SOURCE: “Clement of Alexandria: Conflicting Views on Women,” in The Second Century: A Journal of Early Christian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 1989-90, pp. 213-20.

[In the following essay, Kinder contends that Clement believed that while women should be subservient to men in daily life, they could ultimately be equal before God.]

In his introduction to the Library of Christian Classics translation of Stromata III, Henry Chadwick pronounced Clement of Alexandria's views on marriage as “curiously confused.”¹ One might also regard Clement's views on women as equally so. Clement grants to women equal capacity with men for attaining virtue and perfection.² He even acknowledges for them the possibility of training in the Christian philosophy.³ However, all that Clement grants to women he appears to take away when he asserts that women succumb more easily to temptation,⁴ that their place is in the home, waiting on their husbands,⁵ and that by their seductive wiles they pose a constant threat to men.⁶ Is there some way of connecting these apparently contradictory positions? Moreover, when one examines the role Clement ascribes to women in marriage, one wonders how, in fact, women can be men's equals when Clement maintains that they are so unequal in authority and in the allotted roles of the household. Do these tensions in Clement's views on women reflect the tensions already present in his culture and sources? Finally, is there any way to make any sense at all of what appears to be in Clement so incoherent?

Clement asserts in Stromata IV. 8.59.3 that both men and women are obligated to pursue virtue.⁷ From the Paedagogus especially, it is seen that Clement enjoins both sexes to emulate the life of the Instructor, keeping themselves as free from all voluntary transgressions as possible.⁸ Indeed, Clement claims in the Stromata that this capacity for virtue is innate in women as well as men.⁹ Clement goes so far as to reject any view that posits different natures for women and men, saying that if such a position were true, then only men would be required to practice virtue, and women would be free to do whatever they wished.¹⁰ Thus, in his opinion, women must seek after all the major virtues usually attributed to men, i.e. self-control, righteousness, and temperance.¹¹

Clement's reasoning behind these assertions is that women share with men in all the common traits of anthropos. Not only do women share in the common physiological traits of the human species (such as respiration, sight, and hearing),¹² but they also participate in the goodness of human creation in general. Clement refers to the human individual as the highest and most beautiful of God's creatures.¹³ Humankind is also unique due to the fact that the breath of deity resides in every individual.¹⁴ Clement claims that the reason God gave life to humankind in the first place was that every person, male and female, might be permitted to know God.¹⁵

Clement's optimistic view of the human race, therefore, informs his belief that women as well as men should seek their highest potential. This higher path of spirituality, to which Clement refers as the way of the true gnostic, is open to both sexes. Women, too, must not only combat desire, but attempt to be completely above it.¹⁶ Even in the area of sexual relations, Clement recommends that both marriage partners engage in relations only with the predetermined purpose of having children.¹⁷ Here Clement argues that motivation by passion is not only part of the lower way, but also is not living according to nature. This Stoic apatheia is also required when, on occasion, women are faced with persecution and possible martyrdom.¹⁸ Clement commends many women who have given their lives with such impassibility.¹⁹

Clement regards the study of philosophy as preerequisite to attaining this higher life, and again he envisions women included in such training.²⁰ For him, philosophy teaches righteousness and virtue, and thus whatever contributes to such an end is appropriate, even if it is derived from Stoic, Platonic, Epicurean, Aristotelian, or any other school.²¹ Clement contends that philosophizing is necessary for the gnostic to be able to endure any circumstance, whether martyrdom or, for a woman, life with a difficult husband.²² Clement feels that divine providence, therefore, gave philosophy to the whole human race for its benefit and instruction, and to overlook such an aid is to overlook the chief means for acquiring virtue.²³

But in spite of Clement's remarks that women as well as men share in the capacity for virtue and are equally obligated to achieve it, it is clear that for Clement major differences do, in fact, separate the sexes. Chief among these is the obvious difference in physical construction. He states that women's bodies are softer than men's; therefore, he concedes to women the wearing of softer apparel.²⁴ Of greater importance, Clement believes that difference in physical design necessitates difference in temporal activity. He claims that women's bodies are suitable for giving birth to children and, in his mind, the corollary, to housekeeping. On the other hand, men are physically superior and should be involved in more active pursuits.²⁵

In marriage, the obvious difference between the sexes is seen in their allotted roles and in who leads the relationship. From Clement's perspective, the divinely appointed head is the husband.²⁶ The wife is to be subject and subservient to him. The list of household duties which Clement provides in Paedagogus III. 10 definitely confirms his refusal to allow women to go beyond the traditional role of housekeeper. For him, the good wife must remain indoors most of the time to keep house, and when the husband is home she should provide for his every need.²⁷ The husband, however, while the wife is busily exercising by cooking or making clothes, is told to keep himself physically fit by taking walks, playing ball, or going fishing.²⁸

With regard to the procreation of children, for Clement the goal of marriage, although both mother and father contribute to the conception of the child, it is clear that Clement thinks the father provides the more significant part. The wife seems designed only as the receptor of the husband's seed, which in Clement's eyes is already the whole person.²⁹

Even when life with the husband seemingly becomes unbearable for the wife (some might think that Clement's depiction of the wife in constant servitude to her husband is just that), Clement does not give the wife the option of leaving. Any divorce proceedings must be initiated by the husband.³⁰ Instead, the wife must continue to “never do anything against his will, with the exception of what is contributing to virtue and salvation.”³¹ She may quietly attempt to persuade him toward greater virtue, but if she is unsuccessful, she must be content in realizing that God is “her helper and associate” and that her real aim in life is to please the Lord.³²

Clement's outlook, in which women are granted equal natures with men but in actuality are relegated to be men's servants, has strong similarities with that of many Stoic philosophers. Several Stoics had been known for their promotion of women's equality with men. Yet, like Clement, they retained positions which definitely portray women as the weaker sex, in need of domination by men, and best suited for housework. Antipater, in the second century b.c., describes marriage as the full union of men and women. He states:

Other friendships are like platefuls of beans or mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any case of penetration; for they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body.³³

Later, Plutarch³⁴ wrote that “marriage is a source of friendship, for it is a common participation in the mysteries,” and within it there is a “daily growth between man and wife of mutual respect, kindness, affection and confidence.”³⁵ In his treatise Bravery of Women he stated that “man's virtues and woman's virtues are one and the same.”³⁶ Likewise, Musonius argued that women as well as men possess a natural inclination to virtue, and “That Women Too Should Study Philosophy.”³⁷ In discussing “Should Daughters Receive the Same Education as Sons?” he asserts that virtue is “equally appropriate to the nature of both” sexes.³⁸

Upon closer examination, however, even though these Stoics argue theoretically for the equality of the sexes, they contend that women are inferior and therefore should be subordinate to their husbands. Antipater's treatise Concerning Marriage is addressed to men who wonder if marriage might be a burden to their freedom. To these men he writes:

Life with a wife seems to appear troublesome to some men because of their inability to rule.… Certain things they willingly and corruptly surrender to a wife, and do not teach her anything concerning household management.³⁹

It should also be noted that Antipater states that if a man desires a life of leisure devoted to reason or politics, he should find a wife who will manage the house for him, and thus free him for more important things.⁴⁰ In practice, therefore, Antipater was not an advocate of equality of the sexes.

Plutarch, though lauding the virtue of women, enumerates for new brides tasks which are clearly subservient. He writes that a wife should have no feeling of her own. Neither should she have preferences, friends, property, or even her own religion, but should follow the husband in everything.⁴¹ He suggests, “A woman ought to do her talking either to her husband or through her husband.” Moreover, Plutarch advises the husband to control the wife as “the soul controls the body.”⁴² It appears that Plutarch praises the ideal of marriage only when the wife is willing to forfeit her mind and personality to her husband.

Also, Musonius demonstrates the distance between the theoretical affirmations of women and the prescriptions he recommends for them. While he claims that women indeed have the same capacity for virtue, he is aware that some may object to this theory and say that women will abandon their household duties.⁴³ Musonius responds by discussing the four cardinal virtues which a woman learns in her study of philosophy. He explains all four from a practical perspective and argues, “In the first place a woman must be a good housekeeper.”⁴⁴ Later, he refers to women's education:

I do not mean that women should possess technical skill and acuteness in argument. It would be quite superfluous, since they will use philosophy for the ends of their life as women.⁴⁵

Musonius states clearly the ends of a woman's life:

Prepared to nourish her children at her own breast, and to serve her husband with her own hands, and willing to do things which some would consider no better than a slave's work. Would not such a woman be a great help to the man who married her?⁴⁶

To the objection that his theory on equality will cause men to take up spinning and women to exercise in the gymnasium, he states that indoor work is still more suitable for women, and outdoor work for men. Occasionally, if need arises, Musonius admits that this arrangement might be varied, but this appears the exceptional case.⁴⁷ Thus, even though Musonius seems to reject the theory of women always inside the home and men outside, he still largely retains it in practice.

Furthermore, Musonius employs the typical Greek distinction between men and women as stronger-weaker, ruler-ruled, and better-worse. In his contention that neither husband nor wife should commit adultery, he argues as follows:

And yet surely one will not expect men to be less moral than women, nor less capable of disciplining their desire, thereby revealing the stronger in judgment inferior to the weaker, the ruler to the ruled. In fact, it behooves men to be much better if they expect to be superior to women, for surely if they appear to be less self-controlled they will also be baser characters.⁴⁸

Clement, too, believes that women are inferior morally, and in his argumentation seems closer to the Musonian Stoic tradition than to certain Christian writers of his period. For example, while he agrees with Tertullian that women need to be veiled, unlike Tertullian, he fails to root this advice in the original sin of Eve.⁴⁹ For Clement, women's present weakness is not attributable to an ongoing defect which the first woman placed upon womankind. He states that each person sins by individual choice.⁵⁰ Admittedly, in Clement's view, women choose wrongly more than men, but for Clement this seems due to women's basic character, not to any continuing “sentence of God” upon them.⁵¹ Clement merely assumes women's weakness without discussion. He is therefore more like Musonius in remaining in the philosophic tradition which had long viewed women as men's inferior in every way.⁵²

For Clement and for the Stoics, it is clear that what one considers virtue determines what day-to-day roles are recommended for women. For Musonius, as has been noted, the virtue for women is in the demonstration of their ability to be good housekeepers. For Clement, one of the chief virtues for women is chaste behavior. He seems to think that this virtue is best met when women remain at home. He states:

Not to deck and adorn herself beyond what is becoming, renders a wife free of calumnious suspicion, while she devotes herself assiduously to prayers and supplications; avoiding frequent departures from the house, and shutting herself up as far as possible from the view of all not related to her, and deeming housekeeping of more consequence than impertinent trifling.⁵³

Clement apparently believes that such behavior serves as the best preventative against adultery.⁵⁴

In the practical sphere, therefore, it appears that for both Clement and Musonius, women must pursue virtue by seeking to fill the domestic mold according to the status-quo. Moreover, the study of philosophy, which both Musonius and Clement recommend for women, serves as instruction to reinforce such service. While Clement argues that philosophy can benefit those men or women who must occasionally face persecution, it is apparent that philosophy's major benefits lie in the day-to-day guidelines for life at home.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, one wonders how a woman, in Clement's view, might even have time for philosophizing since she is constantly assumed to be keeping house and serving her husband. Thus Clement, along with the Stoics, is not bothered by a distinction between the equality of one's ultimate nature and the unequal distribution of physical and moral strength which, in their minds, must necessarily lead to a distinction in roles.⁵⁶ In their opinion, it is entirely possible for women to share equality with men before God, while still being directed to the traditional role of the husband's subservient housekeeper and mother of his children.

Notes

1. Alexandrian Christianity, ed. Henry Chadwick and J. E. L. Oulton (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954) 33.

2. Strom. IV. 859.1-3; cf. Paedagogus I.4.1.

3. Strom. IV. 8.62.4-63.1; 8.67.1-3; 1.1.1.

4. Paed. II. 10.107.2; 2.33.2.

5. Paed. III. 11.58.1; 10.49.3-5.

6. Ibid. II. 2.33.4; Strom. III. 12.93.1-3; Paed. III. 11.83.3-4.

7. Cf. IV. 8.59.1.

8. Paed. I. 3.9.1.

9. Strom. IV. 8.59.1.

10. Ibid. IV. 8.19.2.

11. Paed. I. 4.10.2.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. I. 8.63.1.

14. Ibid. I. 3.7.1; cf. Genesis 1:26; 2:7.

15. Strom. III. 9.64.3.

16. Ibid. III. 7.57-58.

17. Paed. II. 10.90.3; 10.98.2; Strom. III. 7.58.2; et al.

18. Strom. IV. 1.1; cf. IV. 8.58.3.

19. Ibid. IV. 8.58.2.

20. Ibid. IV. 8.62.4-63.1.

21. Ibid. I. 7.37.6.

22. Ibid. IV. 8.67.1-3.

23. Ibid. VI. 17.159.6.

24. Paed. II. 10.107.3.

25. Ibid. III. 3.19.1-2. The same passage states that women are assigned “passivity.”

26. Strom. IV. 8.63.5.

27. Ibid. III. 10.49.3-5; cf. II. 23.146.1.

28. Paed. III. 10.50.1-50.2.

29. Ibid. II. 10.94.4.

30. Strom. II. 23.145.3.

31. Ibid. IV. 19.123.2.

32. Ibid. 20.127.2.

33. Antipater, Concerning Marriage. Frag. in H. F. A. von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (Leipzig, 1903-1924) III. 254ff. Trans. in E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911), p. 319. Cancik-Lindemaier speaks of Antipater's making possible the equality of men and women: Hildegard Cancik-Lindemaier, “Ehe und Liebe. Entwürfe griechischen Philosophen und römischer Dichter,” in Zum Thema Frau in Kirche und Gesellschaft. Zur Unmundigkeit verurteilt? ed. Hubert Cancik, et al. (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1972) 62. Cf. Albrecht Oepke, “GUNE,” Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 1, ed. by Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964) 779.

34. Actually a Middle Platonist, but he had appropriated many views of the Middle Stoa.

35. Plutarch, Erotikos 769A.

36. Bravery of Women 242F.

37. Oration III.

38. P. 46, 32, Lutz. Cora Lutz provides an English translation of Musonius in “Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates,” Yale Classical Studies 10 (1947): 38-49. Oepke states that with Musonius the estimation of women and marriage reaches its climax; op. cit., p. 780.

39. Antipater, Concerning Marriage 256.2-9. Trans. by David Balch in Let Wives Be Submissive; the Domestic Code in 1 Peter (Chico, Ca.: Scholars Press, 1981) 145.

40. Concerning Marriage 256.33—257.10.

41. Advice to Bride and Groom 138B-146A.

42. Ibid. 140A-D, 142D-E, 145C-E.

43. P. 42.11-15, Lutz.

44. Ibid. 40.10-12, 17, Lutz.

45. P. 19, 8-14, Lutz.

46. Orat. III, Lutz.

47. Ibid. 46.13-31, Lutz.

48. P. 86.38-88.4, Lutz.

49. Paed. II. 10.114.3; cf. Tertullian, De Cultu Feminarum 1.1. Tertullian sees women's covering as part of their garb of penitence.

50. Strom. III. 9.65.1.

51. Tertullian, De Cultu Feminarum 1.1.

52. The Alexandria of Clement's time had for a century or more been experiencing a revival of Greek philosophy of an eclectic nature, whose principal ingredients were Pythagoreanism, Platonism, and especially Stoicism. For philosophy's influence on Clement, see Simon Wood's introduction to Christ the Educator (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1954) vii, x-xvi; as well as the important study by S. R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971). Lilla says Clement's overall system “represents the meeting point of three distinct streams: the Jewish Alexandrine philosophy, the Platonic tradition, and Gnosticism” (p. 227). Also informative is Eric Osborn, “Clement of Alexandria: A Review of Research, 1958-1982,” Second Century 3 (1983): 219-244.

53. Strom. II. 23.146.1.

54. The quoted passage occurs in the context of Clement's discussion on divorce and adultery.

55. In the passage where Clement states that women are to “philosophize equally with men” (Strom. IV. 8.62.4), the context concerns who is rulling the home.

56. Manning argues cogently that to talk of a Stoic concept of the “equality” of the sexes requires so many reservations that it is best to dispense with the term altogether. C. E. Manning, “Seneca and the Stoics on the Equality of the Sexes,” Mnemosyne 26 (1973): 176.