SOURCE: “Democritus,” in Morality and Self-Interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus, E. J. Brill, 1985, pp. 75-91.

[In the following excerpt, Nill examines Democritus's moral theory, particularly concerning pleasure and the ability of an individual to attain an ideal state.]

Democritus (c. 460-396 b.c.) was a younger contemporary of Protagoras; both were born in Abdera.¹ Although he had encyclopedic interests and was the author of many works, the 298 fragments ascribed to him in Diels-Kranz are at most all that has survived of his writings.² Almost all of these fragments concern ethical matters. But despite this, Democritus has generally not been known for his moral theory. He has always, and rightly, been considered an important figure in the history of natural philosophy for his theory of atomism.

Commentators on the ethical fragments have often found them to be of little or no philosophical importance³ and have sometimes questioned their authenticity. The issue of whether these fragments are authentic is not important in the context of the present study, which is only interested in these fragments insofar as they represent the views of an early Greek moral theorist concerned with the issue of the compatibility of self-interest and morality. Thus, it would make little difference here whether the fragments be attributed to Democritus or one of his contemporaries, although my own view is that they probably should be assigned to Democritus.⁴ On the other hand, it is a crucial question in the present context whether the fragments have philosophical importance. It is true, of course, that the ethical fragments are written in a style closer to the philosophically unrigorous fragments of Antiphon's On Concord than to those from On Truth. But it cannot be concluded from this fact that they are trivial. On the contrary, the fragments strongly imply that Democritus held moral views which he rigorously argued for. They not only reflect the concerns of the other theorists so far discussed in this study, but also mark an important advance.

A brief glance at several of the fragments provides a useful, preliminary indication of both the focus of Democritus' moral theory and the relationship between his views and those of Protagoras and Antiphon. The following fragment, for example, shows that Democritus shared with Protagoras certain beliefs about the value of nomoi:

Law (nomos) wishes to benefit the life of men. It is able (to do this) whenever men themselves wish to receive benefit. For it shows to men (agents) who obey it, their own particular excellence (idie arete).

(fr. 248)

In this fragment Democritus endorses the view that nomoi are of benefit to men. Indeed, an harmonious political community provides goods which “no one would be able to enumerate” (fr. 255). Nomoi are necessary for harmony in the city (fr. 245); and in fr. 252 he remarks that “the well-run polis is the greatest source of safety and contains all in itself; when this is safe, all is safe, when it is destroyed, all is destroyed.” Democritus thus adopts the Protagorean view that nomoi are a necessary condition for political communities and human survival. In addition, he follows Protagoras in linking nomima kai dikaia (fr. 174) and thus thinks of nomoi in terms of moral requirements.

These views are traditional and Protagorean; but his following remarks suggest that he went well beyond traditional defenses of nomoi:

The one employing exhortation and persuasion of reason (peitho logou) appears stronger in respect to arete than one employing nomos and constraint (ananke). For it is probable that the one who is prevented from injustice by nomos would commit wrong in secret, but it is not likely that the man who is led to what is necessary (deon) by persuasion would do anything discordant (plemmeles). And thus, a man acting rightly through intelligence (synesis) and knowledge becomes at the same time courageous and a man of upright thought.

(fr. 181)

Democritus suggests he has an answer to the escaping-notice problem. There is, he says, some logos which will convince men to act morally on all occasions. Further, to act in this way is to act with intelligence (synesis), that is, with prudence and practical wisdom.⁵ Thus Democritus is claiming that agents have self-interested reasons for acting morally even when they can escape notice in acting. Of course, neither Protagoras nor any other traditional defender of nomoi made such a strong claim. And needless to say, Democritus would not have tried to defend this claim on the basis of Protagorean arguments. In this fragment Democritus implicitly acknowledges the validity of Antiphon's critique of Protagorean views. But insofar as he claims that there is some logos which will convince agents not to do wrong in secret, he rejects Antiphon's conclusion that agents do not always have reasons to act morally.

Fr. 248 (already quoted) gives some indication of how Democritus went about rejecting Antiphon's conclusion. He remarks that nomos shows to agents who obey it their own particular excellence (arete).⁶ That Democritus is thinking of this good (arete) as prudential is made clear by the fact that he mentions it in the context of arguing that observing nomoi is beneficial for agents. In obeying nomoi, agents are shown (promote) their own good. His argument suggests that he responded to Antiphon's claim that moral requirements ought not always be obeyed by arguing that there is some prudential good for persons which is promoted by acting morally.⁷ It appears, then, that the focus of Democritus' moral theory is on the individual and the good for persons. His focus is the same as Antiphon's, but it is a focus which is quite different from Protagoras'.

The fragments and ancient testimony indicate that Democritus saw the good for persons in terms of the attainment of an ideal state or condition. He used a number of different terms to characterize this state. Stobaeus⁸ notes that Democritus characterized this state as eudaimonia, euthymia, euesto, harmonia, symmetria, and ataraxia. Diogenes Laertius⁹ remarks that Democritus gave many names to euthymia, including euesto; and Clement¹⁰ notes the same thing, but adds that Democritus also used the word ‘athambia’ to designate man's end (telos) or ideal state. That most of these words were used by Democritus is confirmed by the extant fragments. ‘Euthymia’ (or cognates) is found, for example, in frr. 3, 174, 189, 191, and 286; ‘symmetria’ in fr. 191; ‘euesto’ (well-being) in fr. 257; ‘eudaimonia’ (happiness) in frr. 170 and 171. Ataraxia is an Epicurean word, and probably should not be attributed to Democritus; however, athambia (imperturbability), a word roughly equivalent to ataraxia in meaning, is found in frr. 215 and 216.

Since the emphasis in the extant fragments is on euthymia, I shall generally confine my discussion to this term. It is, however, a word which is not easy to translate, Traditionally it has meant cheerfulness and this is perhaps the English word which comes closest to Democritus' meaning. But he packs so much into his notion of euthymia that no one-word translation is adequate or particularly helpful. Probably all the terms which Democritus uses for the ideal state refer to different aspects of that state or characterize it from different perspectives.¹¹ But in any case, all of these terms decribe a certain state or condition of the soul (psyche).¹²

Fr. 191 provides a convenient and important overview of Democritus' conception of human good:

Euthymia arises for men from moderation (metriotes) of pleasure and harmoniousness (symmetria) of life. Things in excess or deficiency are apt to change and create disturbances (movements) in the soul. But souls moved by great divergences (diastemata) are not stable, nor do they have euthymia. Accordingly it is necessary to keep one's mind on things possible and find satisfaction in things that are present. … If you no longer desire more [than you have], you cease to suffer in your soul. … Thinking thus, one will expel the not little sources of destruction in life: jealousy, envy, and spite.

This fragment touches on central features of euthymia. One of these is the notion that euthymia requires moderation of pleasure; and there are two components to this notion. First, moderation of pleasure involves the maintenance of overall pleasure in the soul, that is, a proper balance among the various pleasures one accepts.¹³ No pleasure should be admitted into one's soul if it would conflict with one's maintaining a due balance of pleasures (fr. 74). In fr. 72, for example, Democritus remarks that a very strong desire for any one thing blinds the soul to all others, so that the pursuit of any pleasure (or at least the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure) to the exclusion of others is detrimental to one's well-being. Second, moderation of pleasure involves observing the limits of any given pleasure. These limits are fixed by nature; beyond them lie excess and pain: if anyone exceeds due measure, the most pleasant things become most unpleasant (fr. 233). The two senses of moderation of pleasure are related insofar as the pursuit of any given pleasure beyond its proper limit will be incompatible with maintaining a proper balance of pleasures in one's soul.

If one is to maintain euthymia, certain pleasures, according to Democritus, must be pursued with much caution. Among such pleasures are bodily pleasures or pleasures of sensation. In fr. 235 he says,

All who derive their pleasures from the stomach, exceeding what is fitting in eating, drinking, or sexual activity have pleasures that are brief and short-lived; [they have pleasures] only while they are eating and drinking, but pains that are many. For this desire is always present for the same things, and when people get what they desire, the pleasure passes quickly, and they have nothing good for themselves except a brief enjoyment; and then again the need for the same things returns.

One important question to be asked here is why Democritus thinks those who derive pleasures from the senses exceed what is fitting. ‘Exceeding (hyperballein) what is fitting’ recalls Democritus' claim in fr. 191 that things in excess (hyperballonta) create disturbances in the soul. Fr. 235 should be interpreted in light of this claim. Thus, those who derive their pleasures from the senses are those who are constantly confronted by that excess (or deficiency) which causes disturbances in one's soul, for they are constantly desiring more (excess) by virtue of the fact that they are always perceiving themselves to be in a state of deficiency and lack—except for those brief periods when they are actually indulging in pleasures of sensation (or perhaps also for a brief period thereafter). Such persons do not lead lives which are compatible with euthymia. Democritus might be making the point that such persons eat or drink too much on occasions when they eat or drink, but his major point is that they have souls which are (virtually) never at rest, balanced, or in equilibrium. It is primarily in this sense that he thinks of them as exceeding what is fitting. His argument is directed against those who derived pleasure exclusively from sensations.¹⁴ It should be noted that no fragment gives any indication that he thought finding (some) satisfaction in pleasures of sensation is incompatible with the maintenance of euthymia.

In addition to pleasures of sensation, pleasures of external goods like wealth or possessions must also be pursued with much caution. In fr. 219, Democritus notes that

striving after possessions/wealth, if not limited by sufficiency, is far more painful than extreme poverty; for greater desires make for greater needs (endeiai).

There is, of course, virtually no limit to the amount of wealth a person might desire. If a person puts no limit on this desire, then he will forever feel himself in a state of deficiency and pain. His soul will constantly be in a disturbed state; and he will always be desiring more (excess). His situation would be analogous to that of those who restrict their pleasure to bodily sensations; and he is perhaps worse off because he will not even have brief moments of pleasure and satisfaction. As with sensuous pleasure, neither the desire of unlimited wealth nor the exclusive pursuit of it is compatible with euthymia.

This initial discussion makes clear that euthymia requires that one be properly disposed to pleasures. Indeed, the relationship between euthymia and pleasure is a central component of Democritus' theory of human good. This relationship is a complex one and needs to spelled out in considerable detail.

In fr. 188 (= fr. 4), Democritus says the following about pleasure:

Pleasure (terpsis) or the lack of pleasure is the criterion (horos; landmark, sign) for what is advantageous (symphoron) and disadvantageous.

In other words, pleasure is the criterion for euthymia or the ideal state for man. On the other hand, Democritus prescribes the following in fr. 74:

Accept nothing which is pleasant (hedu) unless it is advantageous.

As has often been noted, there is an apparent discrepancy between the two fragments; for if some pleasures are not advantageous (fr. 74), then pleasure cannot be the criterion for advantage (fr. 188). Some commentators have argued that Democritus distinguished between higher and lower pleasures and that he saw the good for persons primarily in terms of higher pleasures.¹⁵ Higher pleasures are intellectual and spiritual pleasures; lower pleasures include bodily pleasures and pleasures derived from external goods. This interpretation provides one way in which the apparent discrepancy in the above two fragments can be reconciled. Higher pleasures alone are the criterion for advantage (fr. 188), while there are lower pleasures which are not (or may not be) advantageous (fr. 74).¹⁶

Support for this interpretation has been seen in those fragments which are thought to indicate a negative view of so-called lower pleasures. For example, in fr. 40 he remarks that men find happiness (eudaimonia) neither through the body nor through possessions (cf. frr. 171, 214, 235). In addition, Democritus claims that things of the soul are superior to the body (e.g., frr. 37, 187, 189); and he sometimes speaks of this superiority in terms of the superiority of the divine over the human (mortal) (e.g., fr. 37; cf. fr. 189).¹⁷ Hence, it might he thought that for Democritus true pleasure, that pleasure which is the criterion for advantage, is exclusively intellectual and spiritual.

This interpretation would make Democritus' theory quite advanced: his conception of the good for persons would be completely internalized; that is, not only would euthymia itself be an inner good, but also the pleasures which promote it would be essentially inner, spiritual ones. On this interpretation, bodily and external goods would be valuable only insofar as they make possible the attainment of euthymia and the pursuit of, say, intellectual pleasures.

However, I do not think Democritus held any such view.¹⁸ No ancient source attributes this view to him, and the extant fragments hardly even mention intellectual pleasures.¹⁹ More importantly, there are claims in the fragments which indicate that Democritus did not think of intellectual pleasures as the criterion for advantage. To begin with, I would suggest that his notion that euthymia is brought about by moderation of pleasure indicates that in large part he saw the proper acceptance of bodily pleasures and pleasures derived from external goods as that what brings euthymia about. It is, after all, these pleasures which are normally and rightly thought to require moderation. It would simply not be relevant or appropriate to talk about euthymia as a state brought about by moderation of pleasure, if the pleasure in question is intellectual. Intellectual pleasures are such that one does not need to be advised to pursue them moderately except, of course, when one is pursuing them to such an extent that one is neglecting survival needs.²⁰

Of course, it might be thought that moderation of pleasure means that one must be moderate when indulging in the lower pleasures in order to make euthymia and the successful pursuit of higher pleasures possible. No fragment, however, implies that Democritus held such a view. And there are strong reasons for not attributing this view to him. For one thing, lower pleasures would then be a mere means to other, higher ones. This would be difficult to reconcile with Democritus' obvious interest in lower pleasures as such and with his obvious concern for showing how they can be maximized. As he says in fr. 211, moderation increases pleasures (see also fr. 233).²¹

Indeed, to attribute to Democritus this view is to miss a prominent feature of his theory. He is emphatic in his belief that all the things in the world are good and that the goods of the world are only turned into evils as a result of an improper disposition to them. In fr. 175 he says:

The gods are the givers of all good things, both in the past and now. They are not, however, the givers of things which are bad, harmful or non-beneficial, either in the past or now, but men fall into these through blindness of mind and lack of sense.

And in fr. 173 he remarks that evil comes out of good if one does not know how to ‘guide’ and ‘drive’ correctly. Surely the goods in question would include bodily and external goods, as Democritus makes clear in fr. 77: “Fame and wealth without intelligence are dangerous possessions.” This implies, of course, that fame and wealth, if made use of with intelligence, would be goods. The wealth which is at issue in fr. 77 is clearly substantial and well above that level which could be described as ‘moderate’.²² Frr. 229, 279, 280, 285, 286 all assert or imply that at least a moderate amount of wealth is a good for persons.

Democritus' emphatic belief that the things of the world are good strongly suggests that (1) he did not see the goods of the world as a mere means to higher, intellectual pleasures and (2) he saw the good for persons to lie in the proper acceptance of all pleasures and goods without distinction as to whether they are higher or lower ones.²³ It is not certain kinds of pleasures that are to be shunned, but the improper acceptance or pursuit of any given pleasure. For example, excessive eating or exclusive attention to eating would turn the good of eating into an evil. Indeed, it is Democritus' view that any good can be turned into an evil if one's use of it or desire for it is at odds with euthymia.

Thus, when he claims in fr. 74 that one should not accept any pleasure which is not advantageous, he is claiming that a person should not accept any given pleasure (1) if it is incompatible with the maintenance of an overall balance of pleasures in his soul, (2) if he already has his fill of that pleasure and further indulgence would involve excess, or (3) if the pursuit of that pleasure would create disturbances in the soul. Accepting or pursuing any given pleasure under any of these conditions would result in more pain than pleasure. On this interpretation, fr. 74 would be entirely consistent with fr. 188 where pleasure is viewed as the criterion for advantage.²⁴ Those fragments which appear to take a negative view of so-called lower pleasures are best interpreted as a warning that such pleasures are to be pursued with caution if one is to attain euthymia. And those fragments which assert the superiority of the soul over the body and external goods should be understood as expressions of the view that what makes for the good life is not bodily or external goods in themselves, but a proper pattern of pleasures in the soul, a soul that has a proper disposition to pleasures, and a soul which has properly controlled desires.

Democritus did not completely internalize the good for persons. Although he internalized it to a great extent inasmuch as euthymia is an inner good, the properly accepted pleasures which produce this inner good would be, at least for most men, primarily non-inner ones. In addition, euthymia involves the active, albeit proper, acceptance of pleasures. As Taylor correctly argues, euthymia is not to be understood as mere tranquility or freedom from fear and anxiety.²⁵ “They are fools,” claims Democritus, “who live without enjoyment of life” (fr. 200); “life without festival is like a long road without an inn” (fr. 230).

However, this interpretation of euthymia as the active, proper acceptance of pleasures raises the crucial question of whether the good life depends, in any important sense, on the quantity of the particular pleasures one accepts, whether, for example, the good life depends on having more, rather than less pleasure-producing goods like wealth. An answer to this question is crucial for determining Democritus' conception of human good; for if the good life depends in any important sense on the quantity of pleasures properly accepted, one is going to lead a quite different life than one would lead otherwise. However, to answer this question, it will first be necessary to spell out two notions found in Democritus' important sketch of euthymia in fr. 191 (quoted above on p. 77): (1) euthymia involves attending to and finding satisfaction in things which are possible and (2) euthymia involves finding satsifaction with things that are present and at hand. Democritus does not appear to acknowledge the distinction between these two notions; but as we shall see, they do not come to the same thing.

Democritus' first notion that one ought to restrict one's desires to things which are possible is not an expression of the truism that one ought not to pursue things that are impossible to obtain.²⁶ This point is made clear in fr. 3 where he contrasts things that are possible with (good) fortune (tyche, chance) which leads men on to more (es to pleon, excess) by (false) seeming. He remarks that one ought to discount or rate low the presence of good fortune and not reach for more than is possible since fullness is safer than “overfullness.” In part, Democritus is pointing out that good fortune (abundant wealth, for example) has a tendency to cause one to be overconfident and attempt things beyond one's reach. But more importantly, he is drawing attention to the problematic nature of (good) tyche. Whether or not one attains good fortune is a matter of chance and does not, in an important sense, depend on one's own actions. “Tyche is a giver of great gifts, but it is unreliable; on the other hand, physis is self-sufficient and it thus conquers by its smaller power the greater promise of hope” (fr. 176; cf. fr. 210). “Fools,” says Democritus, “are shaped by the gifts of tyche …” (fr. 197).

Democritus' position is not that one ought to reject good fortune or that abundant wealth is necessarily incompatible with euthymia, but rather that it is incompatible with euthymia to pursue good fortune or to rely on retaining it. Attempting to pursue it would involve having great desires, that is, desires for a great amount of external goods (frr. 284, 219). Given the realities of life, the desire for good fortune will more likely than not be frustrated and will create disturbances in one's soul. But the wise man who acts in accord with the first notion of euthymia restricts his desires to goods which are normally obtainable by his own efforts and not a matter of chance. Such a man would, for example, desire and pursue the attainment of a ‘moderate’ amount of wealth (fr. 285).²⁷

However, Democritus' second notion, the notion that a man with euthymia finds satisfaction in things which are present (fr. 191), would seem to involve a stronger claim. That is, he would seem to be claiming that euthymia involves the absence of any desire to increase one's goods (that is, any or all goods which produce pleasures that can be components of a proper balance of pleasures in a man with euthymia). In fr. 191, he specifically cautions against thinking about things which are envied and admired; rather, one should think of those in distress; for by doing so, one's own condition seems great and enviable. In fr. 224, he argues that the desire for more than one has destroys the good that one has at present. And in fr. 231, he claims that the right-minded man is one who is not grieved by what he does not have, but enjoys what he has (cf. fr. 202). This view of euthymia would be most accurately described as contentment: euthymia would consist of finding satisfaction in what one has, regardless of what that might be. In such a state one would experience no deficiency or excess; one's soul would be without disturbances or even movements. Democritus seems to think that (virtually) no one needs to desire and pursue more than he has: “The things needed by the body are available to all without toil and trouble; but the things which require toil and trouble and which make life disagreeable are not desired by the body, but by the ill-constitution of the mind” (fr. 223). In other words, the bodily and external goods necessary for a pleasant and good life are (normally) present to everyone. It would seem, then, that euthymia is compatible with a minimal level of goods and wealth. Indeed, Democritus suggests that living one's life with only minimal goods is not necessarily to live in a condition of poverty. Whether one lives in poverty or not is, in large part, a product of one's outlook and desires; as he notes in fr. 284, small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. Poverty and wealth are terms for lack and sufficiency (fr. 283); one lives in poverty when one thinks one has insufficient wealth.

The above discussion suggests that there is a tension in Democritus' view of euthymia. On the one hand, when euthymia is seen as involving satisfaction with things that one has at present, it involves contentment and the complete absence of desire to increase one's goods. A person with this kind of euthymia would always experience fullness, regardless of what possessions or level of wealth he happens to have. On the other hand, when euthymia is seen in terms of pursuing and finding satisfaction in things which are possible to obtain by one's own efforts, it is compatible with some dissatisfaction with one's current good. And thus on this view, euthymia would be (sometimes) compatible with desiring and pursuing an increase of goods. This tension has serious implications for the earlier-posed question of whether the good life ever depends, in any important sense, on the quantity of pleasures one accepts or on the quantity of pleasure-producing goods one has.

The first thing to be noted is that the good life cannot depend solely on the quantity of pleasures since a balance of pleasures in the soul would not necessarily be produced by maximizing the quantity of any particular pleasure or by maximizing the number of one's pleasures. However, quantity of pleasures does affect, to some extent, the degree to which one possesses the good life.

This is best seen by looking again at Democritus' view of wealth. On the one hand, he argues that poverty is compatible with euthymia or human good on grounds that one can find satisfaction in things at hand and that small appetite makes poverty the equivalent of wealth. But on the other hand, he remarks in fr. 291, for example, that it is a mark of a man with sophrosyne to bear poverty well. The clear implication of this fragment is that poverty is not a desirable condition to be in although, of course, it is compatible with euthymia. And given, as we have seen, that levels of wealth above or perhaps even substantially above the poverty level are compatible with euthymia, it would appear that Democritus would agree with the following: X, a man who has euthymia and a level of wealth above the level of poverty is objectively better off than Y, a man who has euthymia and who lives in poverty. And thus either (1) X has realized a higher degree of euthymia (human good) than Y or (2) X and Y possess an equal amount of euthymia, but X possesses a greater amount of human good. On the second view, euthymia would be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for (maximum) human good. But on either view, the degree to which X and Y possess human good is partly dependent on the quantity of pleasure-producing goods they have.

The upshot of this discussion is that Democritus is committed to the view that those who find the pleasures of wealth and possessions important would ordinarily be objectively better off if they had more wealth than they currently possess provided the possession of it be compatible with euthymia. But the fact that Democritus is committed to this view does not mean that he is committed to the view that these people would be subjectively better off if they had more wealth or that they would be better off in any sense if they pursued it. Whether he is committed to this further consequence depends on which view of euthymia is adopted. On the view of euthymia as complete satisfaction with things one has presently, one would not be subjectively better off with more wealth since one's level of wealth—whatever it may be—should be experienced as fullness. Nor would one be better off in any sense desiring and pursuing more wealth. However, on the view of euthymia as satisfaction with things possible to obtain by one's own efforts, people who find the pleasures of wealth important would, at least in some cases, be subjectively better off with more wealth. If euthymia is compatible with some dissatisfaction with their current goods, such people would be subjectively better off possessing the increase of goods they desire so long as the pursuit of it is compatible with maintaining euthymia. In fr. 243 Democritus endorses the desires and pursuits of these people when he remarks that toil is more pleasant than rest when men attain that for which they labor or know that they will attain it.

In discussing Democritus' conception of the good for persons, I have focused on his attitude toward wealth (possessions) because it is a traditional good which many people pursue and because the way one spells out the relationship between wealth and the good for persons has direct bearing on the question of whether morality and self-interest are compatible. The tension in Democritus' view of wealth is, at bottom, caused by the fact that he did not completely internalize man's good: while euthymia, the good for persons, is an inner good, the pleasures which bring it about are for most men largely non-inner. That Democritus largely internalized man's good marks a significant advance over Antiphon and Protagoras; and thus when viewed from an historical perspective, the kind of tension which exists in Democritus' view of wealth is readily explicable and understandable. Less understandable, however, is the tension in his notion of euthymia; but we can perhaps account for it in the following way: On the one hand, his view of euthymia as complete satisfaction would seem to be prompted by (1) his belief that dissatisfaction is at the heart of much individual unhappiness and social unrest and (2) his interest in showing that poverty does not preclude happiness. On the other hand, his view of euthymia as compatible with some dissatisfaction would seem to be prompted by his belief that the goods of the world are a good for persons and hence worthwhile pursuing.

My analysis thus far has been concerned with the self-regarding actions an agent must perform if he is to attain euthymia. What remains to be done now is (1) to confirm the thesis that on Democritus's view, self-interest is compatible with and promoted by the other-regarding behavior required by morality and (2) to determine how Democritus justified that view.

As for (1), the fragments clearly show that Democritus believed morality and self-interest compatible. In fr. 174, for example, he remarks that

the cheerful man (euthymos), impelled to acts that are just and lawful (dikaia kai nomima), rejoices day and night and is strong and free from troubles. But the one who is neglectful of justice and does not do what he ought to do, all such things are distressful to him whenever he remembers them, and he is fearful and reproaches himself.

The man with euthymia, then, is happy (partly) because he obeys nomima kai dikaia; disregard for nomoi, on the other hand, leads to pain and, presumably, the loss of euthymia. Thus Democritus is claiming not only that moral requirements and self-interest (euthymia) are compatible, but also that acting morally is a necessary condition for euthymia and happiness.

Further, in fr. 181 (quoted above on p. 76) he argues that men will (likely) act morally—even when they can act in secret—if they have been persuaded by reason (logos), that is, if they have knowledge and understanding or intelligence (synesis). Conversely, “the cause of wrongdoing (hamartia) is ignorance of what is better” (fr. 83).²⁸ The fragments as a whole emphasize the importance of intelligence and understanding for determining how to maximize one's self-interest. For example, he remarks in fr. 77 that fame and wealth are not safe possessions without intelligence (synesis, the same word as used in fr. 181).²⁹ That is, they are dangerous possessions if one does not have the practical wisdom and prudential good sense to use them properly in promoting self-interest. Thus when Democritus says that one will (likely) act morally when one has knowledge and intelligence (fr. 181), he is claiming that those who know what is in their true self-interest will (likely) act morally even when they can act in secret.

However, it is in fr. 45 where he indicates just how strongly he is committed to the view that moral action is in one's self-interest: “The one who commits an injustice is more unhappy than the one who suffers an injustice.” Democritus claims here that committing an injustice does more harm to one's soul and is more at odds with one's self-interest than suffering an injustice. This claim strongly endorses the view that acting justly benefits agents. Indeed, Democritus may have been the first to make this claim in Ancient Greece although, of course, he may have been preceded by Socrates. Moreover, given that the question of compatibility of morality and self-interest was such a controversial issue among Democritus' contemporaries, the fact that he makes such a strong claim suggests that he thought he could provide a substantive defense for it.³⁰

Scholars generally have not addressed the issue of the compatibility of morality and euthymia although Colvin and Irwin have recently given it some attention. Colvin correctly sees that Democritus needs an argument to refute the view that it is beneficial to act unjustly in secret, and he also correctly sees that the best argument would show that a wrongdoer is more harmed than the wronged (fr. 45).³¹ However, he finds no evidence of such an argument in the fragments and concludes that Democritus made his claim in fr. 45 without the Socratic elenchus to back it up. Irwin, on the other hand, does think that Democritus presented an argument and that it is very close to the one employed by Socrates; but he adds that Democritus' and Socrates' arguments are open to the same objections.³² In essence, he thinks Democritus argued in the following way: (1) The best condition of the soul is undisturbed harmony (fr. 191); (2) harmony requires (practical) wisdom to prevent disturbances in the soul (fr. 31); (3) wisdom requires temperance (sophrosyne) in order to avoid the distress caused by greedy and intemperate desires; (4) justice and temperance prohibit acting upon greedy and intemperate desires; and thus (5) it is advantageous for agents to observe the requirements of morality.

Irwin is on the right track, I think, in suggesting that Democritus, like Socrates/Plato, attempted to justify acting justly on grounds of the intrinsic benefits of just action, that is, on grounds that acting justly in itself benefits an agent's soul. And it is certainly plausible to hold that Democritus could have argued in a way similar to the one Irwin has suggested. Democritus did believe that one's true interest lies in maintaining a harmonious condition of the soul and that this condition can only be attained by practicing temperance and by placing strict control on one's desires and one's pursuit of pleasure. And it is obvious that in many cases the temperance necessary for euthymia will require one to regard the interests of others.

But as Irwin points out, there is an obvious and serious shortcoming in the argument he attributes to Democritus; that is, the argument does not show why the moral arete of temperance which prescribes temperate behavior towards others and regard for their interests is always compatible with the prudential arete of temperance by which an agent controls his desires in order to pursue successfully his rational aims and attain harmony in his soul. Say, for example, that someone has the rational aim of attending college, an aim that is compatible with euthymia. And say further that in attempting to procure the money to attend college, he practices the self-regarding arete of temperance so that his desires do not conflict with his pursuit of procuring the money he needs. The argument Irwin attributes to Democritus would not show that this person would necessarily be acting contrary to the self-regarding temperance required for euthymia if he stole the money which he needed. This, of course, is the very issue raised by Socrates when he asks Protagoras whether it is possible to exercise (self-regarding) temperance in committing an injustice (Protagoras 333b-c).³³ On the basis of the argument Irwin attributes to Democritus, Democritus would not able to provide a negative answer to Socrates' question. However, if Democritus did use this argument, it would only have been one of the arguments he used. And it seems to me that Irwin is mistaken to model Democritus' defense of acting justly so closely on the one used by Socrates.³⁴ Democritus' defense is both stronger and more complex than Irwin maintains.

Democritus' strongest argument for the intrinsic benefits of acting justly focuses more on the need to avoid jealousy and envy than on the need to practice temperance. In fr. 245 he argues as follows:

Nomoi would not prevent each individual from living according to his own inclination (exousia; power, authority) if individuals did not harm each other; for jealousy (phthonos) creates the beginning of strife (stasis).

I take this fragment to mean that nomoi would not be established to prevent men from acting on their own inclination if men were not inclined to harm each other. On Democritus' view then, men harm each other if left to their own devices because they act from reasons of jealousy. Nomoi are created and designed to prevent this; in other words, nomoi embody prescriptions prohibiting jealous behavior.

Clearly the views of Democritus about the role of nomoi differ significantly from those of Protagoras. The latter had argued that justice and nomoi are good and necessary insofar as they prevent injury and secure the existence of political communities. Although, of course, Democritus would agree with Protagoras' position, he primarily sees the good of nomoi in terms of human psychology and the good for persons (agents). It is this shift in focus which allows Democritus to argue for the view—as Protagoras could not—that agents have sufficient reasons to obey the laws in all circumstances.

The crux of Democritus' argument lies in his appeal to the notion that jealousy is incompatible with euthymia. In fr. 88, he remarks that the jealous or envious man grieves (torments) himself as if an enemy. In other words, being jealous of the goods and happiness of others makes one hate oneself and be dissatisfied with one's present goods. Jealousy, as it were, makes one an enemy to oneself. And just as jealousy creates strife in a political community (fr. 245), so it creates strife in one's soul. In fr. 191, Democritus says that if one dwells on goods that are present to oneself, one promotes euthymia and expels destructive elements in life like envy, jealousy, and spite. He also makes the point in this fragment that dwelling on the goods of others incites one to act contrary to the laws. Democritus' argument, then, for the view that acting justly in itself benefits agents is as follows:

• (1) Nomoi embody prescriptions prohibiting jealous action
• (2) Acting jealously is contrary to one's self-interest
• (3) Therefore, it is disadvantageous for agents to disobey nomoi and disregard the interests of others.

Conversely, it will be advantageous for agents to regard moral requirements because such action promotes non-jealous action and satisfaction with oneself and one's condition.

Democritus' argument has considerable strengths, and certainly it is stronger than the one Irwin attributes to him. However, it rests on the assumption that all unjust actions are ultimately motivated by jealousy; and it will be necessary to determine how adequately Democritus could justify this assumption in order to evaluate the effectiveness of his argument.

It seems to me that the only way he could support his assumption would be to argue as follows: (1) All acts of disregarding the rights of others (as those rights are defined by the nomima kai dikaia) involve attemps to increase one's goods; (2) one would not attempt to do this unless one were dissatisfied with one's goods; (3) dissatisfaction with one's goods is always motivated, at bottom, by feeling envious and jealous of the goods of others, goods which one does not currently have, but would like to have; and hence (4) all unjust actions are motivated by feelings of jealousy.

There is one notable and striking feature of this argument: It would commit Democritus to the view that acts of pursuing an increase of one's goods are always motivated by jealousy even where such action does not involve committing an injustice. Given that jealousy is contrary to self-interest, it would follow that an agent never has self-interested reasons to desire an increase of goods. This consequence squares with that notion of euthymia which counsels complete satisfaction with goods that are present, for in that case an agent never has self-interested reasons to increase his goods. On this view of euthymia, it seems plausible to hold that all desire for increasing one's goods is motivated by jealousy.³⁵ Given this, the above defense of Democritus' assumption works; and he thus has a very strong argument to show that acting unjustly is intrinsically disadvantageous since he establishes a necessary correlation between morality and self-interest.

There are, however, two further problems to be considered. First, although the ultimate success of Democritus' argument depends on how convincingly he could defend the notion that complete satisfaction with goods at hand is the good for persons, he is not in a position to do so; for as we have seen, he has another notion of euthymia, one that is compatible with increasing one's goods. On this second notion of euthymia, he could no longer argue that all pursuit of an increase of goods is necessarily motivated by jealousy, given that jealousy and self-interest (euthymia) are incompatible. Rather, he would have to argue that jealousy is the motivating force for those actions which specifically involve increasing one's goods by immoral means. But this would not be a plausible position. To use a previous example, if it is compatible with a certain person's euthymia to desire and pursue the goal of bettering himself by attending college, there would be no reason to assert that he would necessarily be acting jealously if he stole the money which he needed for pursuing his goal. Rather, his action could merely be motivated by his desire to better himself—a desire which is compatible with euthymia.

The problem is strikingly brought to the fore in fr. 78: “To make money is not without use; but if it comes from wrongdoing, nothing is worse.” Here Democritus presupposes that it is sometimes compatible with euthymia to better one's condition; but then he cannot show why nothing is worse than wrongdoing or why acts of wrongdoing are necessarily motivated by jealousy. Of course, Democritus might well have mistakenly assumed that anytime someone disregards the interests of others he is acting with jealousy (or spite) toward the persons he wrongs. Given that it would have been an easy enough assumption to make, it is possible that he did not try to argue for it and did not see that his argument for the compatibility of self-interest and morality is flawed when euthymia is seen as being compatible with some pursuit of an increase of goods.

The second problem in Democritus' argument is that certain prescriptions of justice cannot plausibly be said to be prescriptions prohibiting jealous action. For example, in frr. 258-262 Democritus argues that justice requires one to do his best to ensure the punishment of wrongdoers. And in fr. 38, he may be thinking that justice requires one to prevent another from doing a wrong if it is possible to do so. These requirements have nothing to do with matters of jealousy, nor would disregard of them ordinarily be motivated by feelings of jealousy. Thus Democritus could not argue that observing these requirements benefits agents because it is not advantageous to act on feelings of jealousy. He could, however, readily defend them on the basis of Protagorean arguments. Maintaining a well-functioning political community requires that wrongdoers be punished or ‘re-educated’; and in a well-run state, the person who acts in accord with these requirements can reasonably expect his actions to be reciprocated when he himself has been wronged by someone. But, of course, Protagoras could not justify the claim that it is never in one's interest to disregard these requirements—and neither could Democritus, given what we have seen of his views thus far.

However, this second problem in Democritus' argument is not serious insofar as the problem concerns relatively few requirements of justice. On the other hand, it is a serious problem that his argument is not very effective when euthymia is viewed as satisfaction with and pursuit of goods which are obtainable by one's own efforts. The problem is particularly serious since the pursuit of wealth is not necessarily incompatible with euthymia and it is not Democritus' view that wealth is a good only insofar as it makes possible the pursuit of intellectual, higher pleasures. Much wrongdoing is committed in pursuing external goods like wealth. What Democritus clearly needs is an argument to support the view that acting justly in itself necessarily promotes euthymia—when euthymia is viewed as a state which can be compatible with some dissatisfaction with one's goods. In other words, he needs an argument to show that it is intrinsically disadvantageous for an agent to increase his goods by unjust means, even though increasing one's goods by just means can be in an agent's interest.

Although I do not believe Democritus could provide such an argument, he does restrict significantly the circumstances in which it would be in an agent's interest to act unjustly. He does this by putting strict restrictions on the conditions under which it would be compatible with euthymia to desire and pursue an increase of goods. To begin with, euthymia requires that one desire and pursue only those goods which are possible to obtain by one's own efforts; it would create disadvantageous disturbances in the soul to desire things which one does not have reasonable expectation of attaining on one's own. As Democritus notes in fr. 243, toil is pleasant (only) when men attain or know that they will attain that for which they labor. Furthermore, euthymia requires that a person's desires not blind his soul to other goods and that the attainment of his desires be compatible with the maintenance of overall pleasure in his soul. And finally, desire cannot be motivated by jealousy: the presence of jealousy indicates that a person desires something primarily because he perceives that someone else has a good which he does not have, and not because he has carefully considered whether it would really be in his own interest to possess that good.

In many circumstances, then, it will not be advantageous for a person to seek an increase of goods; but clearly there would still be occasions on which it would be beneficial. And thus it might well be that stealing, for example, would be in person's interest if he can act in accord with all the requirements of euthymia, maintaining a balance of pleasures in his soul and so forth, and if he can expect to escape notice in acting.³⁶

There are two ways Democritus could attempt to overcome this deficiency in his theory. First, he could try to argue that acting unjustly is always disadvantageous for agents because of disadvantages which are extrinsic to such action. He does seem to argue for this view in fr. 215: “The reward of justice is confidence of mind and imperturbability (athambia), but the result of injustice is fear of disaster.” And in fr. 174, he claims that the euthymos man who obeys the nomima kai dikaia is free from worry, but that those who disregard justice live in fear. Such fear, of course, would create disadvantageous disturbances in the soul; and hence acting unjustly would not be in an agent's interest. This argument has some force; but it is not strong enough to show that it would never be in an agent's interest to act unjustly: it is empirically implausible that every agent would suffer from fear as a result of every immoral act he commits. In any case, even though Democritus does appear to employ this argument, he did not consider it an important one; for he expressly states in fr. 41 that one should not refrain from wrongdoing because of fear.³⁷

The second way Democritus could attempt to overcome the deficiency in his defense of the compatibility of morality and a person's good would be to try to argue that promoting the good of others is an end which is a component of one's own good. Thus far I have only discussed the compatibility of morality and a person's good in terms of moral action benefiting agents because such action would be an instrumental means by which one can further one's own good. Defending the good of moral action in these terms can make no appeal to the notion that altruistic action or the promotion of the good of others for its own sake is a good for persons (agents).³⁸ If Democritus did, in fact, appeal to this notion, he would be, as far as I can tell, the first Greek moral theorist to do so. According to Irwin, this notion is found in Plato and Aristotle.³⁹

There is some indication in the fragments that Democritus might actually have appealed to this notion. I would call attention here to the fact that Democritus speaks approvingly of the following three kinds of action: (1) showing generosity without expecting (any?) return (fr. 96); (2) having pity for those who suffer misfortune or who are worse off than oneself (frr. 255, 107a); and (3) giving aid, if one is wealthy and powerful, to the people in one's political community (fr. 255; cf. fr. 282). It is possible, of course, that he defended the action in (3) as being in accord with self-interest on grounds that such action secures social peace and harmony. It is also possible that he defended the actions in (2) and perhaps (1) as being in accord with self-interest on grounds of reciprocity: Life is such that good fortune is fleeting (fr. 285); and so when someone has good fortune, he ought to help others when possible and reasonable to do so because it is quite possible that at some time in the future he himself might need such help. If Democritus did, in fact, argue in this way in defense of these actions, his arguments would have been quite weak.

It seems to me, however, that his approval of these actions could be better accounted for on grounds that he held the view that promoting the good of others is a component of one's own good. If he held such a view and if he could successfully defend it, he would be able to show that agents have self-regarding reasons not only to perform these actions, but also to regard always the interests of others.

Although I do think the fragments provide some indication that Democritus held the view that altruism is a component of one's good, it is not clear that he actually argued for it. On the other hand, the fragments do supply the raw material out of which an argument can be constructed. His probable approach would have been to argue that altruism is a necessary consequence of having euthymia; and his argument, roughly speaking, would have been as follows:⁴⁰ The attainment of euthymia is the good for persons. The attainment of this requires, among other things, the knowledge that life is beset with problems and that good fortune cannot be pursued or relied upon (frr. 176, 285). This knowledge comes from observing one's own life and the lives of others and involves recognition of the fact that misfortunes are common to all human beings (fr. 293). Recognition of this fact establishes for the man with euthymia a bond between himself and others. When the euthymos man sees the misfortunes of others, he not only mourns for and pities his own (actual and potential) misfortunes, but also mourns for and pities the misfortunes of others because he recognizes that men have misfortunes in common: “It is proper, since we are human beings, not to laugh at the misfortunes of others, but to mourn” (fr. 107a; cf. fr. 293).⁴¹ The euthymos man expresses this pity for others by promoting their good (as implied by frr. 96, 255, 282). Thus, altruism is a component of one's own good because it is a consequence of having euthymia.

However interesting this argument may be, it is, at bottom, unsuccessful; for it illegitimately moves from the fact that the man with euthymia sees misfortune as the common lot of humanity to the claim that the man with euthymia desires to benefit others. The fact that this argument is not successful is not surprising: it is extremely difficult to provide compelling reasons to pursue altruism as a part of one's own good. If Democritus did hold this view, it is far from certain that he would have argued for it; and I think it unlikely that he would actually have laid out an argument as elaborate as the one I suggested. But even granting that he argued rigorously for the view in question, it is virtually certain that he would not have been able to argue successfully for it. And thus, he would still be without a conclusive argument to demonstrate that acting morally is congruent with an agent's good or euthymia, when euthymia is understood as satisfaction with goods obtainable by one's own efforts. And as far as I can tell, there are no further claims or arguments in the fragments which give any indication that he had such a conclusive argument.

Although in the course of my discussion I have been insistent in pointing out the weaknesses in Democritus' defense of the compatibility of morality and self-interest, these weaknesses should not be allowed to obscure the strength of that defense. The difficulty of arguing for the view that one's morality promotes one's self-interest should not be underestimated; in fact, it may be impossible to provide a successful argument. Democritus' attempt seems particularly remarkable when viewed from an historical perspective. The evidence suggests that no early Greek moral theorist—except perhaps Socrates—could provide a defense of moral requirements that approached the cogency of the one provided by Democritus. The other defenses which have come down to us are traditional and Protagorean.

As I suggested in the last chapter, a close examination of Antiphon's theory could indicate to a perceptive theorist that there is a crucial relationship between one's conception of the good for persons and one's answer to the question of whether acting morally is compatible with self-interest. Antiphon himself does not appear to have been aware of that relationship. Democritus was, and he may have been the first. But of course, one is not likely to be aware of this relationship unless one is aware of the possibility that the good for persons might be an inner good. Democritus was aware of this possibility. Indeed, he (largely) internalized man's good; and again, he may have been the first Greek moralist to do so. It was precisely because he had a largely inner conception of human good that he was able to provide a strong case for the benefits of acting morally—in particular, that he was able to argue for the view that acting justly benefits agents because of advantages which are intrinsic to such action. He appears to have been the first Greek moral theorist to argue for such a view. In doing so, he anticipated Plato. And as we have seen, he may have even taken groping steps toward the view that promoting the good of others is a component of one's own good.

On the other hand, there are certain important areas in which his moral theory did not mark any advance. There is, for example, no evidence that he took an interest in defining the various moral aretai. And insofar as he saw moral requirements in terms of the customs and laws of existing political communities, he grounded the content of morality in the same unsatisfactory way as Protagoras. Not only is the legal conception of morality, in itself, a clearly deficient one, but it also makes even more difficult the task of demonstrating the compatibility of self-interest and moral action. But despite these shortcomings, his accomplishments are remarkable, and his importance in the development of Greek moral theory is indisputable.

My discussion of Democritus' views brings to a fitting close this study of early Greek moral theory. The next advances in the defense of acting morally are those made by Plato. But Plato clearly owed much to the work of his predecessors. Indeed, my analysis of Protagoras, Antiphon, and Democritus has shown that they laid out all the central issues and many of the arguments which are relevant to the question of the relationship between morality and a person's egoistic good.

Notes

1. Commentators are in general agreement that Democritus was born around 460 b.c. The date of his death, however, is a more controversial issue. In suggesting that he died around 396 b.c., I am following Davison (pp. 38-39). For a general discussion of Democritus' dates and life, see Guthrie, II, 386-387.

2. For a discussion of the various writings of Democritus, see Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 293-299.

3. It is a rather commonly held view that Democritus was not a systematic moral theorist. Bailey, for example, remarks that “Democritus' ‘ethic’ hardly amounts to a moral theory: there is no effort to set the picture of the ‘cheerful’ man on a firm philosophical basis …” (The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), p. 522). For a selective bibliography of others who share Bailey's view, see Guthrie, II, 492, n.1. In general, those commentators who disagree with Bailey's assessment do so on grounds that there is a systematic connection between Democritus' ethical and physical theories. However, my analysis in this chapter will show that Democritus' moral views are philosophical, systematic, and perfectly intelligible apart from any consideration of their connection to his physical views. And, in fact, I shall not discuss this issue. On my view there is simply not enough evidence to establish the connection in question. Vlastos' attempt to establish it is the most elaborate, impressive, and ambitious one to date (“Ethics and Physics in Democritus,” Philosophical Review 54 (1945), 578-592 and 55 (1946), 53-64). Taylor, however, has convincingly shown that Vlastos' arguments are open to very serious doubts (“Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus,” Phronesis 12 (1967), 6-27, esp. 8-16). Barnes (II, 231-232) briefly evaluates the various theories of those who argue for a systematic connection between Democritus' ethical and physical views and concludes, rightly I think, that the fragments do not support their theories. Indeed, the very attempt to establish the connection may be questionable. As Barnes remarks, “Ethics and physics, so far as I can see, have no systematic interconnexion at all; in many boring little ways a man's natural philosophy will rub off on his moralizing, but no general or systematic influence is even conceivable. The long scholarly discussion of the possible ‘materialistic foundation’ of Democritus' ethics is empty. …” On the other hand, ethics and physics can, as Barnes notes, be inconsistent. And they appear to be in Democritus: his physical theory is deterministic, while the ethical fragments take it as given that man has free will. On this point, see Bailey, p. 188.

4. Essentially two arguments are employed to cast doubt on the authenticity of the ethical fragments, specifically those fragments preserved in the Stobaeus anthology (frr. 169-297) and the fragments in the Democrates (sic) collection (frr. 35-115). First, no ancient source, including Plato and Aristotle, even mentions that Democritus had any interest in moral theory until Seneca in the first century a.d. remarks that Democritus wrote an excellent book about euthymia (De tranquilitate animi II.3); if Democritus had been the author of ethical writings, surely the ancient sources would have mentioned this and discussed his views. And even if one could explain how the ancient sources could have been silent about Democritus' moral theory for over four hundred years, one could not give a reasonable account of how his ethical writings would have been preserved and transmitted. This first argument has been plausibly countered by both Stewart (“Democritus and the Cynics,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958), 179-191) and Voros (“The Ethical Fragments of Democritus: The Problem of the Authenticity,” Hellenica 26 (1973), 193-206). In brief, Stewart argues that (1) the Cynics were interested in various aspects of Democritus' moral views and thus preserved his ethical writings and (2) for a variety of reasons, the other ancient philosophical schools were not interested in his views or were actually hostile to them. Voros agrees that it was the Cynics who were originally interested in Democritus' moral theory, but additionally argues that Democritus' ethical writings became available at the Ptolemaic Library in Alexandria and that Seneca, Clement, and perhaps even Diogenes Laertius actually read Democritus' book on euthymia, a book which could have been available later to Stobaeus. The second argument against the authenticity of the ethical fragments is that they are trivial and hence could not have been written by a first-rate thinker like Democritus. Guthrie relies heavily on this argument (II, 489-492). It is my view, however, that they are not trivial; and I trust that my analysis of them in this chapter will convince the reader of that view. Given that the ethical fragments reflect concerns which were current in Democritus' lifetime and given the lack of force of the two arguments against the authenticity of the ethical fragments, I see no reason not to attribute these fragments to Democritus. Of course, the case for the authenticity of the fragments would be secured if it could be established that there is a connection between Democritus' views in the ethical fragments and his physical theory; but as suggested in n. 3 above, such a connection cannot be established

5. On p. 84, I defend the view that the intelligence and knowledge referred to in fr. 181 are to be understood as (self-regarding) practical wisdom or prudence.

6. The Greek reads: toisi gar peithomenoisi ten idien areten endeiknytai. ‘Idien areten’ could mean either (1) the excellence (arete) which belongs to nomos or (2) the excellence which belongs to men (if they obey nomos). Colvin notes that translators have wavered in their interpretation of this passage; but he concludes, rightly I think, that ‘idien areten’ is best interpreted in sense (2) (“A New Look at the Ethics of Democritus,” Diss. Indiana Univ. 1974, pp. 104-105).

7. It needs to be kept in mind throughout that I am not claiming that Democritus was necessarily directly attempting to refute Antiphon, but rather that he was attempting to refute those who held views similar to Antiphon's.

8. Diels-Kranz, 68.A167.

9. Lives of the Philosophers IX.45.

10. Diels-Kranz, 68.B4.

11. McGibbon suggests the different terms Democritus used for the ideal state were related as follows: “Euthymia, euesto and eudaimonia are wider terms than the others, the last two perhaps describing the ideal state in an overall way from an outside viewpoint, while euthymia gives emphasis to the subject as actually feeling. Harmonia and symmetria refer to the balance in the ideal state, the former perhaps emphasizing the difference of the ingredients which go to make it, the latter stressing the correct proportion in which these different ingredients are mixed. Finally, ataraxia and athambia indicate that the ideal state is not subject to disturbance” (“Pleasure as the ‘Criterion’ in Democritus,” Phronesis 5 (1960), 75-77, esp. 76-77).

12. In my discussion of Democritus' conception of the good for persons, I shall not attempt to give a complete characterization of the man who possesses euthymia. I restrict my analysis to what will be relevant to the issue of the compatibility of morality and self-interest.

13. Taylor sees overall pleasure as the central feature of Democritus' notion of euthymia (“Pleasure,” pp. 16-19). I generally agree with his view.

14. Indeed, his argument would not be valid if it were not directed against those who derive their pleasure exclusively from sensations. If the people Democritus is discussing in this fragment derived their pleasures from sensations and other things, it would not necessarily be true that their souls would always be in a constant state of unrest. Whether or not their souls would be in such a state would depend on what additional pleasures they pursued and how they pursued them.

15. For example, Natorp, Die Ethika des Demokritos: Text und Untersuchung (Marburg, 1893) and Voros, “The Ethical Theory of Democritus: What is the ‘Criterion’?, Platon 27 (1975), 20-25.

16. As far as I can tell, absolutely nothing can be made of the fact that the word for pleasure in fr. 188 is ‘terpsis’ while in fr. 74 the word used is ‘hedu’. Voros thinks differently: for him, terpsis is Democritus' term for intellectual pleasures, while hedu is a term used for any pleasure (“The Ethical Theory of Democritus: What Is the ‘Criterion’?”, pp. 22-24). But it seems to me that these two terms (or cognates) are used synonymously in frr. 211 and 235. Indeed, the terpsis in question in fr. 235, far from being intellectual pleasure, is that short pleasure derived from sensations immediately after, say, eating or drinking. See also n. 20 below.

17. As Vlastos argues, talk of the divine and the gods (e.g., fr. 175) is not to be taken literally (“Ethics and Physics,” pp. 580-582). The existence of life after death is denied in fr. 297.

18. My analysis of Democritus' conception of human good so far in this chapter suggests, but does not actually establish that he did not hold such a theory. What I have said about his views could be spelled out in such a way as to be made compatible with the view that intellectual pleasure is the criterion for advantage.

19. Taylor nicely shows that some of the fragments thought to refer to intellectual pleasures (e.g., frr. 194, 112) are best interpreted in a different way (“Pleasure,” pp. 6-8).

20. This circumstance is simply too uncommon for Democritus to have emphasized the need to moderate intellectual pleasure. And the fact that it is ordinarily inappropriate to talk about moderating intellectual pleasure is another indication that terpsis is not Democritus' word for intellectual pleasure; for in frr. 191 and 211, he specifically mentions the need to moderate terpsis (fr. 191) and ta terpna (fr. 211).

21. Again, since Democritus is talking about moderation in pursuit of pleasure, he would not be talking about intellectual pleasures in these two fragments (211 and 233). Fr. 211 merely claims that moderation increases pleasure; and it would be implausible to suggest that this claim involves the view that moderation of lower pleasures increases intellectual pleasures.

22. Democritus would not be claiming wealth is a potentially dangerous possession if he had moderate wealth in mind, given that he thinks moderate wealth is safe (fr. 285). Further, the fact that wealth is juxtaposed with fame (doxa) also indicates that the level of wealth in question is substantial.

23. I am not, of course, implying that Democritus thought any given person should pursue all available pleasures. Besides, Democritus remarks in fr. 69 that what is good and true is the same for all men, but that this is not the case for what is pleasant. Thus, what pleasures a particular person actually pursues will depend on his temperament although it is in each person's interest to balance the pleasures in his soul so as to promote euthymia. A person's temperament might be such that he finds his pleasure in intellectual pursuits and finds no pleasure in wealth and possessions beyond the barest minimum needed for survival. But, of course, most people do not have such a temperament; and as I have been, in effect, arguing in the text, Democritus does not suggest that it is each person's true good to have or work towards having such a temperament or to measure advantage by the standard of what promotes intellectual pleasure.

24. My resolution of the apparent discrepancy between frr. 188 and 74 comes closest to Taylor's (“Pleasure,” pp. 16-19). For other attempts to resolve the apparent discrepancy, see Vlastos (“Ethics and Physics,” pp. 586-590) and McGibbon (“Pleasure,” pp. 75-76).

25. “Pleasure,” pp. 7, 17-18.

26. Democritus would agree with this truism on grounds that desire and pursuit of the impossible would create constant disturbances in one's soul and because one would always be feeling deficient and desiring more (than one has).

27. Traditionally the Greeks were of the view that one important component of good fortune was abundant wealth. In fr. 286 Democritus counters this view to some extent: “The man of good fortune is one who is happy with moderate means; the man of ill-fortune is one who is unhappy with great possessions.”

28. Fr. 83 is almost certainly referring to immoral action. Democritus regularly uses ‘hamartia’ (and cognates) to designate actions which involve disregard for the interests of others. See frr. 41, 181, 253, and 265; but cf. fr. 228.

29. Many of the fragments mention or imply that one needs to act with intelligence in order to promote one's self-interest. See also frr. 52, 54, 58, 119, 236, 292.

30. Guthrie (II, 490) notes that fr. 45 is “astonishingly Socratic or Platonic” and thinks it is one of the fragments that indicates that the ethical fragments are not authentic. It could also be noted here that fr. 45 is one of the fragments from the Democrates collection, fragments whose authenticity is more open to doubt than those found in Stobaeus. However, my interpretation of Democritus does not depend on fr. 45 being authentic. It would still be clear from other fragments that (1) he held the view that acting morally promotes one's self-interest and (2) he thought he could provide a substantive defense of that view.

31. pp. 59-60 and n. 23.

32. p. 32. Irwin's remarks about Democritus are brief, and I have added some details to the argument he attributes to Democritus.

33. I discussed this passage from the Protagoras on p. 44.

34. The arguments of Socrates which Irwin seems to have in mind are found in the Gorgias, Republic I, and perhaps even Republic IV, as well as those partial arguments found in various early dialogues. Irwin provides a thorough and excellent critique of these arguments throughout his book; but see especially pp. 52-53, 57-60, 125-127, 177-189, and 212-217.

35. The issue here is complicated. On the one hand, the notion of euthymia as complete satisfaction involves the view that it is not in one's self-interest to act immorally—on the assumption that such action only occurs when one attempts to increase one's goods. On the other hand, it does not in any obvious sense involve the further view that increasing one's goods is not in one's self-interest because such action is motivated by jealousy. But in the present context, it is precisely this further view which needs to be defended. Democritus would be able to present the following plausible argument: (Virtually) everyone's good is sufficient for the good life; and everyone can and should experience his good as fullness. Dissatisfaction arises when someone compares his own goods with the goods others have and, as a result, finds his own goods deficient. This is the source of jealousy. The jealousy in question, however, would not necessarily involve ill-will towards others or the desire to increase one's good at their expense.

36. To determine how many different circumstances there would be in which acting unjustly might be beneficial, one would need to spell out in detail all the restrictions Democritus placed on pursuing an increase of goods. I have not tried to spell out either of these things in detail. To do so would not be productive—or even fair to Democritus—unless we had more of his writings.

37. Democritus probably did not consider his argument from fear an important one because he recognized its weakness and because he, like Socrates/Plato, wanted to defend just action on grounds of its intrinsic advantages. The complete text of fr. 41 is as follows: “Do not refrain from wrongdoing because of fear, but because of what is necessary/needful (to deon).” Voros takes ‘to deon’ to mean moral duty and calls this fragment “the noblest moment” of Democritus' moral theory (“The Ethical Theory of Democritus: “On Duty,” Platon 26 (1974), 113-122, esp. 119). I do not think ‘to deon’ means moral duty, but the issue here is complex and concerns the question of whether Democritus had a notion of conscience and adopted the moral point of view as his criterion for action (in circumstances where the interests of others are at issue). If he did adopt this criterion, then it would be his view that agents should act morally whether or not such action is in their self-interest. Inasmuch as Democritus thought moral action congruent with self-interest, practically speaking, nothing is at stake in the question of whether or not he adopted the moral point of view as his criterion for action (in appropriate circumstances). My own view is that he did not adopt this criterion, but I do not have room to discuss this issue here. I hope to do so in a future paper.

38. In the claim that altruism is a component of one's own good, the good in question cannot be (exclusively) egoistic or self-interested. The good of altruism cannot be defended on grounds of self-interest: to act altruistically is precisely not to act from reasons of self-interest. One could only argue that agents have self-regarding reasons to act altruistically. For the distinction between self-regarding and self-interested reasons, see n. 2 in Chapter One.

39. pp. 254-259. The notion of altruism as a component of one's own good is not a prominent feature of Plato's and Aristotle's moral theory. In fact, I am not entirely convinced that Plato even had this notion.

40. I realize that I am being rather speculative in constructing an argument which the evidence suggests Democritus might have used if he argued for a view which I think he might have held. However, it is for the purpose of exploring all possibilities that I construct the argument.

41. Two things need to be noted here. First, the mourning in question (olophyresthai) obviously cannot be such that it is incompatible with euthymia. And second, the text of the fragment does not actually specify who should be the object of mourning: oneself or the others who have met misfortune. The argument requires that the man with euthymia mourn for others, and not just for himself; but, of course, this step in the argument is the crucial and controversial one.

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———. “The Ethical Theory of Democritus: What Is the ‘Criterion’?” Platon 27 (1975), 20-25.