SOURCE: Dunn, Francis M. “Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K).” American Journal of Philology 117, no. 1 (1996): 65-69.

[In the following essay, Dunn argues that the attribution of a fragment defining the nature of time to Antiphon the Sophist is valid.]

The simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon's understanding of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a substance (87 B9 Diels-Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discussions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not to Antiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument in support of this statement,¹ but given the potential importance of this fragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time, we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.

ANTIPHON OR ANTIPHANES?

Fragment 9 in Diels-Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Aetius (1.22.6) under the heading Πεϱὶ οὐsίας χϱόνου, preserved in Stobaeus (1.8.40b):²

'Αντιφῶν aαὶ Κϱιτόλαος νόημα e μέτϱον τὸν χϱόνον, οὐχ ὑπόsταsιν. ἀντιφῶν F: ἀντιφάνης P, F mrg., Photius

In the text of Diels-Kranz, emphasis is used to distinguish the quote or citation proper (νόημα e μέτϱον τὸν χϱόνον) from the gloss or clarification that accompanies it (οὐχ ὑπόsταsιν). The distinction seems to me correct: since it is not immediately obvious what it means to regard time as a “concept or measure” (and two thinkers may have done so in different ways), the gloss is an attempt by the compiler to delimit this (shared) view. The delimiting term is relatively late (ὑπόsταsις with the implied meaning “substance” is not attested before Aristotle and Theophrastus; cf. LSJ sv III). So if the first thinker cited is Antiphon the sophist, usage confirms that the term was later supplied by the complier; on the other hand, if we suspend judgment on the identity of Antiphon (or Antiphanes), this late usage does not help to date the view that time is νόημα e μέτϱον.

This brings us to the attribution of the fragment: was Diels correct in printing 'Αντιφῶν? and was he correct in identifying this figure as the Athenian sophist? Taking the first question first, we must consider the possibility that the marginal gloss in F was meant as a correction, and that the lemma assigning the fragment to Antiphanes should be followed. Context, however, clearly indicates otherwise. Under the rubric Πεϱὶ οὐsίας χϱόνου, the compiler of the Placita³ has assembled the views of various philosophers: Plato, Xenocrates, Hestiaeus of Perinthus, Straton, Epicurus, Critolaus and the Stoics (1.22.1-7). Antiphon the sophist is repeatedly cited in this compilation (2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3, 3.16.4), whereas Antiphanes the comic poet is never cited at all. The textual confusion arose because this portion of the Placita was extracted by Stobaeus, who also quoted profusely from Antiphanes and other comic poets. To scribes copying Stobaeus, the playwright's name suggested itself more readily than that of the sophist, and the former therefore began to replace the latter.⁴

I have assumed so far (as all editors have done) that the textual variants ἀντιφῶν and ἀντιφάνης entail a choice between Antiphon the sophist and Antiphanes the comic poet. Faced with such a choice, we must choose Antiphon, but Sorabji suggests a third alternative, namely that Antiphon or Antiphanes is a late and obscure peripatetic philosopher. What are the merits of such a suggestion?

A MINOR PERIPATETIC?

Sorabji's Antiphon (or Antiphanes) is so obscure that he has otherwise vanished without leaving a trace. We must therefore decide if it is likely that the Placita not only cited such an individual, but made no attempt to distinguish him from well-known authors who bore the same name. It is worth noting that the compiler of the Placita made no particular attempt to rescue from oblivion the beliefs of insignificant thinkers. Under each rubric he is chiefly concerned with reporting the doctrines of influential philosophers such as Thales, Democritus or Aristotle. The range of views on a given topic may be broadened by including lesser figures, but these are almost always easily identifiable and well-attested in other sources. The reasons for the flooding of the Nile (4.1), for example, are taken from Thales, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Eudoxus, Herodotus and Ephorus; the notion that the river is filled from a fresh-water sea is cited from a lesser figure, Euthymenes of Massilia, who is therefore identified by his place of birth. The factors that determine a child's gender (5.7) are cited from Empedocles, Parmenides, Hippon, Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus; the lesser-known Leophanes, who advised binding the left or right testicle, is glossed for the reader as Lεωφάνης ον μέμνηται 'Αϱιsτοτέλης.⁵ The minor philosophers cited in the Placita are all known to us from other sources with only two exceptions.⁶ The section on tides includes an Apollodorus who is otherwise unknown, but who is clearly distinguished by his place of birth from other thinkers of this name ('Απολλόδωϱος ὁ Κεϱaυϱαĩος 3.17.8); and the section on the destructibility of the universe includes an unknown Epidicus who is distinguished by bearing a proper name (“Liable to Litigation”) that is otherwise unattested (2.4.4).⁷ It is therefore reasonable to assume that in 1.22.6 our compiler refers to Antiphon the sophist. It is highly unlikely that he would refer to an otherwise unknown peripatetic without distinguishing this Antiphon (or Antiphanes) from a more famous namesake.

One might assume that the juxtaposition of another name with that of Critolaus, an active and influential head of the Peripatos, is sufficient identification: the addition aαὶ Κϱιτόλαος identifies our unknown thinker by school as clearly as ὁ Κεϱaυϱαĩος identifies our unknown Apollodorus by birthplace. But such an assumption is not valid. When two or three names are juxtaposed, it does not follow that they have a philosophical affiliation. For belief that god is the spirit of the universe, the Placita cite Diogenes, Cleanthes and Oenopides (1.7.17), juxtaposing two contemporaries of Anaxagoras with the third century head of the Stoa. They credit both Empedocles and Xenocrates with a belief in tiny elements that are, “so to speak, elements of elements” (1.17.3). Parmenides and Democritus both ascribe everything to a necessity which is “fate, and justice, and providence, and creator” (1.25.3). And examples could be multiplied.⁸ So when the Placita attribute the notion that time is a “concept or measure” to two different thinkers, there is no reason to assume that these thinkers belong to the same school.

Finally, the order of lemmas within a particular heading does not help to place an author chronologically. In Stobaeus, Placita 1.7 (πεϱὶ θεοῦ), for example, place Anaxagoras after Archelaus (14-15), Pythagoras after Diogenes of Babylon (17-18), Heraclitus after Critolaus (21-22), Parmenides after Boethus (25-26), and Plato after Xenocrates (30-31). So the place of our lemma after one for Epicurus (1.22.5-6) does not imply a more recent date for Antiphon (or Antiphanes).

Diels was therefore right on both counts: the fragment under discussion should read Antiphon, not Antiphanes, and the doctrine it reports should be ascribed to the fifth-century sophist. A last possible objection to this attribution brings us to the larger question of the specific view (or views) to which the compiler alludes. Sorabji's view seems to be that the doctrine our fragment reports—that time is a concept or measure—cannot be earlier than Aristotle, since it responds to a particular set of problems first articulated in the Physics. By defining time as number (Physics 4.11), and by then posing the paradox that if there is no-one to “count” time, it will not exist (Physics 4.14), Aristotle raises a question to which members of his school repeatedly returned, and which was addressed in an interesting and influential way by Alexander of Aphrodisias.⁹ It may be that when Critolaus calls time a concept or measure (rather than a substance), he is taking sides in this debate and arguing, as Aristotle had done, that the existence of time requires a measuring mind. But it does not follow that the fragment attributes a similar argument to Antiphon. The notion that time is a “concept” or “measure” need have nothing at all to do with Aristotle's particular problem, and just as the Placita cite together the views of Empedocles and Xenocrates on elements and those of Parmenides and Democritus on necessity, here they juxtapose a sophistic with a peripatetic view of time.

Exactly what that sophistic view was or might have been is another question, one that cannot be answered here. Antiphon was certainly concerned with the passage and the apprehension of time. He argued that human life is ephemeral, a short span within a larger continuum (B50, B51); he stressed that time is not reversible (B52); and he warned against letting time slip away (B54, B77). Since justice for Antiphon consists neither in general precepts nor in a body of laws, but in an individual's proper and advantageous action in a particular situation (B44), I suspect he would argue that time has no existence apart from an individual's recognition of temporally marked events. But however we reconstruct the details of Antiphon's views, we may with confidence make use of the citation from the Placita.¹⁰

Notes

1. Sorabji, Time, Creation, Continuum 95: “I have already remarked that Aristotelians were very much divided on the relation of time to consciousness. Two of them, Critolaus (c. 190-155 b. c.) and Antiphon (or Antiphanes), are said to have held that time is not a reality (hupostasis), but a concept (noêma) or a measure (metron),” citing Stobaeus Eclogae 1.8 and Diels, Doxographi 318.

2. The text of the fragment follows Diels and Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, and the apparatus follows Diels, Doxographi. In what follows, the Placita ascribed to Aetius are cited from Diels, Doxographi, and Stobaeus is cited from the edition of Wachsmuth and Hense, Anthologium. On the compiler of the Placita, see the following note. Contrast Guthrie, History III 292 n. 1, who states that this formulation by Antiphon “is the earliest extant Greek definition of time,” and goes on to compare it with that of Aristotle in the Physics.

3. As Lebedev, “Doxographer Aetius” points out, the name Aetius is attested only by the often-confused Theodoretus; he suggests as possible compilers the middle Platonists Arius and/or Eudorus.

4. The philosopher 'Αλaμαίων is likewise replaced by the poet 'Αλaμάν in Theodoretus' excerpt from the Placita, 4.2.2 (Diels, Doxographi 386). Antiphon's name was apparently confused again at 2.29.3, where manuscripts have the lemma 'Αλaμαίων ‘Ηϱάaλειτος 'Αντίφαντος.

5. Aristotle cites Leophanes at de Gen. Anim. 4.1 (765a25). He was also cited, in a different context, by Theophrastus, de Causis Plantarum 2.4.12.

6. Reference to Aristagoras' theory of vision (4.13.8) is most likely an error for Aristarchus; compare 1.15.9 and 1.15.5, and Diels, Addenda (Doxographi 853).

7. Hence the confusion among the manuscripts, which also report his name as ἐπιδίaτου and 'Επίδεaτος (Stobaeus 1.21.6). The name was presumably given to a slave in comedy for humorous effect (Plautus, Epidicus 25).

8. See for example 1.29.7 (Anaxagoras and the Stoics), 3.15.1 (Thales and Democritus), 4.5.1 (Plato and Democritus), 4.5.5 (Parmenides and Epicurus), 5.1.2 (Xenophanes and Epicurus), 5.23.1 (Heraclitus and the Stoics).

9. Sorabji, Time, Creation, Continuum 84-97, esp. 95-97; compare Sharples, “Alexander of Aphrodisias.”

10. My thanks to Robert Renehan for his helpful comments.

Bibliography

Diels, Hermann, ed. Doxographi Graeci. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958.

Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-52.

Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. 6 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-81.

Lebedev, A. V. “Did the Doxographer Aetius Ever Exist?” In Philosophie et culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès mondial de philosophie, 813-17. Montreal: du Beffroi, 1983.

Sharples, R. W. “Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Time.” Phronesis 27 (1982) 58-81.

Sorabji, Richard. Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. London: Duckworth, 1983.

Wachsmuth, Curtius, and Otto Hense, eds. Stobaeus: Anthologium. 5 vols. Berlin: Weidmann, 1884-1912.