[A professor at the University of Heidelberg, Zeller first published his landmark work on Epicurus in German. The following excerpt presents an overview of Epicureanism as a meeting of scientific and moral thought.]

The Moral Science of the Epicureans. General Principles

Natural science is intended to overcome the prejudices which stand in the way of happiness; moral science to give positive instructions as to the nature and means of attaining to happiness. The speculative parts of the Epicurean system had already worked out the idea that reality belongs only to individual things, and that all general order must be referred to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The same idea is now met with in the sphere of morals, individual feeling being made the standard, and individual well-being the object of all human activity. Natural science, beginning with external phenomena, went back to the secret principles of these phenomena, accessible only to thought. It led from an apparently accidental movement of atoms to a universe of regular motions. Not otherwise was the course followed by Epicurus in moral science. Not content with human feelings alone, nor with selfishly referring everything to the individual taken by himself alone, that science, in more accurately defining the conception of well-being, ascertained that the same can only be found by rising superior to feelings and purely individual aims, and by that very process of referring consciousness to itself and its universal being, which the Stoics declared to be the only path to happiness. It is for us now to portray this development of the Epicurean platform in its most prominent features.

The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus, is pleasure; the only unconditional evil is pain. No proof of this proposition seemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not doing. If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact that all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and that consequently pleasure is a natural good, and the normal condition of every being. Hence follows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with all the philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of life.

At the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure nor pain are simple things. There are many varieties and degrees of pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully estimated, and in consideration of the advantages and disadvantages which they confer, would under circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as a good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it would entail a greater corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect of greater pleasure. He also agrees with Plato in holding that every positive pleasure presupposes a want, i.e. a pain which it proposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain, and that the good is nothing else but emancipation from evil. By a Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed as the object of life; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man's general state of mind, but on the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus, advancing beyond this position, recognised both the positive and the negative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion. Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and immediate cause of happiness is repose of mind—ἀτᾳ̑ρᾳ̑ξίᾳ̑. Positive pleasure is only an indirect cause of ἀτᾳ̑ρᾳ̑ξίᾳ̑ in that it removes the pain of unsatisfied craving. This mental repose, however, depends essentially on the character of a man's mind, just as conversely positive pleasure in systems so materialistic must depend on sensuous attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part of Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure; and conversely Epicurus was no less consistent in subordinating it to gratification of mind.

In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we do not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor, indeed, sensual enjoyments at all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make life happy, but a sober judgment, investigating the motives for action and for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace, prejudices. The root from which it springs, and, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. It is intelligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without being ever too early or too late. Our indispensable wants are simple, little being necessary to ensure freedom from pain; other things only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not increased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. The little we need may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting what she gives in thinking what we desire. He who lives according to nature is never poor; the wise man living on bread and water has no reason to envy Zeus; chance has little hold on him; with him judgment is everything, and if that be right, he need trouble himself but little about external mishaps. Not even bodily pain appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud the wise man's happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic's insensibility to pain, still he is of opinion that the wise man may be happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent, exclaiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! A touch of forced sentiment may be discerned in the last expression, and a trace of self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the beautiful language of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. Nevertheless, the principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main thing, according to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the state of the mind; bodily pleasure being of short duration, and having much about it to unsettle; mental enjoyments only being pure and incorruptible. For the same reason mental sufferings are more severe than those of the body, since the body only suffers from present ills, whilst the soul feels those past and those to come. In a life of limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never attain their consummation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not standing in need of unlimited duration.

At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their principles, cannot deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his favourite pupil Metrodorus shrunk from making this admission; Epicurus declaring that he could form no conception of the good apart from enjoyments of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything good has reference to the belly. Still the Epicureans did not feel themselves thereby driven to give up the pre-eminence which they claimed for goods of the soul over those of the body. Even the Stoics, notwithstanding the grossness of their theory of knowledge, never abated their demand for a knowledge of conceptions, nor ceased to subordinate the senses to reason, notwithstanding their building a theory of morals on nature. But all character has vanished from their joys and their pains. Their only distinctive feature can be found in the addition either of memory, or of hope, or of fear to the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater importance is simply ascribed to the greater force or duration belonging to these ideal feelings as compared with the attractions which momentarily impress the senses. Only accidentally is the remembrance of philosophic discourses mentioned as a counterpoise to bodily pain; properly speaking, mental pleasures and pains are not different from other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, by reason of their being stronger and more enduring. Accordingly Epicurus cannot escape the admission that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal enjoyments if these can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of death, and of sufferings; and so the only consolation he can offer in pain is the uncertain one that most violent pains either do not last long, or else put an end to our life; and the less violent ones ought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalacing pleasure. Hence victory over the impression of the moment must be secured, not so much by a mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by a proper estimate of the conditions and actions of the senses.

In no other way can the necessity of virtue be established in the Epicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moral philosophers, so far as to hold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness from virtue, having even the testimony of opponents as to the purity and strictness of his moral teaching, which in its results differed in no wise from that of the Stoics; Epicurus, nevertheless, holds a position strongly contrasted with that of the Stoics as to the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand virtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object in life. Only a conditional value belongs to virtue as a means to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed, Not virtue taken by itself renders a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the freedom from disquiet, fear, and dangers, which follows as a consequence from virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and death, by making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life. Self-control aids in that it points out the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment and the minimum of suffering; valour, in that it enables us to overcome fear and pain; justice, in that it makes life possible without that fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor. To the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but only a means to an end lying beyond it—a happy life—but withal a means so certain and necessary, that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness, nor happiness without virtue. Little as it may seem to be required, still even he would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in what is good.

The same claims were therefore advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only was a control over pain attributed to him, in nothing inferior to the Stoic insensibility of feeling, but he endeavoured himself to describe his life as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from emotions, and being in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the soul, such as compassion, he yet finds his philosophic activity in no wise thereby impaired. Without despising enjoyment, he is altogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life. He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction; he alone knows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as Metrodorus observes, knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is so far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his pupils that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods among men; so little can destiny influence him, that he calls him happy under all circumstances. Happiness may, indeed, depend on certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the disposition to happiness is not found in every nature, nor in every person; but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor can time affect its duration. For wisdom—so Epicurus and the Stoics alike believed—is indestructible, and the wise man's happiness can never be increased by time. A life, therefore, bounded by time can be quite as complete as one not so bounded.

Different as the principles, and different as the tone of the systems of the Stoics and of Epicurus may be, one and the same endeavour may yet be observed in both. It is the tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian philosophy—the wish to place man in a position of absolute independence by emancipating him from connection with the external world, and by awakening in him the consciousness of the infinite freedom of thought.

The Epicurean Ethics Continued: Special Points

The general principles already laid down determine likewise the character of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans. Epicurus, it is true, never developed his moral views to a systematic theory of moral actions and states, however much his pupils, particularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and special points in a system of morals. Moreover, his fragmentary statements and precepts are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that is known corresponds with the notion which we must form in accordance with those general views. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim at conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The wise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for supplying the wants of nature, and for emancipating from pain; that imaginary wealth knows no limit, whereas the riches required by nature may be easily acquired; that the most simple nourishment affords as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far more conducive to health; that therefore the restriction of wants rather than the increase of possessions makes really rich; and that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at all. He therefore can with Epicurus live upon bread and water, and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus. He eschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life; considering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an uncertain future, or to sacrifice life itself for the means of a life, seeing he can only once enjoy it. He therefore neither gives way to passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy. Fame he does not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to danger. Injuries he can bear with calmness. He cares not what may happen to him after death; nor envies any for possessions which he does not himself value.

It has been already seen how Epicurus thought to rise above pains, and to emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death. And it has been further noticed that he thinks to secure by means of his principles the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics thought to attain this independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain and regulate them. Desires he would not have uprooted, but he would have them brought into proper proportion to the collective end and condition of life, into the equilibrium necessary for perfect repose of mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from disapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life. The wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar. Care for business he will not neglect; only he will not give himself too much trouble therewith, and will prefer the business of education to any and every other. Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he can be content when obliged to dispense with them. In short, his self-sufficiency will not consist in using little, but in needing little; and it is this freedom from wants which will add flavour to his more luxurious enjoyments. Nor is his attitude towards death a different one. Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of escaping unendurable suffering, still, the cases in which he will resort to suicide will be rare, since he has learnt to be happy under all bodily pains. The Stoic's recommendation of suicide finds no favour with the Epicurean.

Fully as the wise man can suffice for himself, still Epicurus would not separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings. Yet even he could form no idea of human life except in connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on nothing but a contract entered into for purposes of mutual security. Laws are only made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent their suffering injustice. Law and justice are not, therefore, binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the offender can never be free from fear of discovery and punishment. There is not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and nations—those, in fact, which were able and willing to enter into the social compact. And the particular applications of justice which constitute positive right differ in different cases, and change with circumstances. What is felt to be conducive to mutual security must pass for justice; and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient, it is no longer binding. The wise man will therefore only enter into political life in case and in as far as this is necessary for his own safety. The sovereign power is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm. He who pursues it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most foolishly. Private individuals living as a rule much more calmly and safely than statesmen, it was therefore natural that the Epicureans should be averse to public affairs; public life, after all, is a hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness. Their watchword is therefore Λάθε βιώς. To them the golden mean seemed by far the most desirable lot in life. They only advise citizens to take part in affairs of state when special circumstances render it necessary, or when an individual has such a restless nature that he cannot be content with the quiet of private life. Otherwise they are far too deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the masses to wish even to make the attempt. For the same reason they appear to have been partisans of monarchy. The stern and unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles so much at least is known that they did not consider it degrading for a wise man to pay court to princes, and under all circumstances they recommended unconditional obedience to the powers that be.

Family life is said to have been deprecated by Epicurus equally with civil life. Stated thus baldly, this is an exaggeration. So much, however, appears to be established, that Epicurus believed it to be generally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing of children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances. It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children towards parents to be no inborn feeling. This view is, after all, only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not oblige him to give up parental love altogether. Nay, it is asserted of him that he was anything but a stranger to family affections.

The highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be friendship—a view which is distinctive in a system regarding the individual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on individual character and personal inclination, than to one in which a man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the Epicurean friendship rests is very superficial, regard being had mainly to its advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common enjoyments; but it is also treated in such a way, that its scientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only one portion of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained that friendship is pursued in the first instance for the sake of its own use and pleasure, but that it subsequently becomes an unselfish love. Moreover, the assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit agreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love themselves, is clearly only a lame shift. Still, the Epicureans were of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility was not inconsistent with holding it in the highest esteem. Friendly connection with others affords in short so pleasant a feeling of security, that it entails the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection can only then exist when friends love one another as themelves, it follows that self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong.

Even this inference sounds forced, nor does it fully state the grounds on which Epicurus's view of the value of friendship reposes. That view, in fact, was anterior to all the necessary props of the system. What Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such enjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear of disturbances. But as to trusting his own powers for satisfying these conditions, Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on externals. He needed the support of others, not only to obtain their help in necessity and trouble, and to console himself with this view for the uncertainty of the future, but still more, to make sure of himself and his principles by having the approval of others, thus obtaining an inward satisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval of friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In sympathy with them his mind first attains to a strength by means of which it is able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas are for him too abstract, too unreal. A philosopher who considers individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true, cannot feel quite happy and sure of his ground, unless he finds others go with him. The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of his own cultivated personality; and wherever this standard prevails, particular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and to friendship.

Hence Epicurus expresses himself on the value and necessity of friendship in a manner far exceeding the grounds on which he based it. Friendship is unconditionally the highest of earthly goods. It is far more important in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and drink. In case of emergency the wise man will not shrink from suffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend.

It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less celebrated than the Pythagorean. There may be an offensive mawkishness and a tendency to weak mutual admiration apparent in the relations of Epicurus to his friends, but of the sincerity of his feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression, that referring to the property of friends, is enough to prove what a high view Epicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he aimed at a higher improvement of his associates.

In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind, benevolent, and genial companion. His teaching, likewise, bears the same impress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting on compassion and forgiveness, and supersedes its own egotism by the maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive. The number of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless, the whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and generous character of its moral teaching. To this trait the Epicurean School owes its greatest importance in history. By its theory of utility it undoubtedly did much harm, partly indicating, partly helping on the moral decline of the classic nations. Still, by drawing man away from the outer world within himself by teaching him to look for happiness in the beautiful type of a cultivated mind content with itself, it contributed quite as much, after a gentler fashion, as Stoicism by its sterner tone, to the development and the extension of a more independent and more universal morality.