SOURCE: "Roosevelt's First Inaugural: A Study of Technique," in The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 65, No. 2, April, 1979, pp. 137-49.

Historian David Potter's observation that, by historical hindsight, the critic might not perceive events as contemporaries comprehended them¹ is germane to a study of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's First Inaugural Address. Although Roosevelt had large majorities in the Congress, he could not know the "Hundred Days" legislation would pass without Congressional demurral or difficulty. To assume that FDR knew of his forthcoming legislative successes when he fashioned his first inaugural is mistaken, and such an assumption causes the critics to miss some valuable insights concerning FDR and his speech.

FDR's first inaugural is one of his best known and most important speeches. If for no other reason, it was a significant speech because FDR believed it contained all of the elements of his New Deal.² Samuel I. Rosenman ranked the speech among FDR's best: "This was one of the President's truly great speeches, not only in form and substance but in accomplishment."³ And Harry Hopkins thought it was FDR's best speech: "For myself I think his first inaugural address was the best speech he ever made. . . . With that one speech, and in those few minutes, the appalling anxiety and fears were lifted, and the people of the United States knew that they were going into a safe harbor under the leadership of a man who never knew the meaning of fear."⁴ But surprisingly little rhetorical attention has been paid the speech.⁵

My primary purpose in this essay is to examine three rhetorical techniques that FDR used in his speech. Before discussing them, however, I wish to establish that they were indeed his techniques; and after discussing them I shall observe their similarity to Adolph Hitler's rhetorical techniques in response to the Zeitgeist of March, 1933.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE SPEECH

In this section, I wish to examine three general areas: the nature of the texts, who was responsible for the original draft and the famous fear statement, and selected textual emendations by FDR.

The following extant drafts are in the Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York: the first draft, which is in FDR's handwriting; the second draft, a typed copy of the first with a variety of emendations; the third draft, also typed, which includes the emendations from draft two and additional emendations; and a final typed reading copy from which FDR delivered his speech.⁶

The existence of Roosevelt's handwritten draft, in conjunction with a note which FDR had attached to this draft (the note stated that he wrote the first draft at Hyde Park on 27 February 1933), has led some to conclude that FDR authored his own inaugural address.⁷ Although FDR wrote this first draft, he was not responsible for its authorship.

Rather, Raymond Moley composed the first draft. In fine, Moley has related how he prepared the first draft, how FDR copied his draft in longhand at Hyde Park, and how Moley tossed his own draft into the fire, with the words "This is your speech now," after FDR had finished copying his draft.⁸ Moley's version is independently verified by an investigation of FDR's handwritten draft. Several of FDR's handwritten pages do suggest that he did copy them from another source. Instead of the speech text's filling each successive page, there are lacunae on pages three, five, and seven. These lacunae suggest that FDR took more pages to write than did Moley, or to put it another way, the ten pages of copy could be reduced to approximately eight pages if FDR had written his text seriatim on each page.⁹

As for the famous fear statement, "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," a variety of sources have implied that it was somehow FDR's.¹⁰ However, the phrase was undoubtedly Louis Howe's handiwork. Howe was FDR's personal secretary and Howe dictated a whole beginning paragraph for the third draft in which the phrase appears de novo.¹¹ If the phrase were not original with Howe, then his original source has eluded later researchers.¹²

I turn now to selected emendations made in the texts. But I shall deal only with FDR's revisions, and then only those revisions which are germane to my study.

Only one major relevant revision appears on the handwritten draft (FDR's copy from Moley's draft). In the second paragraph, Moley wrote of leadership in past national crises—the Revolution, the early emergence of the nation, and the Civil War—and how the people's support of that leadership "on every occasion has won through to." FDR crossed out the quoted phrase and substituted "is an essential to victory."¹³ Not only is FDR's phrase more concise, but it also links leadership with victory in a military-like sense, about which I shall note more later.

A variety of minor emendations are made in the second draft (the first typed one), but I pass them by because they are not in FDR's bold, print-like handwriting.

The third draft (the second typed one) is replete with FDR's handwriting and contains some significant alterations. In his paragraph that contained his fear statement, Howe had written, "nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes the needed efforts to bring about prosperity once more." With a definite emphasis on military-like words, FDR produced, "which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance" [hereafter, italicized words indicate FDR's emendations]. Later on, the text read: "The standards of the money-changers stand indicted"; however, FDR wished further to denigrate the bankers by writing: "Practices of the unscrupulous money-changers stand indicted." Practices somewhat sullies the loftiness of "standards" and unscrupulous quite speaks for itself. Treating the bankers in the same vein a bit later, FDR changed "They know of no other ways than the ancient rules" to "They know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers." A little later on, FDR further strengthened the text to cast additional ridicule on the bankers. "The moral stimulation of work must no longer be submerged in the sham of evanescent profit scouring" became "The moral stimulation of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits."¹⁴ All of these emendations demonstrate that FDR took particular pains (pleasure?) to denigrate and deprecate the bankers more than Moley's draft had done. Later, I shall demonstrate why.

In the latter part of his address, FDR turned to his personal leadership as President. In a number of places in this draft FDR strengthened or clarified Moley's language in order to enhance the positive nature and vigor of his intended leadership style. The following examples illustrate the point. "Because without such discipline no progress can be made, or any leadership really led" became "Because without such discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective." The future tense of Moley's thought is brought into the present tense by FDR's change and stresses the immediacy of his leadership, and effective looks for immediate and tangible results. "I am prepared under my constitutional duty to indicate the measures" became "I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures." Recommend has a stronger sense of positive advocacy than "indicate," which suggests merely pointing out. The point is that FDR wanted to stress his leadership role by taking the lead in recommending to Congress his measures rather than merely indicating to Congress what measures he thought were appropriate. But, interestingly, FDR deleted "sword of in the following passage: "With this pledge taken, I assume unhesitatingly the sword of leadership of this great army of our people." Perhaps the term "sword" sounded too militaristic, and perhaps he wanted to stress his personal leadership rather than his assuming a symbolic sword of leadership. All of these emendations demonstrate that FDR wanted clearly to state and to show the active personal leadership with which he would assume the presidency, and that he wished to strengthen Moley's draft in those respects.¹⁵

The fourth draft, his actual reading copy, contained only one emendation. While waiting in the Senate Committee Room for the ceremonies to begin, FDR added in longhand an opening sentence: "This is a day of consecration." When he delivered the speech, he verbally inserted "national" before "consecration."¹⁶

In summary, one might have wished that FDR had authored his own first inaugural, but he did not; and that the famous fear statement, which is so intimately associated with him and his inaugural, was his also, but it was not. Nevertheless, FDR did make emendations on three of the four drafts, and most of those changes demonstrated his desire to use militaristic words to evoke military-like associations in his listeners. He paid special attention to the bankers by utilizing language which purposefully defamed them and their practices. Lastly, he managed his language to strengthen his leadership role. He would act immediately to lead the nation in its crisis. The philosophical significance of this textual investigation is that, although the forthcoming exegesis of FDR's rhetorical purposes is concerned with some of Moley's and Howe's ideas, FDR was satisfied with the text to make it his inaugural address, and many of the points I shall later make were expressly his word choices. What follows, then, is based on the assumption that "the President's speech is the President's speech."¹⁷

THE TECHNIQUES

Before discussing FDR's three rhetorical techniques, I wish to comment briefly on his speech as one in the genre of inaugural addresses. Wolfarth has isolated four major issues on which presidents traditionally speak: Domestic Issues, International Issues, American Traditions, and Other.¹⁸ FDR's first inaugural pays tribute to American Traditions. Some typical examples are "This great nation," "the American spirit of the pioneer," "seeking old and precious moral values," "essential democracy," and so forth. A handful of sentences centered around the "good neighbor" policy comprise his treatment of International Issues. But FDR's predominant theme was Domestic Issues. In an accompanying notation for his inaugural address, FDR wrote that in his speech he attempted primarily to allay the nation's fear: "I sought principally in the foregoing Inaugural Address to banish, so far as possible, the fear of the present and of the future which held the American people and the American spirit in its grasp."¹⁹ Indeed, his famous fear statement made an in delible impression on the American mind. Yet, however popularized and catchy FDR's famous fear statement was, it was not the crux of his speech. Nor was it the solitary theme on which commentators based their evaluations of his speech's efficacy with his reading and listening audiences. A close examination of FDR's first inaugural reveals that he used three rhetorical techniques to aid him in announcing his implementation of his New Deal. In this section, I shall examine these techniques in relationship to the American people and the Congress within the inaugural context of March, 1933.

The Scapegoat Technique

In early 1933, America's preeminent concern was the banking crisis. Almost 5,000 banks had failed since 1929, and twenty-two states had closed their banks prior to March 4 of FDR's inaugural year.²⁰ The spiraling effects of margin and then more margin, stock losses, foreclosures, and, ultimately, bank failures probably had at their epicenter the bankers and the brokers. Tugwell specifically indicted them: "Wall Street was again the wicked place it had been during the progressive era. The financial establishment was being blamed for what had happened."²¹ And Fair concurred with Tugwell's analy sis: "It was true that most of the guilt belonged to the money changers, who probably had something to do with the Stock Exchange."²²

FDR's coup in his inaugural was to make the moneychangers the scapegoat²³ for the Depression. It has already been demonstrated, via the textual emendations, how FDR purposefully used language to denigrate the moneychangers. In his speech, he unflinchingly proclaimed what was believed by the average American—the money-changers were culpable for the Depression. The efficacy of his using the scapegoat technique ensued from his ability to channel the American people's anxieties and frustrations from themselves to the moneychangers. The speech text leaves no doubt that FDR utilized the scapegoat technique to blame Wall Street for the Depression: "the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed through their own stubbornness and their own incompetence, have admitted their failure, and have abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous moneychangers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men." And, again, "Yes, the money-changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths."²⁴ Leuchtenburg noted that FDR's delivery matched the mood of his language: "Grim, unsmiling, chin uplifted, his voice firm, almost angry, he lashed out at the bankers."²⁵ Having castigated Wall Street, FDR then indicated that he would direct his New Deal measures toward checking it and its practices. In order to stop a return to the "evils of the old order," FDR announced that there would be banking reform: "There must be a strict supervision of all banking and credits and investments. (Applause.) There must be an end to speculation with other people's money. (Applause.) And there must be a provision for an adequate but sound currency. (Applause.)"²⁶ To this end, Congress passed FDR's Emergency Banking Act on March 9.²⁷ The task of putting "people to work" began with the Civilian Conservation Corps, March 31 ; the fear of foreclosure was alleviated by the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, May 12, and the Home Owner's Loan Act, June 13.²⁸

>Various contemporary signs indicated that FDR struck a responsive rhetorical chord by utilizing his scapegoat technique. When he said that he would restore the "temple to the ancient truths," his inaugural audience applauded for the first time.²⁹ Editors from Universal Films and Pathe News included FDR's attack on the bankers in their news film.³⁰ Tugwell noted that FDR "tramped hard on those who were responsible."³¹ Morison observed that FDR gave the money-changers an "excoriation." 32 >The news-print media also supported FDR's use of the scapegoat technique. The Christian Century noted, "The 'false money-changers' deserve all the condemnation that can be heaped upon them."³³The Nation observed that Roosevelt dealt the money-changers a "verbal scourging."³⁴News-Week stated, "It was an assault on the bank ers, against whom the voices of the distressed are raised in an ever-swelling chorus as the depression endures."³⁵ The scapegoat technique also had FDR's desired effect on the business community. The Times (London) noted that FDR was "likely to rouse the opposition of a good many vested interests."³⁶ FDR used the scapegoat tech nique to blunt the expected opposition from those laissez-faire sympathizers who might attack his New Deal banking and investment measures.³⁷ Rauch observed that FDR was somewhat successful in disarming his banking critics: "The bankers were in a chastened mood. . . . They had lost the cohesion of a vested group."³⁸

FDR, then, used the scapegoat technique to blame Wall Street for the Depression and the banking crisis. Available evidence from the inaugural audience, from contemporary news-films and news-print media, and from later commentators suggests that FDR was successful in obtaining his end.

Military Metaphor

Although Americans had elected FDR and his New Deal, questions still remained about the nature of his personal leadership. Granted, FDR and the Democratic party platform had advocated reform and recovery through lower tariffs, unemployment relief, the protection of investments and agriculture, the repeal of the Prohibition amendment, etc.; yet Americans avidly awaited his inaugural address, which should cue the nation to how he planned to lead the country out of the Depression.³⁹

Knowing that his program would need mass support and that the New Deal would bring broad and at times radical departures from conducting government as it had been until 1933, Roosevelt endeavored to garner that support by using military metaphor. Osborn has argued that an examination of metaphor can "permit a more precise focusing upon whatever values and motives are salient in society at a given time."⁴⁰ Leuchtenburg studied the Depression era values and motives and concluded that FDR purposefully responded to the Depression crisis by using military metaphor: "Roosevelt's inaugural address . . . reflected the sense of wartime crisis,"⁴¹ and "President Roosevelt sought to restore national confidence by evoking the mood of wartime."⁴² The careful listener or reader would have noted that FDR had deployed an advance guard of military metaphor in the early parts of his address: "retreat into advance," "victory," "direct recruiting," and "emergency of war." But when FDR directly urged support for and acceptance of his New Deal leadership in the latter three-fourths of his speech, his language was replete with military metaphor:

if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army, willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such discipline no progress can be made, no leadership becomes effective. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and our property to such discipline because it makes possible a leadership which aims at the larger good. This I propose to offer, pledging that the larger purposes will bind upon us, bind upon us all a sacred obligation, with a unity of duty hitherto evoked only in times of armed strife. With this pledge taken, I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems.⁴³

There can be little doubt that FDR purposefully used the military metaphor to create the symbol of a great American army. This army, organized under the personal leadership of its new Commander-in-Chief, would wage war on the Depression. In fact, a certain Rev. Hicks from Yonkers, New York, had urged in a letter to FDR that he call for a "mobilization as if the United States were at war."⁴⁴ The repetition of "discipline" four times and of "leadership" three times, and other value laden words, such as "duty," "sacred obligation," and "armed strife," should reinforce those salient values and desires which yearned for action against the Depression. If Conkin was correct when he argued that "The situation invited a surrender of power to some leader,"⁴⁵ then FDR's military metaphor facilitated Americans' surrender of power and liberty, much as one does in the real Army, to their Commander-in-Chief.

The effect-oriented responses from private persons and the press were favorable to FDR's military metaphor appeals. From all quarters came support for FDR's bid for quasi-military leadership power, and that support was often couched in Roosevelt's infectious military metaphor. Republican Alfred M. Landon of Kansas affirmed, "If there is any way in which a Republican governor of a midwestern state can aid the President in the fight, I now enlist for the duration of the war."⁴⁶ Myron C. Taylor, chairman of United States Steel Corporation, declared, "I hasten to reenlist to fight the depression to its end."⁴⁷ James Hagerty wrote in the New York Times, "In the phraseology which ran all through his speech he indicated that he regarded the United States as in an economic war."⁴⁸ The New York Times capsulized other leading newspapers' comments, parts of which are included here: The Constitution in Atlanta said Roosevelt gave a "straight-from-the-shoulder attack"; the News-Age Herald in Birmingham labeled the speech "a clarion call for nation unity in the face of a crisis"; the Plain Dealer in Cleveland responded to FDR's military metaphor and characterized the speech as "fighting words, fit for a time that calls for militant action"; in Des Moines, the Register believed "it is the rallying of the country to renewal of a courageous and sustained war on the depression."⁴⁹ The New York Daily News had not sup ported Roosevelt, but it pledged itself "to support the policies of FDR for a period of at least one year; longer if circumstances warrant."⁵⁰ In its inimitable manner, The Times (London) also took notice of Roosevelt's military metaphor: "What is important to note is the spirit which inspired it throughout. A high and resolute militancy breathes in every line."⁵¹

But this successful use of military metaphor—as gauged by private and media reaction—could also hurt FDR if Americans misperceived his intent. Therefore, in what seems to be an effort to reassure Americans that they had little to fear of a nascent executive dictatorship in his New Deal, FDR hastened to allay the American people: "Action in this image, action to this end, is feasible under the form of government which we have inherited from our ancestors. Our constitution is so simple, so practical, that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without the loss of essential form."⁵² The critic might have chal lenged FDR's assertion that "changes in emphasis and arrangement" can ensue without a "loss of essential form," but Farr believed the assertion sounded fine to about 99 percent of FDR's listeners and, anyway, there was little time to raise that question because FDR's confident voice continued on.⁵³

However, Adolph Hitler's Fuehrer-principle was fresh in some Americans' minds and they were not so easily beguiled. Partially indicative of this thinking was William Randolph Hearst's New York Mirror issue of 6 March, which headlines its story, "ROOSEVELT ASKS DICTATOR'S ROLE."⁵⁴ Edmund Wilson, editor of the New Republic, believed that FDR's military metaphor signaled a dire warning: "The thing that emerges most clearly is the warning of a dictatorship."⁵⁵ Rauch has written that, even among liberals, the military metaphor caused some concern: "Liberals were later to profess they found the germs of fascism in the First New Deal. Perhaps they found cause for suspicion in the evocation of the 'regimented' moods of wartime."⁵⁶

Although some contemporary, and especially later, critics were less comfortable with FDR's military metaphor than were most of his contemporaries, Roosevelt's military metaphor successfully evoked in the American people a patriotic duty and discipline to support his quasi-military leadership in his symbolic war on the Depression. Lest this military metaphor might smack too much of an incipient, executive dictatorship, FDR took pains to assure his audience that the Constitution would survive, that mere changes in emphasis would not affect its essential form.

Carrot-and-Stick Technique

During the interregnum (November 1932 to March 1933), Roosevelt received advice from many quarters, including even President Herbert Hoover, on how he could help to stop the deepening Depression. Of particular concern here is the advice FDR received on how to cope with the new Congress, about which some predictions were not particularly encouraging. Rollins has given an accurate picture of Congress before FDR's inaugural was delivered: "The new Congress was already divided and confused. Some wanted inflation, some a sound gold dollar. Some wanted a 30-hour week, some employment guaranteed. Some looked for a new Mussolini, some for a new Jefferson."⁵⁷ Political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote that it would take a strong President to lead a boisterous Congress: "The new Congress will be an excitable and impetuous body, and it will respect only a President who knows his own mind and will not hesitate to employ the whole authority of his position."⁵⁸ FDR received from Senator Key Pittman of Nevada a letter ( 11 February 1933) in which Pittman warned FDR about the Congress: "your leadership .. . is going to be exceedingly difficult for a while. Democrats have grown . . . individualistic, they have lost the habit of cooperation, they have grown unaccustomed to discipline."⁵⁹ Of these typical warnings, Patterson has written, "Such predictions of an unruly Congress in a time of social and economic crisis were commonplace in the months prior to Roosevelt's inauguration."⁶⁰ FDR had enlisted the country in his symbolic army with the military metaphor; he had used the scapegoat technique to subdue Wall Street; he had a favorable press;⁶¹ he had now only to deal with the Congress.

Accordingly, FDR resorted to the carrot-and-stick approach to move the Congress to follow his executive leadership. His carrot was a clever cajoling of Congress to act either on its own or in tandem with him:

And it is to be hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly equal, wholly adequate, to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure. I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom. I shall seek within my constitutional authority to bring to speedy adoption.⁶²

But if the carrot were not motivation enough, then the stick would be:

But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis: broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.⁶³

The tumultuous applause which immediately followed, and it was the greatest applause of any passage in the speech,⁶⁴ could not have been mistaken by the listening members of Congress. Eleanor Roosevelt thought the applause was "a little terrifying. You felt that they would do anything—if only someone would tell them what to do."⁶⁵ The News in Dallas supported FDR's carrot-and-stick technique by suggesting that, "if Congress fails him, the country will strongly back him in his demands for virtual war powers."⁶⁶ The conservative Boston Transcript even agreed with FDR: 'The President's program demands dictatorial authority. This is unprecedented in its implications, but such is the desperate temper of the people that it is welcome."⁶⁷

In hindsight, the Congress was anything but intransigent, but FDR did not know that when he fashioned his speech. Conkin observed, "Almost any legislative proposal would pass."⁶⁸ Patterson believed that Congress' willingness to cooperate with FDR stemmed from its wish to delegate responsibility, its eagerness to spend, and because FDR was actually more conservative than was the Congress.⁶⁹ Although the carrot-and-stick technique admittedly did not directly cause Congress to cooperate, it did nevertheless serve a vital function. The carrot-and-stick's efficacy ensued from FDR's willingness to use the stick if it were necessary. Rollins believed that if FDR had not demonstrated his ability to act and to lead, he might have failed on inauguration day: "What Roosevelt did do, with monumental success, was to preserve the faith which vague commitment or partial action might have shattered."⁷⁰

ROOSEVELT AND HITLER COMPARED

The Zeitgeist of March, 1933, manifested some similar conditions in Germany and the United States,⁷¹ and these conditions were utilized by their respective leaders. Humphrey has outlined the conditions and their causes:

The same world-wide economic collapse which brought Hitler to power in Germany in 1933, brought Roosevelt and the New Deal to America. . . . [I]n the month of March, 1933, the positions of Roosevelt and Hitler were strangely similar. Both had risen to power on the crest of a wave of protest against things as they were. Both men and both nations faced problems of unemployment, financial collapse, and the task of inspiring a bewildered and despairing people.⁷²

Toland believed that Hitler's Weltanschauung originated "in New York City's Wall Street."⁷³

In reacting to similar conditions, the two leaders used similar language. Hitler blamed the Jews and other halfhearted lukewarm people (die Halben) for the Depression.⁷⁴ The historical originators of the scapegoat became under Hitler the very object of his attack. Hitler also used militaristic terms in his speeches. Words such as "blood, authority of personality, and a fighting spirit," as well as "victory" and "fight," interspersed his speeches.⁷⁵ On 23 March 1933, Hitler used the carrot-and-stick technique in opening the Reichstag. He offered the Reichstag an "opportunity for friendly co-operation"; but his stick was, "It is for you, gentlemen of the Reichstag, to decide between war and peace."⁷⁶ Chancellor Hitler demonstrated that he appreciated the efficacy of Roosevelt's various techniques in his inaugural address by the language Hitler chose to express his congratulatory cable:

The Reich Chancellor is in accord with the President that the virtues of sense of duty, readiness for sacrifice, and discipline must be the supreme rule of the whole nation. This moral demand, which the President is addressing to every single citizen, is only the quintessence of German philosophy of the State, expressed in its motto "The Public Weal Before Private Gain."⁷⁷

Mussolini's Il Giornale d'Italia saw in FDR's inaugural a reaffirmation of its views:

President Roosevelt's words are clear and need no comment to make even the deaf hear that not only Europe but the whole world feels the need of executive authority capable of acting with full powers of cutting short the purposeless chatter of legislative assemblies. This method of government may well be defined as Fascist.⁷⁸

With similar circumstances in which they came to power, with similar reactions via their similar rhetorical techniques, would not one expect their personal leadership to be similar? Under Hitler, Germany became a Nazi dictatorship. The possibility certainly existed for FDR to become a dictator. Gunther has wisely observed that possibility: "We are apt to forget nowadays the immense, unprecedented, overwhelming authority conferred on FDR by an enthusiastically willing Congress during the first hundred days of his first administration. The Reichstag did not give Hitler much more."⁷⁹ Farr has observed that FDR's "proposed charter of authority, as we read it today, was simplicity itself: the President was king."⁸⁰ And Robinson noted, "Clearly, semi-dictatorial powers had been granted the President."⁸¹ Yet, the United States did not have a Mussolini or a Hitler in Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

One reason was the nature of their respective countries. Halasz has argued that the United States had a long history of constitutional democracy which Germany did not have; moreover, FDR was not asking for a sacrifice of political freedom, as was Hitler; nor were the American people, as were most Germans, convinced that the Depression demanded such a sacrifice.⁸² The Democratic party did not utilize intimidation and physical force to bully others, as did the Nazis, and the Republican party could and did oppose FDR, whereas Hitler stifled dissent and suppressed opposing political parties.

Also, Hitler and Roosevelt had critical differences in their conceptions of leadership and the framework in which it should be exercised. On the first day he assumed the office of Reich Chancellor, Hitler said he would never relinquish it: "No power in the world will ever get me out of here alive."⁸³ Juxtaposed to that statement is an interesting FDR emendation of the third draft, which suggests that FDR had a more reasonable and limited conception of his leadership tenure. On the draft, FDR added present to the following sentence: "They have made me the present instrument of their wishes."⁸⁴ The term "present" implies the four-year term, and it does not preclude some other president four years later—nor is a permanent Roosevelt presidency thereby suggested. In the 1934 Nuremburg rallies, Hitler's minion Rudolph Hess proclaimed, "The party is Hitler. Hitler, however, is Germany just as Germany is Hitler. Heil Hitler!"⁸⁵ No such language has been adduced to FDR's most ardent supporters. While Hitler was the embodiment of Louis XIV's popularly ascribed dictum l'etat c'est moi, FDR clearly was not. By philosophy and practice, FDR preferred to work within accepted constitutional channels. Although he threatened Congress in his inaugural, he indicated that he would rather work with them. As Gunther wrote, "Roosevelt, it might be mentioned parenthetically, always strove to work with Congress; this is a point often forgotten these days, but it was vital."⁸⁶ Moreover, FDR had a respect for the Constitution and its essential democracy. Although Sherwood granted that "No President since Lincoln tested the elasticity of the Constitution as he [FDR] did," Sherwood also held that FDR did not equal "Lincoln's record in circumventing the Constitution."⁸⁷ Manchester opined that "Roosevelt preferred to work within the Constitution."⁸⁸ In the final evaluation, then, Freidel was probably correct in his conclusion that FDR did not intend to assume the role of a Hitler because "that was too repugnant to his basic thinking."⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

In his First Inaugural Address, FDR's main concern was Domestic Issues. An investigation of his textual emendations has demonstrated that he selected words to effect certain ends. He used the scapegoat technique to blame the bankers and brokers for the Depression, an efficacious technique because FDR used it to adapt to and to speak for the existing and prevalent attitudes against Wall Street. He marshaled a military metaphor to evoke in the American people a sense of duty and discipline—values salient and needed in a time of national crisis—to persuade the citizens of the nation to support his quasimilitary leadership in his war on the Depression. For the members of Congress he used the carrot-and-stick technique to demonstrate to them and the country his desire to act either in tandem with the Congress or alone if it failed him. FDR successfully used these techniques because their potential efficacy was available in attitudes of the immediate inaugural audience, of most of the contemporary news media, and, perhaps most importantly, of the members of Congress and ultimately the American people. Rodgers realized the successful effect that FDR's address had on the American people, that it "first won for him the support of the great masses of people and put behind his efforts the full force of an overwhelming public opinion."⁹⁰

The Zeitgeist of March 1933 produced Hitler and Roosevelt, who utilized similar rhetorical techniques in reacting to the Depression. Although their rhetorical means were similar, basic dissimilarities in their respective countries, their leadership roles, and their expected tenure of rule accounted for their diametrically opposed ends as national leaders.

Closing remarks are perhaps best left to Roosevelt, himself. His three rhetorical techniques coalesce in his inaugural conclusion: "The people of the United States have not failed. In their need they have registered a mandate that they want direct, vigorous action. They have asked for discipline and direction under leadership. They have made me the present instrument of their wishes. In the spirit of the gift, I take it."⁹¹

NOTES

¹ David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis 1848-1861, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 145.

²The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (1928-1936, 5 vols.; New York: Random House, 1938), II, 16.

³ Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 89.

⁴ Harry L. Hopkins, "Foreword" in Nothing to Fear, ed. B. D. Zevin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), p. viii.

⁵ Although the following rhetorical works on FDR are helpful, they do not explicate FDR's first inaugural nor its significance: Earnest Brandenburg, "The Preparation of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Speeches," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 35 (1949), 214-21; Earnest Brandenburg and Waldo W. Braden, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Voice and Pronunciation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (1952), 23-30; Harold P. Zelko, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Rhythm in Rhetorical Style," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 28 (1942), 138-41; Hermann G. Stelzner, "'War Message,' December 8, 1941: An Approach to Language," Speech Monographs, 33 (1966), 419-37; Earnest Brandenburg and Waldo W. Braden, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt," in A History and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. Marie Kathryn Hochmuth, III (New York: Longmans, Green, 1955), 458-530.

⁶ Inaugural Address, 1933, Master Speech File, Box 0610, Roosevelt Library. The first draft is on legal paper. The second draft was typed on Tuesday, February 28. The third draft was retyped on Wednesday, March 1. The reading copy was typed on March 3 in Washington. Hereafter, references to the Roosevelt Library holdings on the first inaugural will be cited as Master Speech File.

⁷ James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 162; Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership 1933-1945 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1955), p. 104; Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 89; Ernest J. Wrage and Barnet Baskerville, eds., Contemporary Forum: American Speeches on Twentieth-Century Issues (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 136.

⁸ Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 114. Moley gives a general description-of his composition of the address and discusses his and Louis Howe's role in subsequent drafts (pp. 99-115). Moley includes photographs of the handwritten draft, but he does not picture the other three critical drafts. Moley advises that in his earlier book, After Seven Years (New York: Harper, 1939), he made only casual reference to the authorship of the first inaugural, because his "function as a collaborator was well known" and everyone knew he "would be involved in the preparation of this speech" (p. 116).

⁹ Master Speech File, first handwritten draft, pp. 1-10.

¹⁰ Gunther thought the phrase was uniquely FDR's, John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 124. Rosenman thought FDR read it in Thoreau: "Nothing is so much to be feared as fear," Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, p. 91; Henry David Thoreau, The Journal of Henry David Thoreau, ed. Bradford Torrey and Francis H. Allen (New York: Dover, 1962), 7 Sept. 1851, p. 261. Wecter suggested it might have come from the Ladies' Home Journal: "There is nothing to fear—except fear." Dixon Wecter, The Age of the Great Depression 1929-1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 44; "It's Up to the Women," editorial, Ladies' Home Journal, Jan. 1932, p. 3.

¹¹ Moley, The First New Deal, p. 115.

¹² Asbell believed that Howe filched the phrase from a newspaper department store advertisement, Bernard Asbell, The F. D. R. Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday, 1973), p. 32; however, Freidel has complained that the piece has eluded later researchers: Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt Launching the New Deal (Boston: ittle, Brown, 1973), p. 203. My search of Howe's papers provided nothing.

¹³ Master Speech File, first handwritten draft, p. 1.

¹⁴ Master Speech File, draft number three (typed), pp. 1-4.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ Master Speech File, reading copy, pp. 1-2. Those sources, including government printings and Rosenman's edition of FDR's personal papers and speeches, which relied on the advanced text are thus in error.

¹⁷ Arthur Larson, Eisenhower: The President Knowbody Knew (New York: Scribner's, 1968), p. 150. Although Larson said this of President Eisenhower, the statement probably can be generalized to all presidents, and it is specifically applicable to FDR. See Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt, for his analogous role as speech writer for FDR to Larson's for Eisenhower, and Rosenman's analogous conclusion: "the finished product was always the same—it was Roosevelt himself (p. 12).

¹⁸ Donald L. Wolfarth, "John F. Kennedy in the Tradition of Inaugural Speeches," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (1961), 130.

¹⁹The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, II, 16.

²⁰ Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), p. 949.

²¹ Rexford G. Tugwell, Roosevelt's Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 6.

²² Finis Farr, FDR (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972), p. 182.

²³ The scapegoat has its derivation in Jewish antiquity, when the people symbolically placed their sins on a goat's head and then allowed the goat to escape into the wilderness, thus relieving them of their guilt.

²⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "First Inaugural Address," in Great American Speeches 1898-1963, ed. John Graham (New York: Meredith, 1970), pp. 51-52.1 utilize this text because it is a verbatim printing from a recording of the inaugural address, Caedmon Record, TC 2033-A. Hereinafter the address is cited as First Inaugural.

²⁵ William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 41.

²⁶ First Inaugural, p. 53; Caedmon Record, TC 2033-A.

²⁷ Morison, p. 954.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹ Caedmon Record, TC 2033-A.

³⁰ Universal Films, Film MP 77-5, Roosevelt Library; Pathe News, Film 201-29-1, Roosevelt Library. Complete newsfilm footage of FDR's first inaugural is not extant; therefore, what the news editors retained in their truncated versions is significant.

³¹ Rexford G. Tugwell, In Search of Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), p. 222.

³² Morison, p. 950.

³³ 'The Inaugural Address," Christian Century, 15 Mar. 1933, p. 351.

³⁴ "The Faith of Roosevelt," The Nation, 15 Mar. 1933, p. 278.

³⁵ "Roosevelt Takes Oath in Crisis," News-Week, 11 Mar. 1933, p:9.

³⁶ "The President's Speech," The Times (London), 6 Mar. 1933, p. 13, col. 2.

³⁷ Conkin has argued that the end of government laissez-faire was, in hindsight, actually a boon to business. Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Crowell, 1967), p. 34.

³⁸ Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal: 1933-1938 (New York: Creative Age Press, 1944), p. 61.

³⁹ Approximately 50,000,000 Americans listened to FDR's address on the radio, and the immediate inaugural audience numbered approximately 150,000.

⁴⁰ Michael Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 126.

⁴¹ William E. Leuchtenburg, "The New Deal and the Analogue of War," in Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America, ed. John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and Everett Walters (n. p.: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1964), p. 104.

⁴²Ibid., p. 105.

⁴³ First Inaugural, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁴ Letter from the Rev. William C. Hicks, St. Andrew's Memorial Church, Yonkers, New York, 24 Feb. 1933, PPF 10, Box 1, Roosevelt Library.

⁴⁵ Conkin, p. 30.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Cabell Phillips, From the Crash to the Blitz: 1929-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 107.

⁴⁷ "Leaders Here Praise Address as 'Strong,'" New York Times, 5 Mar. 1933, p. 6, col. 6.

⁴⁸ James A. Hagerty, "Roosevelt Address Stirs Great Crowd," ibid., p. 2, col. 2.

⁴⁹ "Comment of Press on Roosevelt's Inaugural Address," ibid., p. 6, cols. 4-5.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Phillips, p. 107.

⁵¹ "The President's Speech," The Times (London), 6 Mar. 1933, p. 13, col. 2.

⁵² First Inaugural, p. 54.

⁵³ Fair, p. 182.

⁵⁴ Quoted in ibid., p. 191.

⁵⁵ Quoted in William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 77.

⁵⁶ Rauch, p. 59.

⁵⁷ Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt and Howe (New York: Knopf, 1962), p. 367.

⁵⁸ Quoted in James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 1.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶¹ Manchester, p. 81.

⁶² First Inaugural, p. 54.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴ Caedmon Record TC 2033-A; Freidel, p. 205; Pathe News and Universal Films both included this important segment (see n. 30).

⁶⁵ Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York: Norton, 1971), p. 360.

⁶⁶ "Comment of Press on Roosevelt's Inaugural Address," New York Times, 5 Mar. 1933, p. 6, col. 6.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Phillips, p. 107.

⁶⁸ Conkin, p. 30.

⁶⁹ Patterson, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁰ Rollins, p. 366.

⁷¹ Fred L. Casmir, "The Hitler I Heard," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (1963), 9-10.

⁷² Hubert H. Humphrey, The Political Philosophy of the New Deal (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970), pp. xx-xxi.

⁷³ John Toland, Adolph Hitler (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976), I, 239.

⁷⁴ Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Adolph Hitler (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 232.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 234.

⁷⁶ Toland, I, 322.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Toland, I, 340-41.

⁷⁸ Quoted in Freidel, p. 208.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Manchester, p. 80.

⁸⁰ Fair, p. 183.

⁸¹ Robinson, p. 107.

⁸² Nicholas Halasz, Roosevelt Through Foreign Eyes (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961), pp. 44-55.

⁸³ Paul Preston, "The Burning of the Reichstag," in Sunrise and Storm Clouds, Vol. X of Milestones of History, ed. Roger Morgan (New York: Newsweek Books, 1975), p. 137.

⁸⁴ Master Speech File, draft number three (typed), p. 13.

⁸⁵ Quoted in Toland, I, 381.

⁸⁶ Günther, p. 278.

⁸⁷ Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 41.

⁸⁸ Manchester, p. 81.

⁸⁹ Freidel, p. 205.

⁹⁰ Cleveland Rodgers, The Roosevelt Program (New York: Putnam, 1933), p. 16.

⁹¹ First Inaugural, p. 54.