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Critique of Pure Reason by German philosopher Immanuel Kant (22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was originally published in 1781. It is widely acknowledged to be among the most important philosophical works of the modern period, transforming the way philosophers regard fundamental questions about the nature of being and knowledge.

In this work, Kant takes a systematic and scientific approach to questions of metaphysics (in its classical sense of the study of "being qua being") and epistemology. One especially important aspect of his approach to the topic is his emphasis on the limits of human knowledge. He tries to precisely demarcate what can be known with certainty from things of which it is only possible to have limited knowledge and those about which no real knowledge is possible.

One key distinction Kant makes is between things known a priori (i.e., prior to experience) and those known a posteriori (i.e., knowable only after having experience of those things). The truths of mathematics, for example, are known a priori. One knows that if one places two apples in a basket and then adds two additional apples, one will have four apples. One has this knowledge without the need to actually place apples in baskets or even to have ever encountered an apple. On the other hand, the color of a neighbor's cat is known a posteriori; it can only be determined after one has had the experience of seeing the cat itself or a picture of it. Certain truths of logic and mathematics are examples of a priori knowledge, while facts about the external world, such as the population of a country or the distance between two cities, are known a posteriori by empirical measurement.

Another important distinction is between things known analytically and things known synthetically. Analytic knowledge inheres in the thing being analyzed. For example, one can determine the truth of the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" or "all dogs are quadrupeds" simply by knowing the definition of the relevant terms. The statement that "dogs are often beloved pets" requires knowledge that does not inhere in the definition of a dog.

A particularly important class of knowledge for Kant is synthetic a priori intuitions, which include the notions that effects have causes and that all things are extended in space and time. These intuitions, for Kant, condition our experiences. Rather than experience things-in-themselves (noumena) directly, people's experience is of phenomena, which are filtered through human consciousness conditioned by synthetic a priori intuitions. This insight harmonizes the empiricism of Hume and other empiricists with the rationalism of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Descartes.

Context

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Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is an established classic in the history of epistemology. First published in 1781 and then revised in 1787, it is the fruit of Kant’s later years and, as such, clearly reflects the insight and wisdom of a mature mind. It is a work in which the author attempted to conciliate two conflicting theories of knowledge current at his time: British empiricism as represented by John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, and continental rationalism as represented by René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Christian von Wolff. The latter theory maintained that important truths about the natural and the supernatural worlds are knowable by pure reason alone, independently of perceptual experience, whereas the former held that perceptual experience is the source of all our legitimate concepts and truths of the world. Kant believed that both these doctrines were wrong, and he tried in Critique of Pure Reason to correct the pretensions of each while saving what was sound in each.

Metaphysics as Science

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Kant began his inquiry by asking why metaphysics had not kept pace with mathematics and natural science in the discovery of facts about our world. Celestial mechanics had been developed by German astronomer Johannes Kepler at the beginning of the seventeenth century and terrestrial mechanics by Italian mathematician and physicist Galileo later in the same century, and the two theories were soon united into one by English physicist and mathematician Sir Isaac Newton. These developments represented astonishing progress in natural science, but Kant could detect no parallel progress in metaphysics. Indeed, in metaphysics he saw only interminable squabbling with no apparent method for settling differences. He therefore asked whether it is at all possible for metaphysics to be a science.

Metaphysics can be a science, Kant reasoned, only if there exists a class of truths different in kind either from the straightforward synthetic truths of nature discoverable through sense experience or from the straightforward analytic truths that owe their validity to the fact that the predicate term is contained in the subject term of such judgments—in other words, to the fact that they are true by virtue of the meanings of their terms, true by definition. This distinction is illustrated by the statements “Peaceful resistance is effective” (synthetic) and “Peaceful resisters shun violence” (analytic). This distinction had been recognized by Hume, who regarded it as exhausting the kinds of statements that can be true or false. However, Kant believed that there are statements neither empirical nor analytic in character—synthetic a priori statements. These are statements that are true neither by definition nor because of facts discoverable through sense experience. Rather, they can be seen to be true independently of sense experience; in this sense, they are a priori and necessarily true, because no sense experience can possibly confute them. Kant believed that all mathematical statements are of this sort: for example, “Seven plus five equals twelve.” He also believed that synthetic a priori truths constitute the framework of Newtonian science. However, if such truths exist, Kant next asked himself, how are they possible?

A Priori Bases for Human Knowledge

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They are possible, he said, if it can be shown that human knowledge is dependent upon certain concepts which are not empirical in origin but have their origin in human understanding. However, even before he revealed the existence of such concepts, Kant attempted to show in the first major division of Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the “Transcendental Esthetic,” that a priori considerations form the basis even of human perception or sensibility. This view was important to Kant, for in his proposed Copernican revolution in epistemology, the two sources of knowledge are sensibility and understanding working in inseparable harness together. He had already written in the introduction to Critique of Pure Reason that all knowledge begins with experience, but it does not necessarily arise out of experience.

What are these a priori foundations of sensibility? According to Kant, they are space and time. He reasoned that all objects of perception are necessarily located in space and time. Such objects may vary over a period of time in color, shape, size, and so on and still be perceptible objects, but they cannot be deprived of space and time and still remain perceptible. Even to establish ourselves as perceivers, and objects in our environment as objects of perception, requires the use of spatial and temporal terms—hence, the concepts of space and time. As percipients, we regard perceived objects as separate from or distant from us, and we realize that our perceptions themselves, whether of external objects or of our own thoughts and feelings, succeed one another in time. We cannot represent them otherwise and still sensibly preserve the meaning of the terms “perceiver” and “object of perception.” In this sense, space and time deserve recognition as presuppositions of sense experience. All our empirical, descriptive characterizations of perceptible objects take for granted their fundamental nature as objects in space and time. That is why Kant calls space and time “forms of intuition,” in order to distinguish them from the “contents” of sense experience. To be sure, portions of space and moments of time can be perceived, but such parts must always be understood as forming parts of an underlying continuum of space and time. (British phenomenalists such as Berkeley and Hume were not in agreement with this interpretation of space and time.)

Categories of Human Understanding

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Believing that he had already exhibited the dependency of human knowledge upon conditions prior to immediate sense experience, Kant next proceeded to a consideration of the a priori conditions of human understanding. In Kant’s view, all knowledge is the product of human understanding applied to sense experience. Does the understanding organize the contents of sense experience according to its own rules—rules that must originate elsewhere than in sense experience if their function is to categorize it? Such rules exist indeed, declared Kant, and he called them the “categories of the understanding.” He argued that there are twelve such categories and that they can be discovered and classified by careful scrutiny of the logical forms of the judgments we characteristically make about the world. For example, if we look at our categorical judgments, we see that they contain a referring expression that we call the grammatical subject and a characterizing expression that we call the predicate. In “Beethoven was a great composer,” the referring or subject term is “Beethoven,” and our characterizing or predicate term is “great composer.” Now a tremendous number of the factual claims we normally make are of this same basic form—substance and predicated property—and for Kant, therefore, the concept of substance deserves the status of a category of knowledge. Under it are subsumed all the substance-words in our conceptual scheme of things—“table,” “tree,” “moon,” “nail,” and so on—which denote material objects in our environment. It is thus a familylike concept denoting all those objects that have substantiality in common, something that none of the individual terms in this category does.

Much the same point can be made about the concept of causality, to take another of Kant’s categories, which he derived from the form of hypothetical or conditional judgments—our “if . . . then” judgments. “If water is heated under normal atmospheric conditions to 212 degrees Fahrenheit, it will boil” and “If one suppresses his guilt-feelings, one will become neurotic” are examples of hypothetical judgments that assert a causal connection between the states of affairs mentioned by the antecedents and consequents of such judgments. Such judgments also appear frequently in our factual reports on the world and suggest that the concept of causality is an important and fundamental concept in our way of recording experience. It is a concept embracing numerous words in our language, such as “create,” “produce,” “bring about,” and “make,” all of which are causal terms. By virtue of designing such a large family of terms, the concept of causality must be regarded as one of the relatively few root concepts or categories at the basis of our conceptual scheme that give this scheme its flavor by influencing it throughout. The importance of causality is something that Kant clearly saw, even though it had been missed by the British phenomenalists.

Many philosophers have disagreed with Kant over his number and selection of categories, as well as his method of arriving at them, but they have not taken issue with him as to the existence of categories in our conceptual framework and their importance in any account of human knowledge. However, many others have rejected Kant’s major contention that human knowledge is dependent upon such categories as substance and causality and so have sided with Hume, who, not finding anything answering to such categories in immediate sense experience, proceeded to dismiss them as fictitious. Kant, of course, agreed with Hume that substance and causality are not to be found in sense experience, but he insisted nevertheless that they are necessary ingredients in a world about which we can hope to have knowledge. The Kantian point is sometimes made by saying that unless one assumes that the general features referred by one’s judgments persist in time and are public entities independent of any particular percipient, there can be no confirmation judgments and consequently no knowledge at all. Kant saw this simple but essential point when he stated that the categories are necessary conditions for our having any knowledge whatsoever.

He also saw that categories such as substance and causality are by no means arbitrary impositions upon sense experience, as is sometimes implied by Hume and his followers, but are useful concepts, since sense experience testifies to a great amount of orderliness in the world rather than to a befuddling chaos. It is the presence of order observable by all that vindicates the use of such ordering principles as substance and causality—they would have no utility whatever in a chaotic world.

Principles of Newtonian Science

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It is chiefly as ordering principles that Kant viewed the categories. What they order or synthesize in his partly phenomenalistic theory of knowledge are the items of experience: colors, shapes, sizes, sounds, tactile impressions, odors, and so on. However, Kant believed that there is a problem in showing how such a priori principles can be applied to empirical data, and he thought that the answer to this problem is to be found in the mediatory power of time, which, as seen above, is an a priori ordering form which is a necessary condition of sense experience. Kant proceeded to relate the categories to the concept of time, and it was this merger of the concepts of substance, causality, and time that paved the way to his discussion of the presuppositions of Newtonian science. Kant believed that there are three such presuppositions: namely, the principles of the conservation of matter, of universal causality, and of the universal interrelation of all things making up the natural world. (In the Newtonian view of the universe, all objects were considered to be made up of material particles governed in their behavior by the universal laws of motion and attraction.)

Such principles are not analytic truths, according to Kant, because their denials are not self-contradictory, nor are they empirical generalizations, because we know them to be necessarily true, and no empirical generalization is ever necessarily true. They must therefore be genuine synthetic a priori truths, and their possibility arises from the fact that they utilize a priori concepts whose use is indispensable to human knowledge and yet whose only sanctioned cognitive use is in relation to the objects of sense experience in the manner dictated by the principles in question themselves.

Kant’s argument in this respect is somewhat circular, though it has been defended as illuminating by thinkers who believe that any examination of basic principles must inevitably be circular in that they must be elucidated in terms of one another. However, his argument has not been convincing to many others who, although granting that Kant isolated the main presuppositions of the scientific thinking of his day, do not concede that the presuppositions are synthetic a priori. Such critics argue that it is one thing to show that certain concepts are not empirical in origin and another to show that the judgments in which they figure are a priori. Concepts such as substance and causality may indeed underlie our factual discourse about the world and so be necessary and ineradicable concepts to intelligible and informative discourse, but it is not at all evident that the principles in which they occur—such as that the quantity of substance remains invariant throughout all physical transformations—are necessarily true. Such principles may be fruitful guideposts in scientific inquiry, yet not be true or false judgments at all, merely heuristic rules in the way that Kant himself was to regard certain metaphysical concepts, as we shall see shortly.

The Transcendental Dialectic

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Up to this point Kant’s concern was to explore the foundations of scientific knowledge and to disclose the dependency of such knowledge upon a handful of forms, concepts, and principles. In this exploration, he clashed sometimes head-on, sometimes obliquely, as we have seen, with accounts of human knowledge provided by British empiricists. However, his conclusions thus far were also brewing trouble and embarrassment for continental rationalism as well—for what follows from showing that concepts such as causality and substance are presuppositions of empirical knowledge? It follows, Kant said, that their use independent of sense experience is illegitimate and can result only in conceptual difficulties and empty noise. Kant’s initial concern was to determine whether people can fruitfully engage in metaphysical speculation. In his time, such speculation chiefly revolved around such matters as the immortality of the soul, the origin and extent of the universe, and the existence and nature of God. Was a science of such matters really possible? In the third and concluding portion of his inquiry, called “Transcendental Dialectic” (that dealing with the categories and principles he had termed the “Transcendental Analytic”), Kant’s answer to this burning question was an unequivocal no.

Kant identified the main concepts of the aforementioned metaphysical issues as the psychological idea (or soul), the cosmological (or world), and the theological idea (or God), and he considered the author of such ideas to be human reason rather than human understanding or sensibility. However, why is human reason unable to develop these ideas cogently and scientifically? Kant’s chief explanation for this debility was that nothing in sense experience corresponds to the ideas of pure reason, and thus there can be no control over their speculative use.

Cartesians and Leibnizians, for example, argued that the soul was an immaterial, simple, and therefore indestructible substance. However, where is the empirical support for such claims? It does not exist, said Kant, and furthermore the reasoning leading up to such conclusions is wholly fallacious. These Cartesians and Leibnizians have treated the “I think,” or cogito, that is presupposed by all acts of knowing as the logical subject of our judgments, analogous to the way in which “Beethoven” is the subject of the judgment “Beethoven became deaf in his later years.” Furthermore, Cartesians and Leibnizians have argued that just as “Beethoven” designates a real person, so does the knowing subject of the cogito. Kant’s rebuttal to this argument consisted of saying that it is an analytic truth that acts of knowing presuppose a knower, but the existence of the knower is an empirical question that cannot be inferred from an analytic truth whose validity is founded upon the meaning of terms. The existence of the soul as well as its properties must remain an empirical question, and the concept of substance is properly applied only to the self that is the object of empirical psychology.

The Limits of Reason

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Kant next turned to metaphysical speculation about the universe at large. People have always asked themselves with respect to the universe whether it had a beginning in time or has always existed, whether it is finitely or infinitely extended in space, and whether it was created. Kant showed that no definitive answers to such questions are possible. Indeed, he argued that reasoning can establish with equal cogency alternative answers to such questions. His explanation for such a disconcerting and paradoxical state of affairs in metaphysics was that one cannot regard the universe as a substance or given entity in the way a desk, for example, can be so regarded. It is of course meaningful to ask when a certain desk was made, how it was made, and what its spatial boundaries are. Such questions can be settled empirically, for we can trace the history of the desk and have it before us to measure. However, this investigation of the properties of the desk and the countless ones like it which we undertake in our daily lives occur within the framework of the universe, so that the questions that can significantly be raised about things within the universe cannot significantly or profitably be asked of the universe itself. If the categories of substance and causality have as their proper epistemic function the characterization of given and possible objects of perception, it is an improper use of such categories to apply them to what is neither a given nor even a possible object of perception such as the universe. Because it is not such an object, the universe cannot serve as a check or control upon our speculations about it, and it is this basic consideration again which explains reason’s incompetence in this area.

Can human reason do any better, then, in the area of theological speculation? Can it, in the absence of empirical evidence, produce convincing arguments for God’s existence, his benevolence, omniscience, and so forth? Kant surveyed the standard arguments or alleged proofs for the existence of God and concluded that none of them has any real force. He found that arguments that use the facts of existence, design, and causality in nature to support claims on behalf of divine existence not only make an unwarranted leap from the known to the unknown but also fall back on the ontological argument for the existence of God as propounded successively by Saint Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz. This famous and captivating argument begins with the premise that God is the being greater than which nothing is conceivable, and—with the help of a subordinate premise to the effect that existence in the real world is better than existence merely in idea—proceeds to the conclusion that God must exist, for if God did not exist, God would not then be the greatest conceivable entity.

Kant’s rebuttal of the ontological argument consists of saying that all existential statements of the form “X exists” are synthetic a posteriori and must be established on empirical grounds. If the major premise of the ontological argument is analytic, then existence is included in the definition of “God” and one has, in effect, defined God into existence. However, Kant asked, can we by definition define anything into existence, or must we not look beyond our concept of something in order to determine whether it genuinely exists? Kant added that it is in any case a mistake to view existence as a predicate like any other, because in all statements in which referring expressions such as “God” occur as subject terms, the existence of the denoted object(s) is not asserted by such statements but rather taken for granted in order to see what is attributed truly or falsely to the denoted object(s). However, if existence is taken for granted in this way, then as far as the ontological argument is concerned, one has assumed the very point in question and the argument is question-begging.

The results of Kant’s inquiry into classical metaphysics prompted him to reject the view that the leading concepts of such speculation have any constitutive place in human knowledge at all. Such concepts do not enter into the weblike structure of our knowledge of the world, as do the categories in his view. However, Kant did not progress further to the Humian conclusion that metaphysical works containing these concepts should therefore be consigned to the flames. On the contrary, he argued that although such concepts do not have a constitutive role in human knowledge, they nevertheless have a vital regulative function in the scientific quest, for they posit a systematic unity to the world and so stimulate scientists to look for connections in nature, even between such diverse elements, say, as falling apples and orbiting planets. It is pure reason, with its concept of an ordering, purposeful, and wholly rational God, for example, which proposes for investigation the idea that the world created by God must be rationally constructed throughout and so reward experimental inquiry by people similarly endowed with reason. No other faculty of the mind was for Kant capable of such a stirring vision.

In this remarkable conclusion to his inquiry into the contributing factors of human knowledge, Kant plainly conceded enormous importance to pure reason, although not that exactly which rationalists defended. He therefore appeased the rationalists no more than he did the British empiricists.

Implications for Later Philosophy

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Many philosophers since Kant have appreciated his middle road between rationalism and empiricism, even if they have not been able to accept the details of this reasoning, and they have credited Kant with the rare ability to raise problems worthy of philosophical investigation.

Other philosophers have not been impressed by Kant’s strictures against rationalism and empiricism, and they have borrowed from his meticulous genius (happily wedded to broad vision) what suits their purposes while ignoring what does not. Thus German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, for example, was stimulated by Kant to seize upon pure reason’s dialectical tendencies—so futile in Kant’s view—and erect upon such tendencies a complete picture of history and the world—quite often at the expense of empirical facts. Latter-day phenomenalists such as John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell persisted in the search for the foundations of human knowledge among sense data (more lately in conjunction with formal logic), which in all their fleeting transiency are so much unlike Kant’s enduring and causally ordered substances.

However, most philosophical critics assent to the rich stimulation of Kant’s ever-surprising fertile mind and rank him among the great philosophers of all time.

Additional Reading

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Allison, Henry E. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. An important interpreter of Immanuel Kant explores relationships between Kant’s theory of knowledge and his moral philosophy.

Bohman, James, and Matthias Lutz-Backmann, eds. Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. The contributors appraise Kant’s theories about and hopes for a universal rationality that would encourage shared moral understanding and reduce political conflict.

Cassirer, Ernst. Kant’s Life and Thought. Translated by James Hayden. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Written by an important twentieth century philosopher, this book offers a readable intellectual biography of Kant.

Caygill, Howard. A Kant Dictionary. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995. A reliable reference guide that helps to clarify key concepts and ideas in Kant’s philosophy.

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. Copleston devotes several lucid chapters to Kant and his significance in the history of philosophy.

Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Taste. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. A careful and detailed study focusing on Kant’s understanding of beauty and goodness and how we make judgments about them.

Guyer, Paul, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Helpful essays by contemporary Kant scholars shed important light on key aspects of Kant’s theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, and religious thought.

Hare, John E. The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. A study of the strengths and weakness of Kant’s influential moral philosophy.

Jones, W. T. A History of Western Philosophy: Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1969. Provides a good starting point for readers who want a clear and basic introduction to Kant’s philosophy.

Kemp, John. The Philosophy of Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. A brief, readable account of Kant’s theory of knowledge, moral philosophy, and aesthetics.

Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. The first major biography of the philosopher in fifty years. Includes extensive notes and a bibliography.

Schönfeld, Martin. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. A study of the philosopher’s work before the Critique of Pure Reason.

Schott, Robin May, ed. Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Essayists bring the perspectives of feminist scholarship to bear on Kant’s method and thought.

Walker, Ralph. Kant. New York: Routledge, 1999. An excellent biographical introduction to the thoughts of the philosopher, clearly presented and requiring no special background. Bibliography.

Wolff, Robert Paul, ed. Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Important scholars contribute essays on a wide range of themes and issues in Kant’s philosophy.

Patricia Cook John K. Roth

Bibliography

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Additional Reading

Allison, Henry E. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. An important interpreter of Immanuel Kant explores relationships between Kant’s theory of knowledge and his moral philosophy.

Bohman, James, and Matthias Lutz-Backmann, eds. Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. The contributors appraise Kant’s theories about and hopes for a universal rationality that would encourage shared moral understanding and reduce political conflict.

Cassirer, Ernst. Kant’s Life and Thought. Translated by James Hayden. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Written by an important twentieth century philosopher, this book offers a readable intellectual biography of Kant.

Caygill, Howard. A Kant Dictionary. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995. A reliable reference guide that helps to clarify key concepts and ideas in Kant’s philosophy.

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964. Copleston devotes several lucid chapters to Kant and his significance in the history of philosophy.

Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Taste. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. A careful and detailed study focusing on Kant’s understanding of beauty and goodness and how we make judgments about them.

Guyer, Paul, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Helpful essays by contemporary Kant scholars shed important light on key aspects of Kant’s theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, and religious thought.

Hare, John E. The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. A study of the strengths and weakness of Kant’s influential moral philosophy.

Jones, W. T. A History of Western Philosophy: Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1969. Provides a good starting point for readers who want a clear and basic introduction to Kant’s philosophy.

Kemp, John. The Philosophy of Kant. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. A brief, readable account of Kant’s theory of knowledge, moral philosophy, and aesthetics.

Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. The first major biography of the philosopher in fifty years. Includes extensive notes and a bibliography.

Schönfeld, Martin. The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. A study of the philosopher’s work before the Critique of Pure Reason.

Schott, Robin May, ed. Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Essayists bring the perspectives of feminist scholarship to bear on Kant’s method and thought.

Walker, Ralph. Kant. New York: Routledge, 1999. An excellent biographical introduction to the thoughts of the philosopher, clearly presented and requiring no special background. Bibliography.

Wolff, Robert Paul, ed. Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Important scholars contribute essays on a wide range of themes and issues in Kant’s philosophy.

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