SOURCE: Muldoon, James. “The Mechanics of Political Evolution.” In The Americas in the Spanish World Order: The Justification for Conquest in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 66-77. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.

[In the following essay, Muldoon traces how the seventeenth-century Spaniard Juan de Solórzano y Pereya argued that his country's conquest of the Americas could be justified only as a temporary measure to assist Native Americans evolve into the kind of advanced Christian society for which Spain provided the model.]

Once Solórzano had demonstrated that the Spanish could not legitimately deprive the inhabitants of the New World of their dominium on the grounds that they were fierce and savage, he turned to a related issue: the possibility that the Indians should come under Spanish control at least temporarily because the Spanish were wiser and more prudent than the Indians themselves. This argument was rooted in the Aristotelian notion that the less intelligent should be governed by the wiser elements of a society.¹ At the same time, Solórzano avoided condemning the Indians to a state of permanent inferiority by rejecting the Aristotelian notion that some people are naturally suited to slavery or similar forms of unfree status. The Indians could move up the ladder of social and political development under Spanish guidance as the Spanish themselves had passed from a less developed stage to their present state of advanced civilization. Having passed from an uncivilized state to a civilized one and having studied the history of that progression, the Spanish understood how the process operated and could assist the Indians in making the same transformation. As the Romans had once brought the ancestors of the Spanish to a civilized way of life, so now the Spanish would provide the same service for the inhabitants of the Americas.²

One might think that Solórzano would have mentioned Sepúlveda and Las Casas at this point because the capacity of the inhabitants of the Americas for civilized existence lay at the heart of their famous confrontation at Valladolid in 1550. Here again, however, Solórzano's hesitation to cite directly the opinion of an author whose work was banned in Spain may have caused him to avoid discussing Sepúlveda's views on the Indians as natural slaves.

To deal with this justification of the conquest of the Americas, Solórzano turned to a consideration of the various kinds of societies that were known to exist. This provided a starting point for a discussion of dominium in the Indian societies of the Americas. At the heart of the issue was the question of whether the Indians were fully competent, rational human beings or not. Was the fierce behavior that many Indians exhibited a sign of inherent inferiority or was such behavior simply the product of a primitive environment that, once changed, would lead to a change in the Indians' way of life?

According to Solórzano, the Indians were clearly rational human beings, as Pope Paul III had emphasized in the bull Sublimis Deus (1537).³ While some writers had asserted that the inhabitants of the New World were monstrous creatures who lacked reason, Solórzano pointed out that such was not the case. It was true that many of these people lived in a savage fashion, but this was not the result of intellectual incapacity or some kind of biological inferiority. These people had demonstrated their mental capacity in various ways and “the more true and more certain opinion” about the intellectual capacity of the Indians was the one that defended it.⁴ Here again, Solórzano was emphasizing the role of cultural influences in the shaping of people. He pointed out that in comparison with the Spanish and the Portuguese, the inhabitants of the New World were barbarians “not only [because] they had not been illumined by the light of the Gospel but also because they generally shrank from using human ways of life.”⁵ The implication of this argument was that once introduced to the ways of civilized living, the Indians would accept them and change their practices, thus passing from a savage to a civilized way of life.

Before moving to examining the societies found in the Americas, Solórzano first discussed the wide variety of societies that existed throughout the world. Each of these societies had its own way of life and own ways of doing things.⁶ He pointed out that regardless of the variations, however, all the societies found in the new worlds that Europeans had encountered could be fitted into one of three categories that the Jesuit missionary Joseph Acosta (c. 1539-1600) had developed.⁷ These categories reflected standards of behavior, activity, and institutional and cultural development, not the moral or intellectual capacity of the people involved, and provided a scale for determining the place of any society along a spectrum of social and political evolution.

The first, and highest, category of non-European society consisted of those people who “do not withdraw much from [the use of] right reason and the practice of the human race but have stable republics, written laws, fortified cities, conspicuous magnificence of wealth, symbols of public office, regular and lucrative trade, a renowned literary tradition, and flourishing academies of learning.” China, Japan “and many other provinces of the East Indies to which there is no doubt that Asian and European institutions came” are examples of this class of society.⁸ This being the case, China and Japan could no more be the objects of European conquest on the grounds that they were not fully developed societies, that is, respublicae, than could the kingdoms of Europe. None of the societies that the Spanish encountered in the Americas fitted this classification, however.

The second category consisted of those peoples who “do not know the use of writing and who do not have written laws, or philosophical or civil studies …” but who do have “their own established kings or magistrates, a republic, fixed, frequented places where they watch over their polity, military leaders, and order and celebration of their religion, and so they are ruled by a certain [kind of] human reason.” This category comprised the Mexicans, the Peruvians, and the Chileans “whose empires, republics, laws and institutions, and their deeds and histories can worthily be admired.”⁹ What differentiated the first class of society from the second was that the first provided more than stability and order for its members. The political stability and order that societies such as the Chinese and Japanese possessed provided a basis for the development of more sophisticated aspects of human existence. The societies of the second class provided the basic framework for civilized existence, stability, and order, but little more.

The third category of societies consisted of those “who are found living in the wild almost like animals, and have scarcely any human judgment, [existing] without law, without a king, without an agreement among the peoples, without established magistrates and without a republic, [people who] move their location repeatedly or whose fixed locations are more like the caves or holes of animals.” Violent peoples, such as the Caribs and others who were bloodthirsty, even eaters of human flesh, fit this category. In addition, some other peoples, though not violent, were in the same category because of the utter simplicity of their lives.¹⁰

The crucial standard for judging the place of any society within Acosta's categories of development was thus the level of organization that the society had attained. Societies that were orderly and disciplined, where there was what Solórzano defined as a respublica, that is, a recognizable form of orderly government, were the equivalent of European kingdoms. In effect, societies everywhere were being judged according to an Aristotelian standard of social order. The inhabitants of such societies possessed dominium just as much as did European Christians. Furthermore, Europeans presumably could deal with such societies through their rulers and other officials just as they dealt with one another in Europe. Diplomatic relations, as it were, could exist with such societies.

The fact that such organized societies might engage in behavior that the European would define as barbarous or immoral did not mean that they were not true respublicae with true dominium. It was the level of political order, not the level of moral behavior, that determined the status of any society. That being the case, the inhabitants of the Americas who belonged to Acosta's second category could not be deprived of their lands or power simply because they were infidels or barbarians.¹¹ Furthermore, Solórzano argued, by respecting the peoples of the New World, the Spanish would be more likely to them away from barbarous and savage behavior and to win them to Christianity, which was, after all, the ultimate purpose of going to the New World in the first place.¹²

Before moving on to consider the arguments Solórzano presented in support of the opinion that the Spanish had the right, even the obligation, to place the Indians temporarily under their governance, however, it is necessary to consider what he meant by such phrases as “to live in a political fashion” (vere politicum vivendi modum) and the terms “republic” (respublica), “empire” (imperium) and “kingdom” (regnum), because by employing these terms he effectively placed the Aztecs and the Incas within a European-based framework for political analysis.¹³

For Solórzano, living in a political fashion meant to live in a society with fixed rules and defined rulers. As Acosta's three-fold classification of societies indicated, political life, life in a polis as Aristotle described it, was orderly, stable, and predictable. Indeed, it was the natural form of life for men because it was a complete one, allowing the individual to develop himself to the fullest. The societies that comprised Acosta's first two categories, the Chinese and the Japanese, the Aztecs and the Incas, all shared these characteristics. The primitive peoples of the third category did not enjoy the stability and order found in the other two classes of society, so such people could not live in a fully human manner.

Solórzano also used the terms “empire” and “kingdom” as synonyms for living in an orderly fashion. Thus, the Mexicans, the Peruvians, and the Chileans had “empires, republics, laws and institutions” the existence of which made them part of the second class of societies. As a result, he could refer to Montezuma, the ruler of the Aztecs, as an emperor, and to the ruler of the Incas as a king. The Aztecs and Incas possessed empires or kingdoms, that is, recognizable political and government units.¹⁴ Furthermore, this classification of the Incas and Aztecs also meant that the Spanish could not legitimately conquer them on the grounds that they were too barbarous, primitive, or undeveloped to govern themselves. Obviously these people did govern themselves in such a way as to satisfy Aristotle and Acosta's definition of the level of political life required of a respublica. If this was the case, then on what basis could anyone argue that the Spanish might have the right to govern the Aztecs and Incas, thus depriving them of the exercise of their dominium, even if only on a temporary basis?

Solórzano also used the term imperium in another way. In addition to meaning a form of government, it could simply mean power or jurisdiction, as it had originally in Latin. In the Roman world, imperium had meant the power that officials exercised, above all the power of life and death, over the citizens of the Republic, and it retained this meaning even as it came to mean a particular form of government.¹⁵ As a consequence, Solórzano could refer to the Indians as “living peacefully under the imperium” of their kings.¹⁶ Here again, the point was that Aztec, Inca, and other Indian rulers of Acosta's second category exercised the same kind of power as their European counterparts.¹⁷Imperium also had the connotation of ruling over other peoples by force, a usage that applied to the Aztecs and Incas who had conquered their neighbors.¹⁸

Acosta's three categories provided more, however, than a convenient system for comprehending the numerous societies that Europeans had encountered as they explored the world. They could also be understood as a convenient guide to the stages of political, social, economic, and cultural development as well. In effect, it was possible to understand Acosta's schema as implying that human beings had progressed upward, starting with the simplest, most primitive form of life, passing to true political organization, then moving to the highest form of purely natural society, where commerce and culture flourish.¹⁹ The apex of this development would be the societies of Christian Europe, which possessed all of the qualities found in the most sophisticated societies described by Acosta and the true faith as well.

To some extent, these two interpretations of Acosta's categorization of societies are in conflict, something Acosta himself may not have realized. To the extent that these categories suggest that people evolved politically and socially from primitive to civilized, from living scattered over the country-side to living in an organized society, that is, in a polis, the categories are at odds with the Aristotelian notion that human beings naturally live in organized societies and that those who do not have degenerated from the universal human norm. Seen as an evolutionary schema, Acosta's categories resemble Cicero's conception of organized society as having evolved from primitive disorder through the efforts of a few men skilled in the art of speaking.²⁰

It should be noted that Acosta claimed this development only for the natives of America; he did not suggest that it applied to the Old World as well. It may be that he was unwilling to attempt an Old World Application of his theory of development because to do so would involve some contradiction of Biblical tradition. The narratives of Genesis allowed for no stage of primeval savagery. Acosta argued that the descendants of Noah who migrated to America went by land, passing no more than a narrow strait, and that they became savage hunters in the course of their wanderings.²¹

Seen in the light of the Aristotelian model, the peoples of the Americas had fallen away from their original way of life in organized communities, and subsequently some of them regained the civilized way of life through the efforts of eloquent leaders such as Cicero described.

Because it was possible to understand Acosta's schema as providing an outline of the stages through which human societies either had passed as they developed or had passed in the course of returning to a civilized way of life after falling away from it, the schema could then serve as a program for assisting less developed societies to advance more rapidly under the guidance of a government that recognized the right path. Using that standard, European Christian rulers had no right, Solórzano pointed out, to subjugate the societies that comprised Acosta's first class. While it was true that societies such as the Chinese and the Japanese “are to some degree barbarous and diverge from the right way and natural law in many matters … they are not to be judged any differently than the Greeks and Romans and the other peoples of Asia and Europe” are judged because “they show potential and some human wisdom and they are found to carry out an organized way of life (politicam vitam agere) according to their own understanding.”²² In effect, all that the Chinese, the Japanese, and similar societies needed to complete their socio-political development was to accept the Christian faith that missionaries were already preaching to them. This in turn would indicate to them what social and political practices they should reject.

Turning to the Indians of the New World and applying the same standard, Solórzano argued that the barbarous behavior of the Indians was not in itself sufficient cause for depriving them of their “liberty and the dominium of their goods.”²³ Furthermore, the Indians were not so “fierce and primitive that if we treat them with patience and pious effort” they would not advance to a more civilized manner of living. Once properly instructed, they would advance to a “Christian and civilized way [politicis moribus] of life” as, among others, the ancestors of the Europeans had done.²⁴

Solórzano pointed out, on the other hand, that the Indians' way of life left much to be desired. They had rejected “right reason and the customary practice of the human race.” In many things, they adhered to practices that were “uncivilized, filthy and inhuman,” including “cruel and accursed sacrifices” as well as numerous other kinds of wickedness. Instead of conquering the Indians, however, something that Solórzano's fundamental argument forbade, he proposed that the Spanish monarchs encourage their own subjects “to dwell among the Indians and begin to propagate the faith and as it were create a single republic with those Indians” under Spanish domination. The period of Spanish domination would only be temporary, however, until the Indians, freed of their wicked practices, could be brought to a higher standard of behavior. Then self-rule would be returned to them.²⁵ Thus, Spanish control would be a period of tutelage from which the Indians would one day emerge.

The justification for the temporary subjugation of the Indians of the second class was simple. The evil practices of their societies, though not a sufficient cause for depriving them of their dominium, would inhibit their reception of “the light of the Gospel or a way of life worthy of a free man.” Spanish control of individual societies in the New World would not automatically end with the baptism of their members and the formal elimination of practices deemed to be uncivilized, however. Such control would have to continue until it was certain that the newly civilized and Christianized people were disposed to remain firm in their new way of life. How long that would take, Solórzano did not specify.²⁶

It is worth noting at this point that Solórzano's argument did not mean that the inhabitants of the New World would have to become entirely Hispanicized before the Spanish government returned the exercise of their dominium. Those practices and laws “that are not contrary to the law of nature or the Gospel they can be allowed to exercise freely.”²⁷ This reinforced what he had said earlier about the Indians retaining their own “liberal arts” as well as learning from the Spanish.²⁸ The Indians and the Spanish were to become a single respublica, as he had pointed out earlier, but that would not necessitate eliminating all elements of the traditional cultures of the inhabitants of the Americas, only those parts that were in conflict with natural law or the law of the Gospel.

Summing up this stage of the discussion, Solórzano concluded that the peoples who comprised the second class of society might seem to fit Aristotle's definition of those who are natural slaves. He pointed out that such, nevertheless, was not the case. These people were not natural slaves, did possess dominium, and to define them as natural slaves was to adhere to a “very dangerous, indeed false opinion that deserves condemnation.”²⁹ At worst, such people might be deprived of the exercise of their rightful dominium temporarily, until they had remedied the defects in their society that kept them from living as human beings should.

On the other hand, the peoples of Acosta's third category, those who had no form of organized society, were in a different situation. These people, “fierce, wild, cannibals, and living without fixed law or a definite king, wandering through the fields like animals,” obviously did not dwell in anything like a respublica. Consequently, it could be argued that such people might not only be brought under temporary Spanish control, but even be “captured by force, tamed, and reduced to servitude and indeed even be killed if they resist” Spanish efforts to civilize and convert them.³⁰ As Francisco Suárez argued, such people “can be warred against not to kill them but so that they might be instructed in a human way of life and be ruled justly,” an opinion that, Solórzano demonstrated, was found in the work of numerous authors.³¹

The logic of this position entailed a recognition that, in contrast to the peoples of the second class, whose loss of the exercise of dominium would be only temporary, the peoples of the third class would come under “a fuller and more absolute domination” while the Spanish worked to civilize and Christianize them. The justification for this arose from the natural order of the world, which mandates that the “lesser intellect (inferior ratio) ought to be subject to the stronger,” as children obey parents, servants obey their masters, and so on.³² After all, “according to the natural order, the ignorant are commanded to follow and be dominated while the wise are commanded to lead.”³³

The goal to which the Spanish should aspire was the creation of a “republic composed of Indians and Spaniards,” something that has already begun to take shape. Eventually the process would bring the Indians “to Christianity and to a political way of life.”³⁴ Furthermore, in the respublica that would develop, Spaniards would not dominate Indians nor would Indians dominate Spaniards. Such a consummate equality lay in the future, however, because all of the Indians, those of the second class as well as those of the third, “appear by far less intelligent and wise than the Spaniards.” At the moment, however, the first priority was the teaching of the Gospel. Until that occurred, the Indians of either class would be less wise than the Spanish, so that allowing them to rule the Spanish would be to allow “the foolish to be in higher places than the wised and learned,” obviously a violation of the right order of the world, something that the ancient pagans like Homer and Plato knew well.³⁵ Obviously, if ancient pagans recognized that the wise should rule the less wise, then Christians, who possessed both natural and divine wisdom, had even more right to dominate the Indians, whose level of civilization and whose religious views were inferior to those of the Spanish.

Having presented an argument for at least temporarily depriving societies of Acosta's second and third classes of the exercise of their lawful dominium for their own good, Solórzano went on to stress that such a deprivation of a right was not without precedent. After all, it was well-known that “free men who, because of age or defective reason or judgment, were unable to care for themselves, could be cared for and ruled by older and wiser individuals.” Furthermore, Solórzano argued that the weaker members of various societies had voluntarily submitted themselves to the “power and guidance (manu & consilio) of the wiser and more powerful” members of society. The “exigencies of human existence necessitated this reciprocal relationship” among people.³⁶ The argument that Solórzano presented here reinforced the traditional notion that societies are hierarchical, not egalitarian, so that the “reciprocal relationship (mutuam inter homines opem, & societatem),” the foundation of any society, is not the same as a social contract, that is, an agreement among equals.³⁷

The fact that government is based not on the voluntary agreement of equals but on the actual circumstances of human life and exists naturally to advance the common good of all meant that defenders of the conquest of the New World could define that conquest as a legitimate act, on the grounds that the Indians required the assistance of the Spanish if they were to move from Acosta's second class of society to the first or from the third class to the second. So, even though the Indians were “free men and masters of their goods,” nevertheless “they were not sufficiently learned to govern themselves appropriately and in a political manner.” That is, the Indians continued to engage in practices more suited to a barbarous way of life than a truly civilized one, and they had not yet come to the “humane and civilized” ways. In addition, even though exposed to Christian teachings, the Indians had not yet become Christians. Thus, the Spanish kings had the responsibility for governing these people until they possessed the levels of civilized and Christian behavior that Acosta identified with the first class of non-Christian societies.³⁸ Again, however, Solórzano stressed that even in this case the role of the Spanish was a temporary one, a necessary intervention by a wiser and stronger society in the development of a younger and weaker one so that the latter would advance more rapidly to the highest levels of human existence. In this argument, there was no doubt expressed about the capacity of the Indians to rise to the same level as the Chinese and the Japanese, not to mention that of the Spanish themselves.³⁹

Having outlined a defense of the Spanish conquest of the New World on natural grounds, that is, on the basis of a natural process of sociopolitical development that the Spanish understood and could, so to speak, speed up to the advantage of the Indians, Solórzano then presented religiously based arguments defending the same opinion. He pointed out that although the relationship between the Spanish and the peoples of the second and third classes of society differed as to the nature and extent of Spanish control over them during the process of social development, in both cases the “precept of charity” bound Christian rulers to assist these peoples in the process of achieving a better way of life.⁴⁰ While the ruler of any society in a higher class of development could, presumably, assist the development of a society in a lower category simply on the basis of natural reason, Christian rulers had a special responsibility. Christians, after all, operated not only with the guidance of natural wisdom but also with the “perfect knowledge of the papacy to which the right of ruling and governing souls properly seems to belong.”⁴¹

The existing leaders of such societies were unable to assist in this kind of development because “they were usually cruel and tyrannical … and enmeshed in barbarous customs and the darkness of ignorance.”⁴² Even though the Indians had selected these rulers for themselves, a responsibility of their having dominium, the true needs of the society could require the appointment of a ruler who was neither barbarous in his way of life nor ignorant of the proper ends of a society.⁴³ Because the wicked rulers of these societies had “abused their dominium, they deserved to lose it.”⁴⁴ To grant these wicked rulers the right to govern their people would be as sensible as giving the guardianship of children to a man who was insane or a slave to his passions.⁴⁵ No one in his right mind would allow such a thing. Reason and charity agree that the peoples of the New World would need the guidance that only European Christians can provide if they were to advance to the highest levels of human existence.

As for the peoples who constituted the third and lowest class of human existence, Solórzano pointed out that it should come as no surprise to anyone that “the wild and savage Indians who live without a fixed ruler and without fixed laws, those whom we number in the third class, can be warred against, subjugated and deprived absolutely of the governance and jurisdiction over their lands until they become accustomed to a more humane way of life and to formation in Christianity.”⁴⁶ Implicitly comparing such barbarous people to those who are mentally impaired, Solórzano argued that they could no more be allowed to continue in such a way of life, destructive as it was, than the mentally impaired could be allowed to roam about without restraint.⁴⁷ Such people required constraint and strong discipline “until they accept soundness of mind,” that is, until they accepted Christian and civilized standards of behavior. Both “the common law of all nations” and the “sacred pages” of the Bible demonstrate that organized, disciplined society is the only way for men to live. Philosophers, theologians, and jurists all agreed on the naturalness of organized society. That being the case, such unsocial men “ought to be restrained by Christian rulers and to be protected and governed,” presumably until they have attained the knowledge and habits necessary for dwelling in an organized society like other men.⁴⁸ To leave these people to live in an uncivilized fashion would be as wrong as it would be “to leave someone free to harm others.” Such unchecked behavior would not be the exercise of true freedom, but rather a violation of true freedom (imperfectio, & defectus libertatis).⁴⁹ In other words, true human freedom requires discretion and moderation in its exercise.

Indeed, not only would it not be sinful or a violation of the natural rights of those who exist in the lowest category of human society to subjugate them, it would clearly be positive. After all, “all human beings, even if (quamvis) they are Jews and infidels, ought to be cherished for humanitarian reasons (humanitatis ratione fovendi)” and “be called fellow human beings and our neighbors.”⁵⁰ This being the case, the Spanish treatment of the Indians, even under some circumstances, their conquest and enslavement, could be justified on the grounds of the barbarous, uncivilized nature of their way of life. Once these people had become settled and civilized, once they had left their barbarous ways behind, once, in other words, they had matured socially and politically, the wars and their consequences would come to an end. Instead, everything would then be done in accordance with the “instruction, gentle governance and liberty of all of the Indians,” because the Indians would have risen from an uncivilized to a civilized state of existence.⁵¹

The argument that all of the advanced societies had passed through various stages of development before reaching their present level meant, of course, that the peoples of the New World, regardless of how politically primitive they might have appeared, could eventually rise to the highest levels of development. At the same time, this line of argument also raised the issue of whether there was a universal standard of behavior that could be applied to every society. Was there a natural law applicable to all men and against whose standards the behavior of all societies could be judged? When the Spanish sought to assist societies of the second and third classes to rise in order to become fully civilized, did they have at their disposal a set of standards to apply to the peoples whom they were assisting? In his discussion of the natural law and what it included, Solórzano sought to answer that question.

Notes

1. Aristotle, Politics, bk. 1, ch. 5; The Basic Works: 1132-33. Curiously, he does not cite Sepúlveda at this point.

2. The comparison with the Romans was a common one in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The English, for example, described their conquest of Ireland in the same terms. See Muldoon, “The Indian as Irishman,” 275-77, 279.

3. Solórzano, 2.9.1. He had provided an excerpt from this bull in 2.8.78-79.

4. Solórzano, 2.9.1-2.

5. Ibid., 2.9.3.

6. Ibid., 2.9.4.

7. Concerning Acosta and his role in the development of comparative studies, see Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man, esp. 146-200. Hodgen pointed out that “Acosta's Natural and Moral History of the Indies … was published and republished, translated and retranslated, before the end of the sixteenth century. …” Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 209.

8. Solórzano, 2.9.9.

9. Ibid., 2.9.10.

10. Ibid., 2.9.11.

11. Ibid., 2.9.16-17.

12. Ibid., 2.9.18.

13. Ibid., 2.9.30.

14. Ibid., 2.13.66. Here Solórzano refers to their “ancient kingdoms and empires.” See also 2.12.25, 2.2.65.

15. On the meaning of imperium, see Koebner, Empire, 4.

16. Ibid., 2.14.46.

17. In addition, Solórzano discussed in various places the Roman Empire as found in Roman and canon law. He also described Christian society as the Christian Republic: Koebner, Empire, 2.14.9.

18. Concerning the military basis of the Aztec Empire, see Inga Clendinnen, “The Cost of Courage in Aztec Society,” Past & Present 107 (May, 1985): 44-89. For an introduction to the current literature on the Aztecs and the Incas, see the thoughtful review by Benjamin Keen, “Recent Writings on the Spanish Conquest,” Latin American Research Review 20 (1985): 161-71.

19. See Pagden, Fall of Natural Man, 167.

20. Ibid.: 140. Cicero, De inventione, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949); bk. 1, chs. 2, 3: 5-8.

21. Rowe, “Ethnography and Ethnology,” 9.

22. Solórzano, 2.9.13.

23. Ibid., 2.9.16.

24. Ibid., 2.9.18.

25. Ibid., 2.9.19.

26. Ibid., 2.9.20.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 2.8.52; see ch. 4, note 31.

29. Ibid., 2.9.23.

30. Ibid., 2.9.24. Very similar language is to be found in papal-royal correspondence dealing with the Portuguese invasion of the Canary Islands in the early-fifteenth century; see James Muldoon, “A Fifteenth-Century Application of the Canonistic Theory of the Just War,” Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1976), 467-80 at 469-70.

31. Ibid., 2.9.26.

32. Ibid., 2.9.27.

33. Ibid., 2.9.29.

34. Ibid., 2.9.30.

35. Ibid., 2.9.31.

36. Ibid., 2.9.39.

37. On the early development of theories of social contract, see Carlyle and Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory, 3: 160-69; 5: 471-72.

38. Solórzano, 2.9.42.

39. Ibid., 2.9.47-54.

40. Ibid., 2.9.55.

41. Ibid., 2.9.56.

42. Ibid., 2.9.57.

43. Ibid., 2.9.58-59.

44. Ibid., 2.9.60.

45. Ibid., 2.9.62.

46. Ibid., 2.9.64.

47. Ibid., 2.9.65.

48. Ibid., 2.9.66-67.

49. Ibid., 2.9.71.

50. Ibid., 2.9.72-73.

51. Ibid., 2.9.75.

Bibliography

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