SOURCE: Mace, George. “The Federalist: From the Truth of Speculation to the Utility of Practice.” In Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage, pp. 98-122. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979.

[In the following essay, Mace examines the influence of Locke and Hobbes on Publius's ideas in The Federalist Papers, noting that Publius improves upon their political theory by adding a way to ensure liberty and stability.]

“In a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. …¹ I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.”²

The Federalist was first published as a series of papers in the New York City press. As Martin Diamond observed, they were addressed to three different audiences: the people of the state of New York, the delegates at the state ratifying conventions, and posterity.³ Concerning the latter audience, Diamond wrote: “It seems clear that its authors also looked beyond the immediate struggle and wrote with a view to influencing later generations by making their work the authoritative commentary on the meaning of the Constitution. While The Federalist was the most immediate kind of political work, a piece of campaign propaganda, it spoke also to thoughtful men then and now, with a view to the permanence of its argument.”⁴

With these two statements Diamond made a transition to an element he had not yet covered. Whereas the first statement points out that The Federalist could influence later generations because of its authoritative commentary on the meaning of the Constitution, the second statement speaks of the permanence of the argument in these papers. And here is an important point. The permanency of an argument turns upon underlying principles of politics, as well as authoritative exposition.

Diamond further noted that the authors did not have to deal “primarily … with the most controversial subject, namely, the standard by which they themselves deemed the Constitution good.”⁵ It is only on a secondary basis that, while going “very far,” Hamilton and Madison suggested “the theoretical grounds upon which a wise acceptance of the Constitution should rest.”⁶ Whereas this could maintain consistency for Publius by not making Hamilton and Madison “lay bare their ultimate differences,” at the same time, it explains “why The Federalist falls short of those great works in which theoretical matters are pressed to their proper, that is, farthest limits.”⁷

If we return for a moment to the “great” works of Hobbes and Locke, we may recall that when pressed to their farthest limits, they exhibit very serious problems. Locke said that the majority ought to conclude the community. The majority ought to determine the standards of right and wrong. Yet the executive ought to employ the prerogative, even when contrary to those standards determined by the majority. The only “appeal” was the sword. Hobbes, on the other hand, believed liberty rarely would be threatened by a monarch, since it was in the monarch's private interest to protect liberty. At the same time he knew there were and would be princes who would not protect or recognize men's “unalienable rights.” His solution is precisely the same as Locke's. When the sovereign did not honor the law of nature, the obligation of subjects ceased, returning all to a state of nature and concomitant state of war.

I disagree with Diamond to this extent. I believe The Federalist ranks with at least the “great” works of Hobbes and Locke. Publius, working from a similar view of the nature of man, overcame both problems through a solution that was consistent with liberty.

Hobbes's greatest shortcoming was his failure to see that a monarch need not nurture the strength and wealth of all members to be glorious, powerful, wealthy, and famous. For what he forgot was one of his own principles. While praise, and therefore fame, “disposeth to laudable actions,” they are very particular actions, being “such as please them whose judgement they value: for of those men we contemn, we contemn also the Praises.” The monarch in the society of Hobbes's day would be much more likely to be indifferent to the poor than to the wealthy, to the weak than to the strong, to the many than to the few. When this notion is added to that demonstrated above (a king can be wealthy and powerful if some have a great deal of wealth and others very little) we see little protection for the majority of the commonwealth.

I believe Locke attempted to overcome this problem through “majority rule.” In so doing, he was confronted with the problem of the majority faction. But I believe his point is well taken. If there must be within society some who are favored, let it be the majority rather than an absolute monarch and his chosen few.

I know the so-called brief for majority rule as a form of government is very questionable in the Second Treatise. But certainly the principle is there. I am also certain it can be argued that the majority Locke is writing about is not a majority of numbers, but rather of wealth and position. Even if this were true, however, I think it would amount to a poor criticism of Locke, who wrote during a time when less than 2 percent of the adult population were “represented people.” At any rate, Locke's solution to the problem of majority (by either definition) faction resulted in a return to the state of nature and the state of war. Neither a tyrannical majority, nor executive prerogative, nor war, as a means of ultimate “value allocation,” can be considered a part of our constitutional system.

I intend to show through The Federalist that the Constitution employed Hobbes's solution in a manner that both resolved the problem of instability (without resorting to the arms of monarchy) and secured men's rights. Publius's solution is simply this: a constitutional system that employs the pursuit of private interest to attain the public good. But where Hobbes applied this principle only to government, the genesis of our heritage lies in the fact that Publius applied it to society as well, thereby enlarging, refining, and correcting Hobbes's teaching so it could be “converted into the Utility of Practice.” If the theoretical principles of The Federalist fall short because they do not go far enough, the things they fall short of are also the shortcomings of Hobbes and Locke. There is at least one element common to all three. There is no difference between their views of human nature.

Publius also viewed man's nature as passionate. Striking a Hobbesian note he asked, “What is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?”⁸ “Men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.”⁹ Thus “Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate … upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question.”¹⁰ As with those on both sides of a question, passions operate upon the governed and governors alike. Publius appealed to the governed that they might not allow the “sacred knot” of union to “be severed or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or misrepresentation.”¹¹ He showed his concern that even a President might “sacrifice his duty to his interest” because of avarice or ambition.¹²

His awareness of a sweeping variety of passions, ambition, avarice, conceit, envy, fear, jealousy, love of fame, love of novelty, pride, resentment, self-love, et cetera,¹³ and of their effects, is found throughout the papers. For Publius, or Hobbes, government must reflect man's nature. If the cause of instability is due to man as the maker of commonwealths, and not as the matter, to overcome that cause is to rightly order the commonwealth so it accounts for man as the matter.

For Hobbes there was a science of politics¹⁴ so that “The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules.”¹⁵ Publius also believed there was a science of politics.¹⁶ He saw, moreover, the efficacy of various principles: separation of powers, legislative checks and balances, judges holding office during good behavior, and legislative representatives elected by the people.¹⁷ By employing these accepted principles along with two additional, “novel” principles, Publius believed he had attained the right ordering of society. The two novel principles are first the enlargement of the orbit,¹⁸ thereby helping create the second, a proliferation of interests.¹⁹ We turn now to an examination of that rightly ordered society, the causes of instability, and the means whereby those causes tend to be mitigated.

The form of government determines the particular sort of problems that will cause the most concern in a particular society. Given a majority-rule form of government, Locke had to contend primarily with the majority faction. His solution was the prerogative, and thereby the arms, of the executor. A secondary concern was the protection of the rights of the people, determined by the nature of government. Hobbes's thorniest problem concerned his search for a means of protecting individual rights. He effectively ruled out the problem of faction by giving the right of sovereignty to a monarch and making that power absolute within the limits of the covenant and therefore the laws of nature. But with this sort of power little could prevent a monarch from violating the contract.

What form of government determined the primary problem Publius faced? In noting that observations correctly attributed to democratic forms of government were incorrectly applied to republican forms,²⁰ Publius made clear which form determined the primary problem he faced. He spoke first of “The error which limits republican government to a narrow district.”²¹ Further, “the vices and defects of the republican” form had been meretriciously demonstrated by “citing as specimens … the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy.”²² Thus through a confusion of names, observations applicable to a democracy had been transferred to a republic.²³

Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.²⁴

Publius argued two points. First, he proved that application of the representative principle to a democratic form of government allows extensive republics. And second, since the representative principle does allow an extensive republic, upon a democratic basis, it allows an unmixed republic. As Diamond observed, “The word ‘unmixed’ must be read in its full force. The American states were not mixed regimes [but] wholly popular states.”²⁵ Publius saw no examples of government in Europe based wholly upon the representative system and, at the same time, wholly popular.

Democracy and the American republic are both wholly popular, but only the American republic is further based upon the representative principle. Publius had twice before defined democracy and republic. He first dealt with “a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.”²⁶ A republic, on the other hand, is “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place.”²⁷ Later, he added “The true distinction between these forms … is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents.”²⁸

A republic and a democracy differ in that the latter is pure, and by implication, the former is impure. However, the strand of impurity results not from mixing in elements from other forms of government. A democratic republic is a wholly popular government. It differs only from pure democracy in that representation takes place. Thus The Federalist's republic, as democracy, is a species of the genus, popular government.²⁹

Since Publius espoused popular government, the primary problem confronting him was “to break and control the violence of faction.”³⁰ “The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.”³¹ The friend of popular government will set a due value on any plan that provides a proper cure while not violating the principles to which he is attached, among which is popular government. The task Publius set for himself was “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of … faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of popular government.”³² This is, as “G. L. Pierson applied to Tocqueville, to ‘make democracy safe for the world.’”³³

For Publius, the effects of faction were what they had been historically. “The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished.”³⁴ “Complaints are everywhere heard … that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties.”³⁵ And greatly important to Publius was the problem Locke faced: “Measures are too often decided, not according to justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”³⁶ The “heaviest misfortunes … must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.”³⁷

The primary source of Publius's concern was the problem of faction, since “the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people.”³⁸ A faction is: “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”³⁹ Publius saw two methods of “curing the mischiefs” of faction: by removing its causes, or by controlling its effects.⁴⁰ There are two means of removing the causes of faction: by destroying liberty which nurtures it, or by giving the same opinions, passions, and interests to all.⁴¹ But to destroy liberty is worse than the disease. Whereas this is unwise, the second means of removing the causes is impracticable. For “as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.”⁴²

There are at least two “insuperable obstacles” to a uniformity of interests. The first stems from man's reason and passions. Reason, as well as passion, is apt to operate upon those on both sides of a question. Man is subject to error. Therefore, through reasoning, men will arrive at different opinions about things. This difference may be widened because these opinions are also determined in part by passions. Opinions and passions influence one another, and opinions are objects to which passions attach themselves.

Different opinions result from reason and passion. But this is not to say different opinions result from man's reason. Differences of opinion result from “fallible” reason. I believe that Publius sees the possibility of truth stemming from reason, which on a particular issue, or at a particular time, is not fallible. But for infallibility to occur, man's passions must either be in accord with truth or must be suspended. Man's passionate nature rules out the latter, leaving the only possible explanation that passion can be compatible with reason in arriving at the truth of the matter.

The second obstacle is the diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate. Madison made a crucial observation on this point. Not protection of the rights of property, but “The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.”⁴³ For it is the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property that allows various degrees and kinds of property to be held by man.⁴⁴ And “from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.”⁴⁵ Both amounts of property and kinds of property influence the sentiments and views of men. The opinions men hold due either to their degree or kind of property create one of the sources of interests and parties, that is, of faction.

The irony of Publius's government is that in protecting the varying faculties of man, it protects the aspect of man that causes faction. Such things as freedom of thought, so necessary for those with a flair for creativity, allow variable expression by men, and in great part, ensure their liberty to do or think as they please within the limits of the law. The lawful acquisition of property, based upon men's faculties for doing so, elicits a division of the society into different interests and parties.

Since it is differences in the faculties of men that cause divisions within society, Publius continued that “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.”⁴⁶ The nature of man also causes factions based upon interests other than property. Opinions about religion, government, and different leaders have “divided mankind into different parties” and “inflamed them with mutual animosity.”⁴⁷ In fact, “So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.”⁴⁸

A civil war in England fought over which end of the church to place the altar in bore sufficient testimony for Publius's point (as it had for Hobbes's). History served to demonstrate the effect of factions stemming from different opinions regarding government, religion, and various leaders.⁴⁹ “But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.”⁵⁰

The most common source of faction has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Publius is obviously implying here that it continued to cause factions until he tackled it. And we must permit a certain pride he manifests when further noting that it has been the most durable source, that is, the source most difficult to overcome and control. The amount and the kind of property have been the most frequent causes of faction throughout history and the most difficult to overcome.

As examples of the two sorts of division resulting from causes based on kind and amount of property, Publius listed: have-nots divided from haves, creditors divided from debtors, a landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, wherein all are divided from the rest. The haves and have-nots are clearly factions caused by amount of property. The latter four are clearly factions caused by kind of property. But what of the creditors and debtors? They seem to be caused by amount of property. That is, they do until we take a closer look at the debtor class. In a commercial society, the property owners are usually those who owe the most money. Mark Twain summed this up in The Gilded Age, wherein one of his characters boasted of how he had come to New York a few years before, penniless, and shortly became a big success. He owed a million dollars. At any rate, some of the wealthy are debtors and do not fall neatly into the amount category, which would be necessary if we were to align wealthy creditors against non-wealthy and debtors.

Publius tells us that “The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”⁵¹ Hereby he raised both the problem for government and the problem of government, given a popular form. The task of regulating these interests falls upon the legislature. But the legislature is nothing more than a representation of those interests within society. At this point, he faced the same problem Hobbes and Locke faced. “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own case, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”⁵²

Hobbes thought he solved the problem by giving the judicial power to one man, the monarch. And when it came to a problem of the monarch judging in his own cause, Hobbes believed the monarch's cause was the same as the public good. There was no problem here. Locke, on the other hand, spoke in terms of a “common judge.” The majority concluded the minority, and determined the standards of right and wrong. Whether the laws, the majority, the legislature, or the executor, or all can be said to be the common judge is not clear in Locke when the majority is opposed by the prerogative. If it is the majority, the prerogative of the executive seemingly prevents judging in their own cause. But this solution is as insufficient as Hobbes's seems.

Whereas Hobbes and Locke insisted men ought not be judges in their own cause, Publius gave a different answer. “The parties are, and must be, themselves the judges.”⁵³ His reasoning was that many legislative acts are judicial determinations concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens. “And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine?”⁵⁴

“Justice ought to hold the balance between them.”⁵⁵ It ought to hold the balance between competing interests, but when the parties are judges, “the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.”⁵⁶ It is too much to expect “enlightened statesmen” to adjust these clashes and bring them into line with the public good; such men will not always be found. Besides, in most cases these interests cannot be brought into accord with the public good without looking to “indirect and remote considerations.”⁵⁷ Such considerations “will rarely prevail over the immediate interests which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.”⁵⁸

The paradox of popular government is that in maintaining the popular form, the causes of instability are in a sense protected. One cannot prevent individuals from being judges in their own cause without removing the legislative power from them. When this happens, the government is either no longer popular, or no longer wholly popular. And in protecting the diverse faculties of man, the government thereby protects the latent cause of faction.

This led Publius to infer “that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”⁵⁹ There is no other way in light of the paradoxical situation.

The means by which Publius purported to secure stability while attaining the public good is simply a reapplication, refinement, and enlargement of Hobbes's means. Publius declared that “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of … faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.”⁶⁰ The greatest threat to the public good and the private rights of citizens stems from a majority faction. If the faction amounts to less than a majority, its “sinister views” are defeated by the republican principle, regular vote.⁶¹ But when a faction consists of a majority of the people, “the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”⁶²

A minority faction may “clog the administration” and “convulse the society,” but “it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.”⁶³ The great threat stems from the majority that can execute violence under the mask of constitutional legitimacy through regular vote.⁶⁴

Since the majority is “derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it,”⁶⁵ “The problem for the friend of popular government is how to avoid the ‘domestic convulsion’ which results when the rich and the poor, the few and the many, as is their wont, are at each others' throats. Always before in popular governments the many, armed with political power, precipitated such convulsions.”⁶⁶ Historically, democracies had witnessed attempts by the many to use government to take wealth away from the few. The few responded with mercenaries, and war was the result.

Two ways of preventing this confrontation are at the same time consistent with the spirit and form of republican government and the public good. The first is by preventing the simultaneous existence of the same passion or interest in a majority. The second is (given a failure to prevent a coexisting passion) by rendering the majority incapable of consenting and carrying into effect their “schemes of oppression.”⁶⁷

We shall first direct our attention to the second means, for it reinforces the first. We turn, therefore, to the principle of enlargement of the orbit. Publius introduced it first by observing that a “pure democracy” could not be extended over a large area since in that form “the citizens … assemble and administer the government in person.”⁶⁸ To administer the government the citizens have to assemble. Given the means of transportation and communication of that time, the area over which a pure democracy could extend itself was limited to a few miles. As the form of pure democracy prevented its extension over a large area, it also ruled out the possibility of democracy as a cure for the “disease” of faction.⁶⁹ Its very nature required that the majority, in fact all, concert and communicate. Any time a common passion existed it would be felt by all, would be communicated to all, and their schemes would be carried into effect. Common passions and common interests also would be more likely under pure democracy. Within a limited area there are fewer interests, if for no other reason than the natural resources of that area.

The “true distinction” between democracy and a representative democracy is that the republican principle gives rise to a further difference on the basis of the size of the country and the number of citizens over which a democratic-republic can be extended.⁷⁰ Thus whereas enlargement of the orbit is severely restricted in a pure democracy, it is possible in a democratic republic.

An impure democracy is vastly superior to a pure democracy because it provides greater protection from a majority faction. The representative principle allows a larger country with more citizens because the people no longer have to assemble and administer the government in person. The practical problems of transportation and communication make it almost impossible for a majority faction to coalesce and further difficult to concert for action.⁷¹

This is but one of two beneficial effects of representative democracy. Enlargement of the orbit is of itself the second means of frustrating the pernicious effects of majority faction. It is beneficial in that it helps to make possible the conditions necessary for the prevention of a coexisting passion or interest within a majority faction. A greater number of citizens and size of territory is the “circumstance [which] principally … renders factious combinations less to be dreaded,”⁷² in a representative democracy. “The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party. … Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”⁷³

This, perhaps, is the most important statement in The Federalist. A majority faction is less likely to form when the sphere is extended, thereby taking in a greater variety of parties and interests. Should religion be the interest, the sects of Massachusetts will be counterbalanced by those of Rhode Island or Pennsylvania. Should the most common and durable source of faction, property, be the interest, the varieties of each kind of property are brought into play.

The problem of majority faction stemming from property had been that when the many came to perceive themselves as poor, they had an interest in common. This was directed against those who were not poor, who by their very condition were perceived by the many as the cause of their poverty, and were, therefore, regarded as an opposing rich class.⁷⁴ Thus the struggle that resulted in the dissolution of democracies in the past was caused by divisions over degree or amount of property.

The solution lay in changing the nature of the struggle from a class basis, centered on degree or amount of property, to a nonclass basis, centered on variety or kind of property. The greater number of kinds of property that could be brought into play would cause a greater amount of interests to be involved. Publius intended to change the confrontation from the basis rich versus poor to the basis of some of the rich and some of the poor versus some others of both classes, et cetera. As the number of alignments on this basis became greater, alignments along class lines became less likely. In other words, the solution lay in multiplying the number of interests within society.⁷⁵

This attacks another “conventional” notion of that time. Democracy was believed best operable within a small area, but this was primarily applicable to a pure democracy. Democracy was also held to be more attuned to the virtues of an agrarian society. Men of the time needed only to appeal to the authority of the oracle, Montesquieu.

An agrarian society is limited to a smaller number of interests than a commercial society. With Publius, it was a matter of the more the merrier. As more and more kinds of interests develop, there is less and less chance of a struggle upon class lines. And the less likely are the chances of a struggle developing upon class lines, the less likely are the chances of majority faction developing. “Publius sees in the large commercial republic the possibility for the first time of subordinating the difference over amount of property to the difference over kind of property.”⁷⁶

Publius calls not simply for a multiplication of interests by bringing in a greater number through enlargement of the orbit. He calls for a proliferation of interests on the basis of future developments through a commercial society. Perhaps there are not enough at the time, but the problem of poor communication and transportation serves to prevent “concert.” As the republic becomes more commercial, the less the second means is needed. We can set up an equation: the more commercial—the more interests—the fewer majority factions.

In fact, the more commercialized the republic, the more likely it is that each separate interest will become fragmented into further interests. We need look no further than a contemporary attempt at legislation to make the point clear. In prior years, railroads developed a type of service called piggybacking. Loaded truck trailers are placed upon special cars and hauled by rail. When they arrive at or near their destination, truck tractors meet them, quickly attach them, and make a short haul to their destination. The loss by the trucking industry of the long-haul profits did not make respective owners of that industry happy. In conjunction with the teamsters unions, they attempted to get legislation passed through Congress to outlaw or severely limit the practice of piggybacking.

The response to this attempted legislation was a militant mobilization of the railroad industry. Both management and labor put all possible pressure upon Congressmen to prevent the passage of that bill. This was a reaction by some of the few and some of the many against some others of the few and some others of the many.

What was the cause of such an alignment? “Battle lines” were drawn not on a horizontal basis of the few versus the many, but rather on a vertical basis, cutting through both the few and the many. The answer is this: “What's in it for me?” Union members perceived that their cut of the national economic pie would decrease in the same ratio as that of the owners for whom they worked. Their concern was not on a few-many basis. Their own, immediate, private interest was the determining factor. “How much will I lose?” The confrontation was not on the basis of amount of property. It occurred, rather, on the basis of kind. We see examples of this every day: aircraft companies vying for government contracts, sugar beet growers vying with sugar cane growers. At this point those famous words from Anna and the King of Siam rush to mind—“et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.”

Man's passionate nature is based in psychological egoism. “What's in it for me,” and “look out for number one” express the attitudes used to make our system work. In the final analysis, it is man's pursuit of his private interest that tends to prevent the coalescence of a majority faction.⁷⁷

This is, in one sense, economic determinism. But the nature of what is determined forms, as Martin Diamond often noted, a beforehand answer to Karl Marx. The class struggle, which Marx saw as inevitable roughly half a century later, was not going to occur in Publius's representative democracy. This is not to say Publius felt he had completely ruled out the possibility of majority faction on this or any other basis. This is one of the principles that tend, and mightily so, to prevent the formation of majority factions, however. When and if factions occur, Publius erected another obstacle against them, which, at the same time, was an obstacle against tyranny from another quarter—government.

Recognizing both the role of government and the threat government posed, Publius wrote: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”⁷⁸ For Publius, as for Locke, tyranny was “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective.”⁷⁹

The solution to tyranny from above is the prevention of an accumulation of powers by any one group. We must not be misled here by Publius's allusion to the one, the few, and the many. The separation is not on the basis of mixed government so that power is given to a monarch, an aristocratic body, and a democratic one. Publius is referring to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary in the first clause. For proof we need only look to the second clause. We find that hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, do not modify the one, the few, and the many. There is a tendency, because of the second clause, to read meaning into the first. This is wrong. The judiciary is not self-appointed, the legislative not hereditary, nor is the executive. Publius's concern is that all power not be held by one man or body of men, whether elective, hereditary, or acquired. Otherwise, tyranny is the result. The Constitution founds a wholly popular government. But this of itself does not prevent tyranny.

For that matter, provisions of the Constitution also include propositions that expressly prohibit the accumulation of power into the hands of one man or one body of men. “All legislative powers … shall be vested in a Congress … which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” “The executive power shall be vested in a President.” “The judicial power … shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may … establish.”

But Publius placed little faith in such parchment provisions. He knew that the people were sovereign and that majority ruled. Not only could the violence of a majority faction be masked under the guise of the Constitution on ordinary legislation; it could be directed against the Constitution as well. As Hobbes had noted before, the sovereign is above the law in that he makes it or can change it. In a profoundly popular government, the great threat of tyranny would stem from the sovereign majority working through the legislature.

The threat of tyranny from the executive and judiciary is less to be feared. The body closest to, and most influenced by, the majority is Congress. Thus Publius argued that in

a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.⁸⁰

One of the ironies of our time is that the Constitution has been condemned by some as antidemocratic because of the very things that prove its wholly popular nature. It is because of majority rule that we find the full faith and credit clause in Article IV and “no abolition of debts” in Article VI. These are not conservative, whatever this means, reactions to democratic principles. They are attempts to nurture the development of a commercial society. They are attempts at making democracy work. The same is true of the separation of powers principle, which is directed primarily against the legislature. This is not to frustrate democracy, nor to prevent majority rule. Again it is an attempt at making democracy work by frustrating the rule of majority faction. The very fact that separation of powers is directed against the majority is at the same time the thing that tells who rules. It is the majority.

If this were not so Publius could have devised another means of preventing tyrannical majorities from running roughshod over hapless minorities, for Publius shows his awareness of at least two methods. One is “by creating a will in the community independent of the majority.”⁸¹ The other is “by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable.”⁸² The first method is found in all governments based upon hereditary or self-appointed authority. Monarchy, and to some lesser degree, aristocracy, constitute a will independent of the majority or society. Not the first, but “the second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States.”⁸³ “Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.”⁸⁴

Within Congress that multiplicity was represented with all its ramifications. Interest would check interest, thereby checking the majority faction. Should a majority faction overcome the represented interests, the further check of separation of powers would tend to frustrate it.

The mechanical contrivance of separation of powers seems as if it would work in theory. But what of practice, especially in light of Publius's lack of faith in the written words of constitutional provisions? The constitution could give the executive and the judiciary the means “to stave off oppressive legislation; the veto, the president's legislative initiative, his discretion in the enforcement of the laws, judicial review.”⁸⁵ Parchment means were not enough. “The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. … Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”⁸⁶

Separation of powers is a viable force against tyranny because of the same principle Publius applied to society. Because of their ambition and interest and because of their passion and interest, the executive and judiciary resist tyranny, thereby attaining an aspect of the public good. This represents a further attempt to attain the public good through the pursuit of private interest. Publius could say that the “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public,”⁸⁷ because he did his utmost to make it so.

The departments were constructed to make them as dissimilar as possible. Representatives were chosen by direct election for shorter periods; the President was chosen by indirect election for a longer term; judges were appointed for life, barring bad behavior. The very nature of executive and judicial powers differed from those of the legislative body. Even the legislative branch was divided into different branches “to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”⁸⁸

With the legislative, executive, and judicial branches being dissimilar, and with members of each led by their ambition to resist one another, “Why will they collaborate with the legislature in good actions, without which collaboration government would be reduced to the imbecility Publius despised, and collide with the legislature in its bad actions?”⁸⁹ This raises another question: why will the legislature ever initiate good actions?

Good legislative action is possible because majorities can form along good lines. Majorities also can be united by reason. “A coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good,” given “the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces.” The passions tend to exert centrifugal force upon majorities, while reason exerts centripetal force.

Separation of powers cannot prevent a determined majority from having its way, but it functions as a retarder. The assumption underlying the principle is that a majority faction, based upon passion, is a short-lived entity. Time, then, can give men the opportunity for cool, sedate reflection, time for the passions to cool and give way to reason. For “Americans … seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.”⁹⁰ There are also times when man's private interest does not clash with the public good. Publius summed up his statements about man thus: “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.”⁹¹ These qualities are of both reason and passion, and both can initiate good activities.

The ability of men in government to cooperate is based in part upon their ability, given time, to come to the good. But this ability is based primarily upon passion. “The desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human conduct … [and] the best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty. … Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds … prompt[s] a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit.”⁹²

One of Publius's better students, and perhaps one of Hobbes's as well, saw the deeper significance of this principle. Hobbes has been condemned not only as antilibertarian, but also as atheistic. Many believe that, for Hobbes, religion and God were really things to be used; that is, they were good insofar as they were useful. This completely misses Hobbes's point. Hobbes said that the moral influence religion exerts upon men decreases as religion becomes less influential upon them. When this happens, one thing only will oblige men—fear. There is one who is not obliged by fear—the sovereign monarch. He must be brought into line with the public good by identifying his private interest with that good.

The following statement by de Tocqueville shows at once both the problem Hobbes contended with and the superiority of Publius's solution over that of Hobbes. “Do you not see that religious belief is shaken, and the divine notion of right is declining?—that morality is debased, and the notion of moral right is therefore fading away? Argument is substituted for faith, and calculation for the impulses of sentiment. If, in the midst of this general disruption, you do not succeed in connecting the notion of right with that of private interest, which is the only immutable point in the human heart, what means will you have of governing the world except by fear?”⁹³ The notion of right must be connected with private interest. Hobbes favored such a connection with the sovereign, but not with the subjects. He therefore needed a common power to hold them in awe or fear. Publius, on the other hand, connected private interest with right throughout “the whole system of human affairs,” including the sovereign people and their government. Through his more extensive and refined means of using private interest to attain the public good, Publius limited the need for and use of fear as a means of governing to as great an extent as it ever will or can be restricted, barring a change in human nature. As Publius noted, “I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness.”⁹⁴

Five conclusions now have been drawn: (1) Hobbes's political theory is in harmony with that of the Declaration of Independence; (2) Locke's solution to the problem of societal instability is inadequate; (3) the Founding Fathers rejected Locke's solution; (4) they adopted not only a Hobbesian definition of the problem but a Hobbesian solution as well; and (5) they did this while establishing a profoundly democratic society.

Insofar as we may be termed a Lockean or Hobbesian nation, we are certainly more Hobbesian than Lockean. Our political system is not characterized by unchecked majority rule—that is, checked if at all by Locke's “will independent of society,” by the prerogative of the monarch. Nor are the ends of our society restricted to the protection of life, liberty, and estate. Locke's “property” is too narrow a category, being only a part of a larger, more inclusive end, happiness.

Happiness, on the other hand, is the end of Hobbes's thought. A substantial implementation of that thought is found throughout our political system, our basic political documents, and our political ideas. At the same time, Hobbes's belief that monarchy was the only form of government capable of securing both the rights of man and societal stability is not an American political idea. The reason he supported monarchy, albeit borrowed, refined, and enlarged, however, is indeed an American political idea.

Additionally, as the founder of modern political theory, or at least of libertarian theory, Hobbes made a significant contribution, not to just our American form of government but to all popular government. Few can deny the significance of his passionate-natured man, of his making all men equal in rights, and of his notion of an essential equality of ability, the prerequisite justification of modern democratic-libertarian theory. It would be a mistake, however, to close our eyes to the shortcomings of his system. As with Locke's, that system fell short of securing liberty and, ultimately, stability.

All of what has gone before seems to come to this: if we can say our political thought and system reflect the teaching of any one theorist, that theorist is Publius. Martin Diamond, who understood that teaching as well as any, was reluctant to call it great political theory. I have no such reluctance.

Publius's system accomplishes two things: it shows the way to secure the rights of man while providing stability. In that it provides us with the means to protect the lives of men and bless them with happiness, subject primarily to individual liabilities, it provides the means for attaining the right ordering of society and man's right life. Publius's theory is theory par excellence, such superior theory that it has needed little modification. And this raises a question that I believe deserves mention in closing.

Many apologists for American political theory seem to have taken Tocqueville at his word that a democratic society creates a certain “addiction to practical rather than theoretical science.” This was seen as one of the results of equality, a desire in man to judge everything for himself. Rather, I believe the answer lies in the obvious, but little-mentioned fact that such “theoretical” science is not needed here. Theory usually arises when men criticize existing political systems. We may view the entire history of natural law or natural right as a complex of normative symbols existing above the political situation and used as bases for criticism. When the existing situation is perceived as not in need of such criticism, theory does not develop. I suspect the reason so little theory has evolved in the United States is that, for the most part, the grand issues have been resolved, which has left us free to concentrate upon those “practical” sciences.

Notes

1. A.R. Waller, ed., Leviathan; or The matter, for me and power of commonwealth, ecclesiasticall and civill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1904), p. xiii (Dedication).

2. Ibid., p. 268 (chap. XXXI).

3. Martin Diamond, “The Federalist,” in Leo Strauss et al., History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 573. Hereafter cited as Diamond.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 574.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist, intro. by E. M. Earle (New York: The Modern Library, n.d.), no. 51, p. 337. Hereafter cited as The Federalist. See also no. 15, p. 92. “Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”

9. Ibid., no. 6, p. 27.

10. Ibid., no. 1, pp. 4-5.

11. Ibid., no. 15, p. 86.

12. Ibid., no. 75, p. 487.

13. For references to some of the passions, see Meynard Smith, “Reason, Passion, and Political Freedom in the Federalist,” The Journal of Politics, 22, no. 3 (1960), 525, n. 10; James P. Acaulan, “The Federalist and Human Nature,” The Review of Politics, 21 (October, 1959), 662-63; Benjamin F. Wright, “The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man,” Ethics, 2 (January, 1949), passim.

14. Waller, p. 53 (pt. I, chap. IX). See also pp. 108-09 (pt. I, chap. XV).

15. Ibid., p. 147 (pt. II, chap. XXI).

16. The Federalist, no. 9, p. 48.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 49.

19. Ibid., pp. 58-61.

20. Ibid., no. 14, p. 80.

21. Ibid. See also Diamond, p. 581.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 81.

25. Diamond, p. 581.

26. The Federalist, no. 10, p. 58.

27. Ibid., p. 59.

28. Ibid., no. 14, p. 80.

29. Diamond, pp. 579-81.

30. The Federalist, no. 10, p. 53.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., no. 10, pp. 57-58.

33. Diamond quoting Pierson, p. 580.

34. The Federalist, no. 10, pp. 53-54.

35. Ibid., p. 54.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., no. 28, p. 173.

39. Ibid., no. 10, p. 54. Compare with the above definition of faction given by Hobbes, see chap. VI, n. 22.

40. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 55.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., p. 56.

48. Ibid.

49. For Publius's use of history, see especially in The Federalist, no. 6.

50. Ibid., p. 56.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., p. 57.

54. Ibid., p. 56.

55. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

56. Ibid., p. 57.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

61. Ibid., p. 57.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., no. 39, p. 244.

66. Diamond, p. 589.

67. The Federalist, p. 58.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 59.

71. The representative principle also has an advantage inherently, and not due to an effect. The public views are refined and enlarged by being passed through a chosen body of citizens. See The Federalist, p. 59; and Diamond, p. 587.

72. Ibid., p. 60.

73. Ibid., pp. 60-61.

74. Diamond, p. 590. Note that this division is likely in a small republic. It is only possible in a large one if there are not many varied interests.

75. Ibid., pp. 590-92.

76. Ibid., p. 591.

77. Professor Douglass Adair attributed Publius's solution to the problem of majority faction to Hume. I believe that the principles of enlargement of the orbit and refinement are most certainly taken from Hume. However, the notion of enlargement of orbit may be found in germ in chapter XXIV of Leviathan. The essential aspect of the solution is the development of varied interests which will check one another. I believe Professor Adair wrongly attributed this notion to Hume: Madison says, “The society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests … which check each other.” Hume says, “The force of popular currents and tides is in a great measure, broken.” These two statements are not the same. There is no mention of interest, varieties thereof, nor interests checking one another. Madison's indebtedness to Hume seems even more dubious in light of Hume's full statement. That which breaks (checks) the force of popular currents and tides is not interests checking one another. Rather, Hume believed that people dispersed in small bodies become “more susceptible both of reason and order.” It is not passionate, self-seeking interests that check each other. Hume's solution is not the attainment of the public interest through the pursuit of private interest. The public interest is attained because geographic dispersion renders men more reasonable. See The Huntington Library Quarterly, “That Politics may be Reduced to a Science: David Hume, James Madison, the Tenth Federalist,” 20, no. 1 (1961), especially pp. 351, 354, n. 10; and David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (London, 1758), I, 113.

78. The Federalist, no. 51, p. 337.

79. Ibid., no. 47, p. 313.

80. Ibid., no. 48, pp. 322-23.

81. Ibid., no. 51, p. 339.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., pp. 339-40.

85. Diamond, p. 586.

86. The Federalist, p. 337. See also Diamond, p. 586.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., p. 338.

89. Diamond, p. 586.

90. The Federalist, no. 3, p. 13.

91. Ibid., no. 55, p. 365.

92. Ibid., no. 72, p. 470. Compare with Publius's motives in no. 1, p. 6.

93. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Richard D. Heffner (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 106.

94. The Federalist, no. 1, p. 6.