SOURCE: Hirschberg, Edgar W. “G. H. Lewes and A. W. Schlegel: An Important Critical Relationship.” University of South Florida Language Quarterly 5, nos. 3-4 (spring-summer 1967): 37-40.

[In the following essay, Hirschberg compares the critical methods of Schlegel and G. W. Lewes, arguing for the influence of the former on the latter.]

Bernard Shaw once termed George Henry Lewes “the most able and brilliant critic between Hazlitt and our own contemporaries.”¹ Certainly at the time he wrote most of his dramatic criticism, during the 1840's and 1850's, he was better equipped by way of background, education and experience for the task of criticism than any other English writer. Many literary historians regard him as the equal of any nineteenth-century critic and superior to most of them—with the notable exception, of course, of Shaw himself. One—and perhaps the chief—reason for his superior critical acumen was his thorough acquaintance with contemporary European thought, in particular the literature and philosophy of Germany. His most enduring book has been his Life of Goethe, completed in 1855 and still in print. His Biographical History of Philosophy, first published in 1845-46, came out in numerous editions during the next thirty years and contains observations that are still pertinent concerning Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.

In formulating his aesthetic theories about the drama, the German critic to whom Lewes owed the most inspiration and stimulation was A. W. Schlegel, whose work Über Dramatische Kunst und Litteratur, first published in 1809 and 1811, came out in an English translation by John Black in 1840. Lewes's reactions to this translation are found in an article he wrote on Schlegel that appeared in the Foreign Quarterly Review in 1843, in which he compared his own and Schlegel's ideas on dramatic criticism.² Although there were areas of disagreement, his dependence on some of Schlegel's fundamental conceptions is considerable.

The two basic theories that Lewes and Schlegel seem to disagree on most concern critical relativism and the classification of works of art into so-called objective and subjective groupings. In the matter of relativism, Lewes had pointed out previously that, in studying the literature of another nation or period, “our first necessary step towards its appreciation is the going out of ourselves, and imaginatively identifying ourselves with the people of that nation and period.”³ The critic, when judging a work of art, must try to project himself back “into the era in which it was produced”, so that he can look at it “as those looked at it for whom it was produced.” If possible, he must “penetrate into the spirit of that age, to understand its language,—its beliefs,—and its prejudices; in order that the imagination of the poet who utters that language” may influence the critic's mind “unimpeded by any want of sympathy, which ignorance would create.”⁴ Here Lewes anticipated by a century the words of another critical relativist, F. A. Pottle, who wrote in 1946 that “all critical judgments are relative to the age producing them, since the measure or standard varies unpredictably from one age to another.”⁵ But both had been foreshadowed by A. W. Schlegel, who subscribed to the same idea about the temporal variability of aesthetic criteria when he said in 1809 that no one “should be tried before a tribunal to which he does not belong”, and that consequently “when we give to the new kinds of poetry the old names, and judge of them according to the ideas conveyed by these names, the application of the authority of classical antiquity which we make is altogether unjustifiable.”⁶

It is in the application of this general principle that Lewes is at odds with Schlegel. He contended that changes in aesthetic appreciation result from the national origins of artistic works, as well as from the passage of time. The foreign poet “wrote to his nation and for his time”—not for ours—and so it is a fallacious criticism that applies the aesthetic values of one nation to the works of art of another. Here he collides head-on with Schlegel's ideas about the French Classical drama. Schlegel felt that the writer who builds his play around an ancient subject should enter the spirit of antiquity and enable the spectators to do so as well. If it is founded on a Greek fable, the playwright should preserve the simple manners of its heroes, and the characters should resemble the gods from which they descended. The dramatist should not—as Racine did—give them the manners and refinement that characterize the court of Louis XIV and allow them to get into situations that could not even exist among the ancient Greeks.⁷

But to Lewes, the critic should regard Racine with the eyes of a seventeenth-century Frenchman. Schlegel was wrong in judging his plays as they relate to the ancient dramas of the Greeks, because Racine's object was not to imitate a Greek play but “to ennoble his countrymen, taking the antique as his model”, by depicting Frenchmen and their sentiments in order to move and interest Parisians, not ancient Athenians.⁸ It is perhaps pertinent to note here that Goethe had expressed substantially the same idea about Shakespeare in his “Conversations with Eckermann”, which Lewes was, of course, familiar with, agreeing with Lewes rather than with Schlegel. Just as Racine converted his Greeks into Frenchmen, so, writes Goethe, Shakespeare “machte seine Römer zu Engländern, und zwar wieder mit Recht, denn sonst hätte ihn seine Nation nicht verstanden.”⁹

Lewes's other major disagreement with Schlegel concerns their ideas on the classification of the works of art of various times and countries. Schlegel's distinction was based on a division between classic and romantic, or ancient and modern, art.¹⁰ Lewes rejected this as “unscientific”, claiming that the two classifications should be “subjective” and “objective”, or northern and southern. Madame de Staël had made the same distinction in her work De La Littérature, first published in 1801, which Lewes had read, and doubtless this was the source of his classification of literature into that of the northern and that of the southern peoples. His application of the terms “subjective” and “objective” to designate the drama of the north and the south respectively was not original with him, but his interpretation of them gave an added dimension to his relativistic approach to literature.

He illustrates the differences in his criticism by the drama of Calderón and Alfieri as opposed to that of Shakespeare. The aim of the English poet, whose art is essentially subjective, is “the dramatic evolution of character and passion.” The Spaniard or the Italian, as an objective artist, “never attempts more than the evolution of plot.”¹¹ In the “objective” drama of the South, interest concentrates on the story; character and passion are the means to the end of telling it. In the “subjective” drama of the North the opposite obtains: Shakespeare's object is to illustrate character and passion, and he used the story as a means to accomplish this purpose, and so it is “subordinate to the higher aim”. In the Spanish and Italian drama, the plot is the chief concern; the feelings of the characters are definite and distinct; and their emotions are revealed by their actions, not their thoughts. There are no subtle complications in the delineation of these “objective” characters. But Shakespeare's treatment of them is essentially “subjective”.

Lewes's reason for making these distinctions is to prove that the northern and southern dramatists started out with different purposes in mind, and that what was art to the one was not art to the other. His idea is to show that “subjective” art is simply different in a very fundamental sense from “objective” art—and not necessarily superior. He concludes that a judgment of the work of Alfieri or Calderón should depend on its quality as it relates to the “objective” standards of Italian or Spanish art, just as a judgment of Shakespeare depends on the “subjective” standards of English art. Unless a decision about the relative merits of Alfieri and Shakespeare, for example, is made on the basis of these two differing sets of critical criteria, it is a fallacious and unjust decision, because Alfieri will always be considered inferior to Shakespeare if he is measured according to Shakespeare's aesthetic standards and not his own. Schlegel, according to Lewes, failed to consider these “objective” and “subjective” diversities in artistic aim in his criticism of the drama of various ages and national origins, and so was in error in his comparative judgments of the works of such dramatists as Shakespeare, Alfieri, and Racine.

There are also some interesting points of agreement and disagreement between Lewes's and Schlegel's critical methods. An exponent of the “synthetic”—as opposed to the “analytic”—method, Schlegel had considerable influence on Lewes's early critical writings, and in 1840 Lewes expressed the hope that the “polemical fault-finding and superficial criticism of this analytical age” would give way to “a deeper and truer spirit of synthetical exposition”.¹² But within the next three years, he had changed his mind, probably because of his increasing absorption in Auguste Comte's scientific Positivism. In his article on Schlegel he expressed his preference for the “science over the metaphysics of criticism, and claimed that the “philosophic” method, by rejecting analysis in favor of synthesis, substitutes “easy theorizing for philosophic judgment”.¹³ He comments acridly on R. H. Horne's account of the advantages of the synthetic over the analytic process, which is included in Horne's introduction to Black's translation of Über Dramatische Kunst und Litteratur. Synthetic criticism “reconciles apparently conflicting elements and contradictory details, by referring them to some common principle”,¹⁴ according to Horne.

Lewes, however, disagreed. He felt that the “apparently conflicting elements and contradictory details” of a work should be analyzed and studied as individual parts of the whole, and that they should be judged on the basis of standards related to the work of art, and not by reference to some extraneous “common principle”. On the other hand, Lewes could contemplate nature and art “under their largest and most entire aspects, and receiving the full impression of all objects and designs”,¹⁵ even though Horne felt that only synthetic critics had this capability. Lewes could “synthetize” the conclusions he drew on the basis of analysis into a comprehensive whole in order to form a complete impression, whenever such a synthesis was necessary. His major claim against an exclusively synthetic method was that it neglects due analysis, and he cites examples from Schlegel's own criticism to demonstrate this point.

The art of the Greeks, according to Schlegel, expresses “the consciousness of the harmony of all their faculties”. They “invented the poetry of gladness” because of the inspiration of polytheism, while the moderns, under the influence of Christianity, composed a poetry of desire. “Die Poesie der Alten war die des Besitzes, die unsrige ist die der Sehnsucht; jene steht fest auf dem Boden der Gegenwart, diese wiegt sich zwischen Erinnerung und Ahunng.”¹⁶

The translator rendered the phrase “die Poesie des Besitzes” as the “poetry of enjoyment”—probably construing it as meaning originally “the poetry of the possessor of present enjoyment”—and Lewes accepted the translation as it stands. But he rejected the antithesis. To say that the Greeks invented the “poetry of gladness” is a “downright absurdity”. What place does gladness have, he asks, “amidst the intense bitterness and horror of Aeschylus, the pathos of Sophocles, the crime and rhetoric of Euripides?” There is wit and fun in Aristiphanes, he concedes; but where is the ‘consciousness of the harmony of his faculties?’ Schlegel's ideas, Lewes feels, are “founded on an a priori view of the consequences of such a religion as polytheism, not upon an examination of the facts.” If religion has an effect upon art, then Christianity, with its hope for a higher life after death, would be more of an inspiration for the poetry of gladness than Greek polytheism, which holds no such hope. Lewes judges the possible effect of religion on Greek drama on the basis of his observation of the plays and not, as Schlegel does, on the basis of a preconceived hypothesis concerning the nature of polytheism. His conclusion about the kind of poetry the Greeks invented is false because, as Lewes points out, reading the works themselves will demonstrate that they never wrote such poetry.

Another example of the weakness of “synthetical appreciation” that Lewes cites is Schlegel's criticism of Shakespeare's characterization of Shylock. Schlegel's view is that Shylock, although an individual in his own right, still has “a slight touch of Judaism in everything which he says or does. We imagine we hear a sprinkling of the Jewish pronunciation in the mere written words.”¹⁷ Taking exception to this comment, Lewes writes,

Surely, if critics are allowed to ‘imagine in this way, sane men will shut their ears. If criticism is to become a province of conjecture and imagination, not a science, the sooner it be abolished the better. To conjecture is easy; to know is difficult; therefore, unless we curb the vagabond licence of the former, the latter will grow into rusty disuse.¹⁸

In the ensuing years, criticism has gone the way of Lewes's “science” rather than Schlegel's conjecture, particularly in regard to Lewes's insistence that the critic concentrate on the work of art itself, rather than on extraneous factors pertaining to it, in arriving at his final aesthetic judgments.

But although Lewes repudiated Schlegel's critical method, he used many of Schlegel's ideas in the formulation of his own critical conceptions. For example, concerning Shakespeare's delineation of character and passion, Schlegel considers that Shakespeare “gives us the history of minds: he lays open to us, in a single word, a whole series of preceding conditions.”¹⁹ In very much the same terms, Lewes attributes to Shakespeare's characterizations those “slight touches which reveal preceding conditions of the mind and the affections”²⁰ and calls attention to his ability to portray, by a few hints, a character's past life by picturing “the man as he always appears, and not only as he appears in the present scene.”²¹ We have already seen, in addition, the similarity between Lewes's and Schlegel's views on critical relativism. There were also points of agreement in their ideas on the classification of works of art. They both felt that climate and natural surroundings exert a tremendous influence upon the artistic capabilities of the northern and southern peoples. The northerner's imagination is “gloomy”, according to Schlegel; the southerner's is “glowing”. The one has a “scrutinizing seriousness” and is disposed to withdraw into himself; the other is “impelled outwardly by the violence of passion”.²² Lewes's division of art into “objective” and “subjective” categories is based on the same distinction between the temperaments of southern and northern peoples, although his use of this distinction does not accord with Schlegel's in his criticism of the drama of varying national origins. Here he agrees with Schlegel's premise but goes his own way in applying it.

Another aspect of Lewes's resemblance to Schlegel is in his opinions concerning the proper understanding of art. Specifically referring to drama, he writes that “we must patiently examine the works of art; and, from a large observation of successful efforts, deduce general conclusions respecting the laws upon which success depends.”²³ Schlegel had enunciated the same principle many years previously: “The comparing together and judging the existing productions of the human mind must supply us with a knowledge of the means which are requisite for the conception and execution of masterly works of art.”²⁴

On the basis of this principle—which he probably derived from Schlegel—Lewes deduces the idea that the “Rules of Art”, being based on a “large observation of successful efforts”, are not absolute in themselves and binding on all generations, but are “conclusions which from time to time experience appears to have warranted, with respect to the best methods of attaining the artist's aim.” The appearance of every truly original poet, consequently, probably originates new laws, which critics, as the “Judges and Police of literature”, try to enforce. These are the only valid rules by which a work of art should be judged; the application of abstract philosophical principles to works which the artist never suspected to be philosophical is, then, “a vain and misplaced employment of ingenuity” and no advance to criticism.²⁵

In formulating these conclusions, Lewes defined another aspect of his belief in the flexibility of aesthetic laws. He tried to hold to it in his dramatic criticism; although Schlegel professed a similar belief, at least in principle, he was inconsistent in his application of it, and made the error, as Lewes pointed out, of judging works of art by reference to standards founded on abstract philosophy which had no direct relationship to the works themselves.

Lewes accepts Schlegel's definition of a “true critic” as one who possesses “a universality of mind” and

the flexibility which, throwing aside all personal predilections and blind habits, enables him to transport himself into the peculiarities of other ages and nations, to feel them, as it were from their proper central point.²⁶

But, while accepting this definition, Lewes repudiates Schlegel himself; in his opinion, Schlegel is not a true critic because “he has failed in placing himself at the central point of view”. Lewes feels that his practice contradicts his precept. Schlegel says that a true critic should have “universality” and “flexibility” of mind, but he lacks these qualities himself because he does not realize that aesthetic laws are inconstant and that works of art should be judged not by absolute standards but by those that are appropriate to these works and consequently flexible. Again Lewes accepts Schlegel's principle, but rejects his criticism because his point of view does not permit him to understand fully the true meaning and quality of the works of art of nations and ages other than his own.

I have tried to show that Lewes's defections from Schlegel apparently were based more on matters of procedure than of principle, and on questions relating to Schlegel's practice rather than to his precept. But there are many points on which they agree. In several instances Lewes's conclusions are based upon Schlegel's original conceptions, and there seems to be little doubt that Schlegel's influence on Lewes was more profound and more lasting than Lewes himself either realized or admitted. His criticism, then, has a strong German foundation—which, as strong German foundations often do, contributed materially to both its solidity and its quality.

Notes

1. Bernard Shaw, Our Theatres in the Nineties (London, 1931), III, 163.

2. George Henry Lewes (herein-after GHL), “Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel”, in Foreign Quarterly Review, XXXII (1843), 160-181.

3. GHL, “The French Drama: Racine and Victor Hugo”, Westminster Review, XXXVI (1840), 289.

4. GHL, “Leigh Hunt and the Italian Poets”, Foreign Quarterly Review (1845-46), 337.

5. F. A. Pottle, The Idiom of Poetry (Ithaca, 1946), p. 6.

6. A. W. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, translated from the German by John Black (London, 1840), II, 98-99. In Über Dramatische Kunst und Literatur (Heidelberg, 1809), Abt. 2, 9.

7. A, W. Schlegel, Über Dramatische Kunst …, II, 130-132.

8. GHL, “The French Drama …”, p. 294.

9. Johann Peter Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den Letzten Jahren seines Lebens, edit. Dr. H. H. Heuben (Leipzig, 1909), p. 182. “… made his Romans into Englishmen, and again so with justification, for otherwise his nation would not have understood him.”

10. Schlegel, Über Dramatische Kunst …, I, 12-13.

11. GHL, “Spanish Drama: Lope de Vega and Calderón”, Foreign Quarterly Review, XXXI (1843), 506.

12. GHL, “The French Drama …”, p. 287.

13. GHL, “Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel”, pp. 163 ff.

14. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures …, Introduction, p. xi.

15. Schlegel, Über Dram. Kunst …, I, 24; in A Course of Lectures, I, 16.

16. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures …, II, 136. In Über Dramatische Kunst, II, Abt. 2, 60. Literally: “The poetry of the Ancients was one of possession, ours is one of longing; the former firmly stands on the foundation of the present, the latter balances between reminiscence and presentiment.”

17. GHL, “Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel”, pp. 180-181.

18. Ibid.

19. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures …, II, 136. In Über Dramatische Kunst, II, Abt. 2, 60.

20. GHL, “Spanish Drama …”, p. 506.

21. GHL, “Alfieri and the Italian Drama”, in British and Foreign Review, XVII (1845), 374.

22. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures …, I, 2. In Über Dramatische Kunst, I, Abt. 2, 13.

23. GHL, “Shakespeare's Critics: English and Foreign”, Edinburgh Review, XC (1849), 68.

24. Schlegel, A Course of Lectures …, I, 2. In Über Dramatische Kunst, I, 4.

25. GHL, “Shakespeare's Critics …”, p. 40.

26. Quoted by GHL in “Augustus Wilhelm Schlegel, 175.