SOURCE: Mullen, John D. “Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical: Kierkegaard's Either/Or.” Philosophy Today 23, no. 1/4 (spring 1979): 84-94.

[In the following essay, Mullen questions the usual reading of Either/Or that positions the aesthetic and the ethical as two progressive stages of life.]

INTRODUCTION

In the following paper I would like to call into question what seems to be the accepted way of reading S. Kierkegaard's Either/Or. ([4]) This interpretation can be developed in the following way. First, Either/Or depicts the first two stages of a journey of the spirit similar in logical structure to Hegel's Phenomenology, with the exception of the “leaps” between stages. Second, that the ethical is the second stage and is therefore “closer” to the “final” religious stage than the aesthetic. Third, that since Kierkegaard's own views coincide with (a version of) the religious stage, the views of the ethicist are “closer” to those of Kierkegaard than those of the aesthete and thus Judge William's diagnosis and criticism of A in Either/Or represents the correct (meaning Kierkegaard's) diagnosis and criticism of the aesthetic life. Fifth, that it is unequivocally accurate to claim that the life of the aesthetic is lacking in freedom, spirit, self-discipline, self-knowledge, willed-despair, a concept of good and evil, and a life view.

I believe that each of these five propositions is incorrect. Against these I would place the following. First, Either/Or depicts the most general features of the two life views predominent (in Kierkegaard's mind) in 19th century Europe, and thus the two modes of life from which one would be likely to enter the religious mode. Second, that there is no ranking of the two modes; and in particular, that the ethical is not a stage through which a former aesthete must, will, or even is likely to pass, before realizing the religious. Third, that the Judge's description and criticism of the mode of life of A is not Kierkegaard's. Finally, that it is not unequivocally accurate to describe the life of A in the terms of number five above.

I will argue for the second way of reading Either/Or by first reconstructing in a relatively systematic way the life views of the aesthete and the ethicist. This will bring out the overlooked fact that each is relatively complete unto itself, and isomorphic to the other in the sense that for every major concept and principle of one (e.g., freedom, the necessity to will despair, etc.) there is an analogously functioning concept or principle in the other. This fact has been overlooked partially because the commentators, having accepted the principles of the accepted reading, have allowed Judge William to provide the explication of A's views, rather than constructing the explication directly from A's writings.¹ The existence of this isomorphism shows that the Judge's criticisms of A's life are false from A's point of view, while true from A's point of view if directed at the Judge himself. The explication of the Judge's views will bring out the manner in which his criticisms of A rely upon his Hegelian philosophy rendering it impossible for these criticisms to represent the views of Kierkegaard. This suggests the following conclusion about the place of Either/Or in Kierkegaard's authorship. Kierkegaard was never interested in criticizing ideas as such, but only ideas as functioning in life. He notes in Point of View that the pseudonymous authorship with the addition of Postscript describes two ways of becoming a Christian, “… viz. away from the aesthetical in order to become a Christian … the other way … viz. away from the System, from speculation, etc., in order to become a Christian …”. ([5], p. 42) Either/Or provides the touchstone for this authorship by providing a description of the two staging platforms (not stages) from which one would be likely to enter the religious life. Volume two describes the realization in ordinary life of the principles of Hegelian philosophy, which corresponds also to the ideals of the socially orthodox middle class. Volume one describes the expression in life of the principles of romanticism, which corresponds also to the ideals of the socially disaffected intellectuals of the early 19th century. Kierkegaard was interested in motivating each of these groups to move (directly) to the religious.²

ONE EXAMPLE

Before proceeding, I will illustrate what I have called the accepted reading by reference to just one work, The Narrow Pass by George Price. ([6]) I select Price not because his views are unusual, but precisely because they are not. But I use the book also because it is excellently written, having the unusual virtue of being more than it promises. Price begins his discussion of the stages by making the usual disclaimer that the stages, “are not ascending stages on an inevitably progressive and upward journey—like so many stations to town” ([6], p. 159). And again, “… there is no progressive development from one stage to another—the movement is not by evolution but by choice, by the leap” ([6], p. 159). Both remarks display the ambiguity as to whether Price is denying that the stages are ascending or that the movement is inevitable, or both. It becomes clear in Price's exposition that he is not denying the ascension. He states,

The aesthetic, for example, is the world of the average, healthy minded, naively unreflective person who simply enjoys life as it comes; the ethical is that of a man suddenly aware of the issues beyond the moment … ; the religious … is finally existence at its most authentic level.

([6], p. 159)

Ignoring the content of the descriptions, we are drawn, with the terms ‘suddenly’ and ‘finally’, the clear picture of a movement through the stages. To the question, “What happens to the ‘worlds’ from which a man leaps away? Are they discarded, and made to count for nothing … ?” ([6], p. 159) Price says that Kierkegaard answers it clearly when he says that nothing is ever lost. “For example, the aesthetic as an attitude towards life must inevitably disappear, but the ethical which replaces it does not annihilate its content …” ([6], p. 160) About this, two points. First the word ‘inevitable’ here seems to indicate that the model of the Phenomenology is so firmly entrenched that even the constant references to the “leap” cannot entirely remove its view of necessary movement. More importantly, the view which Price attributes here to Kierkegaard is in fact the view of Judge William which Price correctly references. It is not surprising that the Judge believes that the relation between the aesthetic and the ethical is one of development, since for him there are only two stages and the ethical is the higher. Nor is it surprising that the Judge holds the view that the aesthetic stage is aufgehoben with respect to the ethical, i.e., cancelled yet preserved and uplifted, since the Judge is a representative of the Hegelian position. This suggests how the model of the Phenomenology may have become so entrenched. Once it is accepted, the Judge is used to speak for Kierkegaard, and this further reinforces the model since the Judge is himself a Hegelian. Later in the work Price discusses Johannes De Silentio's treatment of the Abraham-Isaac story as indicating Kierkegaard's view that faith demands the suspension of the ethical. But the views of Judge William and Johannes De Silentio on this issue are contraries; i.e., cannot both be true, though they may both be false. It cannot be true both that the stages can be mediated and that they are so conflicting that one must be suspended to implement the other.

In his specific discussion of the aesthetic stages, Price quotes primarly Judge William; though he never, of course, quotes A in his description of the ethical.³ The discussion of the ethical sphere opens with the following developmental picture.

The individual is on the move. He has chosen despair—and, in doing so, he has chosen himself.

([6], p. 171)

Price is not unaware either of the relation between the Judge's views and those of Hegel or the ultimate inadequacy of the Judge's views in Kierkegaard's eyes. Thus having committed Kierkegaard to the Judge's views by allowing the latter to speak for the former, Price has real difficulties. He attempts a resolution by stating that, concerning the views of Judge William,

Kierkegaard is in agreement with them all—so far as they go—for he analyses them and develops them in many interesting directions. But the entire exposition is so directed that it becomes a ghastly reductio ad absurdum of all ethics. Fear and Trembling, although an extreme example, shows us clearly how he works.

([6], p. 179)

This indicates the problem Price has gotten into by having Judge William speak for Kierkegaard; for he has Kierkegaard embracing a view on which he is performing a reductio. I think that these difficulties could have been avoided had Price, who is an excellent commentator, heeded the statement of one equally accomplished, Johannes Climacus, who states about Either/Or, “there is no didacticism in the books … There is not even a conviction that is communicated.” ([2], p. 228) Climacus is referring, of course, to direct communication.

THE AESTHETIC LIFE VIEW

Kierkegaard received his model for the aesthetic life view from his extensive reading in German, French and English romantic literature.⁴ Romantic personalities abound in Either/Or, the Wandering Jew, Don Juan, Faust, Nero, Byron, the Noble Outlaw; as do the themes of romanticism, the death wish, the betrayed virgin, disdain for orthodox virtue and for the ‘herd’, pain as a necessary concomitant of pleasure, rejection of rationalism, despair as one's individuation from the herd; and finally the romantic character traits, melancholic, cynical, witty, introspective, sentimental, bored, resigned, sceptical, imaginative, clever, and so on. As a character the romantic was the outsider; too intelligent, too sensitive, and/or too proud to submit to orthodoxy. He was the defiant one. The character of A is an attempt to distill these various and often contradictory personalities, themes, and emotions into one life view. Kierkegaard does not describe this view, he shows it through a character. As method it is artistic rather than philosophical, indirect rather than direct. This is the meaning of his use of the term ‘aesthetic’ to describe his pseudonymous works (with Postscript as a partial exception).

As any philosopher knows a life view will include at least a metaphysics, describing in some general way the structures of existence. As a corollary there will be a discussion of man's relation to the rest of existence which includes some account of the apparent uniqueness of the human person. There will be implications from this for epistemology concerning the degree of confidence one ought to have in the various methods of attempting to comprehend existence. And of course there will be a value theory providing a general statement of the characteristics of what is worthwhile and what is not (good and evil) as well as more specific claims concerning what types of people and what types of activities are worthwhile and what types are not. It should not be surprising that A's life view is not systematically presented. As with all but systematic philosophers one must dig to find it. When we do, we find that for A existence is not rational or orderly, but rather contains elements of inherent paradox, absurdity, randomness.

There seems to be something wrong with cause and effect also, that they do not rightly hang together. Tremendous and powerful causes sometimes produce small and unimpressive effects, sometimes none at all; then again it happens that a brisk little cause produces a colossal effect.

([1], V.I., p. 25)

and paradox,

There are well known insects which die in the moment of fecundation. So it is with all joy; life's supreme and richest moment of pleasure is coupled with death.

([4], V.I., p. 20)

and again,

“… the melancholy temperament has the greatest comic sense; the most exhuberent is often the most comic sense; the most exhuberent is often the most idyllic; the debauched often the most moral; the doubtful often the most religious.

([4], V.I., p. 20)

After describing the techniques of maintaining an arbitrary life, A notes “the arbitrariness in oneself corresponds to the accidental in the external world.” ([4], V.I., p. 296) This notion of life's structure reflecting the structure of existence is taken up again by A's creation, the Seducer,

Accursed Chance! … unfathomable being, barren mother of all … You whom I love with all my soul, in whose image I mold myself … I shall not overcome you with principles nor with what foolish people call character; no I will be your poet … You who long ago must have wearied of tearing human beings away from what they love … Take me by surprise, I am ready.

([4], V.I., p. 322)

This paradoxical and unpredictable nature of existence renders it futile and foolish to make great plans for oneself,

Alas, the doors of fortune do not open inward, so that by storming them one can force them open; but they open outward, and therefore nothing can be done.

([4], V.I., p. 23)

The metaphysics leads to pessimism (scepticism) not only in the realm of action, but also in the intellectual realm. Such a world could not be readily comprehended.

Ask me whatever questions you please, but do not ask me for reasons … I generally have so many reasons, and most often such mutually contradictory reasons, that for this reason it is impossible for me to give reasons.

([4], V.I., p. 25)

and,

What philosophers say about reality is often as disappointing as a sign you see in a shop window, which reads: Pressing Done Here. If you brought your clothes to be pressed, you would be fooled; for the sign is only for sale.

([4], V.I., p. 31)

Existence is governed by chance and refuses to be neatly summarized either by causal principles or those of the “System”. What distinguishes the human from the non-human is spirit, the power of freedom. The freedom which spirit provides is control over one's existence, not in the realm of action, but in reflection. What A in “Rotation Method” calls the art of remembering and forgetting is the ability to be selective concerning what one brings in and out of consciousness, in order to have control over one's (experienced) world.⁵

Forgetting and remembering are thus identical arts, and the artistic achievement of this identity is the Archimedean point from which one lifts the whole world.

([4], V.I., p. 291)

Such an artist

… is in a position to play at battledore and shuttlecock with the whole of existence. The extent of one's power to forget is the final measure of one's elasticity of spirit.

([4], V.I., p. 290)

For A freedom means the ability to control the manner in which the world is experienced, which for A is equivalent to controlling “the whole of existence”. The type of control is appropriate to the aesthete for whom, “everything is light, beautiful, transitory.” ([4], V.I., p. 363), namely to bandy it about, to play at badminton with existence as the birdie. It is a reflective control, not the control of the man of affairs. The latter is lacking in spirit, lacking in what distinguishes the human.

… every human being who lacks a sense for idleness proves that his consciousness has not yet been elevated to the level of the humane. There is a restless activity which excludes a man from the world of the spirit, setting him in a class with the brutes, whose instincts impel them always to be on the move.

([4], V.I., p. 285)

In exercising the freedom of his “poetic memory” A is creating a thing of beauty of his own life. And he is justified in being what “foolish men of character” would consider fast and loose with “Reality”, because as Schiller says the ideal (beautiful) can only be created if both feeling and imagination remain free and spontaneous, free of both stylistic and ontological restraint. A is an “aesthete” not because he is concerned with feeling, but because the artistic process (as romantically understood) provides him with the model for his life-view. Reality is amorphous, unstructured, and random, as the medium of an art work. Freedom is the control an artist has over his medium. The paradigmatic knower is not the mathematician, scientist, or philosopher, but the poet, for whom existence is an inexhaustible source of possible arrangements depending upon the demands of the moment.

This metaphysics has implications for a theory of value. Existence as so described is not a system of Aristotelian final causes or “immanent teleologies”. Nor is there room for a doctrine of salvation in the Christian mold. No concepts of earthly vocations or divine reunion can constitute the ultimate good for man. Instead A assumes, “… that it is the end and aim of every man to enjoy himself”. ([4], V.I., p. 285) The ultimate evil is enjoyment's opposite, boredom; not pain, of course, since that can and often should be enjoyed. The metaphysics of a life-view must be such as to account for the possibility of evil, i.e., solve “the problem of evil”. For A,

Boredom depends on the nothingness which pervades reality; it causes a dizziness like that produced by looking down a yawning chasm, and this dizziness is infinite.

([4], V.I., p. 287)

What then is it which most generally extinguishes boredom? Not pleasure, of course, since pleasure can and often is boring. It is the “interesting”, which can be achieved in a real sense only once one has despaired.⁶ Despair of what? Despair of the possibility of earthly salvation through the world of affairs.

Of all the ridiculous things, it seems to me the most ridiculous is to be a busy man of affairs, prompt to meals, and prompt to work … What do they accomplish, these hustlers? Are they not like the housewife, when her house was on fire, who in her excitement saved the fire-tongs? What more do they save from the great fire of life?

([4], V.I., p. 24)

and so,

It is impossible to live artistically before one has made up one's mind to abandon hope … Hope was one of the dubious gifts of Prometheus; instead of giving men foreknowledge of the immortals, he gave them hope.

([4], V.I., p. 288)

Having despaired, one can practice the “principle of limitation” which is, “the only saving principle in the world.” ([4], V.I., p. 288) It advocates the use of self-discipline and the freedom of poetic memory to create singularly intensive experiences. This practice distinguishes the artist from the bungler, Johannes the Seducer from Don Juan, the aesthete from the man of affairs who are always busy and,

… are precisely on this account the most tiresome … this species of animal life … like all lower forms of life … is marked by a high degree of fertility, and multiplies endlessly.

([4], V.I., p. 284)

Keeping busy, changing diversions, is an extensive method. It cannot escape boredom and, “needs to be supported by illusion.” ([4], V.I., p. 287) To have not despaired is to lack self-knowledge, it is to lack “transparency to oneself”. Only self deception can maintain one in “busy-ness”.

The principles of limitation and poetic memory are practiced by A in constructing the Diary which is a poetic construction of A's relationship(s) to women. Johannes has a,

… poetic temperament which, we might say, is not rich enough, or, perhaps, not poor enough, to distinguish poetry and reality from one another.

([4], V.I., p. 301)

and

His life had been an attempt to realize the task of living poetically. With a keenly developed talent for discerning the interesting in life, he constantly reproduced the experience more or less poetically. His Diary is therefore neither historically exact nor simple fiction, not indicative but subjunctive.

([4], V.I., p. 300)

Let us then summarize A's life view. For A existence is random, amorphous, and unpredictable. Man's ability to comprehend it according to traditional epistemological models is exceedingly limited. Thus it is the imaginative construction of the poet not the naive realism of the scientist which supplies the epistemological paradigm. And it is this power of imaginative construction which provides for freedom, the elasticity of spirit which separates out the human. The purpose of life is to escape the greatest of all evils, boredom. The fool attempts this through busy-ness and diversion. The aesthete has the self-knowledge to recognize boredom, the courage to despair, the craft to practice poetic memory, and the self-discipline to implement the principle of limitation. In this way, the aesthete creates a work of beauty of his own existence, and is saved.

THE ETHICAL LIFE VIEW

The ethical life view is represented by Judge William, who notes of himself,

I sacrifice myself for my profession, my wife, my children, or, more properly expressed, I do not sacrifice myself for them, but I find in them my satisfaction and joy.

([4], V.II, p. 174)

He is the successful man of affairs, the backbone of society, apologist of orthodoxy, of marriage, family, friendship, hard work and self-sacrifice. He is the ideal of bourgeois values. His life view is more easily discerned than that of A.

Compared to A the Judge is, in the most general sense, a rationalist. Existence, with the one exception of individual human action, is governed by necessity, and here philosophy (not poetry) is appropriate.

The spheres with which philosophy properly deals, which properly are the spheres of thought, are logic, nature, and history. Here necessity rules …

([4], V.II, p. 178)

Concerning poetry and art, “… they provide only an imperfect reconciliation with life … when you fix your gaze upon poetry and art you are not beholding reality”. ([4], V.II, p. 277) All areas except individual choice are law-governed and predictable. In these areas certainty can be achieved. “In the act of thinking, my relation to the thing thought is one of necessity …” ([4], V.II, p. 227) In fact the Judge has no quarrel with “philosophy” (Hegel) when it says, “the absolute is for the fact that I think it,” nor with the emendation which philosophy adds in order to eliminate any freedom on the part of the thinker to think what he will, “… to wit, that my thinking of the absolute is the self-thinking of the absolute in me”. ([4], V.II, p. 228) He insists only that an exception be made for the distinction between good and evil, which can never be either discovered nor created by thinking, but only by will (freedom). Freedom, is then for Judge William, the individuating characteristic of the human person. Spirit is the human power of freedom; thus where there is no fredom there is no spirit. This is true, on the Judge's view, of the aesthetic life, “… within the aesthetic domain … spirit is not determined as spirit but is immediately determined.” ([4], V.II, p. 185)

What kind of freedom does spirit bring? Not, as has been noted, the freedom to imaginatively construct (think) existence as one will; rather it is the freedom to choose one's self. The concept of self-choice takes on meaning only within the framework of Judge William's metaphysics which contains,

The ethical thesis that every man has a calling … [which] … is the expression for the fact that there is a rational ordering of things in which every man, if he will, fills his place in such a way that he expresses at once the universal—human and the individual.

([4], V.II, p. 297)

Put in another way,

The individual has his teleology in himself … His self is the goal toward which he strives … [however] … In the movement toward himself the individual cannot relate himself negatively toward his environment … His self must be open in due relation to his entire concretion.

([4], V.II, p. 179)

To choose oneself does not, then, mean to create oneself. It means rather to commit oneself to becoming the person which the “rational ordering of things” has determined that one should be. Self-choice means self-acceptance; the acceptance of, in Greek terms, one's moira. Having accepted one's place, it becomes one's task to develop this “ethically planned” self.

The aim of his activity is himself, but not as arbitrarily determined, for he has himself as a task which is set for him … a concrete self which stands in reciprocal relations with these surroundings, these conditions of life, this natural order. This self which is the aim is not merely a personal self but a social, a civic self.

([4], V.II, p. 267)

Thus man's freedom lies not in deciding who he is to be, or in creating a place for himself in the natural order, it lies rather in the ability to accept (or not) one's place and carry out (or not) the duties assigned to it. Of course, if one's acceptance is true, the duties will appear not as external prohibitions, but as flowing directly from one's personality. There will thus be a mediated harmony between the universal (duty connected with one's place as determined by the natural order) and the particular (the natural inclinations of the individual person). The Judge has achieved this mediation which is why he is able, as we saw, to receive fulfillment through self-sacrifice, to effect self development through self denial.

But before one is able to choose oneself, it is necessary to despair, to choose despair. This is the active choice to give up hope in the aesthetic life, the life of defiance, of attempted self-creation which is, in the Judge's eyes, the life of flight from one's self. To will despair is to stop running from one's self, one's place, it is resignation.

Here again is manifest the importance of willing one's despair, of willing in an infinite sense, in an absolute sense, for such willing is identical with absolute resignation.

([4], V.II, p. 225)

This, of course, requires courage. Put at the moment of self-choice … “he is most thoroughly absorbed in the root by which he is connected with the whole.” ([4], V.II, p. 220) Having despaired, courageously resigned himself, that is, chosen himself, his life can be transformed into a thing of beauty. For if, as Kant says, the work of art displays purposiveness without purpose, is the result of rule governed activity freely chosen for its own sake, the man who has freely chosen to develop his “ethically planned” telos creates a work of art of his life. His life,

… is a work of freedom, but at the same time it is immanent teleology, and hence it is here only that there can be any question of beauty.

([4], V.II, p. 279)

Let us then summarize the life view of the ethicist. For Judge William existence is orderly and (with one exception) predictable. Man's ability to comprehend it with clarity and certainty is secure. The “System” provides the model of ideal knowledge in all but the realm of individual freedom. It is this freedom of (self) choice, elasticity of spirit, which separates out the human. The greatest good is to become oneself, to freely take one's place in the natural order. This takes concrete form in the exercise of the “civic virtues”, of marriage, friendship, and vocation. The greatest evil is to not become oneself. The ethicist has the self-knowledge to recognize his place, the courage to despair, and the self-discipline to live out his immanent teleology. In this way the ethicist creates a work of art out of his own existence, and is saved.

COMMENTS

It should be clear from this characterization of Judge William's life view that, for all his criticism of Hegel, he is in fact the embodiment of Hegelianism in the practical realm. His rationalist notions of a natural order; his organic concept of natural place; his historicism; his view of the ethical person as the mediation of universal and particular; his belief in the possibility of a life of harmony within oneself, between persons, between ethics and religion; and his views concerning the necessary relation between thought and being are, when taken in concert, a direct expression of Hegelianism. More importantly for this argument, they are all views which were inimical to Kierkegaard, every bit as inimical as those of the aesthete.

It should be clear also that although it is true from the point of view Judge William that, as he charges, A did not choose, was not free, lacked spirit, was not transparent to himself, did not will despair, and had no life view, it is equally true that from A's point of view these charges are false. And further, from A's point of view the charges are true when directed against the Judge. It is for this reason that the Judge's charges are not unequivocably true. But neither set of charges correspond to the thought of Kierkegaard because, just as the significance of the terms involved differs radically according to whether the terms emanate from the views of A or the Judge, so they will differ radically when expressed by Kierkegaard. For example it may sound Kierkegaardian for the Judge to counsel A to choose himself. But when we see that what the Judge means is that A resign himself to his natural place to be personally fulfilled through the “civic virtues” of friendship, marriage and vocation, we know this is not Søren speaking. It may sound Kierkegaardian for the Judge to charge that A is not transparent to himself. But when we see that what the Judge means is that A does not know what his place is within the natural (including civic and social) order, we know this is not Søren speaking. Finally it may sound Kierkegardian when the Judge advocates resignation. But when we are reminded that this is not the resignation of reason through faith but the acceptance of one's ethically planned self the details of which we are certain, we know that this is not Søren speaking. The point is, then, that the content of the Judge's diagnosis of A's malady as well as the recommended treatment are inextricably bound up with his Hegelianism while simultaneously expressing the ideals of bourgeois existence. For each of these reasons he was unable to represent Kierkegaard.

One may be tempted to argue that even though the Judge's diagnosis and recommended treatment for aestheticism does not represent Kierkegaard, the aesthete must still become an ethicist before becoming a Christian. But given the above characterization of aestheticism, this view is untenable. A is a distillation of the many varieties of romantic sufferers. To argue the thesis that the Christian must first have been an ethicist would be to have Kierkegaard proposing the ludicrous view that had Lord Byron become a Christian, he would first have had to become a tax assessor (or at least a Tory).

Perhaps one would argue finally the even weaker thesis that although the aesthete may become “directly” a Christian, the ethical is still “closer” in the sense that the ethicist is better prepared for Christianity. This is to argue that had Lord Byron become a tax assessor it would have been an easier “leap” to Christianity. There is nothing in Kierkegaard that would support this view. In fact, of course, a better case could be made for the opposite. There are elements of the aesthetic life which are preparatory for (Kierkegaard's) Christianity, e.g., the acceptance of paradox, suspicion of reason, the view that in existence all things are possible, the extreme individualism, etc., but this will not be pursued.

In conclusion, I believe that it has been shown that the five principles which constitute the accepted reading of Either/Or are incorrect, and further that it is more correct to substitute the five alternative principles. A corollary of this argument is that when considering such topics as Kierkegaard's concept of the self, Kierkegaard's ethics, etc., one is not at liberty to borrow from the views of Judge William, without making adjustments for the fact that these are not the views of Kierkegaard. This principle is violated continually in the Kierkegaard literature.⁷

Notes

1. There is an interesting parallel between this situation and the tradition of relying solely upon the comments of Plato for a characterization of the Sophists.

2. I will not discuss the autobiographical elements of Either/Or, or its place in Kierkegaard's personal development. These topics can and should be dealt with separately.

3. For A's views of the ethical, see below.

4. For a discussion of this reading see T. H. Croxall's introduction to [3].

5. The parallel with Freud's concept of repression, when properly understood as a technique of self-deception, is striking.

6. It is difficult to miss the similarity between A's life-view and certain post-war forms of existential philosophy.

7. See for example the two fine articles, [1] and [7].

Bibliographical References

[1] P. Dietrichson. “Kierkegaard's Concept of the Self,” Inquiry 8, 1965, 1-33.

[2] S. Kierkegaard. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941.

[3] ———De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1958.

[4] ———Either/Or V. I and II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

[5] ———Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

[6] G. Price. The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaard's Concept of Man. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. 1963.

[7] S. Schrader. “Kant and Kierkegaard on Duty and Inclination,” in J. Thompson (ed.) Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972.