper's religious affections.

40. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 39.

41. Or, at least not in Protestant worship. Schleiermacher is critical of Roman Catholicism for what he sees as their view that a sacrament is an opus operatum, which would mean that it is a means to an end outside itself, or an effective activity, and thus not properly part of worship. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 159.

42. DeVries, in her introduction to Servant of the Word, stresses the already-present aspect of piety in worship. Nonetheless, her overall argument in Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher is to show that preaching, for Schleiermacher, is an incarnational event. In other words, it is in preaching that the picture of Christ is represented and thus confronts and affects hearers in precisely the same way that Jesus' followers were confronted with his perfect God-consciousness; this is the origin of Christian faith.

43. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammtliche Werke, II/1: Predigten (Berlin: Reimer, 1843), 7. Wilhelm Grab cites this passage in, “Predigt als kommunikativer Akt: Einige Bemerkungen zu Schleiermachers Theorie religioser Mitteilung,” in Kurt-Victor Selge, ed., Internationaler Schleiermacher-Kongress Berlin 1984 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985) 657. While Grab's starting point is different from mine (he is interested in applying Schleiermacher's theory of communication to his theory of preaching), his argument has been instructive for me throughout this section of my essay.

44. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Monologen. Eine Neujahrsgabe (intro., D. Carl Schwarz; Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1869) 22; ET, Schleiermacher's Soliloquies (intro. and trans., Horace Leland Friess; Chicago: Open Court, 1926) 30.

45. Schleiermacher, Monologen, 23; ET, 31. This sentence is Friess's translation.

46. Ibid., 24; ET, 31.

47. Ibid., 29; ET, 38.

48. Ibid., 30; ET, 38.

49. Ibid., 46; ET, 56.

50. Ibid., 46; ET, 56.

51. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 68.

52. DeVries, Jesus Christ in the Preaching of Calvin and Schleiermacher, 50.

53. Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion, 319; ET, 149.

54. Ibid., 322; ET, 152.

55. Ibid., 390; ET, 213.

56. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 65.

57. Grab, “Predigt als kommunikativer Akt,” 657.

58. Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 43.

59. Schleiermacher, Uber die Religion; ET, 6-8.

60. “… so werden alle auch eine Ordnung ihrer religiosen Gefuhle zu erhohen suchen.” Schleiermacher, Praktische Theologie, 68-69.

61. Schleiermacher, Kurze Darstellung, [sections] 147 (60-61); ET, 60.

62. Ibid., [sections] 21 (12); ET, 24.

63. Ibid., [sections] 196 (76-77); ET, 72.

64. Schleiermacher, Ober die Religion, 197-98; ET, 47.

65. James Duke and Francis Fiorenza give a good account of Baur's criticisms of the first edition of the Christian Faith in their “Introduction to Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher” (On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lucke [AAR Texts and Translations 3; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981]).

66. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sammtliche Werke, I/2: Uber seine Glaubenslehre, an Dr. Lucke (Berlin: Reimer, 1836) 589; ET (see n. 65), 42.

67. Ibid., 642; ET, 81.

68. Ibid.