SOURCE: Flinterman, Jaap-Jan. “The Main Character.” In Power, Paideia & Pythagoreanism: Greek Identity, Conceptions of the Relationship between Philosophers and Monarchs and Political Ideas in Philostratus's Life of Apollonius, pp. 60-66. Amsterdam, Netherlands: J. C. Gieben, 1995.

[In the following excerpt, Flinterman discusses Apollonius of Tyana, examining the ontological status of the main character, and expounding on Philostratus's attitude toward magic and his hero.]

At numerous points in his work Philostratus explicitly states his intention of offering his readers a view of Apollonius which deviates from current opinion; in fact, it is at odds with it. Philostratus' view can be summarised as follows: Apollonius was a Pythagorean philosopher whose exceptional wisdom earned him the reputation of being a supernatural, divine being.¹ Philostratus provides an explicit statement of this objective in the programmatic chapters which introduce the book. VA (Life of Apollonius of Tyana) 1.1 deals with Pythagoreanism, and is directly followed by an outline of the main features of Philostratus' image of Apollonius (1.2). The succeeding chapters, on Apollonius' youth, focus on his choice of Pythagoreanism and the consequences it entails for his life-style: he abstains from meat and wine, adopts celibacy, and observes a strict rule of silence for five years (1.7f. and 13f.). Philostratus opposes this view of the sage of Tyana to the notion that Apollonius was a magician (magos) who engaged in goēteia, dishonest magic.² This view was connected with prophecies and miracles attributed to the sage of Tyana. Philostratus does not deny the supernatural capacities of his hero, but he repudiates the idea that Apollonius had anything at all do with goēteia or that he deserved the title magos. The miraculous stories in the VA are related to the hero's supernatural knowledge and wisdom; Philostratus presents Apollonius' prophecies and miracles as a corollary of his divine nature or as the result of his asceticism and his divine inspiration and assistance (7.38f.; 5.12; 8.7.9).

Contradictory views of a miracle-worker like those found in the VA play a crucial role in Celsus' attacks on Christianity and its founder and in Origen's reaction to them. The work of the pagan polemicist dates from the 170s; Origen's defence was written in the 240s.³ The period of their debate thus corresponds exactly to the lifespan of the author of the VA. The terms of the debate come remarkably close to those used by Philostratus in his defence of Apollonius. Celsus claims time and again that the miracles performed by Jesus prove that he was a goēs; Origen is equally insistent that Jesus performed miracles by means of divine power.⁴ It is plausible to suppose that such controversies were based on some tangible social phenomenon: the activities of charismatic wise men and miracle-workers, who operated more or less independently of the institutionalised cults, and who claimed a special relationship with the divine which was expressed in their supernatural powers.⁵ Their activities provoked a wide range of reactions, ranging from devotion to disapproval. Either the supernatural powers of the sage and miracle-worker were attributed to a special relationship with the divine or divinity; or the supernatural acts were simply treated as instances of magic or goēteia. Magos and goēs were regarded as more or less synonymous in these debates; both terms were used in a pejorative sense.⁶

In general, for the inhabitants of the Greco-Roman world in the first centuries A.D. the term ‘magic’ meant the manipulation of supernatural forces by means of spells and rituals which were believed to bring about the desired effect automatically. At the same time, words like magos and goēs were used to stigmatise socially deviant, and therefore undesirable, views and behaviour.⁷ The question of what people had to do to be accused of ‘magic’ cannot be answered with a simple reference to their alleged machinations; as we have seen, supernatural acts could be interpreted in very different ways, either as signs of divine assistance or as the result of dabbling in the supernatural. In inquiring into the background to an accusation of ‘magic’, we therefore have to begin by explaining in what respects the views and behaviour of the person accused of ‘magic’ deviated from the norms of the individuals or groups who wielded enough social influence to initiate the process of making allegations.⁸

In the case of charismatic sages and miracle-workers like Apollonius, one can point to the tension between such figures and the institutionalised cults. Sages and miracle-workers probably made regular attempts to use existing shrines as their seat of operations,⁹ and they were sometimes successful; at the same time, their claim to a special relationship with the divine could be regarded as a threat to the position of institutionalised cults. Even if they were not inevitable, conflicts were certainly on the cards. The VA contains various indications to support the assumption that the existence of a tension between the sage of Tyana and the priests of the institutionalised cults was a recurrent theme in the Apollonius tradition. Although Philostratus mentions that his hero lived for a time in the temple of Asclepius in Aegae (1.7-12), and records positive reactions to his activities from the oracles of Colophon and Didyma and the temple of Asclepius in Pergamum (4.1), he cannot gloss over the fact that, according to various local traditions, the first reaction when the sage of Tyana wanted to visit a shrine was to bar his entry as a goēs (witness his reception in Eleusis (4.18), the oracle of Trophonius in Lebadea (8.19), and the temple of Dictynna on Crete (8.30)).¹⁰ The priests of these shrines were understandably averse to pretentious rivals; moreover, Apollonius' disapproval of sacrifices—a recurrent theme in various parts of the Apollonius tradition¹¹—may help to explain their attitude. Sacrifices were the ideal opportunity for members of the urban elites to display their civic qualities by paying for the ceremonies and regaling their fellow citizens with wine and meat. They thereby demonstrated their indispensability in two ways: the community was dependent on them not only for its immediate material prosperity, but also for the maintenance of a harmonious relation with the gods by holding religious festivals with the appropriate ostentation.¹² To condemn sacrifices was thus more than an expression of religious non-conformism: it was an attack on a practice which played a key role in the legitimation of the social and political order.

As mentioned above, Philostratus sometimes explains Apollonius' prophecies and miracles in terms of divine revelation and assistance. The predominant view in the VA as a whole, however, is that the sage of Tyana is himself in possession of a supernatural, divine nature. Philostratus primarily conveys this impression to his readers through the reactions of people who are confronted by Apollonius and recognise him as a holy man (theios anēr) (2.17; 2.40; 8.15) or daimōn (1.19; 4.44).¹³ There is a crucial episode in this respect in Book 7. After being thrown into irons in prison on the orders of Domitian, Apollonius frees his leg of the fetters in the presence of Damis. Damis now realises fully for the first time that his master is endowed with a ‘divine and superhuman nature’.¹⁴ The VA does not provide any unambiguous indication that Apollonius is in fact a god. However, although Philostratus' Apollonius declines divine honours (4.31) and seems to regard those who believe that he is a god as the victims of a delusion (in the speech written for his defence before Domitian, 8.7.7), the reader is given the impression that the author is motivated by a desire to avoid giving offence rather than by the need to refute incorrect views.¹⁵

The claim that Apollonius was endowed with a superhuman nature is stressed in the VA by stories about the omens connected with his birth (1.5), according to which he was an incarnation of Proteus (1.4) and a son of Zeus (1.6), and by the traditions on his miraculous departure from this life (8.29f.). Philostratus provides different versions of how Apollonius' life on earth ended. His own preference is for the tradition that the sage of Tyana ascended into heaven; he attempts to substantiate this tradition with the remark that, during his travels over virtually the entire globe, he has never come across a grave of Apollonius.¹⁶ According to the VA, Apollonius derived the belief that good people are gods from the Indian sages (3.18; cf. 8.5). As he takes his leave of the sages, their leader Iarchas tells Apollonius that he will be revered by the people as a god not only after his death, but during his life as well (3.50). In the speech written in his defence before Domitian, Apollonius elaborates on this idea of the wise men of India to produce a portrait of the man who creates order in the souls of his fellow men and who is referred to as ‘a god sent down by wisdom’.¹⁷ There is no reason to doubt that the hero's words at this point are intended to refer to himself,¹⁸ although the VA does not contain any unambiguous statements regarding Apollonius' ontological status. Philostratus resorts to suggestions and the opinions of other without tying himself down. The closest that he comes to voicing his own opinion is when he interprets a sign at the birth of Apollonius as a divine indication that he should ‘transcend all things upon earth and approach the gods’;¹⁹ but here too he refuses to commit himself unequivocally.²⁰

What is the reason for this ambiguity? We cannot rule out the possibility that some degree of reticence on the part of the author of the VA is involved; as we shall see, there are occasional signs in the VA that the writer felt certain reservations towards his theme, despite the openly professed apologetic intention of the work. More important, however, is the fact that, in so far as the pre-Philostratean tradition on Apollonius presented a positive image of the sage of Tyana, it was very likely marked by a similar ambivalence: the superhuman nature of Apollonius and his special relationship with the divine were affirmed without being defined more precisely. The same ambiguity was a typical feature of the tradition on the superhuman nature of Pythagoras himself.²¹ According to Aristotle, an esoteric doctrine of the Pythagoreans was that there are three sorts of rational beings: gods, men, and those like Pythagoras.²² After the revival of Pythagoreanism as a religious and philosophical current in the first century B.C., this doctrine of a third ontological category characterised by a special relationship with the divine or by divinity provided a context within which the activities of charismatic sages and miracle-workers could be set and legitimated.²³

… Philostratus attempts to clear Apollonius of the charge of goēteia and to establish a connection between his supernatural powers and his superhuman knowledge and wisdom. It is evident that this endeavour sometimes creates problems for the writer.²⁴ For instance, while it is impossible to see the miraculous freeing in prison (7.38) as an expression of superior knowledge, nor is there any question of divine assistance, it is this very episode which forces Damis to recognise the superhuman nature of his master. Philostratus is at pains to stress that this is not an instance of goēteia, but he does not actually offer any alternative interpretation of this miracle (7.39). It is not enough to note the author's perplexity when faced with such material without inquiring into the background to this phenomenon. This entails an examination of the interaction between the norms and values of Philostratus, on the one hand, and the traditions on Apollonius on which he relied in the writing of the VA, on the other. Discussion of the form and content of these traditions will be postponed to the following section; for the time being it is sufficient to note that the Apollonius tradition on which the author of the VA drew contains numerous elements which are hard to reconcile with an attempt to clear the sage of Tyana of the charge of magic. I shall confine my remarks here to Philostratus' attitude to magic/goēteia.

Philostratus responds to accusations of magic against sophists on two occasions in the VS (523 and 590). In both cases he rejects the allegations by arguing that anyone whose reputation as an educated person (pepaideumenos) is at stake will keep goēteia at arm's length. The same distinction between magic/goēteia, on the one hand, and paideia, on the other, is postulated by Celsus, who claims that magic can only gain a grip on the intellectually undeveloped and corrupt, not on philosophers (Origen, Cels. 6.41). In this way, magic is equated with socio-cultural and moral deprivation, a common enough attitude among Greek intellectuals of the imperial age. Naturally enough, it was very closely connected with the use of the terms ‘magic’ and ‘magician’ to stigmatise socially deviant views and behaviour.²⁵ This rejection of magic/goēteia was not always accompanied by a denial of the possible effectiveness of magical practices. The view that identifies magic with simple trickery is mainly found among those who were connected in some way with Epicureanism. It was an Epicurean, a certain Celsus (not to be confused with Origen's pagan opponent), to whom Lucian addressed his satire on Alexander of Abonutichus;²⁶ Lucian refers to a text written by this Celsus against magicians in which the author apparently endeavoured to reveal magical practices as conjuring tricks.²⁷ It is interesting to note that Philostratus comes surprisingly close to this point of view in a passage in the VA. This is the tirade against goēteia (7.39) which follows the account of how Apollonius freed his leg from the fetters in prison (7.38), though it is independent of the content of the previous chapter.²⁸ Philostratus here claims that simple-minded people, such as athletes, traders and especially those in love, attribute such acts to wizardry. They believe that any successes they score are the result of such practices (instead of resulting from chance, their own efforts or other purely human factors), and assume that any failure to achieve results is due to negligence in carrying out the recommendations of the magicians. The writer refers to the writings of those who make fun of magic/goēteia and reveal how magicians perform all kinds of ‘miracles’; he is presumably referring to texts like the one written by the addressee of Lucian's Alexander. However, he adds a warning to young people not even to meddle in matters of this kind in this manner, and concludes his digression with the remark that magic/goēteia is equally condemned by nature and by law.²⁹

The vehement denial of the effectiveness of magical practices and the emphasis on the decisive influence of chance and purely human factors on the results of human actions are highly reminiscent of Lucian's attitude.³⁰ All the same, it would be an exaggeration to credit Philostratus with a coherent system of views on nature and the supernatural on the basis of these passages from the VS and the VA. Undeterred by any need to be consistent, in another passage he defends Apollonius against the charge of goēteia in connection with his prophetic abilities by claiming that the sage of Tyana could only see into what was predestined thanks to divine inspiration, but that he did not attempt to bring about any changes in that future by means of magic (5.12; cf. 8.7.16). The only consistent feature in the attitude toward goēteia of the author of the VA and the VS is the combination of disdain and repugnance. It is hardly surprising that a writer with such an attitude runs up against difficulties once he undertakes to write a laudatory biography of a man of whom it was said that he could understand the language of birds (1.20; cf. 4.3), that he averted an epidemic by revealing the plague demon and having him stoned (4.10), and that he ordered another demon who had possessed a young man to leave his victim and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the exorcism by overturning a statue (4.20). The question which arises is why a writer who held an attitude of this kind felt inclined to write an apologetic vie romancée of Apollonius of Tyana.

It is customary in this connection to refer to the fact that Philostratus began work on the VA on the orders of Julia Domna, and to connect the explicit apologetic intention of the writer with the views of Apollonius that were current in her circle.³¹ There is no reason to doubt Philostratus' statement that he started work on the life of Apollonius on the instructions of the empress. … [T]he literary and philosophical coterie of Julia Domna consisted of a variegated assortment, probably including Platonic and Pythagorean philosophers. It seems reasonable to suppose that both these philosophers and the empress attached importance to a positive image of the sage of Tyana. However, we are not therefore entitled to assume that Philostratus' portrait of Apollonius met their expectations in every way. The VA was not completed until after the death of the empress, suggesting that Philostratus' interest in Apollonius was not just a reflection of the devotion shown Apollonius by the empress and her son.³² In view of the author's distaste and scorn for anything which might seem to bear the taint of magic/goēteia, it is most likely that he was primarily interested in the sage of Tyana because the Apollonius tradition offered him attractive material for literary adaptation.³³ At the same time, his choice of theme reflected the growing interest in and acceptance of figures like Apollonius in educated circles. The controversial character of the protagonist made it virtually impossible for the author not to adopt a particular view of Apollonius; the nature of the material forced him to give vent to the reservations which he entertained with regard to certain aspects of the Apollonius tradition.

Notes

1. See esp. VA 1.2: … ἔψαυσε του̑ δαιμόνιόs τε καὶ θει̑οs νομισθη̑ναι.

2. Unlike μάγοs and μαγεία, γοηs and γοητεία are completely pejorative terms, at least since the classical period, see Burkert (1962) 50; Poupon (1981) 71. The term γόηs has various connotations, which can be summed up as ‘meddler in the supernatural’: a γόηs is a dishonest magician, a charlatan and a cheat, see MacMullen (1966) 322 n. 20. Philostratus does not distinguish clearly between μάγοs and γόηs.

3. See Chadwick (1953) xxvi-xxviii and xiv-xv.

4. See e.g. Origen, Cels. 1.6, 38 and 68; 2.48-51. For conflicting views of sages and miracle-workers in the imperial age see Gallagher (1982) 41-150 (a full-length discussion of the Contra Celsum) and 157-165 (on the VA).

5. See e.g. D.S. 34/5.2.5-9, with Bradley (1989) 55-57 (Eunus, the leader of the first Sicilian slave revolt); Origen, Cels. 7.9, with Chadwick (1953) 402f. n. 6; Act. Ap. 8.9-24 (Simon Magus).

6. See M. Smith (1973) 227-229.

7. I am here following Aune (1980) 1510-1516, esp. 1515, whose definition of magic takes into account both the explicit criteria for the application of the term by Greco-roman users and its social function: “magic is defined as that form of religious deviance whereby individual and social goals are sought by means alternate to those normally sanctioned by the dominant religious institution. (…) Religious activities which fit this first and primary criterion must also fit a second criterion: goals sought within the context of religious deviance are magical when attained through the management of supernatural powers in such a way that results are virtually guaranteed.” For the debate on the term ‘magic’ and the validity of the distinction between ‘magic’ and ‘religion’ see Phillips (1986) 2711-2732; Versnel (1991).

8. See e.g. Remus (1983) 62.

9. Cf. the significant καὶ ἰν ι̑εροὶs καὶ ἔξω ἰερω̑ν in Origen, Cels. 7.9.

10. Lane Fox (1986) 253 denies the existence of any tension between institutionalised religion and such figures as Apollonius. This is clearly incorrect. Lane Fox is probably right in arguing that there was no absolute distinction between the ‘temple’ and the ‘magician’ (p. 686 n. 34, contra J. Z. Smith, ‘The Temple and the Magician’, in J. Jervell and W. A. Meeks [eds], God's Christ and His People. Studies … N. A. Dahl [1977] 233ff., at 238 = J. Z. Smith [1978] 187f.), but such a claim ignores passages like VA 4.18, 8.19 and 8.30.

11. See esp. Epp. Apoll. 26 and 27; the complete material in Penella (1979b) 105.

12. See Gordon (1990) 224-231.

13. For the terms θει̑οs ἀνήρ and δαίμων see Betz (1983) 235-238. Both θει̑οι ἄνδρεs and δαίμονεs belong to the domain between gods and humans; the difference between them is that θει̑οs ἀνήρ emphasises the divine presence in a human being of flesh and blood, while δαίμονεs are semi-divine beings. See, however, Betz (1983) 237: “Eine klare Trennung haben die Griechen nicht für notwendig gehalten.” Gallagher (1982) 1-26, Corrington (1986) 1-43, Phillips (1986) 2752-2764, and Koskenniemi (1994) 64-100 provide surveys of the modern debate on the θει̑οs ἀνήρ. Lane Fox (1986) 686 n. 34 dismisses the whole issue of the ‘ubiquitous divine man’ with the remark that the phenomenon requires more precise definition-hardly a fruitful approach. Of course, it is wrong to suppose that the term θει̑οs ἀνήρ refers to an empirically observable phenomenon that can be defined in an unambiguous way. The ancient sources do bear witness, however, to a conflict between opposite assessments of sages and miracle-workers: one of the terms which can be used as a positive qualification for such figures is θει̑οs ἀνήρ.

14. VA 7.38: … φύσιs θεία τε καὶ κρείττων ἀνθρώπου. Cf. VA 8.13.

15. For the offensive character of claims to divinity cf. Epp. Apoll. 48.3.

16. Talbert (1978) 1638f. refers in this connection to ‘a merger (…) of two originally distinct views of divinity’; at the end of his life, the θει̑οs ἀνήρ is incorporated among the immortals.

17. VA 8.7.7.: … θεὸs ὑπὸ σοφὶαs ἥκων. On this passage see also below, p. 187.

18. Kee (1973) 407 denies this, but ignores the connection between this passage and the views which Apollonius is supposed to have derived from the Indian sages.

19. VA 1.5: … τὸ ἀγχου̑ θεω̑ν.

20. Cf. Gallagher (1982) 161f.; Cox (1983) 39.

21. See Burkert (1972b) 136-147; cf. J. Z. Smith, ‘Good News is No News: Aretology and Gospel’, in: J. Neusner (ed.), Christianity, Judaism and other Greco-Roman Cults: Studies for Morton Smith at Sixty. Part One: New Testament (Leiden 1975) 21-38 = J. Z. Smith (1978) 190-207, esp. 194-204.

22. Arist., fr. 192 Rose (= Iamb., VP 31): του̑ λογικου̑ ζῳου τὸ μέν ἐστι θεόs, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωποs, τὸ δὲ οἷον Πυθαγόραs.

23. Goulet (1981) 175f.; Burkert (1972b) 146. On the revival of Pythagoreanism and the problem of continuity cf. Burkert (1961) 226-246. Of course, not everyone was convinced by such legitimation: Artemidorus (2.69) classifies the Pythagoristai among the false prophets who pull wool over the eyes of their audience with goēteia.

    I cannot accept the contention of Koskenniemi (1994) 218, “dass die heidnischen Wundertäter, wie wir sie in den antiken Quellen finden, vor allem Teil der heidnischen Welt der ausgehenden 2. Jahrhunderts [A.D.] sind.” Koskenniemi bases his claim on the scarcity of references to pagan miracle workers in the surviving sources from the Hellenistic period up to and including the first century A.D. In my opinion, the Finnish scholar does not sufficiently reckon with the rather poor state of preservation of pagan Greek prose literature of the Hellenistic and Julio-Claudian periods and with the possibility that the growth of our evidence reflects an increase in the respectability and social standing of miracle workers rather than an increase in their numbers. Besides, Eunus (above, p. 60 n. 11) is a fine example of a pagan miracle worker from the Hellenistic period.

24. Cf. Anderson (1986) 139: “… Philostratus was caught between two stools: he had to prove that Apollonius was not a γόηs, consistent with being no ordinary mortal; he had therefore to invest his sage with ‘rational’ miracles.”

25. Cf. Chadwick (1953) 356 n. 1; Aune (1980) 1521. See also M. Ant. 1.6, where Marcus Aurelius refers to Diognetus, one of his tutors during his youth, not just as the first to introduce him to philosophy, but also as the one who taught him τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν τοι̑s ὑπὸ τω̑ν τερατευομένων καὶ γοήτων περὶ ἐπῳδω̑ν καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ἀποπομπη̑s καὶ τω̑ν τοιοὐτων λεγομένοιs. On this passage cf. Rutherford (1989) 181-188.

26. Lucian, Alex. 1; cf. Chadwick (1953) xxiv-xxvi.

27. Lucian, Alex. 21. A similar text must have served as the basis for the chapters on magic by the Christian apologist Hippolytus (Haer. 4.28-42). Cf. C. P. Jones (1986) 137 and 139.

28. Philostratus himself speaks of an ἐκτροπὴ του̑ λόγου (7.39).

29. On anti-magic legislation see Hopfner (1928) 384-387; MacMullen (1966) 124-126.

30. See e.g. Alex. 36, where Lucian makes fun of an oracle by Alexander's snake-god Glycon that was hung above the doors of numerous houses during the outbreak of the plague in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. According to Lucian, it was the residents in these houses that were often the hardest hit, either by chance or because they had a blind confidence in the power of the amulet and neglected to take other preventive measures.

31. See e.g. Solmsen (1941) 143; Esser (1969) 95 and 98.

32. On this question see the remarks by Palm (1976) 17-24.

33. Thus e.g. Bowie (1978) 1666: “… his aim was most plausibly that of a professional writer, to produce a well-rounded and entertaining piece of literature, rather than to further a propagandist interpretation of Apollonius as a Pythagorean sage.” Cf. Reardon (1971) 266; Anderson (1986) 133f.; Koskenniemi (1986) passim and (1991) 70-79.

Abbreviations

The abbreviations used in referring to the names of Greek authors and their works are those used in: H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, R. MacKenzie, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford 1940⁹; supplement 1968). For incidental references to this lexicon the standard abbreviation LSJ is used. The abbreviations VA (Vita Apollonii), Epp. Apoll. (Epistulae Apollonii), VS (Vitae Sophistarum) and VP (De Vita Pythagorica or Vita Pythagorae) are used in the main body of the text as well as in the references. Names of Christian Greek authors and their works not included in the list of abbreviations in LSJ are generally abbreviated in accordance with G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford 1961). The names of Latin authors and their works are abbreviated in accordance with the system of P. G. W. Glare (ed.), Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1982). In the few cases in which I have departed from the abbreviations used in these lexicons, I have generally given the full names of authors and/or works; otherwise, I hope that my abbreviations will not give the reader any problems. Titles of periodicals and series are abbreviated in the bibliography (see below) as in L'Année Philologique. Where reference is made in a note to an introduction or extended commentary in an edition of an ancient author, the edition in question is generally included under the name of the writer of the introduction or commentary in the bibliography. Collections of inscriptions and documentary papyri are referred to in accordance with the abbreviations used in the Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum and the Berichtigungsliste der griechischen Papyrusurkunden aus Ägypten respectively.

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