SOURCE: “Schleiermacher, Rationalism, and Romanticism,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher: The Evolution of a Nationalist, University of Texas Press, 1941, pp. 17-42.

[In the following excerpt, Dawson traces the development of Schleiermacher's nationalism and his response to the romanticist philosophy in the context of his Speeches on Religion.]

The subtle, subjective influence of Pietism upon Schleiermacher was an excellent preparation for the next step he took in his evolutionary progress toward nationalism: the study of rationalism. When he cast off the yoke of rigid Moravian Pietistic doctrines in order to study at Halle, he did more than just leave one institution for another. He cut himself off from a basic interpretation of the relationship of man to God and of man to society. Discarding his theological interpretation of human relations necessitated a vigorous search for a suitable substitute with which he would be able to evaluate society. Almost accidentally he turned to reading the works of the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, in the hope that in Kant he might find a suitable substitute for the moral absolutism of the Moravians, which he had just discarded. After having read Kant's Prolegomena the young scholar was sure that he was ready for a detailed study of Kantian metaphysics and ethics before he ever arrived at the University of Halle.¹ Though not exactly positive that he understood all that was involved in Kantian rationalism, he was still captivated by the philosopher's unusual approach and methodology. The big surprise came for the young scholar when he arrived at Halle and found that Kantian rationalism was not a popular subject among the professors at the University. Possibly as a continuation of his rebellious attitude at Barby, or in defiance of his professors, but more probably because of his consistent aversion to accepting intricate ideas without first investigating them, Schleiermacher from the moment he arrived in Halle buried himself in Kantian thought in order to defend the philosopher from the attacks of his Halle professors.² However, even though he made an intensive study of Kant's philosophy, he did not become a devoted follower as so many of the philosophy students did during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. He saw within the Kantian system too many disagreeable philosophical complications that prevented it from answering the specific problems of man.

To be more specific, the categorical imperative, the demand by Kant that man regulate his moral values on the basis of what the moral act would mean if everyone in the community committed it, was too vague to be of real value. Schleiermacher was much more attracted by Kant's advocacy of the freedom of rational process for the individual than by his ethical theories. He could readily see from his Pietistic point of view that individuality not only qualified one to approach God without help from an outside source, but also qualified one to interpret moral acts according to the way these acts would affect the community. Until he studied Kant, however, he had never been able to see any way to justify the personal evaluation of moral acts in the light of what effect the moral decision would have.

His ability to see a justification for individuality in Kant's philosophy was one of the more important intellectual achievements in his development toward nationalism. The most vital factor in his concept of nationalism, the belief in the possibility of expressing the collective will of all the people by teaching the traditions of the nationality, rested ultimately upon the possibility of expressing an individual will in any manner. Once he had extracted this kernel of rationalism from Kantian philosophy he was well on his way toward an interpretation of the individual as a political as well as a moral agent within the state.

Quite significantly Schleiermacher had been able to retain from Kantian rationalism only one useful philosophical concept, the unique moral responsibility of the individual, just as he had utilized only a small but vital part of Pietism. He had been so little affected by Kant that when he had an opportunity to spend several hours with the famous philosopher in Königsberg, Schleiermacher left the meeting totally unimpressed.³

Kant did not deserve all the credit for leading Schleiermacher to see the value of individual expression within the framework of society. Another philosopher who contributed a great deal to his evolution as a nationalist by focusing attention upon the importance of the individual was Spinoza. From 1793 until 1796 Schleiermacher studied Spinoza's theories with even more concentration than he had devoted to Kant. As a result of his intensive study of the works of Spinoza he wrote two excellent essays on Spinoza's system of philosophy of individualism: “A Description of Spinoza's System” and “Spinozianism.” Since Spinoza's works had not been published by 1795, Schleiermacher based both of these writings on Friedrich Jacobi's Letters concerning the Theories of Spinoza.

Although he was deeply impressed by Spinoza's concept of substance and universal order, Schleiermacher believed that the defects of his system outweighed its merits. Spinoza belittled human passion and will, which, because of his Pietistic background, Schleiermacher valued very highly. Also, in Spinoza's system individuality was equated with limitation. Spinoza could not visualize any logical activity which would have meaning beyond the limited confines of personal activity. Having already accepted Kant's view that the moral will was man's absolute dignity, not his source of limitation, Friedrich rejected Spinoza's insistence that the individual was limited in his activities to purely self-related functions.

In the process of disputing with Spinoza, he realized an aspect of individuality which he had not yet seen. He discovered that the individual truly lived in a world of individual acts and functions, while still maintaining a group identity. This enabled the individual to retain his personal freedom and individuality even though each free individual act was a part of a group action. While he exercised his freedom the individual might think that his free act had no limitation, but the force of tradition and public opinion would so mold his act that it would not in a true sense be free.⁴

Although it is difficult to determine the relative values of the influences of Kant and Spinoza upon Schleiermacher, one must admit that without their contributions his development as a nationalist would certainly have been different. One must also remember that neither Kant nor Spinoza gave him a satisfactory explanation of man's relationship to his fellow man. His still unresolved goal remained the finding of a “world view which does justice to human personality, on the one hand, and to the infinite universe that stands over against man, on the other.”⁵

Schleiermacher's adventures in the realm of philosophical speculation never made him oblivious to the world of events around him, but the steady intellectual progress he was making toward a nationalistic point of view was not matched by an ability to make practical applications of his ideas. Three or four brief glances at his writings and letters demonstrate clearly that by 1795 his concept of patriotism was still a very weak conviction, although he was beginning to recognize in a very immature way the value of national traditions. One of the documents which reveals this weak but nevertheless noticeable spirit of nationalism is a letter which Friedrich wrote to his father concerning the progress of the French Revolution through the year 1793. In this letter he admitted that on the whole he had heartily sympathized with the French people during the first three years of the revolution. He was quick to add that just because he thought that the revolution was good for France, this did not mean that he was “seized by the foolishness of wanting to imitate it” in Germany.⁶ Here was the faint beginning of a consciousness of the role which tradition must play in the life of any group of people. He did not think that the French Revolution was “wrong” for France because the revolutionary spirit obviously arose out of the historical processes and developments of the French nation. The French Revolution would be “wrong” for Germany because the German people had experienced none of the phenomena that had led to the overthrow of the Ancient Regime in France. In other words, he defended the French Revolution on the basis of his belief that the French people were expressing their national feelings. He then denied the possibility of the same type of revolution for Germany on the grounds that such a revolution in Germany would be completely out of character for the German people. The difficulty inherent in this point of view was that the people with whom he conversed concerning the Revolution did not share his ideas on the historical progress of national groups. Consequently, most of his close associates leaped to the false conclusion that he was a defender of the spirit of revolt.⁷

Schleiermacher derived a valuable lesson from the criticism which his defense of the French Revolution aroused: one must be precise when speaking about nationalities. He could see that people were motivated less by reason and more by emotion when it came to national problems than in most other areas of their social life. He also came to see that people who were strong in their national devotion could seldom see the value of the nationalism of people of other nationalities. Every time Schleiermacher tried to point out to his friends that Frenchmen were entitled to actions consistent with their historical heritage, he found that they immediately misunderstood him. “Such has been my fate in relation to French affairs more than a thousand times,” he said to his father in 1793.⁸

A second document revealing his growing but still immature sense of nationalism in the early 1790's is a sermon which he delivered late in 1793 or early in 1794. In this undated and untitled sermon he repeated what he had said on other occasions about the French Revolution, but he revealed a more mature approach to the national sensibilities of his German listeners by emphasizing German traditions instead of praising what the French had done. He explained that the Revolution had been for the French a natural result of a long series of events which they had experienced as a nation. In the sense that contemporary events in France were the rational outgrowth of historical developments, they were correct and necessary. This was the same approach that he had used before in describing the French Revolution. The difference came when he very carefully called attention to the fact that the hallowed traditions of Germany, sanctioned by the German people since the days of Martin Luther, would not allow the Germans to make the foolish mistake of trying to copy the example of France. Schleiermacher seemed to be a polished nationalist when he declared, in an appeal to the emotions of his listeners, that if Germans ever encountered the problems which had driven the French into a revolution, the spirit of German tradition would almost certainly force them to seek a peaceful solution to their problems.⁹

Since Luther's day the German people had adhered to the principle of obedience to the law of the land and had maintained a respect for each man's station in life. A man's pride in his own importance to society because of his worthwhile occupation would not only make him a better father and husband, but also would make him a firm believer in the political system which allowed him to maintain his occupation. Schleiermacher felt that a man would never advocate revolution unless he reached the point where he felt that his opportunities for personal recognition and advancement were being denied him by his government. Thus he did not believe that the German tradition of obedience to the law would prevent any type of revolution from occurring. He was saying that there would not be a revolution of the French variety as long as the German people had faith that their governments were being fair to them.¹⁰

The documents mentioned above indicate quite clearly that Schleiermacher possessed that kernel of nationalism, a faith in the traditions of a national group, long before he was able to make specific applications of any particular set of traditions. Hans Kohn called attention to an interesting aspect of nationalism when he said, “German nationalism—as all non-Western nationalism—was born in the war against France, not in an attempt to secure better government, individual liberty, and due process of law, but in an effort to drive out a foreign ruler and to secure national independence.”¹¹ While this may be true, one should note that the nationalist often had the foundation of nationalism long before the structure had been erected. Without the many almost intangible and obscure concepts such as Schleiermacher revealed in his writings before the struggles of the first decade of the nineteenth century erupted between France and Germany, he might never have become the ardent patriot of a decade later. For instance, he used the terms “German” and “Germany” so loosely that one has to conclude that he had no clear conception of what constituted a German nation and that he was using generalities for the sake of argument. He was actually dealing with nationalism more or less in a philosophical sense rather than in a framework which could be applied to any specific group of people composing the German nation. In his opinion the religious nature of the Germans gave strength to the concept of submission to exterior authority. If God was the author of peace and if each man accepted the principle of peace in Kantian fashion, the leaders of Germany, who presumably had accepted the same principles as the people, would allow the free unfolding of the historical development of the people.

Although recognition of the value of tradition was a worthwhile and significant segment of Schleiermacher's nationalism, belief in the value of tradition was not, in and of itself, nationalism. He still lacked the insight or maturity to apply what he knew and felt in his heart to the world of practical events. Of course, he was not the first to encounter the difficulty of transmitting ideas and feelings into worthwhile political activity, nor would he be the last. He simply had reached the point where he needed some help in making practical use of his nationalistic feelings. Fortunately for him, he came in contact with a group of Germany's more outstanding intellectuals, who were able through their stimulating environment and personal encouragement to help him work out his nationalistic ideas with coherence and force. These intellectuals who came to mean so much to his nationalistic career but who themselves were not nationalists were known as the “romanticists.”

Schleiermacher was introduced into the romanticists' circle quite by chance. He had tutored the children of Alexander von Schlobitten for two years after he completed his education at Halle in 1789. Through Alexander he came to know Henrietta Herz, the beautiful and cultured wife of a Berlin doctor. Henrietta's home was the meeting place for a weekly social gathering of some of Berlin's more notable political and cultural figures, who devoted their meetings to discussions of literary works and to readings of essays.¹² Friedrich was not able to take immediate advantage of his newly acquired friendship with the scholars of the Herzes' circle because he was appointed by the Reformed Church to a pastorate in Landsberg in 1794. It was only in 1796, when he returned from Landsberg to Berlin as pastor of the Charity Hospital, that he became intimately associated with a particular set of Henrietta Herz's friends who were known as the romanticists. No other group of people made as great a contribution to the development of his nationalism as did these men. Even though few of them could be described as nationalists except in a very superficial way, they breathed into him a compassion for the homeland that he had never known during the course of his philosophical or theological wanderings.

Each of the romanticists left his own unique imprint upon Schleiermacher's life in such a way that he learned fundamental truths concerning nationalism from them without ever losing his own identity because of their influence. The member of the group who exercised the greatest influence in the realm of Schleiermacher's political thought was Novalis, a man with unusual talent for communicating intricate political ideas. When Schleiermacher was with him he sensed that Novalis was saying what he himself had wanted to say for a number of years and yet had never been able to express intelligently. Listening to Novalis expound on the virtues of the Volk and on the need for Germans to become a united people led Schleiermacher to crystallize his feelings on German traditions.¹³ Novalis was thus probably more influential than any other man in getting Schleiermacher to see the need to apply nationalistic principles to all of Germany. Novalis used the organic concept of the state to show him the need for a clearer definition of Prussia's relationship with the rest of Germany. Novalis insisted that whether a people constituted a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, in the late-eighteenth-century sense of these terms, they must attempt to organize their nation as an organic whole. Schleiermacher had reached the same general conclusions about the need for individual recognition as a result of his philosophical speculations concerning Spinoza and Kant, but he had not realized the potentialities of individualism as an element of nationalism until he met Novalis. Thus, while Novalis was not the father of Schleiermacher's basic belief concerning the organic nature of the state, he did help him clarify his thoughts.¹⁴

The inspiration which Schleiermacher received from Ludwig Tieck, another member of the romanticist circle, was quite different from that which he acquired from Novalis. Where Novalis would show a direction or course for Schleiermacher's thought, Tieck would supply the desire to pursue the course. Friedrich's sense of inferiority—perhaps his greatest limitation as far as writing was concerned—somehow took a secondary place in his personality when he was in the presence of this great German writer. He once told a friend that Tieck was a man destined to occupy a position in the literature of Germany “which neither Goethe, nor Schiller, nor Richter, nor, perhaps any one but himself could fill.”¹⁵ The confidence which he felt for Tieck bolstered his own ego, for when he was in Tieck's presence he felt that he ought to express the ideas which he had within him, even if doing so should cause the world to laugh at him. Tieck did not convey any political concepts to Schleiermacher which could be interpreted as a contribution to his growth as a nationalist, but had it not been for him Schleiermacher might never have attempted to write the works in which he expressed nationalistic concepts.

If Novalis helped Schleiermacher discover a fundamental element of nationalism within himself, and if Tieck imparted to him the inspiration to share these discoveries with the world, then it must also be said that Wilhelm Schlegel gave to him the spark of determination to carry through to completion the lengthy journalistic undertakings which contained his nationalistic philosophy. Wilhelm was not the most important of the romanticists, but he made up with tenacity what he lacked in ingenuity. Because of his unique ability to remain at a task until it was completed Schlegel became an inspiration to Schleiermacher, who suffered from an inability to concentrate on a single manuscript over a long period of time.¹⁶ The impact of Schlegel's determination was a significant factor which enabled Schleiermacher to write a number of works, both while he was with the romanticists and years after he had parted company with them.

Great though their influence was in helping him express his nationalist views in a coherent way, neither Tieck, Novalis, nor Wilhelm Schlegel had as much direct influence over Schleiermacher's eventual nationalistic outlook as did Wilhelm's brother, Friedrich Schlegel. Schleiermacher's relationship with the other romanticists was only casual in comparison with the close friendship which he established with him. This intimate acquaintance was important for the development of Schleiermacher's nationalism because it was through Schlegel that he came to know the personal satisfaction which the romanticists derived from the study of antiquity.

Carlton J. H. Hayes said that romanticism, together with forces created by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, not only made the nationalistic process possible, but almost made the awakening of nationalism inevitable.¹⁷ The romanticists' interest in folk language resulted in a widespread study of national philology. The natural result of these studies was the development of a deep-seated interest during the nineteenth century in national history.¹⁸ To a small degree through Novalis, but more through Friedrich Schlegel than anyone else, Schleiermacher was exposed to a lively interest in antiquity—an interest which complemented his own scholarly studies in Greek philosophy.¹⁹ Again, almost fortuitously, Schleiermacher's encounter and involvement with the romanticists came at a stage in his development as a nationalist when he could use their inspiration and interests to mature his nascent nationalism. From the day when he met Friedrich Schlegel in 1797 until the two men parted company approximately three years later Schleiermacher was entranced by Schlegel. He readily admitted that Schlegel was the most stimulating individual that he had ever met, and that just being near Schlegel was an inspirational experience for him.²⁰ It was Schlegel who opened the world of romanticism to him, for it was he who introduced him to Tieck, Novalis, and Wilhelm Schlegel. It was Friedrich Schlegel who made him feel the joy of true friendship for the first time in his life. In fact, the two men were so devoted to one another that for a short while they shared a Berlin apartment.

The immediate consequence of this friendship between the two men was their attempt to translate the works of Plato.²¹ This gigantic effort not only intensified Schleiermacher's desire to write and publish material resulting from his studies of Plato and antiquity in general, but also provided a means whereby Schlegel could impart to Schleiermacher the romantic tendency to idealize the past. The fact that Schlegel soon grew tired of translating Plato's works and moved on to other projects became insignificant in the light of the impulse toward glorification of a nation's past which he had imparted to Schleiermacher. This impulse was soon intensified into a compelling force as Schleiermacher cultivated his relationship with the other romanticists. He was quickly approaching that place in his nationalistic development where he would have to give expression to the feelings and emotions, as well as the philosophical concepts, which his associations with the romanticists had stirred within him.

The romanticists were quick to notice that Schleiermacher had reached an intellectual crisis in his life, and it was partly out of a desire to stimulate his self-expression that they began the publication of a cultural journal which they named the Athenaeum. After they had begun the journal they encouraged him to contribute articles in the hope that he would be able to “find himself.” What they actually did do was bring Schleiermacher to the point where he would publish a book that denied the basic tenets of romanticism, and at the same time set forth his first clearly defined ideas on nationalism.

The issue which played a crucial part in causing him to lash out at the romanticists was religion. As far as the romanticists were concerned, from 1795 until the fall of Napoleon, religion was part of the cultural limitation that Germany's people needed to overcome. Later, the romanticists were to play a big part in the revival of Catholicism. Although the romanticists could possibly be described as “religious men” in 1795, for them religion was in its true sense an inward activity and the only inspiration which they recognized was the inspiration which led men to do good.²² From the time Schleiermacher had met the romanticists he had struggled with the problem of trying to show these intellectual friends that they were wrong in attacking religion. Though none of the romanticists ever made light of the fact that he was a minister, he was able to feel the tension which his beliefs caused whenever he was among them. It is easy to see why Schleiermacher decided to use the subject of religion as his point of departure when the romanticists became insistent that he contribute to the Athenauem in order to clear up his personal problems and his difficulties in self-expression. But to the disappointment of the romanticists, he decided to write out his arguments in the form of a book instead of using the Athenauem, giving as his reasons for doing so the fact that he had few friends and as a result had never developed a talent for saying anything briefly. Since he lacked the ability to express himself in brief letters and short articles, his only alternative was to write a book.²³

For the study of the growth of Schleiermacher's nationalism the book which he wrote, Speeches on Religion to Its Cultured Despisers, is a key document. To be sure, in the book he was attempting to correct the misunderstandings of the romanticists concerning religion and the connection between religion in its pure state and the Church, its imperfect embodiment. In the process of explaining the true nature of the Church to the romanticists he became involved in discussions concerning the people who are served by the Church and concerning the relationship of the Church to the state. He found that he could not discuss the role of the Church in Germany without discussing the principles of education utilized by the Church. This took him directly to the problems which became the battleground of nineteenth-century nationalism: education, the relations between citizens and the state, the importance of the use of German as a language, and the role of tradition in Germany. Since his Speeches on Religion to Its Cultured Despisers contained a vast amount of material on his early nationalism, and since he so very carefully explained himself in detail, this book commands the attention of the student of his nationalism.

Before discussing the contents of his book, one must note that Schleiermacher was well aware of the fact that some of his ideas would prove to be so distasteful to officials of the Reformed Church that his career would suffer from their publication. Thus the writing of the book put him under a severe psychological strain,²⁴ which in turn caused him to study his subject very carefully before he committed himself in print. Schleiermacher's statements on nationalism were consequently not offhand remarks casually introduced into a discussion of religion. They were rather a studiously interwoven series of comments which were relevant to the author's concept of man's relationship to other men as well as man's relationship to God. An understanding of the pressure under which he worked will not only reveal the courage he demonstrated in writing the book, but will also give insight into the conviction he had on political and religious questions.

The study of Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion must begin with an analysis of a philosophical or theological point so that the nationalistic implications can be understood. Friedrich's announced purpose in writing the Speeches on Religion was to show the romanticists that they criticized religion because they were ignorant of what actually constituted true religion. The type of religion which he held forth for them was not like the traditional religious systems of the German states, built as they were around dogmas. In place of dogmatic systems he offered them a religion like that of the Moravians, grounded in a personal relationship with a personal devotion to a personal God. He actually abandoned objective manifestations of worship and devoted his work to a subjective investigation into the religious frame of mind.²⁵

The first logical step taken by him in his efforts to demonstrate the true nature of religious activity to the romanticists was to differentiate between religion and religious objects, between practical and theoretical religion. He felt that mankind had made the mistake of equating religious truths with outward manifestations of religion, such as the physical church. The same error had often been made in equating religious truths with the exact opposite of the physical church, Pietistic emotionalism. Followers of each of these tendencies had generally ridiculed and denounced the other due to the fact that people had by nature grown accustomed to either the theoretical side of religion, which produces a way of thinking, an attitude of contemplation, and specific feelings and desires, or to the practical side, which emphasizes a special type of conduct or morality. Schleiermacher was perfectly willing to accept the idea that both extremes of religious practice were a part of the religious life of Germany, but he emphatically denied that either purely practical or purely theoretical religion was in itself “true” religion.²⁶

In order to prove to the romanticist that true religion was not to be found in religious ceremonies or in Pietistic emotionalism, he used an extremely interesting nationalistic interpretation of the role of the church. In Schleiermacher's opinion the outward manifestations of either religious point of view had always become associated with political attempts to preserve it, either by giving the Church a legal position in the state or by the state's assuming a legal position over the Church. Even people like the romanticists, who did not believe in the doctrines of the Church, were willing to let the Church set the moral standards of the nation, but not as a result of any sense of religious enthusiasm or dedication, nor of a belief in a specific set of theological doctrines. Even though the romanticists denied the validity of the doctrines of the Church, they were willing to grant to the Church the continued right to exist because of its usefulness. Schleiermacher rejected outright the idea that the Church should be allowed to exist solely because it functioned in such a way that the state realized a benefit from its presence. As Schleiermacher stated his case, “Could there exist a legal constitution which rests on piety? Would not the entire idea that you hold so sacred disappear as soon as you took such a point of view?”²⁷ In the first place, a relationship between Church and state based upon ecclesiastical utility would actually prove that the Church was a synthetic social force. In addition, Schleiermacher pointed out that the state did not need an institution like the Church as it was conceived by the romanticists because moral laws were the result of the traditions of the people as codified by the state. Here he touched upon the fundamental truth underlying the nationalist's devotion: that the people actually make the laws by maintaining linguistic or cultural traditions which ultimately are sanctioned by the state. To be sure, the Church as an institution played a leading part in shaping the traditions of the people, but the influence of that institution was effective only to the extent that it was able to kindle the spirit of true religion within the heart of its communicants. While the Church might exercise an influence upon tradition, true religion functioned as part of the tradition itself, at least in Germany. Schleiermacher thus quite effectively introduced the nationalistic theme into his defense of religion against the attacks of the romanticists.

Schleiermacher's discussion of the role of the Church in the life of the individual brought up for investigation another point relating to religion which had nationalistic implications. He was deeply concerned over a mistaken notion of the romanticists that theologians claimed to have a special type of knowledge which lay beyond the realm of reason. He contended that religion in itself was not knowledge of either the world or God, nor was it a science concerning them. Rather, religion was an affection where the infinite was felt and seen by the finite.²⁸

Having attacked the romanticist's notion of Christian epistemology he felt compelled to demonstrate to them the exact nature of a Christian system of knowledge, although in doing so he had to turn to nationalistic proofs. His theory was in the nature of a triad in which the Ego, or the interior man, was the key component. The outer world, call it mass, matter, element, or form, was the opposite of the Ego. There was a coming together of the two elements and from this union, which was in constant change, a new state arose which perceived the absolute unity of both elements. This perception was knowledge as far as the individual was concerned. Schleiermacher moved quickly to apply this theory to the life of the individual when he said that the most significant problem for the Ego was transmitting or utilizing this knowledge. He decided that a good definition of freedom was complete external development without restraint of the personality. The self would simply develop into that which it was its nature to become. In other words, Schleiermacher was saying that freedom was the opportunity to develop one's potentialities without any type of interference.²⁹

Since each nationality had different characteristics and traditions, it logically followed that freedom existed only in those countries where the national characteristics were allowed to develop in an uninhibited way. Those nationalities which developed their skills and innate talents without restraint would ultimately rise to a level where an obvious superiority would be recognized. After all, noted Schleiermacher, had this very thing not happened in Germany in the field of theology? When speaking about the nature of true religion there actually was no other satisfactory example of true religion except that of the German people. “To whom should I turn if not to the sons of Germany?” he asked. “Where else is there an audience for my speech?”³⁰ Schleiermacher assured his readers in Speeches on Religion that he did not boast about German spiritual insight because of some blind predilection for his native soil or because he spoke the German language, either of which was grounds enough for boasting by the average nationalist. He took an even more extreme nationalistic position by asserting that the Germans were the only people who were “capable, as well as worthy, of having awakened [in them] a sensitivity for holy and divine things.”³¹

Having assumed such an ardently nationalistic position, he hastened to prove his point by comparing the people of the German states with Frenchmen and Englishmen. He maintained that it would be a waste of time to appeal to the English concerning matters of deep spirituality because they were too involved in gain and enjoyment. To them religion was a sham. As with their freedom, they put religion to the service of their selfish interests. They actually knew nothing of true religion, for they preached love and devotion for the Church in its historic form and ancient usages but they did so only from ulterior motives. They considered the Church and its traditions as a part of their constitution and as a means of protecting the state against its natural enemies.

Though the English lacked what the Germans possessed, they were in a much better situation than the wretched French. Compared to the English the French were barbarians looking with indifference at the historic events taking place in their land. Schleiermacher could not believe that a nation of people so engrossed in destroying their traditions as the French could be capable of deep religious feelings. Although he did not say it in so many words he certainly indicated that a reverence for God and a devotion to national traditions were synonymous. As a final word of evidence against the spirituality of the French, Schleiermacher showed his attachment to laws based on tradition by asking, “What does religion detest more than the unbridled arrogance with which rulers of the people offer defiance to the traditional laws of the world.”³²

Convinced that he had shown by comparison with Germans that neither the French nor the English were worthy of matters which were deeply spiritual, he turned once more with nationalistic fervor to the subject of the superior nature of the German people and the more wholesome religious atmosphere in the German states. With a nationalistic faith that bordered on naïveté he said of Germany:

Only in my native land is there that happy climate which excludes nothing entirely. There is found everything that beautifies nature, even though it may only be scattered. At least in individual cases everything that develops attains its most beautiful form. Neither wise moderation nor studious contemplation is lacking; it is here therefore that religions must find a refuge from the coarse barbarism and the cold worldly mind of the age.³³

The fact that Schleiermacher was so full of praise for the religious nature of the German people is a good indication that he would have heaped as much praise on almost any other aspect of German life. Religion just happened to be the topic in this particular case. One must also keep in mind that Schleiermacher was extremely vague about the meaning of “Germany” and “native land.” Several years were yet to pass before he would be able to distinguish even for himself the political implications of the term “Germany.” He was thinking in terms of generalities where idealization was easy. Like many immature nationalists he was willing to attribute to the “German people” superior qualities which he would not admit existed in any particular German state or group of people.

This nationalistic immaturity could be quite clearly seen in the way in which Schleiermacher treated the subject of religion in a specific German state, Prussia. After having praised in a general way the superior religious environment of Germany, he had nothing but words of contempt for the Protestant Church of Prussia. When he looked at the total picture of religious life in Germany everything was wonderful. When he surveyed particular instances of this same religious life he could express nothing but dismay. He admitted that he could not blame the romanticists for criticizing what passed for religion in Prussia since he, too, felt that Prussian religious life was in a lamentable state. As he expressed it, “Your very contempt for the poverty-stricken and powerless venerators of religion, in whom, from lack of nourishment, religion perishes before it is born, convinces me that you have a bent toward religion.”³⁴ He also made it clear to the romanticists that he shared their contempt for the leaders of German religious life, and, for that matter, for all the leaders of the various German states. In a statement that revealed both idealistic nationalism and realistic particularism he maintained that in spite of the rich cultural background of Germany, his homeland was “burdened with a very high degree of imperfection” and had demonstrated “small ability to prevent or abolish injustice.”³⁵

Schleiermacher's appraisal of religious conditions in Prussia as compared with his belief in the innate superiority of the German people illustrates the dilemma in which his nationalism placed him. He was exercising what Carlton J. H. Hayes referred to as nationalistic faith, which in simple terms was designated by Hayes as a faith in the destiny of a nation, a faith in what ought to be and not necessarily in what actually exists.³⁶ Yet, he was not completely dominated by this nationalistic faith, for his realistic nature forced him to admit that the particular instances of German society with which he came in contact in Prussia were certainly not to be greatly admired.

The deep conflicts resulting from the obvious contradiction between what Germany should be and what it actually was, caused Schleiermacher to lash out in anger against the invisible enemies of Germany who were preventing the natural progress of the German nation. He was exhibiting what has been called nationalistic intolerance³⁷ when he denounced the entire state system in Prussia by saying:

This is the extreme of utilitarianism to which the age with rapid strides is being hurried by worthless scholastic word-wisdom. This new barbarism is a fitting opposite to the old one. It is the lovely result of the paternal eudiamonistic politics which has taken the place of the ruder despotism and which pervades every aspect of life.³⁸

Schleiermacher was not more intolerant of what he saw in Prussia than of abuses elsewhere in Germany. He was just more aware of Prussia's political iniquities.

It is interesting to note that as an angry nationalist he used the same generalities in attacking the enemies of “Germany” as he had employed in defending the superiority of the “German people.” Like many young nationalists who begin to make utterances against the enemies of their nation, he was not yet able to point with assurance toward any specific person or institution which personified the “enemy.” This is understandable if one keeps in mind that in 1799, the year which he spent writing his Speeches on Religion, Schleiermacher was not too sure whether he was defending Prussia and a few other German states, all the German states, or just Prussia. Also, like many other young nationalists he had a tendency to attribute all of his “homeland's” problems to a single source. Like the African nationalist who decries the colonial system, the German nationalist who denounces Jews, or the American nationalist who assails communism, Schleiermacher tried to find one single source of difficulty which, if removed, would allow the natural flow of nationalistic spirit in Germany. He finally decided that the villain in Prussia as well as in most of the German states was the close relationship which existed between the Church and the state.

Since the German people were superior to other people because of their superior religious nature, and since the superior qualities of the German people had been rendered less effective than they should have been in developing a superior German nation, obviously every factor which hindered the work of the ecclesiastical institutions should be removed. If these institutions were as corrupt as Schleiermacher felt they were, then the corruptor was the state. By establishing a constitutional basis for the Church, with all the special privileges this involved, the state had delegated to that religious body many tasks which its members would not have performed under normal circumstances and which they were often not equipped to perform. These delegated responsibilities had in turn attracted to religious groups many people who were interested in the duties of the Church instead of their own spirituality.³⁹

After having given to the Church constitutional privileges and official responsibilities the state had demanded that in return the religious bodies should express their gratitude by consciously serving the interests of the state.⁴⁰ Because the state had delegated civil duties to theologians the state also demanded the right to regulate their activities through which these civil duties were performed. Schleiermacher felt that the main result of this close relationship of the Church and the various German states was the subservience of the Church to the state, which meant that theologians had designed their religious program to meet the needs of the state. Baptism, burial, and marriage, having become merely civil functions carried on by ecclesiastical representatives, had lost both their religious significance and their spiritual value. The results of the servitude of the Church were that in “all its regulations there is nothing which pertains to religion alone, nor is there anything in which religion is the chief subject. In sacred lectures and directions, even in the most holy and sacred affairs, everything has a legal and civil connotation.”⁴¹

Schleiermacher was not implying that the state should not rely upon and use the power of religious sentiment, for religious sentiment would naturally play a vital part in the life of any state inhabited by large numbers of Christians. He was opposed only to the manipulations of the religious feelings of the citizens in order to further the aims and goals of the state. He was finally convinced that the state should allow religious sentiment in Germany to make its natural course without guidance by the political authorities. In his determination to free religious life in Germany from state interference he was focusing attention upon a belief held by leading authorities on nationalism: that religious experience was closely akin to the spirit which motivated a group of people to have an awareness of national distinctives.⁴² Consequently, any act which served to limit the free development of true spiritual religion would automatically curtail the growth of the national consciousness among the German people.

In the place of the existing relationship between Church and state Schleiermacher suggested an alternative which would strengthen the ability of both the state and the Church to stimulate national devotion among the German people. He proposed that the Church should surrender its traditional task of education in Germany to the state.⁴³ He could justify such a revolutionary departure from tradition because this was to him the only step which would help the Church maintain a proper spiritual nature and at the same time give the state a maximum opportunity for teaching patriotic devotion. Both the Church and the state would benefit if the state controlled public education but both would suffer irreparable damage if the changes in the educational system were not made quickly. If the state controlled education, then the Church could cease to be a servant of the state and return to the task of relating man to God.

For the first time in German history the state could properly assume the direct responsibility for controlling the total civic life of its citizens. Schleiermacher was perfectly frank in saying that it was time for the state to stop hiding behind the robes of the ecclesiastical institutions of Germany. If the state wished to see its citizens express loyalty and devotion, then the state and not the Church would have to instill that loyalty in them. According to Schleiermacher:

If the state requires a special discipline in order to produce certain responses among its citizens, this must not have to come from the Church. If there is a universal feeling of the necessity of it, then the state may rely upon families, but as elements of the civil and not as elements of the ecclesiastical society.⁴⁴

In 1799 Schleiermacher was able to see what many modern nationalists discovered with regard to state control of education processes, or for that matter, of any means of communication: that political leaders could be sure of the nationalistic indoctrination of people only if the state itself directly controlled and supervised the transmission of these ideas. Whenever the state left the work of indoctrination to any organization the indoctrination would be diluted by the aims and views of that organization. In the case of the educational work of the ecclesiastical institutions of Germany, double damage was done to the process of instilling nationalism because the value of the Church as a bearer of German tradition was weakened by its duties to the state. This is why Schleiermacher's plea for the preservation of a purely spiritual Church in Germany was synonymous with a call for an increase in nationalistic efforts in German states like Prussia. In hoping to safeguard both the biblical role of the Church and the educational role of the state, he summed up his feelings by demanding, “Away then with every such union between Church and state! That remains my Cato's utterance to the end, or until I see the union actually destroyed.”⁴⁵

Having stated his convictions in a way that would leave no possible room for misunderstanding, Schleiermacher then stepped completely out of character by conjuring up the specter of a revolutionary upheaval in Germany if the separation of Church and state was not soon realized. Almost threateningly he asked, “Will it be, as in nearby countries, only after a great commotion and a simultaneous movement everywhere? Will the state by a friendly arrangement terminate the unhappy marriage with the Church without the death and resurrection of both the state and the Church?”⁴⁶

Publication of Speeches on Religion was a big step forward for Schleiermacher as far as his concept of national devotion was concerned. True, he was thinking in terms of vague generalities instead of concrete particulars but, nevertheless, he was moving toward a clearer vision of the personal responsibilities of citizens to their linguistic group. At the same time he was realizing the importance of tradition and custom as well as the need for recognition of linguistic ties; he was also making halting movements to defend those unique characteristics that set off the German people from other nationalities. He had not yet reached the level where he could intelligently ask himself the central question confronting the nationalist: “What actually is this nationalism which is now so universal?”⁴⁷ He was not yet even aware that he felt a close affection for his German language and for the ties created by it; but neither was he able to identify this feeling with any emotion with which he was familiar.

Quite naturally Schleiermacher's quickening nationalism was expressed in other publications. A number of documents dated about the same time as the Speeches on Religion reveal the same spirit, although none of them were as lengthy or as comprehensive as his first book. These documents, while not relating directly to nationalism or to nationalistic topics, demonstrate the intensity of concern he exhibited for his king and for Prussia and his corresponding search for a better relationship between the German people and their leaders. One such document was a sermon which he preached in Potsdam before Friedrich Wilhelm III at the Royal Garrison Church in March, 1799. In this sermon he told his listeners that they should take note of the fact that Christ lived on this earth for the single purpose of some day dying for the sake of man's righteousness. This was the only way for Christ to fulfill His responsibility to man. There was nothing unusual about Schleiermacher's point of emphasis, for probably half of the sermons preached by evangelical ministers has this as their theme. The nationalistic significance of the sermon was in the application of the principle of living with a definite purpose. He pointed out to the King and his court that it was not necessary for men in places of earthly responsibility to be taken from their tasks in order to give meaning and value to their lives. On the contrary, few men had as good an opportunity to serve their country and bring honor to themselves as did the servants of the state. If Prussia's leadership ever reached the place where the king and his assistants could no longer reform abuses and introduce improvements, then truly a day of grief would come upon the country.⁴⁸

Schleiermacher was trying to show Friedrich Wilhelm III that as king of Prussia he must recognize that he had been given a trust. The nation was an organic whole, of which the king was only one part. If he did not fulfill his obligations to the people who were a nation, not just his subjects, then of course the nation would suffer and the king would be dishonored.

A second document showing Schleiermacher's awakening nationalism was a letter which he wrote late in 1799 to a friend concerning the death of an obscure civil servant. In this letter Schleiermacher went to great lengths in criticizing the Prussian government for allowing advancement on the basis of friendship or political connections instead of on the basis of competence. The recent death of a very capable civil servant had made a strong impression upon him because he knew that with so much incompetence in public office the death of a dedicated public official was a loss to the nation.⁴⁹ Even as early as 1799 he was thinking in terms of gain and loss for the nation. Although he did not discuss the idea of death for the sake of the nation until 1806, he quite obviously was prepared to make some extreme demands upon the citizens for the nation.

It is difficult to consider Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion and the other contemporary documents relating to his nationalism without taking into account the Soliloquies, written and published one year after the Speeches on Religion. Both of these major works were intended to supply answers to questions raised by a specific group of people. The first had been intended for the romanticists, while the second was intended for critics of Speeches on Religion. The Soliloquies was thus only a continuation of the nationalistic exploration which Schleiermacher had begun in his first book.

He began the Soliloquies with an inquiry into the nature of freedom. Once he had caught a vision of the nature of individual freedom, he was able to expand the concept to encompass the nation. He came to see that the same factors which would contribute to the happiness and fulfillment of the free individual would also increase the happiness of a nation of individuals. It seems at first glance that in his Soliloquies Schleiermacher approached nationalism in a backward or at least peculiar way. This may be true, but the fact remains that once he clearly saw the individual as capable of freeing himself by recognizing his unique characteristics and values, it was but a short step to the application of this principle to the German nation, which he viewed as an organism or “person.”

Schleiermacher told his readers in the opening sentence of the Soliloquies that the greatest gift he could give to them would be the example of the spirit's “intimate conversation with itself. For this is the greatest achievement there is, a clear and undisturbed view of the free personality.”⁵⁰ With “free” man as his announced goal, he unfolded his thoughts in five impressive and very beautifully arranged meditations.

The first meditation was of little importance as far as nationalistic content is concerned for in it Schleiermacher merely chided the slave of circumstances who lived his life by adjusting to his environment. The second and third meditations were more important, for in them he waged a polemic against Kant and Fichte by magnifying the role of the conscience and showing its unque influence upon one's individualism. Focusing attention upon the Ego, the individual, the free personality capable of creation and destruction by its own will, Schleiermacher maintained that the inner man was the point of origin of all freedom because only “his innermost activity, the place where his true nature abides, is free, and in contemplating it, I feel myself to be at the sacred foundation of freedom, far from all debasing limitation.”⁵¹ Following this logic to its conclusion, Schleiermacher asserted that no man could ever know any kind of freedom until he had set the “self” free.

Once into the concept of individual freedom he could talk of nothing else. The fourth and fifth meditations, in which he spoke of mankind's destiny and the beautiful rhapsody of spiritual life, were only extensions of his original notion of freedom. They were the critical chapters of his work, however, as well as vital elements in his evolutionary development toward nationalism, for it was in these chapters that he expressed concern that man could be content with mere shadows of freedom. According to him man can never become free by arriving at some philosophical position that is founded on a universal concept; nor can he become free by submitting his life to the duties of the Church or the state. These activities do not raise man's level of activity high enough for him to realize the unique nature of freedom. Furthermore, freedom would never be gained by viewing the rough, shapeless masses of mankind that are supposedly alike but which are in a process of external transition.⁵² But if freedom could not be gained in the traditional ways, that is to say, through philosophical speculation or service to mankind, how then was freedom to come to the heart of a man? With a simplicity that defies an immediate understanding and with a nationalistic impact that revolutionized Schleiermacher's own life just a few years later, he said that freedom was the act of beholding humanity within oneself, for this vision was seen by him to be the intimate and necessary tie between morality and theory.⁵³

This realization furnished Schleiermacher the key for unlocking the mystery of nationalism because it was on this basis that he, a Prussian particularist, would be able to understand that in his own personality each Prussian must be able to see all of Prussia—its traditions, language, customs, laws, religion, and people. Later, when his nationalism matured and he applied this principle to Germany during the dark years before the War of Liberation, he came to understand that Germany could never rise above its limitations unless it looked upon itself as a nation. The same process which would lead to freedom for the individual would make a nation free. But if it was true that the factors causing personal freedom would also induce national freedom, it was also true that the inhibitions limiting the growth of personal freedom would stunt the growth of national freedom.

When Schleiermacher surveyed the political and intellectual scene in Germany he knew that the signs all pointed to a lack of the ingredients necessary for national consciousness. The Enlightenment had made the task of achieving nationalism almost impossible by masking decay with a false front of progress. In his heart Schleiermacher was confessing that for many years Germany would not know the freedom of which he spoke when he said in the Soliloquies: “Every last moment is supposed to have been full of progress. Oh, how much I despise this generation, which adorns itself more shamelessly than any other ever did.”⁵⁴ This statement was one of the first indications that he grasped both the advantages and difficulties inherent in a nationalistic movement. He had a halting notion of what it would take to “free” the German people, but at the same time he could see that there was no immediate indication that the people of Germany would even want to be “free.”

Here then was the young nationalist advancing an idealistic program which had no immediate possibility of succeeding. Unintentionally venturing beyond the subject of religion in his Speeches on Religion and Soliloquies, he stated principles concerning freedom and individual responsibility which were fundamentals for a nationalistic point of view. Scorning his homeland for its old-fashioned government and exalting the traditions of the German people, he called for a national interest in education and complete separation of the affairs of Church and state. He saw that the greatest problem facing Germany was the inertia which neutralized the natural superiority of the German way of life.⁵⁵ Most important of all for the growth of his understanding of nationalism, Schleiermacher by 1800 had arrived at the conviction that man can alter the course of history only by an act of his own will. This led him to pose for his own mind the question of whether the principle that he had discovered for the individual also held true for the nation. If so, then he was also faced with the problem of arousing the German people to exercise their will power in order to change the course of German history. He was not sure of the questions, let alone the answers, but of one fact he was more than sure: any act that helped either him or the German people to realize a greater degree of freedom would be worth whatever cost might be involved. Come what might, Schleiermacher could confidently declare, “My will rules fate, so long as I combine everything into this comprehensive aim, and remain indifferent with reference to external situations.”⁵⁶

Six years were to pass before he was to have the opportunity to test his theory on himself and on Germany. He was not a German nationalist in the full sense of the word in 1800, for he still did not have a clear understanding of the difference between his loyalty to Prussia and his obligation to Germany. Still, he had within him the feelings, emotions, and loyalties which would blossom as national patriotism as soon as a moment of crisis arrived.

Notes

1. Gottfried Schleiermacher to Friedrich Schleiermacher [no place, no date], Georg Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben in Briefen, I, 62-63.

2. Friedrich Schleiermacher to his father from Halle, August 14, 1787, ibid., I, 65-66; Wilhelm Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers, I, 39-46; Friedrich Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, pp. xviii-xix.

3. Schleiermacher to his father from Schlobitten, May 15, 1791, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 87-88.

4. Richard Brandt, The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, pp. 35-38; Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, pp. 121-126.

5. Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, p. xxiii.

6. Schleiermacher to his father from Schlobitten, February 14, 1793, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 107-109.

7. Ibid., I, 109.

8. Ibid.

9. Unnamed and undated sermon, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Predigten, II, 148-161.

10. Unnamed and undated sermon, ibid., II, 116-120; Ernst Müsebeck, Schleiermacher in der Geschichte der Staatsidee und des Nationalbewusstseins, pp. 23-24.

11. Hans Kohn, “Arndt and the Character of German Nationalism,” American Historical Review, LIV (July, 1949), 789.

12. Schleiermacher to his sister from Berlin, October 22, 1797, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 160-164.

13. Paul Kluckhohn, Persönlichkeit und Gemeinschaft: Studien zur Staatsauffassung der deutscher Romantik, p. 55.

14. Ibid., pp. 55-58.

15. Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz from Berlin, July 1, 1799, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 227-229.

16. Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz from Potsdam, February 25, 1799, ibid., I, 198-200.

17. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, p. 59.

18. Ibid., p. 54.

19. Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat: Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates, pp. 69-73.

20. Schleiermacher to his sister from Berlin, December 31, 1797, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 169-171.

21. Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz from Potsdam, April 29, 1799, ibid., I, 169-171. Although it has no bearing on the rest of this manuscript it is interesting to note that Schleiermacher devoted a vast amount of his time after 1810 to studies in Greek philosophy. Of the twenty-three papers which he read before the plenary sessions of the Royal Academy of Science in Berlin from January, 1811, until August, 1832, in eight he discussed problems involving the works of Greek philosophers and in six others he compared in some way contemporary and Greek classical thought. These are listed and dated in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Philosophie, III, xiii.

22. Erwin Kircher, Philosophie der Romantik, p. 5.

23. Schleiermacher to Georg von Brinckmann from Berlin, March 22, 1800, Heinrich Meisner (ed.), Schleiermacher als Mensch: Sein Werden und Wirken, Familien-und Freundesbriefe, I, 167.

24. The tension under which Schleiermacher worked as he wrote Speeches on Religion was so great that he neglected not only the trivial activities of daily life but also some very important duties and responsibilities. The result was that he often did things during this time which were a source of extreme embarrassment to him. On one occasion he happened to pass Friedrich Wilhelm III while taking a walk, but Schleiermacher was so deeply engrossed in contemplation over his book that he paid the sovereign such little mind that he did not even remove his hat. A guard promptly stopped Schleiermacher and gave him a stern lecture on the respect due the head of state. See Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz from Potsdam, March 20, 1799, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 204-205.

25. Über die Religion in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Theologie, I, 143-167; Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, III, 116-118.

26. Über die Religion in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Theologie, I, 174.

27. Ibid., I, 165.

28. Ibid., I, 184-185.

29. Brandt, Philosophy of Schleiermacher, pp. 136-137.

30. Über die Religion in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Theologie, I, 153.

31. Ibid., I, 153.

32. Ibid., I, 153-154.

33. Ibid., I, 154.

34. Ibid., I, 252.

35. Ibid., I, 164.

36. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 165.

37. Ibid., p. 171.

38. Über die Religion in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Theologie, I, 298.

39. Ibid., I, 341.

40. Ibid., I, 341-342.

41. Ibid., I, 343.

42. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, pp. 11-19, 164-182.

43. Über die Religion in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Zur Theologie, I, 379-381.

44. Ibid., I, 380.

45. Ibid., I, 350.

46. Ibid.

47. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 2.

48. “Einige Empfindungen des sterbenden Jesus, wie auch wir uns für unsere letzten Augenblicke wünschen sollen,” in Schleiermacher, Sämmtliche Werke, Predigten, I, 41-53.

49. Schleiermacher to Charlotte von Kathen from Berlin, December 2, 1799, Reimer (ed.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben, I, 235-237.

50. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Werke Schleiermachers, p. 176.

51. Ibid., pp. 180-181.

52. Ibid., pp. 189-190.

53. Ibid., p. 187.

54. Ibid., p. 199-200.

55. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

56. Ibid., pp. 211-212.