SOURCE: Umaruddin, M. “The Freedom of the Will.” In The Ethical Philosophy of Al-Ghazzālī, pp. 69-81. Aligarh, India: The Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1962.

[In the following excerpt, Umaruddin explains al-Ghazālī's views on divine will, human freedom, and causation.]

The problem of the freedom of the will, because of its great ethical significance, received the close attention of al-Ghazzālī. There are three aspects of this problem. Al-Ghazzālī believes that the efficacy of will in changing and improving character is a necessary postulate of ethics. Secondly, he considers that will is determined by knowledge. This he tries to prove by a penetrating analysis of human actions. Freedom, he thinks, consists in the acceptance or rejection by Reason of one or the other alternatives that are presented to it. But this acceptance or rejection is not wholly undetermined. On the contrary it is caused by the Divine Will. Thus man's freedom is determined. This rather complicated view, we shall now explain in detail.

I

Al-Ghazzālī holds that the fact that human character can be changed and improved certainly implies that man possesses some degree of free will.¹ Some people deny that human character is capable of improvement. They argue that Khulq is an expression which stands for the inner form of man, just as Khalq is an expression which stands for the outer form. Neither can be changed. But Al-Ghazzālī adduces the experience of practical life in refutation of this. If the claim, he says, of the impossibility of improvement of character were accepted, all moral imperatives would cease to have any meaning, and all instruction, exhortation, education and self-discipline would be of no avail at all.

Al-Ghazzālī admits the limits beyond which human effort cannot change a person's character. For instance, man only regulates and disciplines his passions, but cannot root them out, nor, of course, is it desirable that he should do so, for without them life would be not only imperfect but also impossible. Now there are two things that stand oddly in the way of the remoulding of character: (a) the greater inherent strength of the passions in certain individuals; and (b) the greater habitual gratification of the passions in the past. Taking proper account of these two things, he divides mankind into four classes and deals with each separately² as follows:—

(1)

There are some persons whose character is yet unformed, who are lacking in the ability to distinguish between good and evil, between right and wrong. They are ignorant, lacking in reflection and self-consciousness, possessing no moral character, no will, and no belief. They have yet not wholly become slaves to the pleasures of the senses. The character of such men can be improved easily. They need only a guide, a determination and a motive to help them follow the right path. All men, when born, potentially possess all these. Their parents mislead them and excite their worldly desires, making them greedy and uncontrolled.

(2)

Some persons in spite of being addicted to the indulgence of the lower appetites are, nevertheless, alive to their evil effects. They can discriminate between good and evil. Their consciousness is fully developed and they realize that the rational self is the only true self. Yet they succumb to the demands of their lower selves because they are not practised in subjecting their actions to the power of their will. They have knowledge. They can be reformed, firstly, by abandoning their habits, and secondly, by cultivating virtuous habits. Such men are amenable to good influence if they have the will to improve their character.

(3)

Some persons are not only addicted to evil ways but also believe that those ways are good and to follow them is necessary. With regard to such people it can be said that the real nature of things has become obscured in their minds; consequently, the gratification of the lower self appears to them as the sole end of human life. They have been brought up in ignorance. Their animal self has grown at the expense of their rational self. It has completely suppressed it and rendered it ineffective. To reform them is almost impossible.

(4)

There are some who, in having been brought up in the way mentioned above, are proud of doing evil and of leading others astray. They take pride in doing so. The improvement of such men is the hardest of all. Only a conversion through Divine power can bring about a radical change in their case.

It is about the third and the fourth types of men that the Holy Qur'ān says³, “God has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and over their eyes is a covering, and there is a great chastisement for them”. The first are ignorant, the second ignorant and misguided, the third ignorant, misguided and wicked, and the fourth ignorant, misguided, wicked and devilish.

Viewing it in the light of the Qur'ān Al-Ghazzālī classifies human character as below⁴:—

(1)

That which is wholly evil. It is overpowered by passions and obeys their dictates gladly. It tries to find the ways and means of gratifying them. The light of reason is almost denied to it. It makes no distinction between the higher and the lower self, for the lower self has become the ideal self to it. This attitude of the human soul is designated by the Qur'ān⁵ as an-Nafs al-Ammārah, the insinuating self.

(2)

That which cannot decide and remains wavering in making the choice between good and evil and is constantly subjected to an inner struggle on this account. Sometimes it is under the sway of the one and sometimes of the other. It is capable of doing both good and evil. It feels the clear distinction between the lower and the higher self, but finds itself totally unable to overcome the powerful impulses of the baser self which burst forth occasionally. This attitude is named by the Qur'ān⁶ as an-Nafs al-Lawwāmah, the reproaching self.

(3)

The fixedly good and illumined consciousness. It has received the Light and therefore always acts according to the dictates of reason. The evil element has been rendered ineffective and now there is scope for the development of constructive qualities alone. This is the stage where the distinction between the two selves fades away, for the higher self which is the true self, has now become the master. Man has achieved perfect freedom. This rational self is called by the Qur'ān⁷ as an-Nafs al-Mutma'innah, the self at peace.

The progress that man makes from the state of an-Nafs al-Ammārah to the state of an-Nafs al-Mutma‘innah through ordeals and pains clearly indicates that he is free in his will. This freedom is not absolute yet it is of paramount importance, for it is sufficient to effect the necessary change in human character.

II

A close study of ‘Alam al-Jabrūt, the world of Mind (Reason, Will and Power) which is the bridge between ‘Ālam al-Mulk and ‘Alam al-Malakūt reveals how far man is free. Al-Ghazzālī analyses the processes in the human mind leading to action, and points out the limits of human freedom and determinism⁸.

Impressions and ideas which enter unceasingly through the internal and external senses affect the human heart. Even if the senses are damped, imagination and ideas which are already in the heart affect it. Imagination, through these ideas, shifts from one object to the other. The heart does not remain continuously in the same state.

Now, impressions which assail the heart are called al-Khawātir, i.e., ideas which consist of thoughts and recollections, that is, knowledge apprehended by the heart. Whatever the heart intends, resolves, etc., must first come to it as ideas. These ideas are the fountain-heads of human action. They first excite ar-Raghbah, i.e., inclination or impulse. This inclination must, if an action is to take place, be followed by a process of the intellect leading to al-I‘tiqād, i.e., conviction or permission of reason. Conviction is followed by al-Irādah, i.e., will. When will is formed it excites power, and the excitement of power results in action. Of these, idea and inclination are not under the complete control of man.

The ideas which lead to the operation of the will are of two kinds⁹. They either leap to good action or to evil action. Those belonging to the first series are known as Ilhām or inspiration, while those belonging to the second are known as Waswas, (whisperings of the Satan) i.e., seductions. These two types of ideas are due to different elements in the nature of man, known as ar-Rabbāniya, the Divine and Ash-Shaitānīya, the Satanic.

These elements in the nature of man are subject to the direct influence of forces in the cosmos, known as the angelic and the satanic forces which are created to help or hinder the workings of the universe. The divine influence which enables the heart to receive the good ideas is called at-Tawfīq, the divine aid. But if the heart operates in the contrary direction, it receives the impact of the other force known as al-Khidhlān, the forsaking. In this way, the heart of man is between the pulls of the angelic and the satanic influences¹⁰. By nature, however, the heart is equally susceptible to both the influences.¹¹ The divine element is guided by al-‘Aql, i. e., reason, and the satanic element is led by ash-Shahwah, i. e. appetition and al-Ghaḍab, i. e., self-assertion (lit., anger). Appetition and self-assertion permeate into the flesh and blood of man and it is through them that evil rules and the heart becomes the abode of Satan. But if appetite and hunger are controlled and kept under the rule of reason, the heart becomes the resting place of angels. The devil can use many gates for entering the heart, but the angels have only one, i. e., reason.¹² The avenues of the devil's approach to the heart are appetition and self-assertion and their innumerable offshoots, for example, envy, greed, malice, etc.¹³

The passage of ideas through the mind cannot be completely controlled. Good and bad ideas will flit across the mind of the saint or the moral wreck inspite of himself. The mind must be concentrated on God and spiritual things. But concentration of mind on one idea is only of a short duration. Good and bad ideas come into the mind in quick succession. A man in deep meditation remains unaffected by every other thing. But the succession of ideas is so quick that the distinction cannot be marked. The heart is susceptible to both good and bad ideas. However, concentration of mind on God and spiritual things will greatly promote good ideas and check bad ones.¹⁴ Idea is naturally and necessarily followed by inclination. Man cannot intervene.

Leaving the intermediate stages of conviction (knowledge, or permission of reason) and will, Al-Ghazzālī discusses three types of human action.¹⁵

(1) NATURAL ACTION (AL-FI‘L AT-TABī‘I).

For instance, the displacement of water as a man swims, is a natural action and is obviously unaffected by human will.

(2) INTENTIONAL ACTION (AL-FI‘L AL-IRāDī).

If a drawn sword is moved towards one's head, one's hands will be raised in self-protection. This is an example of an intentional action. Intentional actions are due to the consciousness of the evils to be avoided. When the evil is perceived it gives rise to volition which moves the eye and the hand without the least delay. Intentional actions are not blind responses but deliberate processes. When a sword is drawn its perception comes to the mind and the premonition of the dangers to be avoided is experienced at once. This gives rise to volition which gives rise to protective movements.

The natural as well as the intentional actions are both involuntary and necessary. The difference between the two is that the intentional action is preceded by perception and knowledge, while in the natural action perception of the object is not present.

(3) VOLUNTARY ACTION (AL-FI‘L AL-IKHTIYāRī).

All actions in which an alternative is possible and reason makes a choice are voluntary actions, for example, committing suicide, and most of our actions in our daily practical life. In this respect we can say that things presented to the mind are of two types¹⁶: (i) Those which our introspection or observation shows without deliberation to be agreeable or disagreeable. (ii) Those about which our reason hesitates to pronounce such a judgment. Here alternatives are presented to the mind and it has to make a selection. An example of the first is that of the movement of a needle towards our eyes. Here we know that the averting of the danger is advantageous and therefore, we immediately make the protective movements. On account of this knowledge our will is at once stirred into action in order to avoid the needle. The eye-lids are at once closed. Such actions are done intentionally without hesitation or deliberation. Such actions which involve a choice, are voluntary actions. In them reason hesitates and judgment is withheld until we know whether the action to be performed will have pleasant or unpleasant consequences, and we need to deliberate until the intellect decides in favour of the acceptance or rejection of an alternative.

This, however, is a complex process during which the Satanic element in man tries to repel its influence. The inherent strength of the instincts of appetition and self-assertion, and tendencies formed by previous acts are factors which often disturb the balance in such a conflict. But when the intellect decides finally it is necessarily followed by the will which executes the action, and it does so unless there are any hindrances in the way, e. g., sometimes the source of the will is too weak to shake off our inertia. Yet, if the idea is attractive to the heart, the will becomes strong enough to execute the act. Even then, sometimes, something still more powerful suddenly occupies attention and one forgets all about the former.¹⁷

In voluntary actions too, will is produced by knowledge, as it is produced in the intentional actions. Will produced by deliberation to execute that which reason has accepted as good constitutes Ikhtiyār. The word ‘al-Ikhtiyār’ is derived from ‘khair’ which means good. So ‘al-Ikhtiyār’ means the choice of an idea or an object appearing good to reason. Therefore, when a decision is made by the intellect, that is, when it accepts something as good, one is impelled to act accordingly¹⁸; will is completely determined by the decision of reason.

From this discourse we understand that so far as natural or intentional actions are concerned human will is not free.¹⁹ In voluntary actions, however, man is free to choose; that is, it is up to his reason to accept something as good. This is his Ikhtiyār. But Al-Ghazzālī further says that even in this Ikhtiyār man's behaviour is determined. He is merely the locus of his Ikhtiyār; the real cause lies in the will of God.²⁰ To understand this peculiar view it is necessary to have a clear idea of his theory of causation and Divine will.

III

Al-Ghazzālī, on the one hand, maintains that man can make or mar himself, he is free to choose; but on the other hand, he believes that God disposes or determines what shall happen. Nothing happens without His will. Whom He wills, He guides aright and whom He wills, He leads astray. He wishes and decides what He chooses. All that happens in heaven and earth proceeds from Him.²¹

To understand this apparent dualism in Al-Ghazzālī with regard to freedom and determinism, that is, the responsibility of actions attributed to God and man simultaneously, we now turn to another aspect of the problem.

To maintain God's omnipotence Al-Ghazzālī considers it necessary to reject the efficiency theory of causation. Like Hume who came seven hundred years after, Al-Ghazzālī upholds the sequence theory of Causation²². He denies that there is power in a cause to produce a specific effect. There is no causal connection between things. They are not connected but conjoined. We see one thing preceding the other over and over again, and through habit begin to think that they are connected as cause and effect. The real fact is that antecedents have consequents.²³

“God alone is the efficient cause, but the ignorant have misunderstood and misapplied the word power”²⁴.

“As to the orderly succession, let it be understood that the two events are conjoined like the ‘condition’ and the ‘conditioned’. Now, certain conditions are very apparent and can be known easily even by men of little understanding. But there are conditions which are understood only by those who see through the light of intuition. Hence the common error of miscalculating the uniformity of events²⁵”

There is a divine purpose linking the antecedents to the consequents and manifesting itself in the existing orderly succession of events without the least breach or irregularity²⁶. Some events succeed others in orderly succession, as the conditioned follows the condition in occurrence. We cannot say that life has been caused by the body, though body is the condition of life. In the same way, we must imagine the orderly successions of events in the universe. Whatever happens in the heavens or on the earth, happens in accordance with an inevitable order. As they occur, so must they occur for ever.²⁷

“Verily”, says the Qur'ān, “we did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in sport. We did not create them but with truth. But most of them do not know”²⁸.

On the one hand, God created life, knowledge, will and action, and, on the other, He created an order (a system) as external to these things. He imposed the order upon the items. These items must conform to the order which is external to them yet imposed upon them. This order of succession is inevitable and necessary and is the result of divine planning (al-ḥikmat al-azalīya²⁹).

Al-Ghazzālī, as we have seen, denies cause in the sense of a power or an efficient force when applied to things other than God. The efficient cause is only one. According to him there is only one eternal power (al-qudrat al-azalīya) which is the cause of all created things.

From one point of view man himself is the author of his actions, from another it is God. On the one hand, we see that the relation of man's actions to his power and will is like the connection of the conditioned with the condition; and on the other, we observe that the relation of man's actions to the divine power is like the connection of the effect with its cause. But by common usage anything which is visibly connected with power, though it be only the abode or channel (Maḥall) of that power, is regarded as ‘cause’. God as a creative power is the real cause of man's actions. But man is the apparent cause of actions, for it is through him that the manifestation of uniform succession of events takes place. Only he who attributes all his actions to God has found the truth and has reached the real source.

Thus we have the apparent paradox that man is determined in his freedom³⁰. The Ash‘arites use for this kind of determined freedom the word ‘Kasb’.

When fire burns, it burns because of necessity (jabr). It is completely determined. God on the contrary is wholly free. Man's position lies midway between these two. He is not determined as fire, nor as free as God. ‘Kasb’ (acquisition) is neither contrary to freedom nor opposed to determinism. For those who have insight, it is the combination of the two. God's action is Ikhtiyār, but the action of man is not like that of God, because man's will is formed after hesitation and deliberation, which is impossible in the case of God. Deliberation is due to lack of knowledge. God's knowledge is perfect. He needs no deliberation for His Ikhtiyār, i.e. choice³¹.

The word cause is used in the Qur'ān in different senses: “The angel of death who is given charge of you shall cause you to die; then to your Lord you shall be brought back³²”. “Allah takes their souls when they die³³”. “We pour down the water in abundant showers. Then we cause grain to grow there³⁴”. “Fight them, Allah shall chastise them at your hands and will bring them to disgrace³⁵. “So you did not slay them, it was Allah who slew them, and thou didst not smite when thou didst smite but it was Allah who smote, that He might confer upon the believers a good gift from Himself³⁶”. “Whatever good befalleth thee (O man!) it is from Allah and whatever of ill befalleth thee it is from thyself³⁷”.

Al-Ghazzālī points out that in these passages negation and affirmation for one and the same action throw new light on the nature of causation. Negation affirms God as the real and efficient cause. Affirmation establishes man's free will faithfully executing the divine order³⁸.

The above passages show that the word ‘cause’ signifies creative power, and must be applied to God alone. But as man's power is the image of God's power to him the word has been applied only in its secondary sense. God alone is the real efficient cause, and the word must be applied to Him in its root meaning of power. Is not everything delusive except God? A thing which cannot exist without the help of another thing is not real but delusive. There is only one thing which exists by itself, it is God. The existence of all other things depends upon Him. Everything is in His grip. He is the eternal and the everlasting. He is the manifest and the hidden. He is the first and the last. He is eternal, the first and the last. All created things have emanated from Him, one after another in an orderly succession. He is the last from the viewpoint of the seeker. In the spiritual progress of man, He is the last stage to be reached. So He is the first in existence and the last in experience. Similarly, He is hidden to those who want to see Him in this world through their senses, and He is manifest to those who see Him through the eye of reason and to whom the mysteries of the supersensuous world have been unfolded.

This is the doctrine of ‘Tawhīd’ (Unity of Existence) which means that every cause, nay, all activity mental or material, begins and terminates in Him, who is the First Cause, the Mover and the Fashioner of the universe.

Al-Ghazzālī uses an allegory to illustrate his views as to how far will is determined and how far it is free³⁹.

A devotee saw a paper with a spot of ink on it. He asked the paper why it had blackened its face. The paper said that the ink was responsible for it. The ink being asked, laid the charge against the pen, saying, that it was living in an inkpot quite innocently when the pen disturbed it in its comfort. The pen tried to prove its innocence; it related its life history and described the cruelty of the hand in depriving it of its home and removing its covering and shaping it with a sharp knife and then putting it into the inkpot and removing the ink from it and letting it fall on the paper. The pen argued that it had no power and the hand alone was responsible for the spot of ink. The hand explained its inability to do anything of its own accord. It was moved only by power without which it was no better than a dead mass of matter. The devotee then asked the power which answered thus: “I am not to blame. I was latent in the hand long before it moved. I was absolutely inactive. I was neither in motion nor had I the ability to impart motion of my own accord. A certain agent came, shook me and obliged me to work. I had no power to resist its orders. This agent is ‘Will’. I know it only by name”. When the Will was asked, it answered: “The mind sent an agent named ‘Knowledge’ who delivered his message to me through Reason to put power into action and I was simply compelled to obey, though I do not know the reason for my obedience. By nature I am inactive and I remain so as long as my master hesitates and deliberates. As soon as he decides, I accept his orders without question. So please do not rebuke me but ask Knowledge.” The devotee then turned to the Mind, Knowledge and Reason for an explanation. The Reason said that it was a lamp which was not self-illumined and did not know who lighted it. The Mind replied that it was a mere tabula rasa which had been spread by some one other than himself. The Knowledge excused itself by saying that it was a mere inscription made on a tablet; it became visible only after the lamp of Reason had become luminous, it was not the author of the inscription. “You had better ask the Pen⁴⁰,” said the Knowledge, “as there can be no inscription without the Pen.”

When the devotee heard from the Knowledge about the Pen, the Lamp, the Tablet, the Inscription, etc., he was perplexed that he was being driven from one thing to another without getting a satisfactory reply. Hitherto he had been receiving some concrete answers, but the answers given by the Knowledge cut the ground from under his feet and he knew not where to go next. The Ink, the Reed, the Pen, the Hand, etc., could be seen. But this Tablet other than that of wood or metal, this Lamp other than those lighted with oil and fire, this Writing other than that written with ordinary pen on ordinary paper or a tablet were wholly incomprehensible to him. He was, therefore, completely at a loss what to do.

The Knowledge, hearing the complaints of the devotee, answered that he (the devotee) was right, for he was not in a position to continue his journey, not having the equipment necessary to pursue the path successfully and reach the destination. But if he was still determined to attain his goal, he must listen to it most attentively. Seeing that the devotee was determined, the Knowledge proceeded as follows:—

“Your journey consists of three stages: (1) The terrestrial world (‘Ālam al-Mulk), the objects of which can be perceived with the physical senses. This region you have left behind. (2) The celestial world (‘Ālam al-Malakūt) which lies beyond the physical senses. The Pen which writes on the heart belongs to this world; you should know that you have entered this world when you have seen this Pen. This world is full of dangers and I do not know whether you will be able to overcome them. (3) The intermediate world (‘Ālam al-Jabrūt) or the world of power which lies between the first two and serves as a link between them. You have travelled three stages of this, viz., Power, Will and Knowledge.

“The celestial world begins when the Pen which records knowledge on the heart becomes visible and man begins to feel that he has acquired unshakable faith in the reality of the unseen world. If you cannot see the Pen, you had better discontinue your journey.”

The devotee who had until now seen only a material Pen opened his eyes wide to see the celestial Pen. His mind was accustomed to experience only the things of the physical world. He failed to see the celestial Pen. The Knowledge again helped him by giving him further hints to have a conception of the celestial world which was free from physical determinations and limits, and proceeded to explain in this way: “The furniture of the house is according to the status of the dweller. Now, God does not resemble anything. So His attributes are also transcendental. He is beyond space and time. His Hand, Pen, Writing, Speaking, etc., are unlike the things we experience in this world. Only that person who has the right conception of Him can apprehend Him and His attributes. You do not seem to have the right conception of Him. Then listen. There are three categories of men as regards their apprehension of Him: (1) Those who conceive Him as transcendental and believe Him to be not only above all material limitations but also above metaphorical limitations. (2) Those who conceive Him to be an anthropomorphic being. (3) Those who believe Him to be neither of the two and yet both. They hold a middle position. It seems that you belong to this position. You believe that He is immaterial and you cannot have a transcendental conception of His Hand, Pen and Tablet.”

As the devotee heard this learned discourse of the Knowledge, he realized his shortcomings. This realization was the starting point of his ascent. The consciousness of his ignorance regarding the nature and essence of the reality of things aroused in him a sense of shame and self-reproach which tore away the curtain which was hindering him from seeing the reality. The light of knowledge dawned upon his heart and the curtain from before his eyes fell. He witnessed the spiritual realities as they were. The devotee then thanked the Knowledge for its invaluable help and proceeded on his journey further. Now he asked the invisible Pen as to why it writes Knowledge on the heart of men, which produces Will, and which in its turn moves the power whereby voluntary actions result. The invisible Pen told him to address the inquiry to the Hand which was the cause of its activities. The Hand told him to direct his inquiries to the Power. The devotee then asked the Power and received the answer: “I am merely a quality, you had better ask the possessor of the quality.” The devotee was about to ask the Omnipotent, when he heard a voice from on high, saying: “He cannot be asked about what He does, and they shall be asked⁴¹.” The devotee was overawed and became unconscious, in which state he remained for a long time. When he came to his senses; he began to speak forth his heart in silence; “Thou art divine and beneficent. I shall fear no mortal. Thy forgiveness is my solace. Thy mercy is my refuge. O, God! open my heart so that I may know Thee. Unite the knot of my tongue.” A voice came from behind the curtain, “stop, do not transcend the limits of the prophets. Return and follow them in everything. Take what they give you and do what they ask you to do. All that you can have from the Divine favour is that you have known the great fact that you cannot know Him, His Beauty and Grandeur⁴².

When the devotee heard the Voice, he realized his limits. He returned to the World of Power (‘Ālam al-Jabrūt) and accepted the excuses of the Knowledge, the Reason, the Will, the Power, the Hand, the Pen, the Ink and the Paper because he had now realized that God was the only cause (fā‘il). The other substances spoken of as causes were such merely in a metaphorical sense. Everything proceeds from Him and returns to Him. He is the First and the Last, the Manifest and the Hidden, the Architect of the universe.

It is not correct to think that Al-Ghazzālī derived his doctrine of God as the only cause from his sequence theory of causation. On the contrary he derived his sequence theory from his realization of God as the sole cause and the moving force in the universe.

The common people believe in the doctrine of the one Doer as an article of faith or on the basis of philosophy. But the ‘illumined’ who have had a vision of the spiritual Reality, realize that He is all in all, the only Doer, the only Mover. This experience, in rare cases, is a permanent state. Upon other minds, however, it dawns occasionally like a flash of lightning. But to the illumined the evidence of this experience is more real than that of the physical senses. Al-Ghazzālī was not only a great philosopher but a great mystic too. His position with regard to the freedom of man is based upon his study and experience of the phenomenal and the transcendental worlds (‘Ālam al-Mulk, ‘Alam al-Jabrūt and ‘Ālam al-Malakūt). This is what explains his apparently paradoxical position, that man is determined yet free.

Notes

1. Al-Ghazzālī, Iḥyā' al-‘ulūm ad-Dīn, Vol. III, pp. 48-50; Al-Ghazzālī, Mīzān al-‘Amāl, pp. 68-70.

2. Iḥyā', Vol. III, pp. 49; Mīzān al-‘Amal, pp. 69-70.

3. Cf. Qur'ān, II, 7.

4. Iḥyā,' Vol. III, pp. 39-41.

5. Qur'ān, XII, 53.

6. Qur'ān, LXXV, 2.

7. Qur'ān, LXXXIX, 27.

8. Iḥyā', Vol. III, pp. 23-27; Vol. III, pp. 35-38.

9. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 23.

10. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 23.

11. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 24.

12. Ibid, Vol. III, p. 27.

13. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 27-31.

14. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 38-39.

15. Ibid, Vol. IV, pp. 219 ff.

16. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 219.

17. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 35-37.

18. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 219.

19. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 219.

20. …

21. Ibid, Vol. III, pp. 41-42; Vol. IV, pp. 11-223; Cf. Qur'ān, VI, 126, XXI, 23.

22. (a) For a full discussion of this theory see al-Ghazzālī Tahāfat, pp. 277-296; Iḥyā', Vol. IV, pp. 220-223; also Obermann, Der Philosophische and Leligiose Sudjectivismus Ghazzālī's (Leipzig, 1920), pp. 68-85. (b) D. Macdonald (Journal of American Oriental Society for 1899, XX, part I, p. 103) says, “In the Tahāfat he had smitten the philosophers hip and thigh; he had turned as in earlier times al-Ash‘arī their own weapons against them, and had shown that with their premises and method no certainty could be reached. In that book he goes to the extreme of intellectual scepticism, and seven hundred years before Hume, he cuts the bond of causality with the edge of his dialectic and proclaims that we know nothing of cause or effect, but simply that one thing follows another.” Renan says (Averroes, p. 74) “Hume Na rien dit de plus.” Munk in his book “Melange” (p. 379) had admirably summarised the arguments of Al-Ghazzālī against causality.

23. Iḥyā', … p. 220.

24. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 220.

25. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 220.

26. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 220. …

27. Ibid, Vol. IV, p. 220. …

    Al-Ghazzālī, like Leibnitz believes that the order of things in which they occur is the only true order and it is according to the preordained plan of the Creator who knew every thing by fore-knowledge. No other order than the one in which the things happen can be conceived. This is the perfect and the most complete of the possible arrangements. And if there was a better arrangement and God could make it and He did not make it, shows a kind of niggardliness on the part of God. This is against His goodness and, therefore, impossible. And if God was unable to make it better, it is against His power and wisdom. But He is all-powerful and all-wise. Therefore it is unthinkable. So whatever is, is for the best and there is everywhere great harmony, order and beauty. (Iḥyā', Vol. IV, pp. 220-221).

28. Cf. Qur'ān, XLIV, 38-39.

29. Iḥyā,' Vol. IV, p 222.

30. Ibid, Vol. IV, pp, 220. …

31. Cf. W. R. Sorely; “Moral Values and the Idea of God,” Cambridge, 1918, pp. 446-447 “If we form a conception of a perfect or infinite mind, it is in this sense that we must speak of such a mind as free. To speak of choice between alternatives is to suggest that other than the best might be chosen and this would be inconsistent with the idea of perfection. “A finite mind, limited in knowledge and power and distracted by desires other than the will of goodness, may yet have a partial measure of self-determination, which is complete only in the infinite. It is incompletely determined by forces external to itself. And if it stands as it does stand between the realm of nature and the realm of goodness, conscious of the good and yet beset by many temptations to fall to a lower level, then the relative independence or partial spontaneity of such as mind may be exhibited in the power to direct its own path towards the goal of goodness or to allow it to lapse into evil. Its freedom will be neither complete agreement with the ideal of goodness but it will exclude total subordination to the forces beyond itself, and it will give opportunity for choosing and serving the good. Inspite of its restrictions, human activity will be recognised as possessing a core of spontaneity.”

32. Qur'ān, XXXII, II.

33. Qur'ān, XXXIX, 42.

34. Qur'ān, LXXX, 25-27.

35. Qur'ān, IX, 14.

36. Qur'ān, VIII, 17.

37. Qur'ān, IV, 79.

38. Iḥyā', Vol. IV, p. 221.

39. Iḥyā', Vol IV, pp. 215-218.

40. i. e. the celestial Pen.

41. Qur'ān, XXI, 23.

42. Iḥyā', Vol. IV, p. 217.