In this article I argue that Tocqueville's view of democracy in Democracy in America (1835/1987) is in large measure given content and structure by the metaphor theme "DEMOCRACY IS A (PASSIONATE) PERSON." The analysis of Tocqueville's metaphors reveals that he saw American democracy as a highly defective system in which a dangerous social force needs to be controlled by other social forces. This result goes against the commonly held view that Tocqueville had a very positive opinion of American democracy. Issues that the "PERSON" metaphor allows us to examine include: What is the relation between the body politic and the "PERSON" metaphor? Was Tocqueville an essentialist or an environmentalist in his position regarding American democracy? To what degree did the "PERSON" metaphor enable Tocqueville to come up with an adequate conceptualization of American democracy? I suggest that the "PERSON" metaphor is a much more complex idea than that of the body politic, that Tocqueville is both an essentialist and an environmentalist, and that the "PERSON" metaphor, although an improvement on the body politic, does not work for democracy.

The general issue that I discuss in this article is: What were Tocqueville's underlying and ready-made ideas when he described American democracy in Democracy in America (1835/1987). I am not as interested in what he explicitly said about American democracy as in what he assumed when he explicitly said something about it. For example, one theme that Tocqueville was very explicit about is that, in his view, (American) democracy is a tyranny of the majority. My concern is not with explicit assertions of this kind, but with underlying ideas and conceptualizations that Tocqueville possibly assumed when he was thinking about and writing Democracy in America. That is, I concern myself with what is subconscious—as opposed to what is self-conscious—in his writing about democracy. Furthermore, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically to some people, I focus on the ready-made ideas that Tocqueville made use of in his work. In other words, for the purposes of the present article I am more interested in what is unoriginal than in what is original in Tocqueville's ideas concerning democracy. The notions of subconscious assumptions and ready-made, unoriginal ideas of course go hand in hand. People typically assume ideas that are ready-made for them in a given culture or intellectual environment. As a cognitive linguist, these are precisely the kinds of things that interest me. I also hope that the explication of these unoriginal ideas help us to better understand and place in context Tocqueville's views.

I study Tocqueville's assumptions with an approach that relies on his linguistic usage and especially his metaphorical linguistic usage in Democracy in America. My study is based on Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, in press) and the methodology that I use in the analysis of Tocqueville's language is an adaptation of the methodology I used in the study of emotion concepts (e.g., Kövecses, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). A metaphor is viewed here as a set of mappings, or correspondences, that exists between a source and a target domain. Mappings enable people to make inferences. A particularly relevant example of mappings and inferences is the idea of the body politic, which has long been with us in our attempt to understand our social-political reality. The metaphor consists of the human body as the source domain and human society as the target domain. It is characterized by a number of mappings. The mappings that have been proposed, at one time or another (for a review, see Hale, 1971), for the "HUMAN SOCIETY IS THE HUMAN BODY" metaphor include the following: head = ruler, stomach = senate, feet = laborers, arm = soldiers. To see how inferences can be made based on these mappings, we need only recall the tale of the stomach and the hands in one well-known application of the body politic, in which knowledge about the assumed functioning of the human body was used to justify a particular social-political structure.

The major metaphor that Tocqueville assumed in the discussion of democracy is that "DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON" (on "SOCIETY IS A PERSON," see e.g., Lakoff, 1992). In addition, he assumed several other things that are all conceptually related to this metaphor. The first is a certain folk theory of a person—that is, an understanding of how a person is structured. The basic dichotomies Tocqueville seemed to assume here involve the bodymind distinction, the bifurcation of mind into reason and passion, and the relation between the two (see, e.g., Kövecses, 1990; Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987). Second, he assumed a view that often accompanies this metaphor. It can be called the "doctrine of the nature of things": a view that maintains that things, including people, have an essence, and this essence determines the behavior of things (Hale, 1971; Lakoff & Turner, 1989). Third, also present in Tocqueville's thinking was the notion that is known as "the great chain of being." According to this notion, things in the world, including people, come in a certain hierarchical order: For example, society is above human beings and human beings are above animals and the like. (Lakoff & Turner, 1989).

The significance of these ideas is that they raise interesting questions concerning Tocqueville's thinking about American democracy. For example, it can be asked in connection with the "PERSON" metaphor itself whether this is merely another version of the body politic, or is it something else? From where does the "PERSON" metaphor Tocqueville used come? Even more important, could Tocqueville make the metaphor work for the concept of democracy at all? With regard to the "essence of things" doctrine, we can ask whether Tocqueville was an "environmentalist" or an "essentialist" in his conception of American democracy. These are some of the questions that will be addressed in the light of the analysis to follow. The possibility of raising these issues indicates that the approach to Tocqueville's conception that is adopted in this article is not a mere linguistic game that is intended to investigate the metaphorical usage of the word democracy in Tocqueville's work. What we can find out on the basis of this analysis is how Tocqueville conceptualized the subject matter of his study—American democracy, what the main elements of that conceptualization were, and to what degree these elements influenced his entire thinking about his subject matter.

The following analysis is based on the first of two volumes of Democracy in America (Tocqueville, 1835/1987) because this is the volume that contains most of Tocqueville's discussion of the concept of democracy and the main features of its particular manifestation in America.

THE GENERAL "PERSON" METAPHOR

The linguistic metaphors discussed in this section may or may not be viewed as instances of the "PERSON" metaphor when observed individually. However, when observed together and considering the examples in later sections they strongly suggest a "PERSON" interpretation.

Each person has a certain nature, and as a result of the "PERSON" metaphor democracy is also viewed as having a nature—that is, a set of essential qualities: "Agitation and mutability are inherent in the nature of democratic republics" (p. 311).¹ In addition to having a certain nature, a person has certain propensities or inclinations. This property of persons is also carried over to democracy. The propensities of the person correspond to the general natural tendencies of the democracy. The nature and propensities of the person often result in characteristic forms of behavior. The same applies to democracy. The qualities and tendencies of democracy produce certain forms of behavior: "In America democracy is given up to its own propensities; its course is natural and its activity is unrestrained" (p. 199).

The person may suffer injuries and may have certain defects. So may the democracy: "The preponderance of capital cities is therefore a serious injury to the representative system; and it exposes modern republics to the same defect as the republics of antiquity" (p. 290). But just like a person, democracy may also be successful: "The early settlers bequeathed to their descendents the customs, manners and opinions that contribute to the success of the republic" (p. 290). Finally, a person may have enemies. Democracy is no exception in this respect either, for example: "I think that the Catholic religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy" (p. 300), and "In the United States no religious doctrine displays the slightest hostility to democratic and republican institutions" (p. 302). These properties seem to be the general ones that define democracy in terms of the "PERSON" metaphor. Tocqueville assumed a notion of democracy characterized by these aspects of our beliefs about a person. The "PERSON" metaphor for democracy is constituted by the particular correspondences between the concept of person and the concept of democracy.

Similar to these correspondences, democracy can be characterized as an entity with the following properties: It has some essential qualities, it has some natural tendencies, it has some characteristic forms of behavior, it can be harmed, it can have defects, it can be successful, and it can have enemies. These properties provide only a vague and very general characterization of democracy. It is vague and general because the properties previously listed apply to many metaphorically structured concepts other than democracy. In addition, this characterization does not really say anything specific about American democracy. The question that we need to ask at this point is this: How could Tocqueville support the "PERSON" metaphor and succeed in being more precise and specific? We can get a much more specific idea of democracy in general and American democracy in particular in Tocqueville's work if we look at other examples that fall under the same general metaphor.

"PASSIONATE PERSON"

We have a pervasive folk theory of persons. This folk theory maintains that a person has a nature and propensities, that a person behaves in certain ways, and that a person's nature and propensities lead to characteristic forms of behavior. Given the metaphorical correspondences between a person's nature and the essential qualities of democracy and the propensities of a person and the natural tendencies of democracy, we also find the metaphorical inference in Tocqueville's work that the essential qualities and the natural tendencies of the democracy lead to some characteristic behaviors in democracy. Consider the following examples:

Agitation and mutability are inherent in the nature of democratic republics. (p. 311)

In America democracy is given up to its own propensities; its course is natural and its activity is unrestrained. (p. 199)

The propensity that induces democracies to obey impulses rather than prudence. (p. 235)

Democratic institutions awaken and foster a passion for equality which they can never entirely satisfy. (p. 201)

As the examples indicate, the person's nature and propensities can lead him or her to be engaged in passions and in actions. In the same way, the democracy's essential qualities and natural tendencies can lead the people in the democracy to be passionate. What corresponds to the person's characteristic passions are the characteristic passions of a democratic people. We can get a sense of the characteristic passions of the people in America from the examples that follow:

For a taste for variety is one of the characteristic passions of democracy. (p. 206)

As a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures of the rich or to witness them without envy. (p. 218a)

The instinct [for lower orders to remove their superiors from the direction of public affairs] to which I allude is not French, it is democratic. (pp. 201-2)

While the natural instincts of democracy induce the people to reject distinguished citizens as their rulers. (p. 202)

In Europe we are wont to look upon a restless disposition, an unbounded desire of riches, and an excessive love of independence as propensities very dangerous to society. Yet these are the very elements that ensure a long and peaceful future to the republics of America. (p. 296)

Moreover, all democratic communities are agitated by an ill-defined excitement and a kind of feverish impatience that creates a multitude of innovations. (p. 216)

A part of our folk theory of emotion is that the passions of a person frequently change, are unstable. Correspondingly, the passions of the people in democracy can also be seen as frequently changing and being unstable.

Not that the American democracy is naturally less stable than any other, but it is allowed to follow, in the formation of the laws, the natural instability of its desires. (p. 257)

the mutability and the ignorance of democracy ... (p. 267)

I grant that the wishes of the democracy are capricious. (p. 329)

Another part of this folk theory is that the passions of the person induce the person to do things that gratify his momentary passions. Similarly, passions in the democracy can be viewed as inducing the people to do things that gratify their momentary passions.

The propensity that induces democracies to obey impulses rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion, was clearly seen in America on the breaking out of the French Revolution. (p. 235)

It [American democracy] is allowed to follow, in the formation of the laws, the natural instability of its desires. (p. 257)

Moreover, just as his or her passions can be dangerous for the person, so the passions of the people can be dangerous for the democracy. The people can be intoxicated and carried away by their passions—that is, they can lose control and thus jeopardize the existence or functioning of the democracy. Not surprisingly, the folk theory maintains that the passions of the person have to be controlled. The inference for democracy is that it may be necessary to control the passions of the American people:

When the American people are intoxicated by passion or carried away by the impetuosity of their ideas, they are checked and stopped by the almost invisible influence of their legal counselors. These secretly oppose their aristocratic propensities to the nation's democratic instincts, their superstitious attachment to what is old to its love of novelty, their narrow views to its immense designs, and their habitual procrastinations to its ardent impatience. (p. 278)

The courts of justice are the visible organs by which the legal professions is enabled to control the democracy. (p. 278)

A further piece of folk knowledge about human emotional behavior is that sometimes it is difficult for a person to control his or her passions. In the same vein, sometimes it is difficult for a democracy to control the passions of its people.

The difficulty that a democracy finds in conquering the passions and subduing the desires of the moment with a view to the future is observable in the United States in the most trivial things. The people, surrounded by flatterers, find great difficulty in surmounting their inclinations. (p. 230)

However, according to our folk theory, certain things can control the passions of the person. The same is applied to democracy: Certain things can control the passions of the people. For example, "If passing occurrences sometimes check the passions of democracy, the intelligence and the morals of the community exercise an influence on them which is not less powerful and far more permanent" (p. 203). It should be noticed and clearly understood that this is a chain of reasoning based on metaphor. It only makes sense to us because Tocqueville metaphorically conceived of the abstract concept of democracy as a person and we share with him a large part of the beliefs he had about people.

Here is a summary of these beliefs and their metaphorical applications (S stands for the source domain of the metaphor: "PERSON;" T stands for the target domain of the metaphor: "DEMOCRACY."

S: The passions of a person frequently change, are unstable.

T: Passions of the people in a democracy frequently change, are unstable.

S: The passions of the person induce the person to do things that gratify his or her momentary passions.

T: The passions of the democratic people induce the people to do things that gratify their momentary passions.

S: The passions of a person can be dangerous for that person.

T: The passions of the people in a democracy can be dangerous for the democracy.

S: The passions of the person have to be controlled.

T: The passions of the democratic people have to be controlled.

S: Sometimes it is difficult for a person to control his or her passions.

T: Sometimes it is difficult to control the passions of a democratic people.

S: Certain things can control the passions of the person.

T: Certain things can control the passions of the democracy.

It may be remarked that the sheer number of the examples relating to intense emotional behavior indicates Tocqueville's preoccupation with this aspect of human social behavior. Furthermore, the particular ways in which he used this part of the "PERSON" metaphor reveals his fear of intense emotional behavior in a democratic people.

"RATIONAL PERSON"

Tocqueville believed that democracy does not simply possess an emotional aspect, but also a rational one. A person's nature and propensities dispose him or her to engage in certain mental actions, not only to feel in certain ways. Corresponding to these mental actions of the person are the various choices and decisions that are made in American democracy. The most conspicuous feature of American democracy in this regard is that it is deficient in the choices that are made in the selection of its leaders. Here are some examples that show this:

Democracy not only lacks that soundness of judgment which is necessary to select men really deserving of their confidence, but often have not the desire or the inclination to find them out. (p. 201)

The vast number of very ordinary men . . . is quite attributable to . . . the bad choice of democracy. (p. 208)

. . . that American democracy frequently errs in the choice of the individuals to whom it entrusts the power of the administration. (p. 239)

In these examples the person's lack of sound judgment corresponds to the people's lack of sound judgment in American democracy; in this case, it is the sound judgment that is required to choose the most suitable persons for government. However, there are differences between places in the United States in this respect. The democracy (i.e., the people) in New England seems to be more sensible than it is elsewhere: "In New England, consequently, the democracy makes a more judicious choice than it does elsewhere" (p. 203).

Just as a person's nature and propensities can be such that they do not enable the person to comprehend something, so can democracy's essential qualities and tendencies. The correspondence here is between the person's inability to comprehend something and the people's inability to comprehend it: "As a democracy is unable to conceive the pleasures of the rich or to witness them without envy . . ." (p. 218). Even more seriously, democracy is downright ignorant: "the mutability and the ignorance of democracy . . ." (p. 267). What makes this charge against democracy serious is that ignorance is a "rigid" property of human beings—that is, it is inherently and permanently present in a person. When it is used of democracy, it lends democracy the character that by its very nature it tends to make the wrong decisions.

On a more positive note, democracy possesses a certain degree of wisdom. But here again, its wisdom does not extend equally to all aspects of democracy. A person may have a great deal of wisdom to do certain things, but very little wisdom to do other things. The same holds for democracy. On the one hand, democracy is wise enough to accept a government as a necessary evil; but on the other hand, it may not be wise enough to conduct its foreign policy properly. The following examples illustrate this point:

In the estimation of democracy a government is not a benefit, but a necessary evil. (p. 207)

It is . . . difficult to ascertain . . . what degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the conduct of the foreign policy of the country; (p. 234)

It is . . . in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments. Experience, instruction, and habit almost always succeed in creating in a democracy a homely species of practical wisdom. . . . Good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society. . . . But it is not always so in the relations with foreign nations. (p. 234)

Whereas democracy may have enough wisdom and sagacity in the conduct of the ordinary affairs of society, this does not seem to be the case in the conducting of its foreign relations.

Democracy can be a reasonable person. It can make reasonable decisions. For example, of the many possibilities at its disposal it adopted a form of government that is compatible with the Constitution of the United States: "The political Constitution of the United States appears to me to be one of the forms of government that a democracy may adopt" (p. 237).

Its actions are not only based on emotion and passion. They are also determined by certain purposes. It is a purposeful person that can serve humanly useful goals: "that the purpose of a democracy in its legislation is more useful to humanity than that of an aristocracy" (p. 238).

However, it does not seem to be suitable to achieve certain other goals: "If you believe such to be the principal object of society, avoid the government of the democracy, for it would not lead you with certainty to the goal" (p. 252).

"ACTIVE PERSON"

A person not only feels and thinks, he or she also acts. Likewise, a variety of events and activities take place in a democracy, and many of them are performed by the people. However, there is one important kind of activity that, according to Tocqueville, is not performed by the American democracy, or more precisely, by the American people; it is the direction of foreign policy. In some of the previous examples, it was shown that the activities regarding foreign policy are poorly conducted by the government of the democracy. The following example suggests that the people do not participate in the conduct of foreign policy at all:

which tends in some degree to detach the general foreign policy of the Union from the direct control of the people. It cannot, therefore, be asserted with truth that the foreign affairs of the state are conducted by the democracy. (p. 232)

Similar to passions and thought, the kinds of actions a person performs are largely determined by his or her nature and propensities. When this knowledge is carried over to the concept of democracy, we find that democracy is disposed to act in certain characteristic ways. This correspondence between the notion of a person and that of democracy is captured in two of the following examples: "Agitation and mutability are inherent in the nature of democratic republics" . . . (p. 311), and "in America democracy is given up to its own propensities, its course is natural and its activity is unrestrained." (p. 199). As can be seen, the essential qualities and natural tendencies of democracy tend to produce mainly agitated and unrestrained activities. Let us now see if this is borne out by the examples we have for American democracy. Tocqueville raised the issue of the intensity of action in relation to emergency situations, such as national crises: "It is difficult to say what degree of effort a democratic government may be capable of making on the occurrence of a national crisis" (p. 227).

We get an idea of the kinds of activity that characterize democracy in the following example:

Democracy appears to me to be better adapted for the conduct of society in times of peace, or for a sudden effort of remarkable vigor, than for the prolonged endurance of the great storms that beset the political existence of nations. (p. 228)

Thus, democracy is capable of producing sudden, vigorous actions that are likely to be unrestrained. Moreover, democracy seems to be better adapted to function in times of peace.

A person can make mistakes in performing his or her activities. The same applies to democracy:

Though a democracy is more liable to error than a monarch or a body of nobles, the chances of its regaining the right path when once it has acknowledged its mistake are greater also; because it is rarely embarrassed by interests that conflict with those of the majority and resist the authority of reason. (p. 231)

Democracy is also a rational and skillful person in that it uses certain instruments, or means, to accomplish its goals: "I am very far from thinking that we ought to follow the example of the American democracy and copy the means that it has employed to attain this end" (p. 330). The purposes of the person correspond to the goals of democratic society. Just as the person uses instruments to achieve his or her purposes, so democracy uses certain means to attain its goals.

But the predominant characteristic of democracy regarding its characteristic actions seems to be that it , engages in agitated, bustling, forceful, energetic activities. Again, the activities that have these properties are produced by, or result from the "nature" of a democratic society. Several examples demonstrate these properties of action in democracy:

In the former [free country, democratic republic] all is bustle and activity; in the latter everything seems calm and motionless. (p. 249)

This ceaseless agitation which democratic government has introduced into the political world influences all social intercourse. I am not sure if this is not the greatest advantage of democracy; (p. 251)

But it [democracy] produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable to create; namely, an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it and which may, however unfavorable circumstances may be, produce wonders. These are the true advantages of democracy. (p. 252)

When a person produces activities of this kind, his or her activities can easily do damage. Therefore, these intense activities often need to be controlled. Democracy's actions can also easily cause social harm and thus need to be controlled as well.

I have already observed that in democracies the members of the legal profession and the judicial magistrates constitute the only aristocratic body which can moderate the movements of the people. . . . it exercises its conservative influence upon the minds of men. (p. 285)

The unrestrained and agitated actions of a person, and especially the ones that arise from the passions, often lead to excesses of all kinds. The same applies to democracy; we must also deal with its excesses. Courts of justice serve to repress the excesses of American democracy: "I have shown how the courts of justice serve to repress the excesses of democracy" (p. 299).

"ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE PERSON"

Some of the economic aspects of democracy are also understood in terms of the "PERSON" metaphor. Just as people sometimes have difficulties budgeting their money, so democracy has a hard time economizing it: "Democracy does not always lessen its expenditures even when it wishes to do so" (p. 216). A clear tendency is that it economizes on the salaries of public officers: "There is a powerful reason that usually induces democracies to economize upon the salaries of public officers" (p. 216), and "A democratic state is most parsimonious towards its principal agents" (p. 217). But it is much more generous toward the people: "In general, democracy gives largely to the people and very sparingly to those who govern them" (p. 219).

The term people does not include everyone. It includes the greatest number—that is, we can perhaps take the word people to denote the majority. Democracy contributes to the well-being of only the majority: "The advantage of democracy does not consist. . . in favoring the prosperity of all, but simply in contributing to the well-being of the greatest number" (p. 239).

"POLITICAL PERSON"

Just as every person is engaged in the political activities of his or her immediate, local community (no matter what kind of society he or she lives in), so certain activities take place in the political sphere of democracy as a largescale society. A person can be the one who governs others in a local community. This will be his or her function in the community. Correspondingly, one function of democracy is to govern. As the following example makes it clear, when Tocqueville wrote of democracy he meant the people: "It is a difficult question whether aristocracy or democracy governs the best. But it is certain that democracy annoys one part of the community and that aristocracy oppresses another" (p. 190). That is to say, the metaphor brings into correspondence the person who governs a local community with the people (the majority) in a complex, large-scale society.

One major advantage of democracy as a system is that it brings new people to the administration all the time. Here the person of the source domain corresponds to the system of democracy as a whole in the target domain: "In the United States democracy perpetually brings new men to the conduct of public affairs" (p. 188). However, it does not always give the people the best government: "Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government" (p. 252).

"A PERSON WHO IS CAPABLE OF LEARNING"

Just like a person, democracy is also capable of learning and discovering the truth. Like a person, it can be thought of as a self-teaching system. However, unlike human beings, it is a system that can learn only through experience: "But a democracy can obtain truth only as a result of experience" (p. 231).

But democracy as a system must meet a condition in order for it to profit from past experience. The condition is that it must reach a certain level of civilization: "A democracy cannot profit by past experience unless it has arrived at a certain pitch of knowledge and civilization" (p. 231). This assumes a particular metaphor-based notion of the development of civilization, a notion according to which Western civilization is becoming better and better as it develops.

"POWERFUL PERSON"

Many of the previous examples suggest that democracy is viewed as a person who has a great deal of power. The powerful person corresponds to the power of the democratic system. This powerful system has violent, difficult-to-control passions and it can produce forceful actions, can be wise and sagacious, can give money to some and take money from others, and, most important, it governs the people. In short, democracy (as the whole system) represents a form of power, as the following additional examples indicate: "I look upon the entire absence of unpaid offices in America as one of the most prominent signs of the absolute dominion which democracy exercises in that country" (p. 208), "Under the rule of a democracy the arbitrary action of the magistrate must be still greater than in despotic states" (p. 209), and "For democracy is rapidly acquiring a more extended sway, and the wilds are gradually peopled with men" (p. 326).

Note that if we think of democracy as a balanced form of power for all the actors in society, then the metaphorical construal of democracy as an all-powerful person (system) seems to be a contradiction in terms.

"DEFECTIVE PERSON"

The "PERSON" metaphor depicts a very gloomy picture of American democracy. On the whole, it seems that the negative elements were more numerous in Tocqueville's mind—at least relative to this particular metaphor. So far, I have introduced several examples that indicate that American democracy is a defective metaphorical person (or system): It cannot control its passions, it is often irrational, its activities are unrestrained, it is liable to make mistakes, it can be stingy, and the like. The defective nature of American democracy appears in many additional examples. The words defect and weakness explicitly appear in the following:

I have already spoken of the natural defects of democratic institutions; each one of them increases in the same ratio as the power of the majority. To begin with the most evident of them all, the mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in a democratic government. (p. 257)

They [lawyers] like the government of democracy without participating in its propensities and without imitating its weaknesses; (p. 275)

Not only is democracy often unable to control its passions, it is also lacking in certain attitudes and emotions that are required for the completion of certain tasks. The missing attitudes and emotions are perseverence, secrecy, and patience.

But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy. (p. 235)

This example suggests that democracy is a fairly poor manager or executor; it can regulate the details of an undertaking only with difficulty. Furthermore, although it can do a good job handling the internal affairs of the country, it does not possess the qualities that the conduct of foreign policy demands: "Foreign politics demand . . . the perfect use of almost all those [qualities] in which it [democracy] is deficient" (p. 234).

Democracy does not prove the winner when we compare it with other forms of society. Despotism appears to be more skilled in accomplishing its tasks: "Democratic liberty is far from accomplishing all its projects with the skill of an adroit despotism" (p. 252).

As I have previously pointed out, democracy is often excessive and it is also extravagant: "The authority that they [the Americans] have entrusted to members of the legal profession, and the influence that these individuals exercise in the government, are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy" (p. 272), and "The extravagance of democracy is less to be dreaded" (p. 215).

A major defect of democracy is its instability:

the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to the most important objects, are here in full operation. Hence America is, at the present day, the country beyond all others where laws last the shortest time. (p. 257)

Not that the American democracy is naturally less stable than any other, but it is allowed to follow, in the formation of the laws, the natural instability of its desires. (p. 257)

As indicated by the latter example, its instability seems to arise, in large measure, from the instability of its desires and passions. The capricious nature of democracy brings about an instability in its legislature by changing it every year and produces mutability in the formation of its laws. The attributes of being excessive, extravagant, and unstable are regarded as major faults in a person's character. Each of them are carried over by Tocqueville in his characterization of American democracy.

The following example provides us with a nice summary of the major defects of democracy: "I grant that the wishes of the democracy are capricious, its instruments rude, its laws imperfect" (p. 329). Here democracy appears as a passionate person whose desires are capricious; as a person who is engaged in action, but whose means to accomplish the goal of the action are rude; and as a person who lives in a society with imperfect laws. Thus, democracy is presented as a person who is defective in terms of his or her emotional functioning, actions, and moral views.

In Tocqueville's view, the force that is primarily responsible for correcting a large number of these defects in democracy is the legal profession in the United States. The following quotes make this clear:

The lawyers . . . form the most powerful . . . counterpoise to the democratic element. In that country we easily perceive how the legal profession is qualified by its attributes, and even by its faults, to neutralize the vices inherent in popular government. (p. 278)

Certain laws contribute to correct in some measure these dangerous tendencies of democracy. (p. 204)

In addition to the lawyers and laws, Americans in general are also seen as agents who made successful attempts to remedy the defects of their democratic situation: "The Americans had made great and successful efforts to counteract these imperfections of human nature [ignorance and presumption] and to correct the natural defects of democracy" (p. 325). Thus Tocqueville viewed democracy as a naturally defective system ("vices inherent in popular government" and "the natural defects of democracy"). Its defects arise from its very nature—that is, its essential or constitutive qualities.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

As a summary, I review the main correspondences that make up the "DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON" metaphor:

The person engaged in emotional, physical, intellectual, political, and/or economic interaction with his immediate environment is the democratic society as a whole.

The nature and propensities of the person are the constitutive (essential) properties of the democracy. The behaviors of the person are the passions and activities that occur in the democracy.

S: The behaviors are produced by the inherent nature of the person.

T: The behaviors that occur in the democracy are produced by the constitutive properties of the democracy.

The dangerousness of the behaviors of the person is the harmfulness of the behaviors that occur in democracy to the democracy.

S: Because the person produces dangerous behaviors, he or she is a defective person.

T: Because the democracy produces harmful behaviors, it is a defective social system.

S: The dangerous behaviors of the person have to be counterbalanced (controlled, corrected, etc.).

T: The harmful behaviors of the democracy have to be counterbalanced (controlled, corrected, etc.).

One particularly interesting question that can be raised in relation to this picture of American democracy is: On what was Tocqueville's idea of American democracy based as described and captured by this version of the "PERSON" metaphor? The qualification "this version of is important. Because the concept of person involves an enormous amount of knowledge, the particular version of the person in terms of which Tocqueville presented American democracy can only be regarded as one of the many possible versions that could be given. The fact that this particular version emerged in Tocqueville's work can in all probability be attributed to several sources that might have affected his thinking. To be sure, the general "PERSON" metaphor was already around—maybe as a continuation or extension of the notion of the body politic. But the specific nature of the metaphor can only be accounted for by invoking some more specific sources. One source may be that Tocqueville's idea of an ideal (free, independent, autonomous) person seems to be the one that lives in a small community and engages in a variety of interactions with his or her environment. This community appears to be the township with its municipal institutions. For Tocqueville, the township, especially the New England township, is the "cradle" of American democracy, as the following quotes make it clear:

It is incontestably true that the tastes and the habit of republican government in the United States were first created in the townships and the provincial assemblies. (p. 164)

In the laws of Connecticut, as well as in all those of New England, we find the germ and gradual development of that township independence which is the life and mainspring of American liberty at the present day. (p. 40)

The independence of the township was the nucleus round which the local interests, passions, rights, and duties collected and clung. It gave scope to the activity of real political life, thoroughly democratic and republican. (p. 40)

The township, taken as a whole, . . . is only an individual. . . Municipal independence in the United States is therefore a natural consequence of this very principle of the sovereignty of the people. (p. 65)

My main point in giving these quotes is not to show that Tocqueville considered the township as the mainspring of American democracy (that needs no pointing out), but to show that he was fascinated by the free and autonomous life of people in the township. I propose that it was this fascination that had possibly led him to conceptualize democracy in terms of a free, independent, and autonomous person who participates fully in the life of a small-scale but full-blown democratic community. If this is correct, it demonstrates a regular cognitive process in the workings of our cognitive system: A given phenomenon is metaphorically comprehended in terms of the cause or origin of the phenomenon. In this case, democracy is conceived as a free and autonomous person in a small community. But this alone does not explain all aspects of Tocqueville's particular "PERSON" metaphor. In particular, it does not explain the passionate side of the person. The other source seems to be Tocqueville's exaggerated fear of intense emotions. In addition to the examples I noted earlier, his book contains a large number of others that reveal this fear. We can surmise that this was his response to romanticism, which gave a much more positive evaluation of the emotions than we can find in Tocqueville's work. As a child of the enlightenment, he may have rejected or may have been disappointed by the emphasis that romanticism placed on emotion.

A further issue that can be raised on the basis of what has been mentioned earlier is this: Was Tocqueville an essentialist or an environmentalist in his conception of American democracy? In other words, the question is whether American democracy was created and shaped by the essential properties of democracy or by the environmental circumstances that surrounded it. As I have shown, the essential properties of democracy are those that produce a certain set of behaviors in the people. In the first few chapters of Democracy in America Tocqueville seemed to suggest that it is primarily the environmental circumstances that shaped American democracy. At the same time, however, in his extensive use of the "PERSON" metaphor, as I have shown throughout, he seemed to attribute the main shaping force to the inherent nature of democracy—that is, its essential, constitutive characteristics. This appears to be a contradiction in his views. But the contradiction is only apparent. The reason is that the essential properties affect American democracy in a way different from the environmental circumstances. The behaviors induced by the inherent nature of democracy include, in the main, intense emotions and agitated activities. The environmental circumstances include the physical characteristics of the country, the manners and customs of the people, and the laws and political institutions that they had brought with them from England. As the examples of the use of the word democracy indicate, Tocqueville seemed to see the passions and activities that the inherent nature of democracy produces in a very negative light. He viewed these as dangerous to society and urged their tight control. This is precisely the job that he viewed environmental circumstances as performing. Illustrated in several examples, the legislation, lawyers, and the customs and manners of the American people are regarded as a controlling mechanism over the intense passions and the often unrestrained and agitated activities of the people. Thus, the inherent nature of democracy and the environmental circumstances that shape it can be seen as performing very different but complementary roles in the creation of American democracy. In sum, Tocqueville is both an essentialist and an environmentalist, and these two roles appear to complement each other.

What relation is there between the "PERSON" metaphor and the body politic? It can be suggested the "PERSON" metaphor as used by Tocqueville goes far beyond the traditional conception of the body politic. The body politic is an organistic view of society. A living organism is assumed to have parts and the parts are assumed to be dependent on each other for their proper functioning. The parts form a whole and function together as a self-contained unit whose global function, unlike that of a machine, is the preservation of its own existence (Scruton, 1982). Hale (1971) wrote in his book on the body politic that in most cases the correspondences between the body and society involve only the various parts of the body and various entities in society. (A good example is the well-known fable, described in Hale, 1971, in which the belly and the rebellious members are compared to the Roman Senate and the common people, respectively.) Although sometimes such nonphysical things as the soul are mentioned in uses of the body politic, the correspondences primarily take the body and its parts as their source domain. This stands in sharp contrast to the "PERSON" metaphor employed by Tocqueville. As has been shown, for Tocqueville the source domain of the metaphor was the entire person. This person engages in a variety of interactions with other people on a number of different levels, including the physical, emotional, intellectual, economic, social, and the like. The microcosm projected onto the macrocosm of society is not the human body with its parts, but a full-blown person who possibly lives in a township and interacts intensely and in many ways with the world surrounding him. In short, the target domain is a person, not just the body of a person.

But how did Tocqueville try to make the person the proper microcosm (source domain) of democracy? In a body politic, the relation among the parts of the organism is typically hierarchical; in most versions, there is a central part on which the other parts depend (for instance, the members depend on the belly). This kind of organization is hopelessly inappropriate for any conception of democracy as a form of society. Although Tocqueville went beyond the body as his source domain and used the notion of person, the "PERSON" metaphor for democracy does not appear to be helpful either. It is not helpful because by his or her very nature this person feels and acts in ways that present danger to the existence of democratic society. The passions and actions in which he or she engages represent forces that flow unidirectionally, without internal restraint. This makes it difficult to control them.

To create a balance of forces that is needed for democracy, Tocqueville introduced, or rather, superimposed a new metaphor on the "PERSON" metaphor. He viewed the person's behavior (feelings, actions) as a force that needs to be controlled by another force that is external. This other force is the legislation, lawyers, customs, and the like. The additional metaphor can be expressed by the complex formula: "PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOR IN DEMOCRACY IS THE INTERNAL PHYSICAL FORCE OF A PERSON" and "THE ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE PHYSICAL FORCES THAT ARE EXTERNAL TO THAT PERSON"; "THE IDEAL STATE IS A STATE OF BALANCE"; "INTERNAL FORCES OUTWEIGH EXTERNAL FORCES"; and, therefore, "INTERNAL FORCES ARE TO BE COUNTERBALANCED BY EXTERNAL FORCES." Tocqueville seemed to have found these external forces in the things previously mentioned. I thus conclude that although Tocqueville successfully improved on the idea of the body politic to make it more suitable for democracy (in that he based the analogy on a free, autonomous, and independent person), it was not possible for him to succeed in his task completely without relying on an additional metaphor that views the person as a source of dangerous forces and the components of society as external counterforces.

CONCLUSIONS

As the previous summary suggests, Tocqueville's conception of democracy was largely based on the "DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON" metaphor. Several characteristics of a person are mapped in the concept of democracy. These include the nature and propensities of a person, his or her passions, reasoning, actions, and significantly, his or her defects. Tocqueville's discussion of American democracy is embedded in a conceptual framework that is a mapping of all these things to democratic society. But this metaphor is not isolated. It forms a part of a larger metaphorical system that is known as the Great Chain metaphor (Hale, 1971; Honeck & Temple, this issue; Lakoff & Turner, 1989). In this chain, human beings are subordinate to society and society is subordinate to the cosmos. This hierarchy allows us to understand a part of the chain in terms of the parts below it. Thus human beings are often comprehended as animals and society can be understood in terms of human beings. The "DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON" metaphor, via the "SOCIETY IS A PERSON" metaphor, is an example of this process of metaphorization. As I have shown, the "PERSON" metaphor also assumes the doctrine of the Nature of Things.

I now try to answer the question: What was Tocqueville's view of American democracy? As I have shown, Tocqueville's view was in large measure, based on the "DEMOCRACY IS A PERSON" metaphor, a certain folk theory of personhood, the Great Chain, and the doctrine of the Nature of Things. He assumed all these ideas and, as a result, his thinking about American democracy was partly determined by his assumptions. Both the structure and the content of what he had to say about American democracy is influenced by all the things he assumed. The content of his notion of American democracy was informed by the Great Chain and the "PERSON" metaphors in that he thought of democracy as a person with a certain nature, propensities, and behaviors. The structure of his notion was informed by the folk theory of the Nature of Things in that the nature and propensities produce his or her characteristic behaviors. Had he seen American democracy through a different set of metaphors and beliefs, he would have emphasized different things, and he would have picked out different relations among the large number of entities that participate in the idea of American democracy. In other words, the characterization of his subject matter could have been very different given other metaphors. However, this should not be understood as what he was actually observing played no role in his conception. It obviously did to a large extent. What I propose here is that whatever he saw must have been thoroughly influenced by the unoriginal, ready-made, and subconscious ideas discussed earlier.

More specifically, we can say that Tocqueville assumed a ready-made metaphorical system that made him see American democracy as an inherently defective system whose nature produces behaviors that have to be and are controlled because of their dangerousness to the maintenance of the system. Tocqueville filled out the details of this generic-level schema: He described the essential qualities of American democracy, the behaviors and the dangers that these qualities produce, and the agents of American democracy that counterbalance the dangerous tendencies. The particular ways in which he filled out the details of the generic-level schema represent what he had to say explicitly and specifically about American democracy. My concern was not with these details. This is a task for historians and other scholars who research whether Tocqueville's ways of filling out the empty slots of the "PERSON" metaphor are adequate. Instead, my goal was to show what Tocqueville assumed in his description and how his assumptions influenced both the content and the structure of what he explicitly said about American democracy. . . .

References

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Lakoff, G. (in press). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought (2nd ed.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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Lakoff, G., & Kövecses, Z. (1987). The cognitive model of anger inherent in American English. In D. Holland & N. Quinn (Eds.), Cultural models in language and thought (pp. 195-221). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Tocqueville, A. de (1987). Democracy in America (vols. 1-2). New York: Knopf. (Original work published 1835)