In this essay, one of the series written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay and published under the name “Publius” in newspapers between 1787–88, Madison addresses a question many people at the time had about the new federal government: Was it a threat to the power of state governments? Madison argues that it is not.

Beginning with the idea that the Revolutionary War was fought to secure the “peace, liberty, and safety” of the American people rather than the power of the individual states, Madison goes on to argue that the state governments remain “constituent and essential parts of the federal government” and that their existence will not be threatened.

Moreover, Madison writes, the states will retain many powers that the federal government will not have: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined” and mostly have to do with “external objects,” like war, peace, and commerce. On the other hand, “Those [powers] which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite,” including “all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”

The more powerful and effective the federal government is in times of war, Madison argues, the less active it will have to be in interfering with the lives of the American people and the powers of the states.

Most of the powers given by the new Constitution to the federal government are not new, Madison writes, but already invested in Congress by the Articles of Confederation. While the regulation of commerce (and taxation) is new, he says that this “seems to be an addition which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.”

In the end, Madison argues, the powers granted in the Constitution only make the federal government more effective; they do not turn it into an existential threat to the states. “The proposed change does not enlarge [the federal government’s] powers," he writes. "It only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them.”

In Federalist 45, Madison’s basic argument is that the new federal government that the Constitution is creating will not be a danger to the rights of the people.  He argues here that the Constitution does not actually enlarge the power of the federal government in any way that is both important and controversial.  Instead, he says, the federal government will remain less powerful than the state governments.  It will employ fewer people.  It will have only a few enumerated powers while the rest of the powers will be retained by the states.  For these reasons, Madison argues, the new federal government will not be a danger to the people.  Therefore, Madison says, the Constitution should be ratified.