SOURCE: "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXII, No. 3, September, 1957, pp. 405-33.

The "quarantine" speech which President Roosevelt made at Chicago on October 5, 1937, is generally assumed to have been a landmark in our foreign policy, showing the point at which the President made a definite decision to take a strong stand against the Axis Powers. It is also widely supposed that, because of evidence at every hand of the country's hostility to the speech, Mr. Roosevelt, quite justifiably, felt compelled to relinquish his determination to deal firmly with the totalitarian states. Yet the further one examines these assumptions, the more they seem to invite rethinking.

I

Turning to the speech itself, the most popular interpretations are that the President was announcing that he had decided: to reverse his foreign policy, abandoning the isolationism of our neutrality legislation for a Wilsonian type of collective security; or to use sanctions against Japan to stop the hostilities in China; or to initiate forthwith a program for the application of sanctions against future aggressors—meaning the Axis Powers. However, a consideration of the events surrounding the speech, and of its text, suggests that the President was probably only engaging in a groping and intermittent effort, which he had been making for some time, to find some sort of a plan which would avert war between the dictatorships and the democracies. If so, the "quarantine" speech should not be regarded as an indication that, in the autumn of 1937, Mr. Roosevelt resolved to embark upon some strong and specific policy toward the Axis countries but rather as indicating that he was still pursuing a variety of nebulous schemes for warding off catastrophe.

In order to discuss further both the popular interpretations of the speech and the interpretation just advanced, it is necessary first to look at the two areas where the material lies which make more detailed discussion possible: the President's search for a program to avoid war and the story of the writing of the Chicago address.

As the international crisis deepened in the 1930s, Mr. Roosevelt was intensely concerned over the aggression of the Axis nations. In keeping with a pattern he tended to follow almost instinctively, he seems to have felt that, if he advanced notions of his own about possible means of meeting the crisis, he might stimulate others to build on his suggestions until a solution was found. His first great effort to dramatize the concept of searching for a program to stabilize the world situation was made in connection with the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936. It will be recalled that this conference was convened at his suggestion to strengthen the Inter-American peace system. However, both the President and Secretary Hull proclaimed over and over again that the purpose of the conference was not just to work out a scheme for the maintenance of peace in the Americas but to evolve a program which, speaking in general terms, could be copied by the rest of the world. And it was precisely to draw the attention of as many people as possible to the universal significance of the proceedings at Buenos Aires that Mr. Roosevelt made his own dramatic trip to the conference.

Two features of the developments at Buenos Aires have a special significance in connection with later efforts to formulate a program to deal with the problem of war and peace.¹ One was the over-all character of the Buenos Aires agreements. The sixty-seven agreements arrived at by the Conference constituted a comprehensive plan divorced from any commitments to sanctions. They emphasized the value of a so-called constructive approach to peace, by which was meant an attempt to settle the underlying causes of friction that give rise to wars. They also emphasized the need to develop machinery to adjust disputes by peaceful means or, if this proved impossible, to limit hostilities once they occurred.

The second significant factor was the discussion about plans for organizing, in wartime, the countries that were not parties to the dispute. One idea was that an arrangement should be made so that these nations would adopt a collective neutrality that went further than anything as yet embodied in the Inter-American peace system. This view was vigorously pushed by Secretary Hull in his famous Eight Pillars of Peace speech delivered at the outset of the Conference.² It was incorporated in the draft convention presented to the Conference by the United States Delegation; for the convention would have committed neutral American countries, in case of war between two or more American republics, to apply laws comparable to the neutrality legislation existing in the United States.³ While the United States proposal was not adopted, the determination to develop the concept of collective neutrality in the Americas remained a fixed part of our policy.

Another idea was that there should be what, for lack of a better term, may be called a collective nonbelligerency. This concept became a center of discussion at Buenos Aires because the Central American nations introduced a draft treaty based on a plan, advanced by Uruguay during the First World War, for the creation by the American states of a moral front which would adopt measures, such as the severance of diplomatic relations, that were noncoercive but not neutral.⁴ In the process of watering down the Central American draft the closeness of this type of a collective nonbelligerency and a common neutrality was underscored. The purpose of both was to have the nations, not parties to the conflict, form a community for their own protection and to influence the course of the hostilities. (It was thought that a collective neutrality could, if necessary, be manipulated to favor one side or the other, as was indeed done after the outbreak of war in Europe.)⁵ Moreover both the ideas of collective neutrality and of collective nonbelligerency were regarded as preventive in that, if either were incorporated in an agreement, they would serve to deter would-be aggressors.

Following the Buenos Aires Conference, the President continued to look for a program to relieve the international tension, suggesting frequently that the nations of the world might get together to work out something comparable to the achievements reached at Buenos Aires. Secretary Hull spoke similarly, both men often stressing the noncoercive character of the Buenos Aires agreements. When, for example, Prime Minister King of Canada visited Washington in the spring of 1937, Mr. Hull told him that, in his estimation, the only way of stopping the drift toward war was for England to seek the coöperation of other European countries in developing a constructive and comprehensive scheme for the stabilization of peace like the Buenos Aires program.⁶ The President himself discussed at length with Mr. King the possibility of calling an international conference to set up a new world organization which would seek to maintain peace by peaceful means rather than by economic or military sanctions.⁷ He suggested that new methods of achieving peace be tried such as "going after the root causes of war" so as to establish a "collective security based on the removal of war causes." Also wars should be prevented or cured by "public opinion" not by "penalty." A few weeks later the President talked along similar lines to Norman Davis, who was about to leave on a mission to Europe, indicating that Mr. Davis might explore some of these ideas with European statesmen informally.⁸

At the same time the President was groping for other means of getting the dictatorships and the democracies to make a concerted effort to ensure peace. Even before the Buenos Aires Conference, Mr. Roosevelt had spoken to friends of the possibility of stopping the trend toward war by some dramatic action such as inviting the heads of the big European nations to a meeting on board a battleship at sea where they would evolve some plan for a "lasting peace" to be achieved without commitments to coercion.⁹ Word of the President's scheme reached the New York Times which printed a front-page article under a streaming headline: "ROOSEVELT IF ELECTED MAY CALL KINGS, DICTATORSHIPS AND PRESIDENTS TO GREAT POWER CONFERENCE."¹⁰

The net result of all this talk of a program to resolve the existing crisis was that, by the spring of 1937, there were repercussions even in the European dictatorships. Mussolini, in a highly publicized interview, virtually invited the President to take the initiative in bringing the statesmen of the world together to settle some of the outstanding causes of tension.¹¹ Hitler was rumored to have said that he would attend a conference for the improvement of the international situation if Mr. Roosevelt convened it.¹²

Perhaps encouraged by signs of possible coöperation from the Axis nations, Mr. Roosevelt, in the spring and summer of 1937, tried to take some concrete steps toward a general international agreement that would make for peace.¹³ Norman Davis, on his trip to Europe in May, had long conversations on this subject with various European statesmen, primarily British and French—conversations of which he kept detailed records that have turned up in his files.¹⁴ Mr. Davis spoke first with Mr. Spinasse, then French Minister of National Economy, and with Anthony Eden. All agreed that a comprehensive program should be developed that would tackle the three most important sources of the growing international crisis: political and economic conditions and the race in armaments. It was assumed that the United States would have to take the initiative in starting such a program but that President Roosevelt would want to limit himself to economic and disarmament problems, leaving the European Powers to settle their political controversies among themselves. In the end it was agreed that some plan might be launched, probably by calling a large international conference, in a few months—possibly September.

When Mr. Davis approached Neville Chamberlain, the latter proved to be more than sympathetic to the idea that the dictatorships and the democracies should try to adjust their differences but considerably less interested in the American concept of bringing this about through a comprehensive program undertaken by many nations. Mr. Chamberlain thought it impractical "to do everything at once" and declared that, in his opinion, political appeasement would have to precede economic appeasement and the limitation of armaments. He told Mr. Davis that the British government was doing what it could toward a "beginning of political appeasement" and had just instructed its Ambassador in Berlin to impress upon Hitler that the British wanted to establish "more friendly relations and a sound basis for peace" as soon as they were convinced that Germany genuinely desired the same thing. Mr. Davis indicated that he was quite in favor of England's trying to reach an understanding with Germany; he only wondered whether tackling the problem of peace on a wider scale could await the outcome of Britain's efforts. In addition Mr. Davis raised the question of the possibility of Mr. Chamberlain's coming to the United States to talk with the President directly.

The President decided, after Mr. Davis's return home, to go on from where the latter had left off. Early in June, Mr. Davis wrote the Prime Minister, in the strictest secrecy, that Mr. Roosevelt would like him to visit the White House around late September.¹⁵ The President, he explained, was ready to make arrangements immediately to have an agenda drawn up for their meeting. Mr. Davis stated also that he thought England and America should pave the way for a "broader move" to ensure peace and hoped that, within a few months, it would be possible to start a "concerted and comprehensive effort to achieve economic rehabilitation, financial stability, a limitation of armaments and peace." The Prime Minister replied that he did not believe the time ripe for a meeting with the President.¹⁶ The British government was, he asserted, still trying to open talks with the Germans and these might provide a "valuable indication" of the direction in which it might be possible to advance, thereby serving as a useful preliminary to discussions between himself and Mr. Roosevelt.

The President was, however, too intent upon his course to drop matters here. At the end of July he wrote personally to the Prime Minister saying that he appreciated his desire to make such progress as was possible along other lines but nevertheless would like suggestions for steps that might be taken to expedite their meeting.¹⁷ Mr. Chamberlain did not answer until two months later when he informed Mr. Roosevelt that he had no suggestions to make.¹⁸ The international situation, he declared, was changing so quickly that any plans were likely to be obsolete almost as soon as they were made. While the tension in Europe was easing somewhat, things were still a "long way from the resumption of cordial relations between the totalitarian states and the democracies."

It was precisely at the time that the Prime Minister rejected the President's second invitation to open discussions that Mr. Roosevelt delivered the "quarantine" speech. Presumably he felt that, if an advance toward peace was to be made, he would have to try some method less dependent upon Mr. Chamberlain's initiative. Perhaps it was to encourage others to supply the necessary impetus that the President renewed his efforts to dramatize publicly the idea of searching for a plan to avert war. Parts of the "quarantine" speech (for reasons that will be clearer later) appear to have constituted one of these efforts. Another effort was started on the day following the "quarantine" speech when Sumner Welles wrote a memorandum for the President outlining a new peace program.

So much has been written about Mr. Welles's scheme that it does not seem necessary to do more than recall its essentials.¹⁹ Mr. Welles believed that it would be easier to get the democracies and dictatorships together to seek a solution of political, economic and armament problems if they first succeeded in reaching an understanding on less explosive issues. He therefore suggested trying to achieve a general agreement on questions such as the fundamental rules which ought to govern international behavior. The President himself proposed holding a dramatic meeting of diplomatic representatives accredited to Washington, in the White House on Armistice Day, at which he would read a message designed to set in motion procedures leading to an agreement of the kind Mr. Welles envisaged. Mr. Welles thereupon put his scheme into more concrete form but the entire matter was dropped before Armistice Day because of Secretary Hull's objections. It was revived, however, in early January 1938 when it was hoped that it would, among other matters, lend support to Great Britain's continued attempt to arrive at an understanding with Germany.²⁰ Perhaps the bestknown part of the story is that which deals with the submission of the Welles plan to Mr. Chamberlain; the latter's rejection of it during Mr. Eden's absence from England; and Mr. Eden's successful efforts to get the Prime Minister to reverse his stand around the middle of January. In the end the matter was dropped for a number of reasons but in the Hyde Park files there are revised drafts with notations by Mr. Roosevelt which show that the President and Mr. Welles continued working on the scheme until at least mid-February.²¹

It would seem therefore that the President was searching for a program to reduce the danger of war over a period which started considerably before and continued for some time after the "quarantine" speech. The programs that Mr. Roosevelt acted upon differed in many respects but all aimed at getting the various conflicting nations to coöperate in the interests of peace at the least by entering into some sort of initial agreement. The emphasis was mainly on a constructive approach to maintain peace. But it was also on arrangements which were designed: to prevent the outbreak of war by providing for a collective neutrality or nonbelligerency, the mere threat of which would act as a restraint upon aggression; or to make possible the use of pressure, through such a neutrality or nonbelligerency, in case hostilities could not be averted.

This then was Mr. Roosevelt's search for a plan which could be used to cope with the international situation. The story of the writing of the speech starts with Mr. Hull. The Secretary, on learning that the President was to make an extensive trip in late September, urged him to deliver an address, in some large mid-western city, for the purpose—according to Mr. Hull's own account—of counteracting the growing trend toward isolationism throughout the country.²² One may take for granted that Mr. Hull also believed that an expression of the moral outrage felt in the United States against the Axis nations would be welcome at home and have a salutary effect abroad. Mr. Roosevelt, no doubt wholly in sympathy with the Secretary's views on this matter, at once agreed and asked Mr. Hull and Norman Davis to furnish him with the necessary material.

The record—pieced together from the Hyde Park files and what has recently emerged from the Davis files—shows that Mr. Davis sent the President four separate memoranda.²³ Two were mailed from Washington where, judg ing by a statement in Mr. Hull's Memoirs, the Secretary and Mr. Davis wrote them jointly.²⁴ Mr. Davis appears to have written the other two in New York and read them over the telephone to Mr. Dunn in the State Department before mailing them to the President. It is these four memoranda which the President took on his Western tour and, during the course of his journey, put together to make up the "quarantine" speech.

The first two memoranda (those in which the Secretary must have had a hand) contained the familiar opening passages of the speech. Without naming the Axis Powers, but obviously referring to them, they described with great forcefulness the brutal chaos being created in parts of the world by certain nations. They went on to make two points repetitiously: that disorder in any segment of the globe could not fail to affect every country; and that peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to maintain peace. Among the statements in the original draft were:

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation to isolate itself from what goes on in the rest of the world or to secure itself through indifference, isolation, or neutrality from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world. . . .

An overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to be left alone to live in peace. Nevertheless, the peace, the freedom and the security of these peoples and nations are being jeopardized by the remaining ten per cent, who are threatening a breakdown of international order and law. Surely the ninety per cent who want to live in peace under law and according to moral standards that have received universal acceptance can and must find some way to make their will prevail. . . .

If we are to have a world in which it is possible to breathe freely and live in amity, the peaceloving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can exist.

The President used the whole of the first two memoranda with the exception of one paragraph which will be referred to later.²⁵ In places, he altered some of the wording and freely rearranged the sentences. One gets the impression that Mr. Roosevelt was trying to edit the text to conform to his usual terse and brilliantly vivid style of writing. But this is only an impression and certain changes may have been designed to convey a stronger meaning. The only additions Mr. Roosevelt made were a few relatively brief passages apparently inserted to supply either color or clarity.²⁶

The other two memoranda, which must have been written by Mr. Davis alone, proclaimed at the outset:

It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace. . . . We recognize, however, that if we are unable to or unwilling to defend our rights and interests we will lose the respect of other nations and we will also lose our own self-respect.

This nation was dedicated to certain principles which our forebears considered to be of greater value than life itself and without which life would not be worth living. If the time ever comes when we are no longer willing or able to defend to the utmost of our ability the principles which are the foundation of freedom and progress we will sacrifice our great national heritage and will cease to have the' vitality and stamina to keep this nation alive.

The President omitted these paragraphs and in their place wrote the famous "quarantine" passage:

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

The remainder of the Davis draft featured the sentence, "War is a contagion"—a sentence which may have suggested the word "quarantine" to the President²⁷—and emphasized that "There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace." It closed with a moving statement that there was a tendency in the welter of conflicting ideologies battling for control of the modern world to overlook one basic truth: that "man, the human being is . . . the supreme end of society." But, despite its eloquence, the President discarded this passage and wrote the following ending:

There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

No doubt some of the reasons for thinking that the popular interpretations of the "quarantine" speech should be reconsidered are already evident. Nevertheless it seems desirable to discuss briefly these interpretations and the conclusion advanced here, one by one.

1. Those who believe the President planned the speech as an announcement of a decision to revert to the type of collective security embodied in the League Covenant rely mainly on two arguments: that the tone of the address was so threatening it must have been designed to indicate a drastic move of this kind; that the speech conspicuously emphasized the idea of nations maintaining peace by a "concerted effort."

But the tone of the speech existed in the original memoranda where it was clearly not meant to go beyond fulfilling Mr. Hull's purpose of awakening the American people to the dangers of isolationism and voicing moral indignation at the destructiveness of the Axis countries. It might be argued, as already suggested, that Mr. Roosevelt strengthened the meaning of the original in places but he does not seem to have sharpened the tone of the draft as a whole and, in one very important instance, he moderated it. The passage of the Davis text which Mr. Roosevelt discarded and replaced with his "quarantine" statement could certainly be construed as a warning that, if pushed too far, the United States would fight. The first version was even stronger, for it included, "We recognize, however, that a policy of peace at any price will not ensure peace. . . . This nation was born fighting for certain principles which our forebears considered to be of greater value than life itself. ... " President Roosevelt may have seen the initial draft but, even if he did not, the interpretation to which the revision opened itself could scarcely have escaped him and it seems probable that he omitted it as too menacing.²⁸ This thesis is further supported by the fact that the one paragraph (referred to earlier) which the President did not use out of the memoranda sent from Washington had similar overtones.

The reference to a "concerted effort" was also in the drafts forwarded from Washington and, read in context, clearly meant that peace-loving nations should coöperate to arouse the conscience of the world to ensure the maintenance of high moral standards in the conduct of international relations. The presence of this theme is indeed not surprising, for, of all themes, it was most frequently used by Mr. Hull at this time and was also often employed by the President.

2. The idea that the "quarantine" speech was an advance notice of a declaration of sanctions against Japan resulted, to a large extent, from the circumstances under which the speech was given. The day after Mr. Roosevelt's appearance at Chicago, the League of Nations blamed Japan for the hostilities which had started in China in July and called for a conference of the Nine Power Treaty nations. Within a matter of hours, the State Department endorsed the League's position. The fact that these events happened hard upon each other gave rise to the belief that they were all part of one piece of political strategy which would culminate in the Nine Power nations adopting sanctions against Japan. However, we know today that there was no such direct connection between the President's Chicago address and the League's actions. And there is no convincing evidence to suggest that the President had decided to use coercive measures against Japan.

Sumner Welles, writing in the 1950s, seemed indeed to supply such evidence.²⁹ He said that in the summer of 1937 the President was far more preoccupied with the Far East than with Europe and that Mr. Roosevelt had, on several occasions, talked to him about the possibility of stationing units of the American and British navies at certain points in the Pacific to enforce an embargo against Japan. Mr. Welles stated further that, as he was in Europe during most of September 1937, he knew little about the writing of the "quarantine" speech but believed the President had in mind the embargo and quasi blockade he had mentioned earlier.

However, on further inspection, it would seem that Mr. Welles's recollections (in common with those of many others) had altered over the years; for in 1944 he had written:

Partly because of the issues involved in the Spanish war, and partly because the real nature of Hitlerism was becoming increasingly apparent, the President determined to make a vigorous effort to persuade public opinion that in its own interest the United States should propose some constructive plan for international action to check the forces of aggression before they succeeded in engulfing the world. For this effort he selected the very heart of isolationism—the city of Chicago.³⁰

Mr. Welles then went on to quote the "quarantine" speech. His recollection closer to the event does not therefore bear out the thesis that the Chicago address reflected Mr. Roosevelt's determination to use sanctions against Japan but instead supports the interpretation that the President was thinking of some program to stabilize the world situation.

3. There is a contemporary record which suggests that the President planned the "quarantine" speech to introduce a program involving sanctions against future aggressors (meaning the Axis states) which he expected to launch immediately after his return from Chicago. Secretary Ickes, in his diary entry of September 19, 1937, described a talk with the President in which the latter said he was considering addressing a letter to all the countries of the world, except possibly the "three bandit nations," proposing that all peace-loving peoples isolate those who invaded the rights of others. "What he had in mind," Mr. Ickes wrote, "is to cut off all trade with any such nation."³¹ According to the Secretary, Mr. Roosevelt said further that his proposal would not apply to the current situations in Spain and China, as what had been done could not be undone; that he wanted to "evolve a new policy for the future." Mr. Ickes himself commented that "of course, if he should do this, it would be a warning to the nations that are today running amuck." The Secretary wrote further that Mr. Roosevelt asked him whether he should send this letter before or after his trip out west, to which Mr. Ickes replied that he should wait until his return.

It would seem, however, that Mr. Roosevelt could not have settled upon this plan more than momentarily, for he appears to have been considering a variety of other schemes with equal seriousness. Just before his talk with Secretary Ickes, the President told two other members of the Cabinet—Hull and Morgenthau—that he was thinking of publicly declaring his readiness to act as a clearing house for peace—a suggestion which on the surface does not sound the same as the one discussed with Mr. Ickes. Further, the day after his talk with Mr. Ickes, the President told Mr. Morgenthau that he had dropped the idea of making such a public declaration and had decided to do nothing that would call for any response or action from any quarter, the whole thing being a matter of longterm education. It should also be recalled that at this time the President was considering still another course, not having as yet received a response from Prime Minister Chamberlain to his proposal for opening discussions which were partly intended to lead to an agreement between the democracies and the Axis countries. Moreover it is clear that he did not abandon the desire to get the democracies and totalitarian states together, for he started working on the Welles plan only three days after his Chicago speech.

4. The theory that the "quarantine" speech was not a vital landmark in Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy but part of a groping attempt to find some means of forestalling war is based on various pieces of evidence (some already mentioned) including Mr. Roosevelt's own statements.

Immediately after the delivery of the "quarantine" speech, Mr. Roosevelt went to Cardinal Mundelein's house in Chicago where they had a long talk which was—and has remained—confidential. However, there appears in the Roosevelt files a letter written, on the following day, by Cardinal Mundelein to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States which says in part:

Yesterday the President of the United States delivered here in Chicago a strong and important address which may affect the future peace and tranquillity of the world. Afterwards, in my own house, he continued discussion of the subject to which he had given considerable thought. He asked me whether he might invite participation of the Holy See in the movement and, as it is for the purpose of establishing permanent peace in a wartorn world, I answered him that I thought he should. . . .

His plan does not contemplate either military or naval action against the unjust aggressor nation, nor does it involve "sanctions" as generally understood but rather a policy of isolation, severance of ordinary communications in a united manner by all the governments of the pact.³²

The rest of the letter indicated that the President hoped such a movement for the creation of a "permanent peace" would arrest the wave of lawlessness already submerging parts of the world.

About two weeks after the "quarantine" speech, Norman Davis, who was about to leave for the Brussels Conference where he was to represent the United States, went to see the President for oral instructions.³³ Mr. Davis's notes show that Mr. Roosevelt used language similar to that of the "quarantine" speech and of his talk with Cardinal Mundelein. They state that the President remarked that, if all other procedures failed at Brussels, the countries wanting to stop the Sino-Japanese conflict and safeguard themselves from its consequences—"or in other words the so-called neutral nations"—should "band together for their own protection against this contagion." The other Powers might, for example, give China every facility for acquiring arms; or an alternative might be for "the neutrals to ostracize Japan, break off relations."

Side by side with his notes on this interview, there is, in Mr. Davis's files, a paper marked: "Handed to me by President as of possible use." This contains what must be an excerpt from an article or book which says, in substance, that the Inter-American principle of neutral coöperation, short of force, would seem to offer a useful formula for the United States in the existing situation; and it urges the President to apply this formula so as to develop a "constructive program" in which a group of neutrals, acting in common, might make their influence felt.

It would seem therefore that, immediately after delivering his address at Chicago, Mr. Roosevelt spoke to Cardinal Mundelein, not as though he had just proclaimed some drastic policy, but as though, as in the past, he were throwing out the germ of an idea with the hope that it might grow. From the tenor of his remarks and the paper he gave Mr. Davis, it appears likely that the President thought the Inter-American concepts of collective neutrality or nonbelligerency contained the seeds of some method for dealing with the world-wide situation. He suggested that "so-called neutrals" might develop a common program but he seems to have been very vague about the nature of that program. It was not to involve military action nor "'sanctions' as generally understood." But it might include, among other matters, the "severance of ordinary communications in a united manner" or a "break off of relations. Perhaps in talking to Cardinal Mundelein, Mr. Roosevelt had in mind the possibility of developing a plan which would provide for the creation, under certain circumstances, of a moral front limited to such matters as the severance of diplomatic relations—a plan which, it might be added, would seem to furnish appropriate grounds for an appeal to the Pope. Or perhaps he was looking for a scheme which would, if necessary, permit the extension of the concepts of collective neutrality or nonbelligerency so that they might embrace a wide range of pressures up to and including economic pressures.³⁴ The mere existence of arrangements of this character was, as stated earlier, regarded as likely to discourage aggression so that they might be considered as a sound basis for the establishment of a "permanent peace." It is just possible that the President also thought some technique might be developed whereby if "neutrals" exercised pressures, which were not regarded as sanctions in the ordinary sense but as measures taken for their own protection against the contagion of war, they would avoid the risk of having to resort to military action inherent in systems like that of the League.³⁵

Somewhat curiously, in addition to Cardinal Mundelein's letter and Mr. Davis's notes, a document which has long been familiar to historians seems to support the idea that the President had no definite policy at this stage but was contemplating a variety of possibilities including ways of embroidering on the Inter-American system. This document is a transcript of the off-the-record press conference he held the day after he spoke at Chicago.³⁶ It is usually assumed that Mr. Roosevelt, anxious to avoid being questioned, was deliberately confusing in his answers to the correspondents; but it seems quite possible that the President's replies were meant to be taken at their face value.

The reporters, over and over again, asked the President to define the meaning of his Chicago address and especially of the word "quarantine." The President stuck to the following explanation of the speech as whole:

P: . . . the lead is in the last line, "America actively engages in the search for peace." I can't tell you what the methods will be. We are looking for some way to peace. . . .

Q: Foreign papers put it as an attitude without a program. . . .

P: It is an attitude and it does not outline a program; but it says we are looking for a program.

At the outset a reporter had asked the President whether he would not admit that a "quarantine" must involve a repudiation of our neutrality legislation. Mr. Roosevelt declared, "Not for a minute. It may be an expansion." The correspondent asked, "Doesn't that mean economic sanctions anyway?" to which the President answered, "No, not necessarily." Later the President remarked that there were many methods of attaining peace which had as yet never been tried. A correspondent asserted that, in his opinion, to quarantine aggressors was no longer neutrality. The President stated that "On the contrary, it might be a stronger neutrality." The conference ended with this exchange:

Q: Do you agree . . . that sanctions mean war?

P: No. Don't talk about sanctions. Never suggested it. . . . Don't get off on the sanction route.

Q: I meant that in general terms; going further than moral denunciation.

P: That is not a definition of "sanctions."

Q: Is a "quarantine" a sanction?

P: No.

Q: Are you excluding any coercive action? Sanctions are coercive.

P: That is exactly the difference.

Q: Better, then, to keep it in a moral sphere?

P: No, it can be a very practical sphere.

For whatever reasons, Mr. Roosevelt seems thereafter to have shunned entering into any explanations of the "quarantine" speech. But in a Fireside Chat, on October 12, he referred to his remarks at Chicago, saying in part that it was the duty of a president to think in terms of peace not only for one but for many generations.³⁷ Peace, he declared, must be "sound and permanent," built on a "cooperative search" for peace by all nations desiring this end.

To me it would seem that throughout the period, before and after the "quarantine" speech, Mr. Roosevelt was moved by a deep inner feeling that it must be possible to find a formula which would avoid as unthinkable a catastrophe as another world war. In retrospect it may look to many as though nothing could have averted tragedy short of a clear-cut and determined policy against the Axis. But the chances are that the Chicago speech reflected no such policy. What governed Mr. Roosevelt's behavior could be fully understood only by a grasp of the whole history of the times illuminated by that rarest of things, a wise and informed feeling for the President's personality. Nevertheless one influence is blatantly obvious, namely, the political situation in the United States, a matter which prompted the rest of these notes.

II

The second assumption referred to at that outset is that Mr. Roosevelt, with full justification, felt that the American people wholly repudiated the "quarantine" speech and that he therefore abandoned his decision to adopt a firm policy against the Axis Powers. If Mr. Roosevelt made no such decision, obviously he did not abandon it. But this does not rule out the possibility that the President, Mr. Hull, and others in the Administration believed that the country almost uniformly rejected the speech and were influenced by their belief. Indeed there is a good deal to suggest that this was the case. Sumner Welles has described the President as "dismayed by the widespread violence of the attacks" following his appearance at Chicago.³⁸ Mr. Hull has stated in his Memoirs that the "reaction against the quarantine idea was quick and violent" and set back by many months the Administration's efforts to educate public opinion away from isolationism.³⁹ Judge Rosenman has likewise spoken of the nation's response to the speech as "quick and violent—and nearly unanimous."⁴⁰ The effect of this evaluation of the country's attitude upon the Administration's policy is inevitably an elusive matter. But certainly during the main international event that followed—that is, the Brussels Conference—the Administration's policy was exceedingly cautious, and cables from Washington to Norman Davis, during his conduct of the negotiations at Brussels, are marked by a worried preoccupation with public opinion at home.⁴¹ As will be seen later, Mr. Roosevelt himself introduced this note of concern in his original instructions to Mr. Davis.

However, even a limited look (such as that which follows) at the kind of material—mainly leading newspapers and weeklies—which the Administration must have used to assess the popular reaction to the "quarantine" speech raises a question which may well be worth more intensive study.⁴² Were the President and those around him, in fact, justified in concluding that the country reacted with speed, vehemence and solidarity against the speech; or were they perhaps so responsive to the criticisms of certain isolationists that they equated these with the opinions of the country as a whole?

A reading of a group of leading publications, of the type that members of the Administration must have seen, shows that the controversy over the "quarantine" speech lasted until the end of the Brussels Conference in late November. Because the speech was immediately followed by the League's denunciation of Japan and its call for a Nine Power Conference, and because we supported the League's action, many believed that these events had been planned to introduce a new, forceful foreign policy which would be fully revealed at Brussels.

In this group of publications, estimates of the country's reaction to the speech went through two phases. Pierrepont Moffat, writing in his diary, described the initial phase—the immediate response to the speech—as a "burst of applause."⁴³ A similar impression was recorded in comment after comment in the publications surveyed. On October 6, the New York Times printed excerpts from sixteen editorials from all parts of the country and indicated their trend in its headline: "ROOSEVELT SPEECH WIDELY APPROVED."⁴⁴ The Christian Science Monitor, on the 7th, declared that observers were surprised at the degree of enthusiasm evoked by the speech, with even papers hostile to the Administration finding words of praise.⁴⁵ In a review of the week on Sunday (the 10th), the San Francisco Chronicle wrote that the average citizen had responded to the President's message like a "cavalry horse to a bugle call."⁴⁶ It said that Roosevelt had appealed to the nation much as Wilson had taken the case for the League to the country to "whip a little group of Senators"—only, where Wilson failed, Roosevelt succeeded. Time magazine stated at about the same time that the Chicago address had elicited more words of approval, ranging from enthusiastic to tempered, than anything Mr. Roosevelt had done in many a month.⁴⁷ He had regained the support of many whom he had alienated earlier and provided himself with an active peace issue which promised to remain popular unless it threatened to involve us in war. Meanwhile he kept the country guessing whether his proposed "quarantine" meant diplomatic pressures, voluntary boycotts, or economic sanctions.

The marked tendency to agree that the initial response to the speech was positive disappeared in the second phase. Fundamentally, the question was whether the American people were initially enthusiastic about the speech largely because they were glad to have the President openly express disapproval of the Axis Powers; and, if so, whether their enthusiasm had changed after the idea became widespread that the "quarantine" speech would be translated into strong action against Japan at the Brussels Conference. Publications, such as Newsweek, felt that, influenced by increasing cries of alarm from leading isolationists, the tide of opinion soon began to turn.⁴⁸ Publications like Time, on the other hand, believed that popular sentiment remained firmly behind the President.⁴⁹ Most of the comments in other publications ranged between these extremes. In general they agreed that the original enthusiasm for the speech had been tempered by anxiety that, at the Brussels Conference, Mr. Roosevelt's new foreign policy would not stop short of war. This was by no means intended, however, to imply that the country would not support punitive measures against Japan, including economic sanctions. For the view was constantly expressed that boycotts, embargoes, etc. against the Japanese would not involve military action. In short, it would seem that the feeling in this group of journals was that the "quick" reaction to the "quarantine" speech, far from being hostile, was decidedly favorable, and it would seem that, in the long run, their opinions differed too widely to justify any definite conclusion.

Turning to the question of editorial policies, an expansion of a study by Lawrence Kramer of eight newspapers, selected to represent different parts of the country and different political convictions, shows six approving the speech and two opposing.⁵⁰

Among the favorable papers were two published on the west coast: the San Francisco Chronicle and the Los Angeles Times. The Chronicle at the outset welcomed Mr. Roosevelt's statements at Chicago as meaning that he had decided to join in coöperative economic sanctions against Japan. It believed the Navy would have to be held in readiness but that there would be no necessity to use it. But, even before the Brussels Conference, the Chronicle stated with considerable bitterness that the hopes placed in Mr. Roosevelt's declarations were apparently unjustified. The President had spoken "brave" words at Chicago but there was no indication that he himself knew what he meant by them.⁵¹ The Times went through a similar pro cess of expectation and disillusionment. It first supported the "quarantine" speech on the assumption that it foreshadowed the adoption at Brussels of economic and financial measures against the Japanese; but when no such measures materialized, it asked sharply why the speech had ever been made. What originally looked like a statesmanlike utterance, it said, appeared very different in the light of the lack of any effort to implement it.⁵²

In the middle of the country, the Milwaukee Journal expressed itself, at the close of the Nine Power Conference, with even greater vehemence. It scathingly described the delegates departing from Brussels utterly beaten, their tails between their legs. "Where do we go from here?" it asked, and declared, "Nowhere. There wasn't any bright new dream when the President spoke at Chicago . . . only rhetoric."⁵³

The Cleveland Press, a Scripps-Howard paper, while hailing the "quarantine" speech and believing it implied more than moral pressure, pursued a cautious policy, never definitely advocating any course.

On the east coast, the Christian Science Monitor at the beginning expected the warm response to the President's message to lead to an arms embargo or possibly economic sanctions. But ultimately it, too, became disappointed and concluded that Mr. Roosevelt had grown more afraid than ever of his isolationist critics. The New York Times, on its part, saw in the "quarantine" speech and subsequent events the need for reconsidering its editorial position. While applauding the speech as ushering in a more internationalist foreign policy, the Times took no definite stand throughout the Brussels Conference. At the end of November, however, it attracted widespread attention by calling on the Administration to overcome its fear of isolationist groups, in and out of Congress, whom it held responsible for undermining our leadership in world affairs and turning the Brussels Conference into a fiasco. A few weeks later the Times, in a dramatic editorial, came out in favor of withholding raw materials and credits from Japan.⁵⁴

While these six papers seem sufficiently representative to assume that their views, or equivalent ones in similar publications, came to the attention of the Administration, it may be well to mention the editorial policies of the Washington papers which Mr. Roosevelt seems to have frequently scanned.⁵⁵ The News, being a Scripps-Howard publication, followed the cautious policy already noted. The Post issued a sensational front-page editorial on October 6 endorsing the "quarantine" speech as a first step toward economic measures against Japan. The Star not only advocated such measures but declared that, unless they were boldly applied, the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty would deserve nothing better than the contempt which they would certainly get from the Axis countries.⁵⁶ The Times and Herald, both Patterson pa pers, were in favor of a long-range, Anglo-American blockade of the Japanese.⁵⁷ It cannot be stated too often, however, that no matter what actions were recommended it was believed, with few exceptions, that they would not and must not lead to war.

If the editorial opinions of the above newspapers suggest considerable evidence of support for the "quarantine" speech, so, it should be added, did the President's mail. The great majority of the letters on the Chicago address, which fill several boxes in the Hyde Park files, are messages of appreciation, often written with deep emotion.

The other side of the coin is the nature of the opposition to the speech and its influence upon the Administration including the President. The two hostile papers in Mr. Kramer's study were the Chicago Tribune and a Hearst publication. Nothing demonstrated the attitude of the Tribune better than its account of Mr. Roosevelt's appearance at Chicago on October 5. It described thousands of Chicagoans turning out to greet the President, expecting to hear a message of peace, and being plunged by his words into a "world-hurricane of war fright." Throughout October and November the Tribune harped upon two themes: that a "quarantine" must mean economic sanctions and economic sanctions must mean war; that we were merely puppets of the British, serving as saviors of their Empire in the Far East.

The same themes were emphasized by the Hearst press. But Mr. Hearst went much further. He issued a questionnaire to members of Congress which, leading off from the "quarantine" speech, asked whether we should take sides in the Sino-Japanese conflict or steer clear of all wars. The answers were published in a series of articles which began on October 17 and ran for about two weeks. The introduction stated that Congressmen from the "Atlantic to the Pacific, from Canada to the Gulf" had "roared back their determination for today, to-morrow, and forever to keep the United States out of foreign wars."

Many of the published replies came from important political leaders, mainly well-known isolationists.⁵⁸ Senator Borah said he was utterly opposed to the United States participating in sanctions against Japan which would be "just the same as initiating war." Senator Vandenberg declared that any move toward naming aggressors, using sanctions, etc., would lead us in the direction of entangling alliances—the one thing we were determined to avoid. Senator George of Georgia wrote that he would not, under any circumstances, favor action which might risk war with Japan. Senator Richard Russell asserted that, instead of policing the world to maintain peace, we should rely upon our neutrality legislation to "quarantine" us against war. Senator La Follette stated that he was opposed to anything which, by implication or otherwise, might ultimately require the United States to use force.

The statement which received the widest publicity was that issued by Hiram Johnson on October 19, the eve of Norman Davis's departure for Brussels.⁵⁹ Speaking of the coming conference, the Senator said, "We want no union with welching nations who will . . . tell us we must lead mankind to save the world." Mr. Davis, he insisted, would not be going to Europe unless an agreement had been reached in advance between England and the United States. Mr. Roosevelt had no right to make a mystery of what he meant by a "quarantine" and, unless he intended nothing but words, the inevitable result would be war.

Even a cursory look at the record shows that the Administration observed Mr. Hearst's tactics closely from the outset. At his press conference on October 6, Mr. Roosevelt made some remarks about excerpts from editorials around the country, presumably those in the New York Times. He failed, however, to mention that they were mostly in his favor but concentrated instead upon the editorial written by—to use his own words—"the old man of the seas—old man Hearst." This, he declared, was "the silliest ever . . . perfectly terrible—awful. Says it means this is getting us into war and a lot more of that." A few days later, Mr. Ickes recorded in his diary that the Hearst press was after Mr. Roosevelt "full cry" for his Chicago address and that the President had said he wanted to remind Hearst that he had been responsible for an absolutely unjustifiable war with Spain.⁶⁰ At about the same time, Pierrepont Moffat noted in his diary that Hearst was "alleged to be about to start a campaign against the idea of a 'quarantine'."⁶¹ When the campaign got underway, Mr. Roosevelt clearly showed his concern. On the day Norman Davis sailed, the President issued a statement which was generally accepted as a reply to Senator Johnson's attack.⁶² Obviously addressing himself to the accusation that we had an understanding with the British, Mr. Roosevelt asserted that we were "of course" entering the Nine Power Conference without any prior commitments. He also emphasized that the purpose of the meeting was to seek a peaceable solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Off the record, the President dictated some instructions to guide Mr. Davis in his relations with the British.⁶³ The British Cabinet, these said, must recognize that there was such a thing as American public opinion. Mr. Davis must make clear, "at every step," that the United States would neither take the lead at Brussels nor be made a "tail to the British kite as is now being charged by the Hearst press and others."

There can be little doubt therefore that the "quarantine" speech provoked a barrage from prominent isolationists and that this barrage had its effect upon the Administration. There can also be little doubt that considerable evidence of approval of the speech came to the attention of the Administration but was not accepted as weighing substantially in the balance. Perhaps an extensive study would reveal a wider tide of opinion against the address to support the Administration's view. But until such a study is made, it seems pertinent to continue asking whether the Administration's judgment was not unduly governed by its sensitivity to the attacks of leading isolationists.

NOTES

¹ Stenographic report of the conference in The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Proceedings (Buenos Aires, 1937); Report of Delegation of the United States to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington, 1937), Department of State Conference Series 33.

²Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41 (Washington, 1943), p. 342; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), I, 498.

³Documents on International Affairs, 1936 (London, 1937), p. 77.

⁴ Martin, Percy Alvin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 361 et seq., 381. Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Proceedings, pp. 138, 221, 739.

⁵ Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943), p. 287, chapter xxi. Welles, Sumner, The Time for Decision (New York, 1944), p. 204.

⁶ The memorandum of this conversation was an unusually comprehensive statement of Mr. Hull's views and was sent to the President. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, I, 641, and Hull, Memoirs, I, 546. Even after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Mr. Hull was urging Japan to join the United States in the leadership of a peace movement based on the Buenos Aires agreements. See Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-41, p. 331.

⁷F.D.R.: His Personal Utters, 1928-45 (New York, 1947), I, 664. Based on notes of their discussion written by Mr. King while talking with the President and shown to the latter.

⁸ Memorandum by Mr. Davis on telephone conversation with the President on March 19. Davis files.

⁹ Hull, Memoirs, I, 546.

¹⁰ August 26, 1936, story by Arthur Krock.

¹¹Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, I, 655.

¹²Ibid., pp. 29, 638, 640, 649.

¹³ Apparently in March, Secretary Morgenthau told Mr. Chamberlain that the United States wanted to help in finding some way of preventing the outbreak of war. For correspondence on this see ibid., I, 98-106.

¹⁴ The following accounts of Mr. Davis's conversations are all based upon his memoranda.

¹⁵ Davis files. Draft in Roosevelt files, P. S. F. Great Britain, 1933-38, Box 7.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, I, 113.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 665-670. Mr. Welles's own accounts of his plan are in The Time for Decision, p. 64, and Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1950), chapter i. See also discussion in The Challenge to Isolation by William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason (New York, 1952), p. 22.

²⁰Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, I, 115-126.

²¹ Roosevelt files, P. S. F. State—1938.

²² Hull, Memoirs, I, 544-545.

²³ The four memoranda are in both the Roosevelt and the Davis files. There is one difference in the texts (noted below) and some differences in the accompanying letters and notations.

²⁴ Hull, Memoirs, I, 544.

²⁵The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1941), 1937, p. 406.

²⁶ The paraphrase of a recent author is from James Hilton's Lost Horizon; the quotation from a Bishop was taken from a letter written to the President by Bishop Frank W. Sterrett (Roosevelt files); the paragraph beginning "the situation is definitely of universal concern" is quoted from the State Department's instructions to the Minister in Switzerland in regard to the League's consideration of the Far Eastern crisis, September, 28. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, IV, 43.

²⁷ There are various stories about the President's use of the word "quarantine." Mr. Ickes thought the President took it from a talk in which he (the Secretary) said that neighbors had a right to "quarantine" themselves against the spread of infection such as existed in the international situation. See The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York, 1954), II, 221. Mr. Welles has stated that the President used the word "quarantine" in talking to him about the possibility of drawing a line in the Pacific to form a quasi blockade against Japan. See Rosenman, Samuel I., Working with Roosevelt (New York, 1952), p. 164. For an account by William Phillips see footnote 34.

²⁸ The original version of this memorandum is in the Davis files and is marked "N.Y. September 17, 1937" with a further notation "Phoned to Mr. Dunn." Presumably the State Department suggested the changes which appeared in the revised version in the Roosevelt files.

²⁹ Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, pp. 8, 13-14, 70-75, 91-93; Rosenman, op. cit., p. 164, has letter from Mr. Welles on the "quarantine" speech.

³⁰ Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 61.

³¹ This statement leaves open to question whether Mr. Roosevelt actually stated he had in mind cutting off all trade with the aggressor or whether Mr. Ickes thought that was what the President had in mind. The document which indicates most clearly that one of the President's ideas was to find some means of using coöperative economic pressures is cited in footnote 34.

³² Roosevelt files.

³³ Davis files.

³⁴ The President must have mentioned a plan including economic pressures to Clark Eichelberger in early July 1937. In mid-July Mr. Eichelberger sent the President a memorandum based on a talk which they had had some two weeks earlier. The discussion seems to have centered on the possibility of evolving a comprehensive international program which would provide for far-reaching economic measures, drastic disarmament, and a renovation of the existing peace machinery. In connection with the last, Mr. Eichelberger, evidently recapitulating some of the points which had been made during the course of the conversation, wrote that the principle of consultation among nonbelligerents embodied in the Buenos Aires agreements might be extended to the entire world. Once the world had adopted such principles, he continued, the American people would be willing to accept the idea of denying trade to the aggressor. "Instead of sanctions being voted piecemeal, they would take the form of a denial of the economic benefits of the more nearly just international society to the nation that would make war." Also at some point during this meeting, the President intimated that he might someday make a dramatic speech which—to quote Mr. Eichelberger—would "lead the world on the upward path." Roosevelt files, O.F. 20 State Department, Box 6.

One further account of a conversation with the President at this time should be mentioned, though the whole tenor of the talk, in addition to the vagueness of the language, makes it hard to evaluate. William Phillips, in his autobiography, describes a visit with Mr. Roosevelt on October 6, and states that he asked the President what he meant in using the word "quarantine" in his speech the day before. The President replied that he had searched for a word which was not "sanctions" and had settled on "quarantine" as a "drawing away from someone." Mr. Phillips adds that as the discussion proceeded, Mr. Roosevelt indicated his willingness to "go very far in drawing away." See Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), pp. 206-207.

³⁵ Based partly on a remark to this effect said to have been made by Mr. Roosevelt some months later. (Talks with John M. Blum who is working on a book with Mr. Morgenthau based on the latter's diaries.)

³⁶The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, pp. 414-425.

³⁷Ibid., p. 429.

³⁸ Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History, p. 13. See also p. 73 and Welles, The Time for Decision, p. 63.

³⁹ Hull, Memoirs, I, 545. One cannot help wondering whether the severely critical attitude which Mr. Hull is known to have developed toward the "quarantine" speech did not arise only after he saw the attacks in the isolationist press. Pierrepont Moffat recorded in his diary on October 5, 1937, that a meeting of State Department officials was being held on that day in the Secretary's office when the ticker service brought in the text of the President's Chicago address. "The Secretary was delighted at the speech," Mr. Moffat wrote, "and the majority thought it would be strongly approved by the public." See The Moffat Papers (Cambridge, 1956), p. 153.

⁴⁰ Rosenman, op. cit.

⁴¹ Statement based on a study of our Far Eastern policy during this period which the writer is making.

⁴² There do not seem to be any polls that show any particular shift in opinion right after the "quarantine" speech. See Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951) which includes exact dates on which polls were issued. Some of the evidence Mr. Hull cites in his Memoirs (p. 545) to prove that the country reacted against the "quarantine idea" is unconvincing. He states, for example, that the A. F. of L. passed a resolution, following the speech, to the effect that "American labor does not wish to be involved in European or Asiatic wars." But he fails to mention that the day after the "quarantine" speech William Green at a convention of the A. F. of L. proposed a boycott of Japanese goods and was, according to all press accounts, overwhelmingly applauded. Moreover about a week later the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. both passed resolutions to boycott Japan.

⁴³The Moffat Papers, p. 155.

⁴⁴ P. 17.

⁴⁵ P. 1. Article by the Washington Bureau of the Monitor.

⁴⁶ Magazine section, p. 3.

⁴⁷ October 18, p. 19. The article was obviously written before the Fireside Chat of October 12.

⁴⁸ December 20, p. 11.

⁴⁹ November 1, p. 17.

⁵⁰ Lawrence I. Kramer, Jr., then at Harvard, wrote a long manuscript summarizing all the editorials in these papers dealing with the major developments in our Far Eastern policy from 1933 to 1937. The above is based on the section on the "quarantine" speech with additions and analyses made entirely on my own responsibility.

⁵¹ November 5. The editorials in each newspaper are too numerous to cite except where reference is made to a specific editorial.

⁵² November 26.

⁵³ November 26.

⁵⁴ These two editorials appeared respectively on November 30 and December 24.

⁵⁵ Mr. Roosevelt's scrapbook at Hyde Park is full of clippings from the Washington press. Grace Tully lists eleven newspapers which the President looked through customarily for editorial opinion. Of these, four opposed the "quarantine" speech: The Chicago Tribune, a Hearst paper, the New York Herald Tribune, and the New York Sun. See F.D.R.: My Boss (New York, 1949), p. 76.

⁵⁶ October 7.

⁵⁷ October 10 and 12 respectively. The New York Daily News, also a Patterson paper, had come out on October 3 for such a blockade (magazine section, p. 6).

⁵⁸ The references in this paragraph are to articles printed on October 17 and 18.

⁵⁹San Francisco Examiner, October 20, p. 1.

⁶⁰ Ickes, Secret Diary, II, 227.

⁶¹The Moffat Papers, p. 155.

⁶²New York Times, October 20, p. 15.

⁶³Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, IV, 85. The memorandum was also sent to Ambassador Bingham in London who conveyed its contents to Mr. Eden (ibid., p. 114).