SOURCE: Flinterman, Jaap-Jan. “The Writer.” In Power, Paideia & Pythagoreanism: Greek Identity, Conceptions of the Relationship between Philosophers and Monarchs and Political Ideas in Philostratus's Life of Apollonius, pp. 29-51. Amsterdam, Netherlands: J. C. Gieben, 1995.

[In the following excerpt, Flinterman summarizes the preface and introduction to Philostratus's The Lives of the Sophists, discussing the author's attitude toward the sophists and various Greek literary and political issues, and finally, challenges scholarly analyses that claim Philostratus did not identify with his fellow sophists.]

The Suda (Φ 421) calls the author of the VA (Apollonius of Tyana) and the VS (The Lives of the Sophists) a sophist,¹ and the mere fact that Philostratus is also referred to as such in inscriptions honouring himself and his son is enough to show that he was attached to this title. Attempts to formulate a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon of the sophistēs as it is known from the imperial age usually run up against the problem of individual cases to which (some) contemporaries considered the title applicable, but which evade part of the definition. It is clear at all events that the term was primarily used for individuals who earned recognition from a broad public as exceptionally gifted orators; that this reputation was due in the first place to improvised declamations on historical or imaginary themes (meletai); and that they generally combined demonstrations of their ability as a form of public entertainment with the provision of lessons in rhetoric.² Show speakers of this kind occupy a central position in the VS, a collection of biographical sketches, in which Philostratus deals with his own cultural milieu and that of his predecessors since the second half of the first century, as well as trying to establish a link between the sophists of the imperial age, on the one hand, and sophists and orators from the classical period, on the other. In other words, the VS is about the cultural and social phenomenon to which Philostratus himself belonged and which he labelled as the ‘Second Sophistic’. It is in the VS more than in his other extant writings that we should expect to find a record of his views, ideas, norms and values in a relatively pure state, uncontaminated by the ideas and conceptions which other themes inevitably entailed. The discussion in this section is thus based on the assumption that Philostratus identified to a large extent with his fellow sophists of the imperial period whose vicissitudes, successes and failures take up most of the VS.

Although the latter point may appear platitudinous to readers of the VS, the identification of the author with his subject matter has been called into question in recent publications. In a study of the reception of Dio of Prusa in antiquity and in the Byzantine period, the Italian scholar A. Brancacci has tried to use the preface and introduction of the VS as a source for the formation of theory associated with the concepts of philosophy, rhetoric and sophistic in the imperial philosophical schools and literary circles;³ his conclusions with regard to Philostratus' cultural ideal are as astonishing as they are unconvincing. Since Brancacci's treatment of the author of the VS has met with a warm reception from authoritative quarters,⁴ it is worthwhile to combine the presentation of my own view of Philostratus' cultural ideal with a refutation of the views of the Italian scholar on this point. For a proper grasp of the differences of interpretation, I shall first present a summary paraphrase of the preface and introduction to the VS.

In the dedicatory preface to Gordian, Philostratus mentions two categories of intellectuals that he has dealt with in his work: persons who concerned themselves with philosophy but had the reputation of sophists; and sophists in the real sense of the word (VS 479; cf. VS 492). At the conclusion of the introduction he explains that certain philosophers earned the title of sophist by virtue of the verbal virtuosity which they displayed in bringing their views to the notice of the public (VS 484). This passage is preceded by descriptions of the ancient sophistic and of what Philostratus refers to as the ‘Second Sophistic’. The ancient sophistic is defined as eloquence on philosophical issues (ῥητορικὴ φιλοσοφου̑σα) of an ethical, theological or cosmological nature. He distinguishes the ancient sophistic from philosophy through the way in which epistemological premises are suggested by the manner of presentation: while philosophers follow Socratic dialectic, the ancient sophists speak as if they are in possession of knowledge. In this respect—the form of presentation of discourse—Philostratus compares philosophy with human divination i.e. astrology, while sophistic is compared with the divinely inspired divination of prophets and oracles. He regards Gorgias as the founder of ancient sophistic. The Second Sophistic, in his view, differs from ancient sophistic in its object and manner of treatment: elaborate discussions of philosophical themes are replaced by a literary (κατὰ τέχνην) characterisation of social types, such as the poor, the rich, war heroes and tyrants, and the treatment of specific themes furnished by history. Philostratus regards Aeschines as the founder of the Second Sophistic, which thus has its roots in the classical period. It should be noted in passing that the author of the VS ascribes the founding of the Second Sophistic to Aeschines after the conclusion of the latter's political career in Athens (VS 480f.).

After the introduction, Philostratus discusses the ‘philosophers with the reputation of sophists’ (VS 484-492), from Eudoxus of Cnidus (first half of the fourth century B.C.) to Favorinus of Arelate (floruit under the emperor Hadrian). The only ones to be given something of a biographical sketch are Favorinus and Dio of Prusa; the other six ‘philosophers with the reputation of sophists’ are dealt with in brief characterisations. The author of the VS then proceeds to tackle those whom he considers to represent ancient sophistic, from Gorgias to Isocrates (VS 492-506). This review is followed by a treatment of the Second Sophistic, beginning with Aeschines (VS 507-510). The next representative of the Second Sophistic whom Philostratus deems worthy of consideration after Aeschines is Nicetes of Smyrna (second half of the first century). He characterises the intervening period as one in which there was a lack of respectable sophists (VS 511: ἀπορία γενναίων σοφιστω̑ν): sophistic was in an impasse (ἐs στενὸν ἀπειλημμένη) until Nicetes restored it to new vigour. The rest of the VS, which accounts for most of the work (VS 511-628), is devoted to the imperial sophists.

According to Brancacci, Philostratus presents himself in the introduction to the VS and in his treatment of the life of Dio of Prusa as a spokesman for a cultural ideal in which eloquence, philosophy and politico-didactic activity form a harmonious whole under the name of sophistic. To this end, Brancacci argues, the author of the VS constructs an absolute continuity between the ancient and the Second Sophistic, and defines sophistic as a ‘philosophical rhetoric’ (ῥητορικὴ φιλοσοφου̑σα). Closely related to this is the category of the ‘philosopher-sophist’ that he creates. In this way, the Italian scholar argues, Philostratus is out to underline the legitimacy of the intellectual claims of rhetoric and to enhance the prestige of the sophistic of his own day, while at the same time carefully detaching a number of important intellectuals ‘dai declamatori che popolano le pagine più numerose delle Vite dei sofisti, e con i quali Filostrato stesso non desiderava essere confuso’.⁵

I consider Brancacci's view of Philostratus' cultural ideal to be fundamentally misguided. No one who has read more of the VS than just the introduction and the life of Dio can accuse the author of wanting to distance himself from the ‘declamatori che popolano le pagine più numerose’ of his work. There is a simple explanation for the fact that they occupy the lion's share of the VS: the author felt an affinity with these show speakers in every fibre of his cultural being. Brancacci himself notes the existence of an actual gap between the type of the philosopher-sophist—whom he seems to regard as the embodiment of Philostratus' cultural ideal—on the one hand, and the ‘sophists in the real sense of the word’, the ‘declamatori’, on the other hand. He thus concludes that, in spite of Philostratus' theoretical efforts, the writer's construction is incomplete and inconsistent. However, if Brancacci's interpretation of Philostratus' discussion in the introduction to the VS is correct, there is more at stake: in that case, the position adopted by the author in the introduction would be in flagrant contradiction with the value judgements expressed in the rest of the work. Even though one always has to take into account the possibility of inconsistencies in Philostratus' writings, in the present case the problems seem to lie in Brancacci's interpretation rather than in the introduction to the VS itself.

First, the Italian scholar is wrong in suggesting that Philostratus attributes the superiority of the manner of discourse of the ancient sophists, as against the method of the philosophers, to the idea that the former had a firmer grip on reality.⁶ What Philostratus actually says is that the manner of discourse of the ancient sophists suggests a superiority of this kind: he is not interested in the relative epistemological merits of ancient sophistic and philosophy, but in their different effects on the audience, which result from a difference in the manner of presentation, i.e. style.⁷ Second, now and then Brancacci seems to forget that Philostratus does not use the term ‘philosophical rhetoric’ to characterise sophistic in general, but as a definition of ancient sophistic which is not applicable to the Second Sophistic.⁸ As a result—and this is the third objection to his theory—he presents the type of the ‘philosopher-sophist’ as the embodiment par excellence of Philostratus' cultural ideal,⁹ ignoring the fact that the author of the VS is primarily interested in this category of intellectuals because of their verbal skills. Philostratus introduces the category of ‘philosophers with the reputation of sophists’ not to distinguish an important group of intellectuals from the representatives of the Second Sophistic, but in order to give a number of important intellectuals—especially Dio and Favorinus—a legitimate place in the history of sophistic. This tendency to annexation has nothing to do with any reservations vis-à-vis show rhetoric, but is connected with the author's fixation on rhetorical performances and stylistic qualities.¹⁰ This is confirmed by the way in which these criteria recur time and again in his explanations of what was responsible for the reputation of each of the ‘philosopher-sophists’ singled out for discussion.¹¹

The fact that Philostratus primarily evaluates philosophers in terms of their literary and/or rhetorical merits can also be seen from his letter to Julia Domna (ep. 73), in which he defends Gorgias against Plutarch's criticisms by referring to the enormous influence of the sophist's style, not least on Plato. As in the introduction to the VS, stylistic quality functions here as the element of coherence in an indivisible Greek literary culture.¹² The letter is indicative of a literary way of reading philosophical texts which irritated philosophers.¹³ The embodiment of Philostratus' cultural ideal is not the philosopher-sophist but the virtuoso rhetor; the appreciation of the latter's skills is of an artistic kind which discounts the epistemological and ethical aspects of the discourse.¹⁴

A comparison of Philostratus' letter to Julia Domna with Aristides' defence of rhetoric against Plato is conventional and illustrative.¹⁵ According to Philostratus, Plato is indebted for his verbal skills to Gorgias, Hippias and Protagoras; the Antonine rhetorician adds eloquence to Plato's skills and even calls the philosopher ‘father and teacher of the orators’.¹⁶ However, the differences are at least as significant as the correspondences. The deadly seriousness with which Aristides defends eloquence as an essential condition of the functioning of human society¹⁷ and as a comprehensive intellectual activity¹⁸ is lacking in Philostratus' text. This is not due to the boundaries of the themes discussed in the letter to Julia Domna,¹⁹ but it is typical of the limitations of the cultural ideal of the author of the VS.

The content of the introduction to the VS, as we have seen, is by no means at odds with the author's identification with the imperial sophists as expressed in the work as a whole. Of course, this does not tell us anything about the cultural historiographical merits of the scheme introduced by Philostratus. It is curious that the writer ascribes the foundation of the Second Sophistic to Aeschines, while he is unwilling or unable to name a successive representative of the phenomenon before the second half of the first century. The introduction of Aeschines as founder of the Second Sophistic is clearly an expression of an attempt to connect the flowering of show rhetoric in the imperial age with the classical past.²⁰ But why does Philostratus delay the revival of the Second Sophistic until Nicetes of Smyrna? In a study of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, K. Goudriaan has argued that a break in the professional practice of rhetoric did actually occur in the Hellenistic period—in part of the third and the beginning of the second centuries B.C.²¹ However, this break is considerably smaller than the abyss which Philostratus sets between Aeschines and Nicetes; the latter does not reflect the actual development of Greek rhetoric between the fourth century B.C. and the early imperial age, but the range of interests and value judgements of the author of the VS. As Goudriaan has demonstrated, the literary sources from the first century B.C. refer to sophists whose style of performance, didactic activities and choice of stylistic examples and themes are very similar to the representatives of Philostratus' Second Sophistic.²²

One factor of importance is undoubtedly the central place which Philostratus accords to Herodes Atticus in Greek rhetoric of the imperial age.²³ As a young man, the Athenian sophist had received tuition from Scopelian of Clazomenae (VS 521), who was a former pupil of Nicetes (VS 516). The most important sophist among Herodes' contemporaries was also a former pupil of Scopelian: Polemo of Laodicea, who had followed in his master's footsteps as the most prominent representative of the sophistic in Smyrna (VS 521 and 536). Philostratus therefore connects the revival of the Second Sophistic with a sophist who was associated with Herodes Atticus and his most important contemporary through Scopelian, the teacher of the Athenian sophist and of Polemo. In itself the key position assigned by Philostratus to Herodes would be enough to explain the fact that he sets Nicetes at the head of the cultural current to which he himself belonged. However, there may be another factor involved as well. Although the author of the VS repeatedly emphasises that rhetorical performance is more important than provenance (VS 480 and 522), he suggests that the imperial sophists who feature in his work were virtually without exception members of the curial order or higher.²⁴ His own predilections and antipathies are by no means exempt from class snobbism: in one and the same breath he can claim that background is of lesser importance, while, in providing information on the background of the sophists, limiting his remarks to those who could boast illustrious parentage (VS 480).²⁵ As we have seen, he notes a ‘lack of respectable sophists’ (VS 511: ἀπορία γενναίων σοφιστω̑ν) in the period before Nicetes; he mentions Nicetes' contribution to sophistic together with the visible results of the latter's activities as a benefactor (euergetēs) of his native city: “This Nicetes found sophistic in an impasse, but he furnished her with access roads which were far more splendid than those which he had built for Smyrna to connect the city with the Ephesian gate—works which equalled his words in compass.”²⁶ It is not inconceivable that Nicetes is not only the embodiment of the revival of the practice of rhetoric in Philostratus' eyes, but that his career was one of the first to be characterised by what the author of the VS recognised as an exemplary combination of the practice of sophistic with high social prestige. As Goudriaan has shown, it is probably no coincidence that the title ‘sophist’ first appears in honourary and funerary inscriptions in the same period to which Philostratus dates the revival of the Second Sophistic; the explanation for this phenomenon is probably to be found in the fact that from the second half of the first century the practice of show rhetoric was held in much higher esteem among the urban elites of the eastern half of the empire than previously.²⁷

It is clear at any rate that the imperial sophists dealt with in the VS often shared the author's social rank. They participated in the administration of the Greek cities and leagues, acted as benefactors of their fellow citizens by funding public works, religious festivals, cultural events and the distribution of grain and other vital necessities, represented the same fellow citizens in delegations to the emperor, and took part in the gradual integration of parts of the urban aristocracies from the eastern half of the empire in the imperial aristocracy of knights and senators. Various of Philostratus' sophists held positions within those careers that were reserved for these orders, especially as ab epistulis graecis and advocatus fisci, both equestrian functions. In his classic Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire, Bowersock placed great emphasis on the importance of the Second Sophistic as a socio-political phenomenon and suggested a causal connection between the professional status of the sophists and their political role. He summarises his own view as follows: “It could be argued without apology that the Second Sophistic has more importance in Roman History than it has in Greek Literature.”²⁸

Bowersock's interpretive framework was challenged in 1982 by E. L. Bowie. He argued that the main explanation for the role of sophists as administrators and benefactors in Greek cities and as participants in delegations to the imperial court lay not in their professional prestige and rhetorical qualities, but in the fact that they came from families that belonged to the leading social and political circles of the population in the eastern half of the empire. Since parts of this Greek elite were integrated in the imperial aristocracy from the Flavian era, it is hardly surprising that sophists are occasionally found in positions which were confined to the senatorial or equestrian orders. The demands made by a career as a sophist, however, were difficult to reconcile with a career as an eques or senator, Bowie claimed; hence if an urban aristocrat from the eastern half of the empire went in for sophistic, this implied a certain preference for an intellectual career to a political one. Bowie recognises that Greek intellectuals were particularly well qualified for the position of ab epistulis graecis, but he tries to explain the fact that a number of sophists are attested in this post from the second half of the second century as a combination of two factors: the rise of Greek aristocrats, especially from Asia Minor and Athens, in the imperial aristocracy; and the penchant for sophistic among these urban elites. Moreover, Bowie claims that in general the post did not open up career opportunities for sophists in the equestrian or senatorial orders; the relatively large number of sophists who functioned as ab epistulis graecis, in his view, cannot be used as evidence for the political significance of the Second Sophistic.²⁹

The great service rendered by Bowie's article is to have posed the decisive question of the character of the relation between the two roles played by representatives of the Second Sophistic: as virtuoso orators, on the one hand, and as members of a socio-political elite, on the other. Without denying that eloquence could be very important in a political context,³⁰ he points out that rhetorical skills were fairly well distributed among the members of the urban aristocracies, and that one may harbour reservations as to the political relevance and effectiveness of the type of show rhetoric that was practised by the sophists. Since Philostratus identifies completely with these show orators, as we have seen, seeing in them the perfect embodiment of his cultural ideal, it is important to investigate what view is encapsulated in the VS of the relation between the practice of sophistic, social status and political activity. The present focus is thus not on the prosopographical data which can be distilled from the VS and other sources (which can be found in Bowersock's Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire), but on the implicit and explicit value judgements which can be found in the VS on such matters as the desirability for sophists of political activity, the holding of public offices and acting as benefactors, as well as Philostratus' views on the social function of sophistic and on the relation between this show rhetoric and other forms of eloquence. I shall deal with the activities of Philostratus' sophists in cities in the eastern half of the empire, and their contacts with representatives of the imperial aristocracy and the emperor.

Only a few sophists are explicitly reported by Philostratus to have given speeches in public meetings and advised their fellow citizens. Scopelian, who preferred Smyrna as his sphere of operations above his native Clazomenae, used to discuss public affairs with the magistrates of his city and put in regular appearances at the assembly, where his cheery eloquence enabled him to keep things calm (VS 518f.). Smyrna later benefitted from the presence of Polemo, whose words of admonition convinced the citizens to abandon their squabbles and to live in harmony; although Philostratus does not state explicitly where these speeches were delivered, it is natural to suppose that they were addressed to the assembly or to the council (VS 531). The author of the VS (529) records that Marcus of Byzantium managed to get the citizens of Megara to resolve a dispute with Athens, and Dio of Prusa is said to have regularly reprimanded cities, an activity which is amply documented in the extant speeches of Dio (VS 487).³¹ The VS also mentions a large number of sophists who occupied important positions at city or federal level. Scopelian was high priest of Asia (VS 515), Lollianus of Ephesus served Athens as hoplite general (VS 526f.), Herodes Atticus held the office of eponymous archon in his native city (VS 549), and Theodotus held an unspecified Athenian magistracy (VS 566). Euodianus of Smyrna was hoplite general in his native city and high priest of Asia (VS 596). Apollonius of Athens held the positions of eponymous archon and hoplite general (VS 600).

What significance does the author of the VS attribute to these political activities on the part of the sophists under discussion, and what connection does he make between their professional and their political activities? The impression given by the VS is that holding political functions and practising as a sophist are two different ways of acquiring prestige, but that there is no direct link between them. Euodianus of Smyrna, Philostratus tells us, was honoured with the high priesthood of Asia and the office of hoplite general in his native city; he obtained the Roman chair for his eloquence (VS 596). In Philostratus' characterisation of the two parallel careers, there is a close affinity between the class consciousness of the urban aristocrat and the mentality of the sophist, both marked by an ambitious and competitive attitude. However, keeping one's distance from urban politics in no way detracts from the reputation of the sophist as such in the eyes of the author of the VS. Besides sophists who take an active part in the political life of their native city, place of residence or elsewhere, the VS also contains cases of sophists who are explicitly reported to have abstained from such activities. Both Nicetes of Smyrna and Antiochus of Aegae were reluctant to appear in assemblies (VS 511 and 568); Philostratus remarks that his own teacher Proclus preferred the calm of Athens to the turbulence of his native city (VS 602f.).³² Philostratus records the aloofness of Nicetes, Antiochus and Proclus from political activity, but without any word of reproof.

All the same, Philostratus expects his heroes to act as aristocrats in some way and to refrain from activities which do not accord with that status. He seems to regard euergesia in the public or private sphere as the most laudable method for sophists to confirm their social status: a man of quality knows how to use his wealth appropriately by assisting friends in need or by making civic contributions, thereby increasing his reputation (VS 603 and 610).³³ Nicetes and Antiochus, who abstained from direct political participation, enhanced their native cities (Smyrna and Aegae respectively) with public works; Antiochus also paid for grain distributions to the citizens when there was a shortage (VS 511 and 568). Proclus managed to save an Athenian acquaintance from losing his house, which he had mortgaged for a loan (VS 603). Damianus of Ephesus assisted his needy fellow citizens, had public buildings restored, and financed the construction of a colonnade linking the city with the temple of Artemis and of a dining room in the temple itself (VS 605). However, Philostratus notes, no one made better use of his wealth than Herodes, whose euergesia benefitted not only friends and cities, but entire provinces (VS 547). He provided Athens with a stadium of white marble and the well-known odeum, and elsewhere in the province of Achaea—Corinth, Delphi, Thermopylae, Euboea, the Peloponnese and Boeotia—he paid for the construction of buildings and works of art (VS 550f.). In the great importance that Philostratus attaches to this display of wealth and generosity, the author of the VS appears as a typical representative of the social elite in the eastern half of the empire. His pattern of expectation with regard to sophists includes both a professional component—he attaches particular importance to improvisation³⁴—and a social component, ensuing from his class consciousness; an essential ingredient of this social component is the ‘proper use of wealth’ in the form of euergesia, in contrast to direct political activity at the level of the city, which may well make a signal contribution to the prestige of the urban aristocrat, but is not a sine qua non for a sophist.³⁵

Philostratus' comments on the fee (misthos) which sophists usually requested for their lessons and on the practice of courtroom oratory both confirm and supplement this pattern of expectation. The author of the VS justifies the demand for a fee with an argument which is completely in line with the importance that he attaches to the ‘right use of wealth’. By demanding payment for his lessons, the sophist enables his pupils to show that they make the right priorities: the pattern of spending is a reflection of the pattern of values.³⁶ For example, as a young man Damianus attended the declamations of Aristides and Hadrian and paid each of them ten thousand drachmae; he preferred to spend his money on this hobby rather than on male or female beauties.³⁷ Herodes was already a celebrated sophist when he spent three successive days in Smyrna as a member of Polemo's audience. He sent him the sum of 150,000 drachmae as misthos. Polemo refused to accept it. It was only when Herodes raised the sum to 250,000 drachmae that Polemo was prepared to accept it, and he did so with the attitude of one who is only receiving his deserts (VS 537f.). In the case of these two giants, the scale by which the pattern of spending is reflected in the pattern of values assumes gigantic proportions as well. On the other hand, Philostratus is appreciative when sophists moderate their demands with an eye to the spending power of their students.³⁸ The desire for material gain alone is a sign of a poor character in his opinion. … Philostratus takes pains to clear his teacher Proclus of this charge in connection with his commercial activities on the side. Of course, banausic activities in general do not receive his approval (VS 506), nor does accepting a position as a domestic teacher with a family whose social position is below that of the sophist in question (VS 599f.).

The same type of norms in connection with the desire for material gain also makes its appearance when the author of the VS deals with the activities of the sophists in the field of courtroom rhetoric. We can begin by noting that Philostratus regards courtroom orators (agoraioi) as forming a distinct category from sophists pur sang: sophists are primarily occupied with education in rhetoric and show performances, and they therefore lack the courage and daring which are the first requirements of a forensic orator.³⁹ Nevertheless, he does mention various sophists who put up a fight in the courts, and in such cases too he attaches great importance to a display of altruism. Damianus, who tailored his misthos to the pockets of his students, offered his legal services free of charge to people in financial difficulties.⁴⁰ Quirinus of Nicomedia, who was appointed advocatus fisci, showed himself to be mild and uninterested in making a profit in the exercise of his profession (VS 621). Of course, not everyone was equally altruistic: Polemo, whose superior arrogance is described by Philostratus in a mixture of disapproval, indulgence and admiration, received the sum of two talents for appearing in court on behalf of his client.⁴¹ In general, Philostratus' remarks on the legal activities of the sophists dealt with in the VS confirm the picture of his norms and values that emerged earlier: aristocratic generosity and the absence of a thirst for gain are the cornerstones of the social component of the pattern of expectation which sophists are expected to meet, both in their professional activity (with regard to the misthos) and elsewhere (in forensic rhetoric). The clear distinction that he makes between sophistic and courtroom rhetoric also confirms the fact that he regards sophistic as a cultural phenomenon with a significance of its own, independent of the practical application of eloquence in assemblies, in council meetings or in court.

A number of the most entertaining and informative anecdotes in the VS concern the contacts of sophists with leading Romans, primarily emperors. As we shall see, these anecdotes also confirm the view that Philostratus did not consider sophistic as rhetoric for utilitarian ends, although this does not prevent him from quoting instances of the successes of sophists in representing the interests of their native city, place of residence or province.⁴² Scopelian went to Rome as a representative of Asia and managed to get Domitian to withdraw the prohibition on viniculture in the province.⁴³ Polemo persuaded Hadrian to build a grain market, gymnasium and temple for Smyrna (VS 531); a posthumous speech by the same sophist earned Smyrna a victory in a hearing before Antoninus Pius (VS 539f.). Marcus Aurelius, who had heard a declamation by Aristides during a visit to Smyrna, was later brought to tears by a monody on the destruction of the city by an earthquake sent to him by the sophist, and agreed to pay for the rebuilding of the city. Philostratus characterises this case as an instance of the influence of good counsel and eloquence on genuinely royal, divine natures, thereby complimenting both the sophist and the emperor.⁴⁴ At the same time, he was aware that the show element which generally characterised the sophists' performances could be counterproductive in connection with a delegation to the emperor.⁴⁵ His view of the relation between sophists and political authorities, especially emperors, is more complex than one might be tempted to suppose on the evidence of the success stories of Scopelian, Polemo and Aristides.

The pattern of norms and values underlying the anecdotes in the VS on the contacts between sophists and emperors can be understood if one realises that the context in which these contacts took place can change, and that the roles of the two parties and the corresponding patterns of expectation with regard to their actions can change with it. As long as a sophist does not act as such—i.e., in virtually all situations except his declamations—his relationship with the emperor is that of a subject to his master. This also applies when a sophist is defending his own interests or those of his fellow citizens in connection with a delegation or a hearing before the emperor. Typical in this respect is Philostratus' comment on the action of Herodes when the latter came to argue his case before Marcus Aurelius in Sirmium against his opponents in Athens. The sophist had to appear before the emperor soon after the death of two daughters of one of his freedmen, to whom he was deeply attached. At the time he was frenzied with grief and levelled direct accusations against Marcus without making any attempt to cloak them in allusions and ambiguities.⁴⁶ It is clear that Philostratus regards the behaviour of his favourite sophist with disapproval in this case; the fact that the trial did not take a fatal turn for Herodes, he believes, was entirely due to the philosophical attitude of the emperor.⁴⁷ Not all autocrats possess such laudable characteristics as Marcus Aurelius; sophists may even be confronted with tyrants. In such cases, Philostratus claims, they should still observe correct behaviour and refrain from provocative remarks which might arouse the wrath of the tyrant;⁴⁸ he makes it clear that those who stray from this code of behaviour have only themselves to blame for the consequences. This applies, for instance, to Antipater, who sent Caracalla an accusatory letter after the murder of Geta. Philostratus' comments on the behaviour of his colleague amount to saying that Antipater should have realised that he was bound to arouse the anger of the emperor by casting doubt on the justification for the murder—an alleged conspiracy by Geta.⁴⁹ Philosophical bravery and courage in voicing criticism (parrhēsia) is the last thing the author of the VS expects a sophist to display.⁵⁰

Philostratus' years of experience as a sophist in the Severan court no doubt lie behind his explicit warnings not to abandon the correct mode of behaviour in one's dealings with emperors.⁵¹ At the same time, this attitude is closely connected with his view of sophistic as an autonomous cultural phenomenon. This can be seen if we consider his pattern of expectation with regard to the behaviour of emperors towards sophists. While the sophist is expected to respect the position of the emperor as sovereign, the emperor is expected to respect the sophist as a representative of paideia, Greek literary culture. This aspect of Philostratus' view of the relation between emperors and sophists can be seen most clearly in his account of the relations between Aristides and Marcus Aurelius (VS 582f.). The emperor had already been in Smyrna for three days without the sophist's coming to welcome him. When Marcus finally summoned him and asked why he had not been to see him, Aristides replied that he was totally engrossed in his studies and could not tolerate any distraction. Philostratus relates that the emperor was pleased to hear of Aristides' dedication to his scholarly duties. He asked the sophist to declaim for him; at Aristides' request the declamation was postponed to the following day and the sophist received permission to bring his students with him. When Aristides asked the emperor whether they were allowed to applaud their teacher, Marcus replied with a smile that it was up to him. The typical feature of this case—besides the emperor's desire to meet the sophist—is his unconditional acceptance of Aristides' excuse for the delay in making an appearance: the emperor accepts the sophist's breach of the code of behaviour out of respect for his role as a representative of paideia.⁵² He then proceeds to turn his court temporarily into a sophists' school by allowing Aristides to bring his students with him; and he emphasises the fact that he lays aside his role as sovereign for the duration of the declamation and accepts that of an admiring member of the audience, by stating that only Aristides himself is in a position to elicit tokens of appreciation from his students.⁵³

Even when the emperor complied with this aspect of the pattern of expectations and changed roles, his position remained ambivalent: he could make or break the sophist. This ambivalence is well illustrated by an anecdote on Hadrian and Favorinus in the Historia Augusta. When Favorinus was attacked by the emperor for using a word which Hadrian did not consider to be pure Attic, the philosopher-sophist immediately acknowledged his mistake. When friends pointed out to him that the word was attested by canonical authors, Favorinus replied that the learning of someone who had thirty legions at his disposal was beyond any doubt.⁵⁴ There was always a tension between the role of the emperor as devotee of the arts and his political power, as sophists repeatedly found out. Although Philostratus does not voice this tension as explicitly as the author of the Historia Augusta, it is possible to distil the beginnings of a view of the relation between paideia and political power in the VS. This requires a scrutiny of the theme of imperial favours and honours which recurs in the biographical sketches of the sophists.⁵⁵

Philostratus certainly expects an emperor to express his appreciation of the skills of sophists in favours and honours; these can be roughly broken down into three categories. First, there is the appointment of sophists to positions for which their rhetorical and literary qualities stood them in good stead (ab epistulis graecis or advocatus fisci). The two sophists dealt with by Philostratus who held the position of advocatus fisci, Quirinus of Nicomedia and Heliodorus, owed their positions, according to the author of the VS, primarily to their skill in courtroom speaking, a branch of eloquence which, as we have seen, he clearly distinguishes from sophistic itself; it is the latter which attracts his interest and appreciation.⁵⁶ Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to the sophists who obtained a position in the imperial bureaucracy as ab epistulis graecis;⁵⁷ letter-writing and sophistic are hardly synonyms. A capable ab epistulis like Celer is still no sophist,⁵⁸ and Antipater, according to Philostratus, was a brilliant imperial secretary but a mediocre declaimer.⁵⁹ Philostratus is more interested in letter-writing than in courtroom rhetoric, as can be seen from the comments on the stylistic merits of the letters of Antipater and Aspasius. This is hardly surprising in view of his own exercises in letter-writing, even though in a completely different branch of this genre. However, in Philostratus' opinion, the positions of both advocatus fisci and ab epistulis graecis do not call for the same talent for the holding of meletai which is the preeminent qualification of a sophist.

A secondary category of imperial honours which features in the VS consists of appointments to one of the other posts which formed part of those careers confined to members of the equestrian and senatorial orders. Nowhere does Philostratus make a direct connection between these appointments and the professional qualities of the sophists in question. The cases mentioned in the VS are very rare indeed;⁶⁰ probably such a connection was not at issue, and these appointments were only what was to be expected in view of the status achieved by the families of the sophists in question in previous generations or of their upward social mobility.⁶¹ As noted earlier, Bowie has pointed out that many sophists came from families that already belonged to the imperial aristocracy. Their decision to become sophists was more or less tantamount to declining a career in the imperial administration: “A man from such a family who chose to be a sophist was in some measure preferring the intellectual to the practical life.”⁶² It is interesting that the author of the VS explicitly formulates the pattern of values which must have underlay such choices. He relates that Herodes attached more importance to his successes as a sophist than to his consular status and origin.⁶³ Elsewhere he enjoys describing how Chrestus of Byzantium rebukes a haughty student who thought of nothing but a career in the service of the emperor.⁶⁴ For Philostratus, the prestige that one can obtain as a sophist is different but certainly not inferior to the prominence associated with the holding of public positions in the urban or imperial administration.

Most of the favours conveyed on sophists by emperors that are related in the VS belong to a third category: gifts or purely ceremonial honours as tokens of the recognition of the artistic merits of their recipients, and appointment to the imperial chair in Athens or the chair of Greek rhetoric in Rome. The pretext for the conferral of such favours is often a declamation in the presence of the emperor. Polemo and Dionysius of Miletus were appointed members of the Museum in Alexandria by Hadrian; and Polemo was overwhelmed by material privileges by Trajan, and especially by Hadrian.⁶⁵ During a visit to Athens in 176, Marcus Aurelius had Hadrian of Tyre perform for him; the emperor had already appointed him to the imperial chair, but the suitability of Hadrian for the post had been called into question. Hadrian's declamation put an end to the criticisms and the emperor rewarded him richly with honours and gifts.⁶⁶ Commodus was so enchanted by the declamations of Pollux that he appointed him to the imperial chair (VS 593). Apollonius of Athens (VS 601) and Hermocrates of Phocaea (VS 611) received rewards for declamations from Septimius Severus, and Philostratus of Lemnos was granted exemption from public office and civic contributions by Caracalla for a declamation (VS 623). However, what an emperor could grant he could also withdraw. Heraclides lost a declamation contest against Apollonius of Athens in the presence of Septimius Severus; his defeat cost him his exemption from public office and civic contributions (VS 601). The protection of Julia Domna resulted in an appointment to the imperial chair for Philiscus of Thessaly, but this did not stop Caracalla from depriving him of the related ateleia (VS 622f.). An emperor could also express his admiration for a sophist by granting material favours to his favourite city. According to Philostratus, Aristides' success with a declamation for Marcus Aurelius paved the way for the emperor's later decision to restore Smyrna after it had been heavily hit by an earthquake (VS 582f.); the author of the VS supposed a similar connection to exist between Polemo's popularity with Hadrian and the material favours bestowed on Smyrna by the emperor (VS 531; cf. VS 533). Of course, in such cases part of the prestige connected with the imperial euergesia reflected on the sophist as well; in connection with Aristides' successful intervention with Marcus Aurelius, Philostratus calls him ‘founder of Smyrna’ (οἰκιστὴs τη̑s σμύρνηs).⁶⁷

Leaving Marcus Aurelius aside, Hadrian is the favourite emperor of the author of the VS; of all the past emperors, according to Philostratus, he was the one who was most inclined to foster talent.⁶⁸ This is hardly surprising in view of Hadrian's legendary love of things Greek. However, it worth considering Philostratus' comments on this emperor in more detail, since they are illustrative of his views of the relation between paideia and political power, and enable us to define his pattern of expectations with regard to the behaviour of emperors vis-à-vis sophists. Philostratus' characterisation of Hadrian as the emperor most prepared to encourage talent is prompted by the report of the admiration that the emperor displayed for Marcus of Byzantium when the latter visited the emperor as a delegate of his native city (VS 529f.). This admiration no doubt concerned Marcus' artistic abilities. Elsewhere Philostratus makes it clear that, in his opinion, Hadrian's interest in Greek culture, especially sophistic and philosophy, was not essential to his view of himself as emperor, but that it was a form of diversion from imperial concerns—a regal leisure activity (VS 490). The author of the VS certainly does not disdain such a view of sophistic and philosophy; on the contrary, in the introduction to the VS he expresses the hope that his work will serve precisely this entertainment function for Gordian (VS 480). His view of sophistic as an autonomous cultural phenomenon, as an art form, implies that he harbours no illusions on the direct relevance of this type of eloquence in social and political life. What he expects from emperors and members of the imperial aristocracy is an appreciation of sophistic as art. The artistic appreciation on the part of political authorities is of great importance in the eyes of the writer of the VS: it makes an irreplaceable contribution to the prestige of sophists and underlines that a sophist's career is equivalent to, if not better than, an active political career as a method of obtaining prestige. Competition between sophists therefore assumes more serious forms in the presence of political authorities. Thus the dispute between Favorinus and Polemo in Ionia, where the two fighting cocks were the respective favourites of Ephesus and Smyrna blazed up during their stay in Rome, where the appreciation of consulares and their sons fanned the flames of ambition and mutual rivalry (VS 490f.).

It is remarkable that Hadrian's non-committal attitude toward paideia, according to Philostratus, applied to philosophy as well as sophistic. His view of the intellectual activities of this emperor recalls Tacitus' account of the philosophers who entertained Nero after dinner with doctrinal debates (Ann. 14.16.2). Of course, philosophers themselves generally tended to cast themselves in a different role in their relation to political authorities than that of entertainer, preferring to be seen as confidants and personal advisors.⁶⁹ In the VS, where Philostratus expresses his views on the practice of the relation between Greek intellectuals and Roman emperors, he has no time for such pretensions; but he adopts an entirely different attitude in the VA, where idealised views of the relation between philosophers and political authorities affect his portrayal of Apollonius.

Philostratus was certainly not the only sophist to attribute such importance to imperial honours. Aristides, whom we may include as a member of the Second Sophistic without too many scruples—he disliked the title ‘sophist’ and preferred to call himself ‘rhetor’⁷⁰—frequently dreamed of meetings with emperors, as can be seen from his Hieroi Logoi. One of the most striking cases of this type of dream concerns a stay in the court of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus:

“On the nineteenth I dreamed that I was staying in the palace. The attention paid me by the emperors and the honour they showed me in everything they did were wondrous and unsurpassable: I alone received all of what is not even in small measure granted to another.”⁷¹

This dream is not only a confirmation of the great importance of imperial recognition for sophist's self-esteem; it also illustrates how well Philostratus hit the nail on the head in a moment of honesty in characterising sophistic as ‘a profession for narcissistic boasters’.⁷²

To sum up the previous remarks, we may state that paideia and political power are autonomous terrains for Philostratus. In his view, sophistic is an art form and must be distinguished as such from utilitarian rhetoric. As for the relation between sophists and political authorities, he believes that it should be characterised by mutual respect for the sovereignty of each party on its own ground. In practice, the boundary between culture and politics was naturally a vague one, and phenomena which transgressed the dividing line were common enough. Two main factors were involved. First, the prestige attaching to achievements in the field of culture was so great that it could lie at the root of conflicts of a partly political nature. Second, there was a measure of interchange between sophistic and utilitarian rhetoric; indeed, to a certain extent it was unavoidable, as members of the urban aristocracies attended the schools of the sophists in their youth and regularly attended declamations by sophists in their adult life. This could lead to politically inappropriate or undesirable remarks in meetings of the council or the assembly. In order to understand Philostratus' view of sophistic and its implications, it is important to discuss the two types of ‘mixed’ phenomena briefly.

As for the first type, the reputation of athletes, actors, sophists and other intellectuals contributed substantially to the prestige of their place of birth or of the city where they lived. One form of expression of mutual competition between cities in a province was in the admiration of rival idols. We have already seen how the dispute between Polemo and Favorinus at first followed the traditional rivalry between Smyrna and Ephesus (VS 490).⁷³ This phenomenon is of the same kind as the disputes between cities claiming to be the ‘first city’ of a province.⁷⁴ Examples of conflicts of this kind that raged in the imperial age are the dispute between the Bithynian cities of Nicaea and Nicomedia, and that between the three leading cities of Asia, Smyrna, Ephesus and Pergamum. The dispute in Bithynia was the occasion for a speech by Dio of Prusa in Nicomedia, while Aristides lectured the cities of Asia on the blessings of mutual concord.⁷⁵ Dio and Aristides did not fail to remind their audiences of the pointlessness of such conflicts. Only one city was the first, and that was Rome; quarrels concerning titles were merely a question of ‘the shadow of a donkey’, as Dio so plastically puts it in his second speech in Tarsus, a city which also had its share of quarrels with its neighbours.⁷⁶ However, since disputes of this kind were one of the few safety valves for interurban rivalry under the Pax Romana, the parties involved saw no point in devoting a lot of energy to the fight for titles.⁷⁷ Under normal conditions, this Greek penchant was a source of amusement to the Roman authorities and served as an opportunity to implement the adage ‘divide and rule’; at least, that is how Dio of Prusa saw it (or. 38.36-38). However, in exceptional circumstances such conflicts could escalate. Thus Nicomedia sided with Septimius Severus during the civil war of 193/4, while Nicaea supported Pescennius Niger.⁷⁸

The same civil war was the pretext for an incident reported in the VS involving a dilution of the boundary between politics and culture. At the beginning of Severus' campaign Byzantium served as a base for Niger, and after the definitive defeat and death of the pretender the city still resisted a siege by the victorious troops for a long time.⁷⁹ During this siege, the Byzantine actor Clemens put on brilliant displays during tragic performances, but the juries were understandably reluctant to accord him the laurels of victory. According to Philostratus, they wanted to avoid proclaiming as victor, in the person of one man, a city which had revolted against Rome.⁸⁰ The same problem occurred during the Pythian games until the president, Hippodromus of Larissa, intervened; he appealed to his obligations as a member of the jury and accorded Clemens the victory that was his due. The sophist thus refused to be influenced by the political implications of the case. When a rival of Clemens appealed against the decision to the emperor, Severus sanctioned Hippodromus' intervention (VS 616). The incident is illustrative of how fragile the line dividing culture from politics was, but at the same time it shows that the norm in such cases was that the autonomy of each of the two areas should be respected. Hippodromus restored this norm, which had been disregarded by the juries, and the emperor confirmed its validity. The sensitiveness of juries at Panhellenic events to political pressure was a sore point. In his Rhodian speech dating from the early years of the reign of Vespasian, Dio of Prusa refers to Roman attempts to influence arbitration in the Olympian games (or. 31.110f.). In claiming that the judges leave letters of recommendation for athletes unopened until after the contest, he reflects the same norm that is found in the VS, even though actual practice will not always have been the same.

Sophistic does not bear comparison with athletic or dramatic contests in every way, of course, but they do have certain points in common. Although in many cases it is the emperor himself who acts as arbitrator for the sophists described by Philostratus and who rewards their performances with such bounties as gifts, honours and academic chairs, in the case of a declamation, as we have seen, the roles of sophist and emperor are changed: the emperor abdicates his role as sovereign for the duration of the speech and assumes the role of an appreciative listener. It may be supposed that, while this was theoretically the case, in practice the granting of imperial favours to the sophists was often dependent on other factors than the appreciation of purely professional merits. All the same, the norm which can be distilled from the VS is that in such cases the emperor proceeds on the basis of artistic appreciation. The fragile line dividing culture from politics is thus retained to a certain extent. A few sophists certainly displayed a striking indifference to imperial favours. When the Athenians wanted to propose Chrestus of Byzantium for the imperial chair in their city, he declined with a deprecatory comment on the value of such academic chairs: “The ten thousand drachmae do not make a man.”⁸¹ Most of his colleagues were milder in their judgement: besides the material aspect, imperial favours and honours formed a substantial contribution to their prestige and self-esteem.

As mentioned above, interaction between sophistic and utilitarian rhetoric was more or less inevitable, but it could be problematical. The themes which the sophists chose for their declamations or which were proposed by their audience were imaginary or historical. The vast majority of historical declamations dealt with themes from the classical period, and sophists enjoyed expatiating on the greatness of Greece in the past. Plutarch's Political Precepts for a local politician from Sardis, a text dating from the late first or early second century, warns against presenting the people with historical examples which are not in line with the existing conditions, i.e. Roman domination. In his opinion, eulogies of Marathon, Plataeae and the Eurymedon belong to the sophists' schools and not to the assembly, although it may be appropriate for a local politician to allude to examples of a different kind from the Greek past, such as the amnesty in Athens after the fall of the thirty tyrants.⁸²

The caution advocated by Plutarch in tackling historical exempla within a political context can be seen in some of the speeches of Dio of Prusa. For instance, after recalling the greatness of Thebes under Epaminondas in a speech before the assembly of his native city, Dio immediately adds that the times have changed and that in the present situation the development of a power like that of Thebes in the past is no longer possible. Patriotism is still a virtue and a possibility, but the consequences of devotion to one's native country are now less far-reaching (or. 43.4). In another speech Dio tells the citizens of Prusa that Athens and Sparta owed their ancestral greatness and fame to orderly behaviour in civic matters (τὸ κοσμὶωs πολιτεὐεσθαι). These are also worthy and profitable objectives in the present situation, according to Dio: good government is more beneficial to a city than privileges like the status of ‘free city’ granted by the Roman authorities (or. 44.11f.). The same attitude can be detected in Aristides' speech before the cities of Asia in which he reminds his audience of the benefits of the concord between Athens and Sparta during the Persian wars: the times have changed and present conditions are not comparable, but the need for a good mutual understanding remains the same (or. 23.41f. Keil). Both Dio and Aristides adopt a somewhat defensive attitude in presenting historical examples in a political context. They seem to anticipate a combination of irritation and amusement on the part of their audience when they parade classical exempla, and they try to anticipate such a reaction by appealing to a certain Greek chauvinism which they assume to be shared by their audience. Apparently the latter also felt that the standard repertoire of the sophists' schools was out of place in a political context, not so much—as Plutarch claimed—because it obfuscated reality and could lead to political adventurism, but because it was utterly irrelevant.⁸³

We do not know to what extent Philostratus displayed his rhetorical talents and made use of historical exempla in council meetings and assemblies, for example during the holding of public offices in Athens. However, there is at least one case in the VS in which he explicitly connects a political lesson with an anecdote over a representative of ancient sophistic. Overstepping the boundary of historical accuracy, he relates that Antiphon provoked Dionysius of Syracuse and paid for it with his life. The author considers the sophist to have been in the wrong in provoking the tyrant and criticising his tragedies; literary activities make a tyrant less tyrannical and render his regime easier for his subjects to bear (VS 499f.). In drawing a lesson from history, then, Philostratus is acting entirely in accordance with his view of the relation between sophists and those holding political power; it is tailored to suit the status quo and is by no means subversive.⁸⁴

There can be no doubt that Philostratus himself exercised the activity which was most typical for sophists: delivering improvised speeches on historical or imaginary themes. Unfortunately, none of the meletai ascribed to him in the Suda (Φ 421) has survived. Roughly two-thirds of the declamations by colleagues that he mentions in the VS are concerned with historical themes, the most popular being situations from the Persian wars, the Peloponnesian war, and the Athenian struggle under Demosthenes against Macedonian expansion.⁸⁵ This pattern corresponds reasonably to the data on the choice of themes by Greek declaimers collected by D. Russell,⁸⁶ and there is no good reason to suppose that Philostratus' choice of themes for his own declamations was significantly different from that of his colleagues. The image of prominent Greeks from the imperial age who assume the role of Demosthenes in advising the Athenians to take to their triremes at the approach of Philip (VS 543),⁸⁷ who lament Chaeronea (VS 522), who dwell at such length on Marathon that the battle becomes a nickname for them (VS 595), who advise the Lacedaemonians not to accept those who had surrendered at Sphacteria as citizens any longer (VS 528), or who follow the Athenian wounded at Syracuse in begging their comrades to kill them with their own hands (VS 574), immediately raises questions on the relation of the sophists and the social elite of the eastern half of the empire from which they originated and which appreciated their performances, on the one hand, and the Imperium Romanum, on the other. The fact that there was a tension between acceptance of this reality and the evocation of the greatness of the Greek past can be seen from Plutarch's recommendations (discussed above), the politico-rhetorical practice of Dio and Aristides, and from the combination of irritation and amusement which they expected their audiences to display whenever the familiar exempla were paraded before them. It is equally clear that the sophists combined a fixation on the classical past, associated with a negation of the Hellenistic period and of the more recent past, with an attitude which could range from unproblematical acceptance to positive appreciation and far-reaching identification with Roman rule, and which never assumed the form of a fundamental rejection of the status quo. The fixation on the classical past was a cultural phenomenon which cannot be interpreted as an expression of resistance to Roman rule. The question that remains is why a socio-political elite whose position was consolidated by the power of Rome and which became increasingly involved in the imperial administration saw its cultural self-awareness to a large extent reflected in a literary genre which continually reproduced situations in which Rome was conspicuously absent and in which autonomous Greek poleis sparred with the Persians, the Macedonians or one another.

In a controversial article, Bowie has tried to explain this phenomenon in terms of the political situation of the Greek aristocracies; though their leading position was guaranteed by Rome within the cities in the eastern half of the empire, their room for manoeuvre, both internally and in their relations with other cities, was at the same time reduced to a minimum. Bowie argues that the contrast between the material prosperity and cultural affluence of the cities in Asia Minor in particular, on the one hand, and the actual political insignificance of these elites, on the other, led Greek aristocrats increasingly to turn to the political glories of the past in their major forms of cultural expression. The integration of sectors of these aristocracies from the eastern half of the empire in the imperial aristocracy mitigated this contrast without eliminating it entirely, and Greek cultural superiority, which was also recognised by the Romans, was insufficient compensation for the lack of real political power. The corollary of acquiescence in Roman rule was a fixation on the Greek past: “By recreating the situations of the past the contrast between the immense prosperity and the distressing dependence of the contemporary Greek world was dulled.”⁸⁸ Bowie sees this historical background as going at least some way to explaining the fact that sophistic came into fashion among the urban elites of the eastern half of the empire.⁸⁹

Bowie's attempt to connect the widespread archaizing tendencies in Greek cultural life of the imperial period with the political insignificance of the urban elites has met with considerable opposition, some of which is the result of misunderstandings with regard to the precise content of his explanation. Thus C. P. Jones associates Bowie with those scholars who see the very pronounced cultural self-awareness of Greek aristocrats in the imperial period and their fixation on the classical past as an expression of a rejection of the Roman present⁹⁰—a position which one will search for in vain in Bowie's article. It may be conceded that Bowie's formulations are sometimes responsible for such misunderstandings,⁹¹ and that he tends to typify the attitude of Greek intellectuals vis-à-vis Rome exclusively in terms in resignation, while he virtually ignores the by no means sparse testimonia which evidence a more positive appreciation of Roman rule by literary representatives of the Greek elite. All the same, his argument is sound in so far as it allows for recognition of the fact that it was precisely the constant harking back to the past of Greece by members of the social elite in the eastern half of the empire which created the conditions within which they could accept Roman rule and could function with unswerving loyalty within that system, as members of urban aristocracies or—more and more—as members of the imperial aristocracy, without giving up their identity and the self-respect which depended on it.⁹² The readiness of the Roman emperors to heed the wishes of the Greek elite in this respect and to take them seriously was naturally of great importance. In particular, by founding the Panhellēnion, Hadrian created a framework which facilitated the combination of devotion to the greatness of the Greek past with positive appreciation of the Roman present.⁹³

For its practitioners and their audience, sophistic was the medium par excellence for the continual reaffirmation of their Greek identity: Philostratus uses terms like hoi Hellēnes and to Hellēnikon to refer to the students of the major sophists.⁹⁴ The show rhetoric linked the participants—the sophist and his audience—to the classical past, which had a normative significance, but which was matched by contemporary achievements in this field. When Herodes was praised as ‘one of the ten’, he remarked modestly that he was no lesser a light than Andocides (VS 564f.), and the Smyrneans found that Hippodromus was a match for the classical orators (VS 619). Aristides received similar acclaim in his dreams.⁹⁵ This identity was experienced in a depoliticised context in which prestige resulting from literary and cultural activities was at least equivalent to, and could even substitute for the prestige that arose from a political career.⁹⁶ The Anabasis Alexandri represented ‘fatherland, family and public office’ for Arrian, and he equated his literary reputation with the military fame of Alexander the Great;⁹⁷ Herodes Atticus attached more value to a reputation as sophist than to his consular status and origin.⁹⁸ Greek aristocrats could experience their identity and acquire prestige in a field that was more or less independent of political reality, while at the same time remaining loyal to Roman rule. On the one hand, they cherished autonomy in that field in which they felt themselves to be superior; on the other hand, apart from a few exceptions like Chrestus of Byzantium, they were constantly eager for recognition from the politically powerful: a recognition that the great sophists apparently experienced as a confirmation of the value of their art and of the prestige to which it gave rise. The same paradox is characteristic of the way in which the author of the VS deals with the relation between paideia and political power.

Notes

1. The lexicographer also mentions μελέται and διαλέξειs, which were characteristic of the sophist, among the literary products of Philostratus II.

2. Bowersock (1969) 12-15; Anderson (1986) 8-10; and see now Brunt (1994) 26-33. Brunt's article came to my attention too late to be taken fully into account.

3. On this undertaking see Brancacci (1986) 89. Brancacci (1986) is a slightly abbreviated and revised version of the sections of Brancacci (1985) dealing with Philostratus, Eunapius and Synesius.

4. See Russell (1988) 237: “The most impressive parts of the book are the excellent accounts of Philostratus and Synesius.”

5. Brancacci (1985) 86-92; the citation is on p. 91. Cf. Brancacci (1986) 89-100.

6. Brancacci (1986) 91f. and esp. 96: “… le plan ontologique continue d'être présupposé par Philostrate.”

7. VS 480: … ὁ παλαιὸs σοφιστὴs ὡs εἰδos λέγει. (…) ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἰδέα τω̑ν προοιμίων εὐγένειάν τε προηχει̑ τω̑ν λόγων καὶ φρόνημα καὶ κατάληψιν σαφη̑ του̑ ὄντοs. Cf. Cassin (1986) 19: “la ‘claire saisie de l'étant’ à laquelle ils (the sophists, jjf) parviennent n'est jamais, et très explicitement, qu'un effet de style.” For criticism of Brancacci's interpretation see ibid. n. 24.

8. See esp. Brancacci (1986) 94.

9. Brancacci (1986) 94f.

10. See Hahn (1989) 46-53, with Flinterman (1991) 505f.

11. VS 484-492; cf. Penella (1979a) 166; Anderson (1986) 9; Brunt (1994) 40f.

12. In assessing the content of this letter, my emphasis is slightly different from that of Penella (1979a) 165, who claims: “In making Plato emulate Gorgias, Philostratus is advocating the compatibility of philosophy and rhetoric/sophistry.” This formulation does not adequately bring out the importance of style as an artistic category in the Philostratean concept of paideia.

13. Gell. 1.9.9f.; cf. Hahn (1989) 86f.

14. See Reardon (1971) 185-198, esp. 186, 190 and 198 for a similar assessment of Philostratus.

15. Cf. Penella (1979a) 165; Anderson (1986) 276.

16. Aristid., or. 2.465 (Lenz/Behr): τὸν τω̑ν ῥητόρων πατέρα καὶ διδάσκαλον. On Plato among representatives of the Second Sophistic cf. De Lacy (1974).

17. Aristid., or. 2.205-211 and 394-399 (Lenz/Behr); cf. Isoc., Nicocles 5-9.

18. Aristid., or. 3.509f. (Lenz/Behr): διαλεκτική forms a part of ῥητορική.

19. Contra Penella (1979a) 165: “If confronted with the Platonic denunciations, Philostratus might have responded with arguments like those employed by Aelius Aristides …”

20. Anderson (1986) 12.

21. Goudriaan (1989) 49-64.

22. Goudriaan (1989) 52-55; cf. Anderson (1989) 84-87 and (1993) 17-21; Brunt (1994) 30 and 47.

23. Anderson (1986) 82-85.

24. See Bowie (1982) 30 and 54f. Doubts on the correctness of the impression conveyed by the author of the VS in Anderson (1989) 148f.

25. Cf. Anderson (1986) 79f.

26. VS 511: οὗτοs γὰρ ὁ Nικήτηs παραλαβoν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐs στενὸν ἀπειλημμένην ἔδωκεν αὐτῃ̑ παρόδουs πολλἳ̑ λαμπροτέραs ὡν αὐτὸs τῃ̑ σμύρνῃ ἐδείματο, συνάψαs τὴν πόλιν ται̑s ἐπὶ τὴν '′Εφεσον πύλαιs καὶ διὰ μέγεθοs ἀντεξάραs λόγοιs ἔργα. Cf. Anderson (1986) 36 and 70 for the significance of the metaphor, which refers to public works commissioned and funded by the sophist; Veyne (1976) 287-289 and Sartre (1991) 150f. for the financing of public works as a form of ‘évergétisme’.

27. Goudriaan (1989) 56 and 59f. Further research would reveal whether this also applies to coins. According to Münsterberg (1915) 119, the title ‘sophist’ is only found on coins from Smyrna dating from the reign of Hadrian up to and including that of Septimius Severus. Brunt (1994) 33-37 explains Philostratus' chronology from a hypothetical blossoming of sophistic oratory from the second half of the first century A.D. onwards. This efflorescence was, in his view, a corollary of the gradual curtailment of the autonomy of Greek cities which resulted in a more and more exclusive concentration on ‘mere epideictic’ at the expense of deliberative and forensic oratory. This explanation seems to supplement rather than to contradict the one given here. Note, however, Brunt's cautionary notice on the relevance of the appearance of the title ‘sophist’ in inscriptions, ibid., 35 n. 41.

28. Bowersock (1969) 58.

29. Bowie (1982) passim; cf. Brunt (1994) 34-36.

30. On this point cf. Goudriaan (1989) 30-38.

31. It should be borne in mind that Philostratus did not regard Dio as a sophist pur sang, but as a philosopher with the reputation of a sophist. Dio himself seems to have regarded bringing about concord in a city as a part of his philosophical activity, see e.g. or. 48.14 and cf. Hahn (1989) 171. Philostratus makes no mention of Aristides' speeches on concord before the cities of Asia (or. 23 Keil) and the citizens of Rhodes (or. 24 Keil).

32. Philostratus makes no mention of Antiochus' epigraphically attested role as an envoy of Aegae to Argos. On this mission see Robert (1977a) 119-129. I owe this reference to Professor H. W. Pleket.

33. On this question cf. Anderson (1986) 79.

34. See Anderson (1986) 31f.

35. In considering the numerous mentions of the holding of public office by sophists in the VS, it should be borne in mind that the distinction between magistracies and civic contributions no longer existed in this period, see Veyne (1976) 272-276 and 354 n. 252, where he refers to the use of language by the author of the VS in this connection; cf. Sartre (1991) 139-141. I still consider it useful to distinguish direct political activity, for example in the form of taking part in meetings of the council or the assembly, from euergesia.

36. See VS 494: demanding a μισθόs is a πρα̑γμα οὐ μεμπτόν, a γὰρ σὺν δαπάνῃ σπουδάζομεν, μα̑λλον ἀσπαζόμεθα τω̑ν προι̑κα.

37. VS 605: … εἰπoν πολλἳ̑ ἥδιον ἐs τοιαυ̑τα δαπανα̑ν παιδικὰ e ἐs καλούs τε καὶ καλάs.

38. See e.g. VS 519 (Scopelian) and 606 (Damianus). Aristid., or. 32.16 (Keil) attributes precisely the attitude toward μισθόs of which Philostratus approves to the grammarian Alexander of Cotiaeum: Μυρία δὲ εὐεργετήσαs μυρίουs οὐδένα πώποτε τη̑s εὐεργεσίαs μισθὸν eτεσεν, τη̑s μέντοι τέχνηs οὐκ eσχύνετο λαμβάνων, ἐδόκει γὰρ αὐτἳ̑ λυσιτελει̑ν τοι̑s νέοιs μαθημάτων εἴνεκα τολμα̑ν προίεσθαι, καὶ ταυ̑τα ὄστιs δυνατόs· ἐπεὶ τοὺs γε ἀδυνάτουs οὐκ ἠνώχλει αλλὰ καὶ παρ' αὑτου̑ προστιθέντα αὐτὸν ἴσμεν.

39. VS 614; on the distinction cf. VS 567 (Theodotus) and 600 (Apollonius), with Rothe (1988) 60f.

40. VS 606; cf. VS 519 (Scopelian).

41. VS 524f.; Polemo's arrogance: VS 535.

42. The full material on delegations in Bowie (1982) 55f. Only a few cases will be mentioned here.

43. VS 520; cf. Suet., Dom. 7.2.

44. VS 582f.; cf. Aristid., or. 18-20 (Keil).

45. Bowie (1982) 33, who refers in particular to VS 570f. (Alexander of Seleucia before Antoninus Pius) and 622f. (Philiscus before Caracalla).

46. VS 561: … οὐδὲ σχηματίσαs τὸν λόγον.

47. VS 560f. Cf. Philostratus' remarks on the case of Polemo and Antoninus Pius, VS 534f. When the future emperor was proconsul of Asia, he stayed temporarily in the sophist's house in Smyrna during a visit to the city. Polemo was not at home at the time, but when he returned at night, he made a scene and threw the proconsul out of doors. After becoming emperor, Antoninus made jokes about this incident, but he did not bear the sophist a grudge. Philostratus sees this as an illustration of exceptional mildness (πραότηs). See also VS 489 (Hadrian and Favorinus).

48. VS 500: … μὴ ἐκκαλει̑σθαι τὰs τυραννίδαs, μηδὲ ἐs ὀργὴν ἄγειν ἤθη ὠμά.

49. VS 607: ὑφ' ὧν παροξυνθη̑ναι τὸν βασιλέα μὴ ἀπιστω̑μεν, καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἰδιώτην ταυ̑τα παρώξυνε βουλόμενόν γε τὸ δοκει̑ν ἐπιβεβουλευ̑σθαι μὴ ἀπιστει̑εθαι. See also the comments on the (unhistorical) execution of the sophist Antiphon by Dionysius of Syracuse (VS 499): 'Απέθανε μὲν οὖν περὶ σικελίαν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου του̑ τυράννου, τὰs δ' αἰτίαs, ἐφ' αἷs ἀπέθανεν, 'Αντιφω̑ντι μα̑λλον e Διονυσίῳ προσγράφομεν. For this version of the death of Antiphon, which is the result of confusion with the tragic poet of the same name (see Arist. Rh. 1385a9-13), cf. [Plu.], Vita Antiphontis, Mor. 833b-c. On VS 607 and 499 cf. Anderson (1986) 53 and 34. Incidentally, nowhere in the VS does Philostratus call Caracalla or any other emperor a tyrant. He does not make any disparaging remarks about Caracalla. The positive verdict on Nero's treatment of Nicetes in connection with the latter's conflict with Verginius Rufus is also remarkable, see VS 512 and cf. Fant (1981) 242: “… a Solomonic figure far removed from the Nero of the senatorial historians.” See Fant (1981) 240f. n. 4 for arguments in favour of reading Nέρωνα (Wright) instead of Nερούα (Kayser).

50. On the παρρησία that philosophers are expected to display in the face of autocrats see Murray (1970) 306f.; Hahn (1989) 189f.; Rawson (1989) 253. In VS 625 Philostratus relates how his younger namesake levelled the accusation of cowardice against Aelian, who had written a tirade against Elagabalus shortly after his fall, for not daring to voice his complaints until after the death of the tyrant. At first sight this appears to be in conflict with the present outline of the mentality of the author of the VS. However, there is no need to assume that Philostratus must have been in complete agreement with his namesake's criticisms of Aelian in order to appreciate his remark as a bon mot, see also Anderson (1986) 48. If ep. 72 (to ‘Antoninus’) is addressed to Caracalla and contains a veiled reference to the killing of Geta—which is by no means certain, see Münscher (1907) 535 and Solmsen (1941) 165—we may be certain that the emperor never read this letter, cf. Anderson (1986) 6.

51. Cf. Anderson (1986) 6.

52. On Marcus' attitude toward the Second Sophistic see Rutherford (1989) 80-89. As a colleague of Polemo (Polemo was so arrogant that he did not regard monarchs as his superiors, see VS 535) and as someone who saw himself as the equal of Alexander the Great in his own field (or. 50.49 Keil), Aristides' behaviour is less unaccountable than is supposed by Gascó (1989). Gascó's explanation of this behaviour—that the sophist was afraid to appear before the emperor because he was a friend of the father of Avidius Cassius, who had made an attempt to usurp the throne—is therefore unnecessary and far-fetched. On this episode see also Quet (1992) 383f.

53. On the importance of a congenial setting for a sophist's performance before an emperor cf. VS 614 (Philostratus' explanation of Heraclides' failure in a declamation before Septimius Severus).

54. SHA, Hadr. 15.12: non recte suadetis, familiares, qui non patimini me illum doctiorem omnibus credere qui habet triginta legiones. Cf. Baldwin (1982) 69f. and, for a similar anecdote on Tiberius and Ateius Capito, D.C. 57.17.1-3. On Favorinus' conflict with Hadrian see Swain (1989).

55. On this aspect cf. Millar (1977) 491-506.

56. VS 621 (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεσχεδίαζεν (sc. ὁ Κυρι̑νοs) προσφυέστεροs δὲ ται̑s κατηγορίαιs δοκω̑ν ἐπιστεύθη ἐκ βασιλέωs τὴν του̑ ταμιείου γλώτταν) and VS 626 (Caracalla appointed Heliodorus advocatus fisci ὡs ἐπιτηδειότερον δικαστηρίοιs καὶ δίκαιs).

57. Philostratus refers to Alexander of Seleucia under Marcus Aurelius (VS 571), Hadrian of Tyre under Commodus (VS 590), Antipater of Hierapolis under Septimius Severus (VS 607), and Aspasius of Ravenna under Caracalla or Severus Alexander (VS 628).

58. VS 524; cf. Bowie (1982) 40 and Anderson (1986) 65.

59. VS 607; cf. Anderson (1986) 65. Philostratus singles out for praise the way in which Antipater empathised with the role of the emperor. Aspasius of Ravenna, on the other hand, remained too much of a sophist in his post as ab epistulis, with negative effects on the clarity of his correspondence, while lucidity was a stylistic priority for an emperor (VS 628). The criticisms of Aspasius in the VS echo the Lemnian's pamphlet against the ab epistulis (Dial. 1). However, while the Lemnian regards σαφήνεια as the top priority of letter-writing in general, the author of the VS appears to regard this quality as a necessary characteristic of imperial letter-writing. P. M. M. Leunissen pointed out to me that if Aspasius was ab epistulis under Severus Alexander and was responsible as such for formulating the emperor's edict on the aurum coronarium (P. Fay. 20; on the communis opinion that this is an edict of Severus Alexander see Oliver [1978] 479), the verdict of the Philostrati is not far off the mark.

60. See VS 524 for the incorporation of Dionysius of Miletus in the equestrian order and his appointment as ‘satrap’ (i.e. procurator, cf. Bowersock [1969] 52 with n. 3) of an unspecified province; VS 567 for the consular rank of Aristocles of Pergamum; VS 607 for Antipater's adlectio inter consulares and appointment as legatus of Pontus and Bithynia. The consulate of Herodes and his position as corrector of the free cities of Asia are only mentioned in passing in the VS, see VS 548, 554 and 536.

61. Bowie (1982) 46-50.

62. Bowie (1982) 50.

63. VS 536: ἤρα μὲν γὰρ του̑ αὐτοσχεδιάζειν ὁ 'Ηρώδηs μα̑λλον e του̑ ὔπατόs τε καὶ ἐξ ὔπάτων δοκει̑ν.

64. VS 591f. On the priority of a reputation as a sophist above the consular status of a family or the holding of prestigious positions cf. VS 597 (Rufus of Perinth) and 612f. (Heraclides of Lycia). On this theme see also Anderson (1986) 81.

65. VS 524 (Dionysius) and 532f. (Polemo).

66. VS 588f.: ἀγασθεὶs δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ επὶ μέγα ἦρε δωρεαι̑s τε καὶ δώροιs.

67. VS 582. Of course, Aristides himself calls Marcus and Commodus οἰκισταὶ τη̑s πόλεωs, but does not fail to mention his own influence on the emperors, or. 19.4 and 7 (Keil). In these cases, Polemo and Aristides acted as ‘brokers in distributing beneficia’; on this phenomenon see Saller (1982) 74-78.

68. VS 530: ἐπιτηδειότατοs τω̑ν πάλαι βασιλέων γενόμενοs ἀρετὰs αὐξη̑σαι.

69. See Hahn (1989) 185-191; Rawson (1989) 233-235.

70. The term σοφιστήs has heavily pejorative connotations in a number of passages in the speeches of Aristides, see e.g. or. 28.128 and 131 (Keil); or. 33.29 (Keil); or. 34.47 (Keil) and or. 50.95 (Keil), and cf. Behr (1968) 106. Even Stanton (1973) 355, who differs from Behr in claiming that σοφιστήs is not always a term of deprecation in Aristides, has to concede “that there remains a residue of passages where sophistes is a term which Aristides would not wish to have applied to himself.” It is at any rate clear that Aristides wanted to distinguish himself from the sophists of his own day, whom he accused of greed and cheap sensationalism in their attempts to curry the favours of the audience; on his disapproval of improvised declamations cf. VS 583. All the same, there are insufficient grounds for excluding Aristides and his oeuvre of speeches, a large proportion of which are historical declamations, from the Second Sophistic; he is exceptional in certain respects, but he is not an outsider.

71. Aristid., or. 47.46 (Keil): ‘Ενάτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα ἐδόκουν ἐν τοι̑s βασιλείοιs διατρίβειν, τὴν δ'ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τιμὴν τω̑ν αὐτοκρατόρων εἰs ἐμὲ θαυμαστὴν και ἀνυπέρβλητον εἰναι διὰ πάντων ἑξη̑s ὧν ἔπραττον· μόνῳ γὰρ ἄπαντα γίγνεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲ μικρὸν ἄλλῳ τῳ.

72. VS 616: … τὴν τέχνην φίλαυτόν τε καὶ ἀλαζόνα …

73. On the rivalry between the two cities cf. D.Chr. or. 34.48.

74. As rightly pointed out by Bowersock (1969) 90.

75. D. Chr., or. 38; Aristid., or. 23 (Keil). On this subject cf. Robert (1977b) passim; C. P. Jones (1978) 83-94; Sheppard (1984-6) 231-237.

76. D.Chr., or. 34.48; cf. Aristid., or. 23.62f. (Keil).

77. C. P. Jones (1978) 85.

78. Hdn. 3.2.7-9.

79. Hdn. 3.2.2; D.C. 74.6.3; 74.10.1-14.6.

80. VS 616: … ὡs μὴ δοκοίη δι' ἑνὸs ἀνδρὸs κηρύττεσθαι πόλιs ὄπλα ἐπὶ ‘Ρωμαίουs ἠρμένη. Cf. the remark by Robert (1967) 26f., who points out that the incident “montre avec force comment la proclamation du vainqueur et celle de sa patrie sont étroitement liées.”

81. VS 591: οὐχ αἰ μύριαι τὸν ἄνδρα. Dionysius of Miletus expressed the same idea to Hadrian's ab epistulis Avidius Heliodorus (D.C. 69.3.5): Και̑σαρ χρήματα μέν σοι καὶ τιμὴν δου̑ναι δύναται, ῥήτορα δέ σε ποιη̑σαι οὐ δύναται.

82. Plu., Mor. 814a-c; cf. C. P. Jones (1972) 113f. and, for the dating, 136; Millar (1969) 13f.; Sheppard (1984-6) 238.

83. D. Chr., or. 50.2; cf. or. 43.3; Aristid., or. 24.23 (Keil) uses the significant term μειρακιω̑δεs, ‘schoolboyish’.

84. … On this passage see also De Lacy (1974) 9.

85. The evidence has been collected by Kennedy (1974) 19. Of the approximate 45 ὑπόθεσειs mentioned by Philostratus, 31 are of a historical nature. Five refer to Xerxes, three to Darius, and seven to Demosthenes. It may be added to the data presented by Kennedy that seven ὑπόθεσειs refer to situations connected with the Peloponnesian war. See also Bowie (1970) 7: no themes postdating 326 B.C.

86. Russell (1983) 107: of the roughly 350 known historical ὑπόθεσειs, 43 refer to the Persian wars, 90 to the Peloponnesian war and 125 to the period of Demonsthenes.

87. This is an example of an ἐσχηματισμένοs λόγοs: the speaker's aim was to convince the Athenians to do the opposite, viz. to take a stand and put up a fight. On this term see Russell (1983) 138.

88. Bowie (1970) passim; conclusions on pp. 35-41; the citation is from p. 41.

89. Bowie (1970) 6; cf. Bowie (1982) 44f.

90. C. P. Jones (1972) 126 with n. 23.

91. See e.g. Bowie (1970) 28: “To a certain extent the archaistic tendencies must be taken as a flight from the present. With the autonomy of Greek cities only nominal those Greeks who felt that in a different age they might have wielded political power in a Greek context must needs be dissatisfied with the present and attempt to convert it to the past where their ideal world lay.”

92. So Meijer (1985) 62. On this subject see also Lane Fox (1986) 49; Reardon (1989) 274f. Anderson (1989) 142f. contests Bowie's ‘political’ interpretation of the archaism mainly by pointing out that archaism was no new phenomenon. However, it is difficult to find clear parallels from earlier periods for the dedication with which members of the social elite in the eastern half of the empire practised show rhetoric from the second half of the first century, and for the prestige that they derived from this cultural activity; see now also Anderson (1993) 101-132; Brunt (1994) 36.

93. On the Panhellēnion see Spawforth/Walker (1985) and (1986), esp. (1986) 104f. (conclusion); cf. Sheppard (1984-1986) 238f.

94. See Aalders (1981) 12 with n. 46, where he refers to VS 571, 587f., 613 and 617; Follet (1991) 206. Cf. Aristid., or. 33.24 (Keil) and or 50.87 (Keil) for terms (applied to himself) like τω̑ν ‘Ελλήνων ἄκροs and πρω̑τοs ‘Ελλήνων.

95. Aristid., or. 50.62 (Keil); or. 51.57f. (Keil); cf. Lucian, Rh.Pr. 21: τὶ γὰρ ὁ Παιανευs προs ἐμέ;

96. Cf. Aalders (1976) 8f.

97. Ar., An. 1.12.5 … On this passage cf. Moles (1985) passim. Arist. or. 50.49 (Keil) offers an interesting parallel. The orator dreams that he is to be buried with Alexander because Philip's son has achieved the peak of military achievement and he himself has attained the summit of eloquence.

98. VS 536.

Abbreviations

The abbreviations used in referring to the names of Greek authors and their works are those used in: H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, R. MacKenzie, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford 1940⁹; supplement 1968). For incidental references to this lexicon the standard abbreviation LSJ is used. The abbreviations VA (Vita Apollonii), Epp. Apoll. (Epistulae Apollonii), VS (Vitae Sophistarum) and VP (De Vita Pythagorica or Vita Pythagorae) are used in the main body of the text as well as in the references. Names of Christian Greek authors and their works not included in the list of abbreviations in LSJ are generally abbreviated in accordance with G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford 1961). The names of Latin authors and their works are abbreviated in accordance with the system of P. G. W. Glare (ed.), Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford 1982). In the few cases in which I have departed from the abbreviations used in these lexicons, I have generally given the full names of authors and/or works; otherwise, I hope that my abbreviations will not give the reader any problems. Titles of periodicals and series are abbreviated in the bibliography (see below) as in L'Année Philologique. Where reference is made in a note to an introduction or extended commentary in an edition of an ancient author, the edition in question is generally included under the name of the writer of the introduction or commentary in the bibliography. Collections of inscriptions and documentary papyri are referred to in accordance with the abbreviations used in the Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum and the Berichtigungsliste der griechischen Papyrusurkunden aus Ägypten respectively.

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