SOURCE: Druart, Thérèse-Anne. “Al-Farabi and Emanationism.” In Studies in Medieval Philosophy, edited by John F. Wippel, pp. 23-43. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987.

[In the following essay, Druart examines al-Fārābī's presentation of emanationism and defends the author's writings against charges of inconsistency by explaining that al-Fārābī's loyalty to Aristotle sometimes led him to shy away from stressing any limitations in Aristotle's views.]

In 1981 Barry Sherman Kogan showed that emanationism had been a very controversial doctrine in Arabic philosophy.¹ In The Incoherence of the Philosophers al-Ghazali relentlessly criticizes al-Farabi and Avicenna for adopting it.² The Epitome of Metaphysics attributed to Averroes upholds emanationism but understands that it is not an Aristotelian tenet.³ In The Incoherence of the Incoherence, his point-by-point reply to al-Ghazali, and in his Commentary on Metaphysics XII, Averroes concurs with al-Ghazali in rejecting emanationism.⁴

Both al-Ghazali and Averroes hold that emanationism is one of al-Farabi's views. Yet some scholars doubt the seriousness of al-Farabi's emanationism. Shlomo Pines contends that al-Farabi believes knowledge of separate substances to be impossible. If this is true then of course al-Farabi cannot defend emanationism.⁵ In his two prefaces to his translation of The Atainment of Happiness, The Philosophy of Plato, and The Philosophy of Aristotle, Muhsin Mahdi argues that, since emanationism is only in al-Farabi's popular works and not in his serious texts, it is not a true Farabian tenet.⁶ He also maintains that, in his serious works, al-Farabi does not consider metaphysics “as an urgent order of business” and excludes metaphysical and divine beings from the structure of the world to which he compares the structure of the city.⁷ Popular works, such as The Political Regime, present emanationism but only as a way of assuaging the religious feelings of the unenlightened. Mahdi's approach emphasizes a contrast between the popular and serious works of al-Farabi. The popular works are designed to disguise al-Farabi's own views.

I acknowledge that indeed al-Farabi is completely silent about emanationism in some texts and yet presents a rather complex emanationist scheme in others. But this curious feature does not presuppose a sharp contrast between popular and serious works. In fact, I think that al-Farabi offers much more continuity and consistency on this issue than meets the eye. What explains the discrepancies in the different works is simply the amount of Aristotelian loyalty al-Farabi wants to show in different contexts. Al-Farabi knows that emanationism is un-Aristotelian but wishes to adopt it in his own views because he thinks that Aristotle's Metaphysics is rather unsatisfactory and needs to be supplemented. Like the author of the Epitome attributed to Averroes, al-Farabi is aware that there is no place for emanationism in a faithfully Aristotelian metaphysics. Already Miriam Galston and Rafael Ramón Guerrero have suggested this theory.⁸

But let us now briefly state the problems involved in al-Farabi's presentation of emanationism.⁹

First, in what I shall call his “Aristotelian” texts, i.e., the texts in which he claims to report Aristotle's own views, al-Farabi keeps silent about emanation and leaves it aside from his presentation of metaphysics. The very brief Aims of Aristotle's “Metaphysics” focuses on the study of what is common to all beings.¹⁰ It considers divine science—which examines God as principle of being in general and not as principle of any particular being—to be only one of the parts of metaphysics. The Philosophy of Aristotle emphasizes the necessity for a metaphysical inquiry but barely touches upon the Metaphysics itself.¹¹ The last two sections of the Letter concerning the Intellect, i.e., the sections dealing with Aristotle's On the Soul and Metaphysics, again do not speak of emanation.¹² Yet, in the Harmonization of the Opinions of the two Sages, Plato and Aristotle, al-Farabi quotes the spurious emanationist Theology of Aristotle but also indicates that its authenticity is disputed.¹³ I have suggested elsewhere that al-Farabi, though officially accepting the authenticity of the Theology, has in fact reached the conclusion that it is not truly Aristotelian but supplements well Aristotle's own metaphysics.¹⁴ If this interpretation is correct, then one can understand why al-Farabi, when he claims to present Aristotle's own views, is rather careful to avoid speaking of emanationism and to play down the divine-science aspect of metaphysics, i.e., the study of eternal and immaterial beings.

Second, in texts in which al-Farabi offers his own views but still in close reference to the framework of the traditional Aristotelian corpus, the focus of metaphysics shifts from the study of being as universal to divine science. The Attainment of Happiness emphasizes the place of metaphysics and focuses its presentation upon the study of immaterial beings, i.e., divine science.¹⁵The Enumeration of the Sciences substitutes a study of beings qua beings for the study of being qua universal and develops a lengthy program for metaphysics, which is then called divine science.¹⁶ These two texts I shall call “programmatic,” since they explain what al-Farabi thinks metaphysics should accomplish, but present only an outline.

Third, the main so-called political works, i.e., The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City¹⁷ and The Political Regime,¹⁸ offer in their first half an extensive presentation of emanationism.¹⁹ These texts I shall call “emanationist.”

Fourth, The Book of Letters²⁰ analyzes some basic concepts, such as being, and is closely linked to the Categories. Though the expression “Book of Letters” is sometimes used as one of the ways to refer to Aristotle's Metaphysics, it is not so used here. In fact this text abundantly refers to the Categories and to other logical texts but does not directly refer to the Metaphysics. Yet some of al-Farabi's own metaphysical views are hinted at in the chapter on interrogative particles.²¹ I shall refer to these passages when appropriate.

One could at once object to two aspects of my division into three basic kinds of texts.

First, one could argue that the inconsistencies in the texts can be explained by an evolution in al-Farabi's positions. Chronological dating of al-Farabi's works is extremely difficult. If one accepts Dunlop's general attempt²²—even though its precise details are very shaky—or that of Walzer,²³ one has to conclude that al-Farabi's final position was essentially emanationist, since both claim that al-Farabi's emanationist works are his last ones.

Second, I have included The Philosophy of Aristotle, the third part of a trilogy, under the “Aristotelian” texts whereas I have classified its first part, The Attainment of Happiness, among the “programmatic” texts. It is clear that in The Attainment, al-Farabi offers his own conception of the philosophical enterprise but wants to give it authority in claiming that it reflects the old tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Yet The Attainment presents many un-Aristotelian features, in political matters for instance. Its Aristotelian character is limited. But in The Philosophy of Aristotle al-Farabi offers a fairly traditional presentation of the corpus aristotelicum and is much more faithful to Aristotle.

The hypothesis I want to explore is the following: since he is aware that emanation is not truly Aristotelian, al-Farabi thinks that Aristotle's own Metaphysics limits itself to the first task of divine science, i.e., the order of investigation and discovery of principles. Yet already in the order of discovery al-Farabi finds Aristotle unsatisfactory. He expresses this dissatisfaction in the “Aristotelian” texts. The “programmatic” texts show that al-Farabi asks metaphysics to go beyond the order of discovery, i.e., the ascent to principles, to reach the order of exposition, i.e., the descent from the principles previously discovered. He carries out such a descent, i.e., the second task of divine science, in his own “emanationist” texts.

Testing this hypothesis requires three steps. The first elaborates the order of discovery of the principles. Already the “Aristotelian” texts argue for the necessity of positing immaterial principles of being or existence. The second step examines al-Farabi's elaboration of a program for metaphysics. In the third and last step, I show how this program is realized in the “emanationist” works.

I. THE “ARISTOTELIAN” TEXTS

The Aims of Aristotle's “Metaphysics” is quite sketchy. A rather lengthy introduction states that Aristotle's Metaphysics does not essentially deal with God, the intellect, and the soul. This distinguishes metaphysics from Kalam (‘ilm al-tawhid or Islamic Theology).²⁴ The reader will note that it also distinguishes it sharply from the pseudo Theology of Aristotle.²⁵ The extremely brief summary of each book of the Metaphysics is rather faithful to Aristotle. Yet his summary of book XII (called XI by al-Farabi) substitutes existence for the Greek kinesis, i.e., change. It speaks not of a prime mover but of a principle of existence.²⁶ This is very un-Aristotelian even if it does not imply emanationism. Al-Farabi is not satisfied with a principle of change and a mere final cause.²⁷

The Philosophy of Aristotle takes more liberties with Aristotle's own views. The first liberty taken by al-Farabi is the presentation of an Aristotle who carefully lays down his principles one by one through the traditional order of the corpus. To explain natural bodies and nature Aristotle posits form and matter, which he calls principles of existence.²⁸ He then shows the necessity for adding another principle, soul, to account for animate beings.²⁹ Later on, to explain the activities of the human intellect and particularly the acquisition of the first intelligibles, he posits a further principle, the Agent Intellect, which is not a body or in a body, since it is always in act.³⁰ He also requires an immaterial mover—the famous prime mover—to explain the circular motion of the heavenly bodies,³¹ which themselves are active principles for the interactions between the four elements.³² Al-Farabi confronts us with an unusual Aristotle who carefully distinguishes different kinds of principles of being, i.e., form and matter, and of change, i.e., soul, the Agent Intellect, the immaterial movers of the heavenly bodies, and the heavenly bodies themselves. The existence of these principles and of immaterial beings is discovered through natural philosophy.

Al-Farabi takes a second liberty. He claims that discovering the existence of these principles and beings is not enough. Their very existence raises new questions. So two further tasks need to be accomplished: first, to determine whether soul, the Agent Intellect, the celestial bodies, and the immaterial mover are not only principles of change but also principles of existence; and second, to clarify the relationships between these principles.

The true Aristotle limited himself to principles of change. Al-Farabi's Aristotle, on the other hand, feels a great need for tackling the question of the cause of existence. In his presentation of the Posterior Analytics, al-Farabi argues that true science looks not only for principles of instruction, i.e., principles showing that a thing exists, but also for the causes of the thing's existence, i.e., its principles of being.³³ Therefore al-Farabi thinks that Aristotle failed to provide a truly scientific physics, since he did not determine the cause of existence of natural beings. For instance, at the end of his presentation of the natural sciences he complains that “up till now it had not become evident that the heavenly bodies supplied the natural bodies with anything besides motion.”³⁴ He also asks whether the Agent Intellect too is a cause of existence and what are the relationships between Agent Intellect, soul, heavenly bodies, and nature, i.e., form and matter.³⁵ The Farabian Aristotle is much more inquisitive than the Greek one. He even begins wondering whether higher principles, conceived as immaterial beings, such as the Agent Intellect, can explain the existence of lower principles, such as soul, form, and matter.

Having expressed his need for further inquiries he confesses that such “matters are beyond the scope of natural theory. For natural theory includes only what is included in the categories;³⁶ and it has become evident that there are other instances of beings not encompassed by the categories: that is, the Agent Intellect and the thing that supplies the heavenly bodies with perpetual circular motion.”³⁷ “Natural theory terminates in the Agent Intellect and the mover of the heavenly bodies, and then stands still.”³⁸ All these questions should be resolved in metaphysics, but as they are neither resolved nor really considered in Aristotle's own Metaphysics, the reader is not surprised that al-Farabi claims that “we do not possess metaphysical science”³⁹—at least if one limits oneself to Aristotle's Metaphysics, which hints at divine science but does not really develop it. So al-Farabi ends by simply stating that metaphysics is an investigation of beings (not being qua universal) in a manner different from natural inquiry and of the beings that are above things material in their rank of existence.⁴⁰

Such inquiries are missing from Aristotle's genuine texts but can be found in al-Farabi's own emanationism in which the question of existence and of ranking are of utmost importance. This is why al-Farabi concludes his Philosophy of Aristotle with the following sentence: “Therefore philosophy must necessarily come into being in every man in the way possible for him.”⁴¹ The only possible way for al-Farabi is emanationism, even though he knows it not to be Aristotelian and therefore avoids foisting it on Aristotle.

The third and last “Aristotelian” text I want to examine is the last part of the Letter concerning the Intellect, i.e., the sections about the meaning of intellect in Aristotle's On the Soul and Metaphysics. Whereas The Philosophy of Aristotle raises questions and determines lines of investigation without pursuing any, the Letter concerning the Intellect makes these investigations and provides answers. It offers a long presentation of the Agent Intellect and of its thinking (both topics rather ignored in Aristotle's On the Soul) and explores the Agent Intellect's relationship to another principle and to the celestial bodies. The move to the celestial bodies leads to affirming the existence of a series of immaterial movers which culminates in an immaterial non-mover equated with the intellect of Metaphysics, book Lambda or XII.⁴² The text presents an ascent to principles and immaterial separate beings. It uses ascent language too.

The first stage of the ascent is the rank of the Agent Intellect, which is a separate form.⁴³ At first the Agent Intellect's role is presented in Aristotelian terms of actualizing the potential intellect as well as the potential intelligibles.⁴⁴ The Posterior Analytics has shown that human beings ascend from that which is less perfect but better known to them, to that which is more perfect but previously less known to them. By contrast, the Agent Intellect thinks first the most perfect beings. Again, whereas we acquire most intelligibles by abstracting them from matter, the Agent Intellect does not do so. The intelligible forms which it thinks originally exist in it qua indivisible. It is the Agent Intellect which puts these forms, in divisible mode, in matter. Thus the material divisible forms imitate the forms in the Agent Intellect, which thereby gives to matter images of what is in its substance.⁴⁵ The reader wonders what exactly al-Farabi means by these forms. They seem to be exemplars of the natural forms. But does the Agent Intellect really give forms to all natural beings or only to souls or human intellects? The text seems first to imply the former but later states that the Agent Intellect “brings [these forms] closer to that which is immaterial little by little until there comes to be the acquired intellect.”⁴⁶ So it seems that the main function of the Agent Intellect is to provide souls or intellects with forms.⁴⁷

Once al-Farabi has delineated the function and thinking activity of the Agent Intellect in what concerns lower beings, he explains that the Agent Intellect is not self-sufficient for its task of imparting intelligible forms. This task requires that the celestial bodies provide matter and substrates for these forms and that there be no impediment. Hence the Agent Intellect needs the help of the celestial bodies in order to exercise its own activity.⁴⁸ This need for help is a sign of deficiency. The Agent Intellect's deficiency prevents it from producing the totality of existing things and from being its own cause of existence. Therefore its existence requires another principle whose name is not given.⁴⁹

The Agent Intellect's need for the celestial bodies leads al-Farabi to investigate such bodies. He argues that each one of them has a mover which is the cause of its existence. The more perfect the body the more perfect the mover. The most perfect celestial body is the first heaven, whose mover has a double nature which is grounded in its intellectual activity. The inferior nature thinks of itself and thereby produces the sphere of the first heaven; the superior one by thinking its principle produces the mover of the next lower sphere, i.e., the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars. Because of its dual nature, the mover of the first heaven cannot be the first principle of all beings and must have a principle which is the ultimate one. This ultimate principle, too, is an intellect, but it is one in all respects. This is why it is called “the principle of all principles and the first principle of all beings.”⁵⁰ Al-Farabi daringly equates this first principle, which for him is not a mover, with the intellect Aristotle speaks of in Metaphysics XII, i.e., the unmoved mover. All the others (which are movers) are also intellects but become so only from the first intellect, who is also the first being, the first one, and the first true.⁵¹ The other pure intellects exist according to ranks, and as I indicated at the very beginning, the Agent Intellect occupies the lowest rank.⁵²

So in the Letter concerning the Intellect al-Farabi pursues the investigations adumbrated in The Philosophy of Aristotle. The cause of existence for all principles and beings is discovered. There is an ascent from the lower pure intellect, the Agent Intellect, through the movers of the celestial bodies to the first principle, which itself is not a mover. All these principles are neatly ranked. At each step of the ascent al-Farabi justifies why a new principle needs to be assumed. Each principle derives its existence from a higher one. The relationship between the Agent Intellect and the celestial bodies is determined. In this ascent al-Farabi makes some use of On the Soul but very little of the Metaphysics and adds a lot of his own. His sole reference to the Metaphysics is to book XII, the only one dealing with divine science. Al-Farabi claims that his ultimate principle, which is not a mover, corresponds to Aristotle's unmoved mover. The emphasis is no longer on a cause or principle for motion but on a cause or principle of existence for all principles and all beings. The arguments set forth to justify the existence of all these principles are Neoplatonic. It seems that al-Farabi uses Aristotle as a springboard for an elaboration of his own metaphysics. While dealing with Aristotle's own views al-Farabi simply reports them, but when he goes beyond them he argues rather carefully. This ascent smacks of Neoplatonism yet it does not include any technical emanationist term.

II. THE “PROGRAMMATIC” TEXTS

The views offered in the “programmatic” texts are al-Farabi's own but are still couched in an Aristotelian framework. The first part of The Attainment of Happiness presents the theoretical virtues necessary for obtaining happiness. “[These] virtues consist in the sciences whose ultimate purpose is only to make the beings and what they contain intelligible with certainty.”⁵³ The presentation of these virtues or sciences follows the order of the Aristotelian corpus: logic, mathematics, natural science, metaphysics, ethics and politics. In his description of logic, al-Farabi states at once that what interests him in every science is the attempt to know the principles of existence.⁵⁴ These principles are the four causes, and there are three kinds of beings. The first kind of being has no cause for its existence but “is the ultimate principle for the existence of all other beings.”⁵⁵ This principle is the First or the divinity.⁵⁶ The second kind, which consists of the natural beings, has the four causes. The third kind, which covers the “metaphysical” beings,⁵⁷ except for the First, has only three of the four principles, since it does not need a material cause. The methodology of going from principles of instruction, i.e., primary cognitions, to the principles of existence is an ascent. Once these principles of existence have been discovered, they become principles of instruction for a descent towards unknown inferior beings originating from these principles.⁵⁸

Having explained the methodology, al-Farabi applies it to the study of natural beings. The ascent to the principles of existence for the celestial bodies and for the soul and intellect leads to the discovery that such principles are metaphysical, i.e., immaterial, beings.⁵⁹ Therefore metaphysics is “the science of what is beyond material things in the order of investigation and instruction and above them in the order of existence.”⁶⁰ The metaphysical inquiry, too, proceeds by means of an ascent from beings that are immaterial but caused to a perfect uncaused being.⁶¹ This, in turn, “is itself the first principle of all the aforementioned beings,”⁶² since it is their formal, efficient, and final cause. The Letter concerning the Intellect presents such an ascent.⁶³ In it, as in The Philosophy of Aristotle, investigation of both the celestial bodies and the intellect causes the ascent.

According to the methodology a descent should follow the ascent. Al-Farabi considers such a descent as soon as the ultimate principle has been discovered. “Having understood this [i.e., the existence of the ultimate principle and its attributes], one should investigate next what properties the other beings necessarily possess as a consequence of their having this being as their principle and the cause of their existence.”⁶⁴ The descent should proceed in orderly fashion from the higher being to the lower. Such an orderly descent is carried out in the “emanationist” texts. The Attainment of Happiness calls the metaphysical ascent and descent the divine inquiry.⁶⁵

The Attainment of Happiness designs a program for metaphysics which includes ascent and descent. It also ends in claiming that the philosophy which answers such a program is Greek philosophy, but only as transmitted by Plato and Aristotle.⁶⁶ Yet The Philosophy of Aristotle, which, as we have seen, completes The Attainment of Happiness, barely alludes to the Metaphysics, though it emphasizes the need for a metaphysical inquiry. It even claims that “we do not possess metaphysical science.”⁶⁷ Instead it offers a rather extensive presentation of natural science. On the other hand, The Attainment of Happiness delineates a careful program for mathematics—which is not included in the corpus—and metaphysics but gives short shrift to natural science. The Philosophy of Aristotle focuses on what Aristotle accomplished but suggests that more has to be done. The Attainment of Happiness, on the other hand, emphasizes what philosophy now needs to investigate because Aristotle failed to do so, and drafts a program for further research.

The Enumeration of the Sciences presents a more extended metaphysical program. The whole text offers an overview of the sciences which basically follows the order of the corpus. The section on metaphysics is entitled “Divine Science” and comes at the completion of the section on natural science. At once it is stated that divine science is divided into three parts according to Aristotle's own presentation in Metaphysics VI, 1.

The content of the first part is stated in one sentence only: it “investigates the beings and their accidents qua beings.”⁶⁸

The second part investigates the principles of demonstration in the particular theoretical sciences: logic, mathematics, and natural science. It also refutes false views on such topics.

The third part is a study of beings that are neither bodies nor in bodies. Al-Farabi tells us that one should first investigate whether such bodies exist and maintains that one can demonstrate that they do. Divine science then shows that these immaterial beings are many and finite in number, and that their ranks of order differ with respect to perfection. Consideration of these ranks of perfection leads to the investigation of an absolutely perfect being which is the most perfect, cannot share its rank with any other, has no like or contrary, and is fully prior. The other beings are posterior to its existence, and it is this first being which bestows on each of them being, oneness, and truth. Thus the First is that which is the most deserving of the name and meaning of one, being, and true. These three attributes were exactly the ones given to the first intellect at the end of the Letter concerning the Intellect.⁶⁹The Enumeration of the Sciences no longer highlights the fact that the first being is an intellect, but uses another terminology and says that such a being “ought to be believed to be god” and that one should investigate all its attributes or names.⁷⁰

This description of the first cause differs from Aristotle's presentation of the prime mover. Most of the attributes of al-Farabi's first cause are missing in Aristotle, since the prime mover is a final cause of motion but does not bestow being, oneness, and truth on any other being.

So divine science begins with an ascent leading to the discovery of the first cause, its activity and its attributes. There follows a descent which explains how other beings receive their existence from the first cause, and how they are ranked. It also shows that the immaterial beings are interconnected and ordered in relation to each other. This descent is nowhere to be found in Aristotle's Metaphysics, but is certainly typical of emanationism, even if al-Farabi does not use proper emanationist terminology.

The program for the third part of divine science is much more elaborate and expanded than the program for the other parts. It is carried out in The Political Regime and in The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City. The double task of ascent and descent was already adumbrated in The Attainment of Happiness and applies the program set out for every science in which principles of discovery and principles of beings do not coincide, i.e., all theoretical sciences save mathematics and logic.⁷¹

Al-Farabi concludes his program for the third part of divine science by a refutation of false views of the acts of God which claim that in these acts there is some defect. The Political Regime, which ends rather abruptly, contains some exposition of false views among the “Weeds,” i.e., the nonconformists. The Opinions ends with a presentation of false metaphysical views of different kinds.⁷² One can find an exposé and refutation of views implying a defect in the acts of God—if one understands these acts broadly—in The Selected Aphorisms.⁷³ There al-Farabi claims that evil has no absolute existence. Both The Opinions and The Selected Aphorisms are probably late works. The un-Aristotelian aspect of, and the emphasis on, the program for the third part of divine science may explain a puzzling feature. At the very beginning of the chapter on metaphysics, some Arabic manuscripts add a line which claims: “the whole of divine science is in his [Aristotle's] book on metaphysics.” This sentence is the only one which does not appear in all Arabic manuscripts of this section. Amin's edition does not consider it as part of the text. If I am right in thinking that al-Farabi had a pretty good grasp of the genuine Aristotelian metaphysics and of its limitations, then this sentence can be understood as simply a gloss by an overzealous scribe. In the section on natural science, al-Farabi usually indicates the name of the Aristotelian work in which each of its subdivisions was studied. Some scribe, knowing of Aristotle's Metaphysics, inserted this sentence thinking it had been inadvertently omitted. Al-Farabi omitted it deliberately. He is aware that most of what he is suggesting has not been realized by Aristotle even if he hinted at it.

Obviously The Enumeration of the Sciences expands the program barely alluded to in The Attainment of Happiness. The task of ascent is realized in the Letter concerning the Intellect. The first half of the so-called Political Regime carries out the descent.

III. THE “EMANATIONIST” TEXTS

In this last section I want to show how The Political Regime accomplishes the second and third parts of this program for divine science. In it al-Farabi uses emanationism to explain the existence of the beings. My hypothesis that The Political Regime realizes this program explains its subtitle, its abrupt beginning, and the structure of its first half, which is purely metaphysical. In it al-Farabi presents the descent about which he had spoken. When useful I shall indicate parallel passages or additions in the other main emanationist text, The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City.

First, let us look at the title of The Political Regime. In many manuscripts this text is subtitled The Principles of the Beings,⁷⁴ i.e., the principles of natural science as well as the principles of immaterial beings. Old listings of al-Farabi's works report this subtitle.⁷⁵ Maimonides recommended to Ibn Tibbon the reading of al-Farabi's Principles of the Beings.⁷⁶ This subtitle reminds us of the beginning of Metaphysics VI, 1: “We are seeking the principles and causes of the beings qua beings.” This subtitle was rather popular because it gives a good account of the work's strong metaphysical character.

Second, the abrupt beginning of the text can be understood only if one assumes that the inquiry about and discovery of such principles has already been accomplished. It begins by listing the principles of the beings: “The principles by means of which bodies and their accidents subsist are of six kinds, and have six main ranks. Each rank embraces one of the kinds.”⁷⁷ This is an immediate listing of the number of principles of natural science and of the number of their ranks. This general statement is then somewhat expanded: “The first cause in the first rank; the second causes in the second rank; the Agent Intellect in the third; soul in the fourth; form in the fifth and matter in the sixth.”⁷⁸ Again these principles are simply listed and ranked. Al-Farabi offers no justification whatsoever for his choice of principles or for their ranking. Obviously he considers the discovery of the principles as settled. In the Letter concerning the Intellect, he had argued for the existence and nature of the highest principles. Aristotle himself had already shown the necessity of positing the lower principles—matter, form, and soul—as we saw in The Philosophy of Aristotle.

The next step for al-Farabi is to claim that the first cause is one and unique whereas all other principles are multiple: “That which is in the first rank cannot be multiple but is only one and unique. But that which is in each of the other ranks is multiple.”⁷⁹ This highlights the Neoplatonic contrast between the one and the many. He then presents a second contrast: “Three of these principles are neither bodies nor in bodies. These are: the first cause, the second causes, and the Agent Intellect. Three are in bodies but are not themselves bodies. Those are: soul, form, and matter.”⁸⁰ The former are the immaterial beings that Aristotle wanted to study in divine science or theology.⁸¹ The latter are the basic principles of natural science.⁸²

Finally, al-Farabi lists in descending order the six kinds of bodies: “celestial body, rational animal, irrational animal, plants, minerals, and the four elements. The totality constituted by these six kinds of bodies is the universe.”⁸³ As the celestial bodies are not really part of natural science, al-Farabi argued in The Philosophy of Aristotle for the necessity of determining their substance.⁸⁴The Political Regime shows that they are not subject to the hylomorphic composition of natural bodies, since their souls are always in actuality and have a substrate instead of matter.⁸⁵

This abrupt introduction assumes that the principles of natural science and the principles of these principles, be they material or not, have already been discovered and partially ranked. One striking feature of this presentation as well as of the Letter concerning the Intellect is that the Agent Intellect is assigned a rank inferior to the second causes though it too is a pure intelligence. This inferior rank is explained by the Agent Intellect's need for an intermediary, i.e., the celestial bodies, for its activity of providing intelligibles to human beings and actualizing their intellect. On the other hand, the second causes are superior, since they do not need any intermediary for their own activity of giving rise to the existence of these celestial bodies.⁸⁶ In The Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City, a less complex text, there is not so much refinement in assigning ranks, and the Agent Intellect there is viewed mainly as the last of the second causes.⁸⁷

From this compact introduction al-Farabi goes on to accomplish two tasks: (1) a brief study of each of the principles he has just listed; and (2) an account of how all beings derive from the first cause. Both studies proceed rank by rank in descending order.

(1) The study of the six principles (p. 31, l. 12-p. 42, l. 13) carries out the task assigned to the second part of divine science. The principles are briefly described.

First, there is a presentation of the first cause (p. 31, ll. 12-13). “The First is the one which ought to be believed to be god [this is nearly word for word a repetition of a formula in The Enumeration of the Sciences⁸⁸] and it is the proximate cause of the existence of the second causes and of the Agent Intellect.”

Second (p. 31, l. 13-p. 32, l. 5), the second causes are described as the causes for the existence of the celestial bodies and so must be as many in number as the celestial spheres. As in the Letter concerning the Intellect their exact number is not given.⁸⁹ Again, al-Farabi assumes this has already been determined. In The Opinions, he tells us that there are nine celestial spheres and therefore nine movers, i.e., a number very different from the fifty-five or forty-seven movers of Aristotle's Metaphysics XII, 8.⁹⁰

Third, al-Farabi explains the Agent Intellect's role (p. 32, ll. 6-12). It takes care of man instead of a celestial sphere. “The essence of the Agent Intellect is one, but its rank includes the rational animals who have purified themselves and attained happiness.”⁹¹

Fourth, the different kinds of souls, i.e., celestial, rational, and irrational, are ranked (p. 32, l. 13-p. 36, l. 5).

Fifth, form is explained in correlation with prime matter and ranks are assigned to the different forms, whereas ranks are denied to matter (p. 36, l. 6-p. 39, l. 13).

Finally, al-Farabi concludes this first part by contrasting the imperfection belonging to hylomorphic bodies with the perfection of the incorporeal substances (p. 39, l. 14-p. 42, l. 13). The inferior ranks among the latter are assigned in accordance with the degree of multiplicity of their objects of thought. It is only to the first cause that there attaches no multiplicity whatsoever. Al-Farabi then speaks of souls and particularly of the celestial souls. As the celestial bodies are not subject to hylomorphic composition but are still corporeal, their degree of perfection is intermediate between the hylomorphic beings and the incorporeal substances.

(2) The account of how all beings and principles derive from the first cause (p. 42, l. 14-p. 69, l. 14) covers at least twice as many pages as the study of the principles; it corresponds to the third division of divine science and matches its greater length. To show how all beings derive from the First, al-Farabi proceeds no longer principle by principle, but rather according to the ranks of the beings. Hence he investigates first the beings that are not bodies or in bodies, then the celestial bodies, and finally the hylomorphic bodies, which he now calls possible beings to contrast them with all the other beings, which are necessary. Thanks to this structure, al-Farabi can study all the beings in descending order. Nearly the same structure is used for the first four sections of The Opinions.

First, there is a rather intricate study of the first cause (p. 42, l. 14-p. 52, l. 4; Opinions, section I). This study shows its absolute perfection. It has no like, no contrary, and is indivisible. It is more entitled than anything else to the name of the one and its meaning, and is intelligence. The First causes all natural beings in bestowing existence to them. This emanation (faydh) does not add anything to it. Finally its names and attributes are discussed. All these points are carefully argued, fulfill more or less chronologically the program designed in The Enumeration of the Sciences, and match its length.

Second, the study of the second causes explains how they give existence by emanation to each other and to the celestial bodies (p. 52, l. 5-p. 55, l. 5).

Third, only a few lines are assigned to the Agent Intellect (p. 55, ll. 5-12). These last two themes are grouped under section II of The Opinions. This concludes the study of the beings that are not bodies nor in bodies.

Fourth, the study of the celestial bodies (p. 55, l. 13-p. 56, l. 12) explains how prime matter proceeds from the common motion of the first heaven. The other various celestial motions give rise to the various forms. This corresponds to chs. 4-7 of the third section of The Opinions. Thus al-Farabi has discovered a cause for the existence of the two basic principles of Aristotle's hylomorphism, i.e., form and matter.

Finally, al-Farabi studies the possible beings, i.e., the hylomorphic substances (p. 56, l. 13-p. 69, l. 14; Opinions, chs. 8-9 of section III and section IV). Their ranks are explained and justified, but in ascending order this time, i.e., first the elements, then minerals, plants, irrational animals, and, finally, rational animals. The possible beings are carefully ranked according to their degree of subordination to each other. The same basic structure of presentation is used in The Opinions.

In the metaphysical half of the so-called political works, the interconnections between the actions of the different principles and the interactions between principles and the different beings are explored, such as the interaction between form and matter; between the celestial bodies and the Agent Intellect (this was one of the unanswered queries in The Philosophy of Aristotle)⁹²; and between superior and inferior bodies. This metaphysical part carries out the program delineated in The Enumeration of the Sciences and answers all the questions raised in The Philosophy of Aristotle and therefore supplements it in completing it.

The emanationist texts offer a detailed account of emanation and even use technical emanationist terms of the root faydh.⁹³ They alone use such technical language because they do not claim to present in any way Aristotle's own views.

The emanationist texts are consonant with the “programmatic” and the “Aristotelian” works. The “Aristotelian” texts do not directly speak of emanation but raise questions that Aristotle did not answer in his Metaphysics. They also show the need for a quest for principles of existence instead of the Aristotelian mere final cause for motion. This explains why al-Farabi is rather silent about Aristotle's Metaphysics while insisting on the need for a metaphysical science. Somehow Aristotle had not accomplished what should have been done. The “programmatic” texts advocate al-Farabi's own conception of metaphysics as fundamentally a divine science, including an order of descent explaining how the existence of all beings proceeds from the First. Yet as the program is still somehow linked to the traditional Aristotelian corpus, he is careful not to use technical emanationist terms since he knows that emanationism is not to be found in the true Aristotle. In the “emanationist” texts, al-Farabi shakes off fully the fetters imposed by the limitations of Aristotle's Metaphysics and presents a complex descending emanationist scheme. This scheme answers all the questions raised by Aristotle's Metaphysics. In such texts he does not hesitate to use technical emanationist language.

Al-Farabi tries to be faithful to Aristotle's letter in avoiding direct emanationism when he purports to present Aristotle's own views. He knows that emanationism is not compatible with true Aristotelianism. Yet he is also convinced that Aristotle's Metaphysics is unsatisfactory and needs to be supplemented. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle's conception of science reveals the incompleteness of the Metaphysics. Faithful to the spirit of his master, al-Farabi undertakes to complete and expand Aristotelian metaphysics by adding to the order of inquiry and by providing an order of exposition or descent. Emanationism allows him to deal with the principles and causes of existence and to explain how all beings and principles, including the principles of hylomorphism, proceed from the First.

Notes

1. “Averroes and the Theory of Emanation,” Mediaeval Studies 43 (1981), pp. 384-404. Cf. also the section “Did Averroes Subscribe to the Theory of Emanation?” in his Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany, 1985), pp. 248-55.

2. Cf. The Incoherence of the Philosophers, discussions 3 and 17. These discussions and Averroes' replies to them can be found in Averroes' Tahafot at-Tahafot. Arabic edition by Maurice Bouyges, S. J. (Beirut, 1930), pp. 147-262 and 517-42; English translation by Simon Van Den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), vol. 1 (London, 1969), pp. 87-155 and 316-33.

3. B. S. Kogan, “Averroes and the Theory of Emanation,” pp. 387-92. Averroes' Epitome has been edited by Uthman Amin (Cairo, 1958) and had been previously translated into German by Simon Van Den Bergh (Leiden, 1924). Kogan takes it as an early work of Averroes, who subsequently changed his mind about emanationism and rejected it. Yet its authenticity has long been disputed. About the question of authenticity, see Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Lam by Charles Genequand (Leiden, 1984), pp. 10-11. Genequand considers it inauthentic.

4. B. S. Kogan, “Averroes and the Theory of Emanation,” pp. 392-403, and C. Genequand, Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics, pp. 36-37 and 42-48.

5. “Les limites de la métaphysique selon al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja et Maïmonide: sources et antithèses de ces doctrines chez Alexandre d'Aphrodise et chez Thémistius,” in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, 1. Halbband, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Bd. 13/1 (Berlin, 1981), pp. 211-25. Pines grounds his claim wholly on accounts of al-Farabi's lost commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. As these accounts are very obscure and not necessarily reliable and no explanation is provided why al-Farabi in this lost text would have contradicted positions held in the extant texts, it seems to me that Pines' claims lack foundation.

6. Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. with an introduction by Muhsin Mahdi (Cornell Paperbacks, 2d ed., Ithaca, N.Y., 1969). This edition includes also the preface to the first edition of 1962. See 1962 preface, pp. 3-4, 5-6, and 9.

7. 1969 preface, pp. xix-xx and xvi.

8. Miriam Galston, “A Re-examination of al-Farabi's Neoplatonism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977), pp. 13-32; Rafael Ramón Guerrero, “Al-Farabi y la ‘Metafísica’ de Aristóteles,” La Ciudad de Dios 196 (1983), pp. 211-40.

9. I have excluded from consideration metaphysical texts the authenticity of which is not certain, i.e.: (1) The Seals [or Gems] of Wisdom or Fusus (cf. S. Pines, “Ibn Sina et l'auteur de la Risalat al-fusus fi’l-hikma: quelques données du problème,” Revue des Études islamiques 19 [1951], pp. 121-24); (2) The Main Questions or Fontes quaestionum in its two versions, i.e., ‘Uyun al-masa’il and Tajrid risalat al-da ‘awa al-qalbiyya; about the relationship between the two Arabic versions, cf. Miguel Cruz Hernandez, “El Fontes quaestionum (‘uyun al-masa’il) de Abu Nasr al-Farabi,” Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 25-26 (1950-51), pp. 303-5; about the authenticity of this text, see again M. Cruz Hernandez, pp. 304-5, and Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy (repr. Chicago, 1979), pp. 21-22, n. 2; (3) Commentary on the Treatise of the Greek Zeno the Great or Zinun al-Kabir (cf. Franz Rosenthal, “Arabische Nachrichten ueber Zenon den Eleaten,” n.s. Orientalia 6 [1937], pp. 63-64 and particularly, p. 64, n. 1); (4) The Demonstration of Immaterial Things or Fi ’ithbat al-mufariqat (cf. Ibrahim Madkour in his chapter on al-Farabi in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif, vol. I [Wiesbaden, 1963], p. 452, n. 10); (5) Explanatory Remarks on Wisdom or Ta‘liqat fi’l-hikmah (cf. Jean Michot, “Tables de correspondance des Ta‘liqat d'al-Farabi, des Ta‘liqat d'Avicenne et du Liber Aphorismorum d'Andrea Alpago,” MIDEO 15 [1982], pp. 231-50).

10. Fi ’Aghrad, Arabic edition (1) by F. Dieterici in Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen (Leiden, 1890), pp. 34-38; (2) anonymously in Hyderabad, h. 1349. French translation and study by Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Le traité d'al-Farabi sur les buts de la Métaphysique d'Aristote,” Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale 24 (1982), pp. 38-43. Spanish translation and study by Rafael Ramón Guerrero, “Al-Farabi y la ‘Metafísica’ de Aristóteles,” pp. 225-40. English presentation by M. Galston, “A Re-examination of al-Farabi's Neoplatonism,” pp. 18-19.

11. Arabic edition by Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Aristotle (Falsafat Aristutalis) (Beirut, 1961); English translation by Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 2d ed., pp. 71-130.

12. Arabic edition by Maurice Bouyges, S. J.: Al-Farabi, Risalat fi’l-‘Aql (Beirut, 1938). English translation of the relevant sections by Arthur Hyman in Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh (New York, 1973), pp. 215-21. Full Italian translation with excellent notes by Francesca Lucchetta: Farabi, Epistola sull'intelletto (Padova, 1974).

13. Arabic edition (1) by F. Dieterici, Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen (Leiden, 1890), pp. 1-33 and particularly pp. 27-32; (2) by Albert Nader, Al-Djam‘bayn al-Hakimayn (Beirut, 1968), pp. 105-9. German translation by F. Dieterici, Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen (Leiden, 1892), pp. 1-53 and particularly pp. 43-51. French translation by Elie Abdel-Massih, Melto 5 (1969), pp. 305-58 and particularly pp. 347-52. English presentation by Majid Fakhry, “Al-Farabi and the Reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle,” Journal of the History of Ideas 26 (1965), pp. 469-78.

14. “Al-Farabi, Emanation and Metaphysics,” in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parviz Morewedge, Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern (The International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, forthcoming). See also M. Galston, “A Re-examination of al-Farabi's Neoplatonism,” pp. 14-19.

15. Anonymous Arabic edition, Tahsil al-sa‘adah (Hyderabad, h. 1345). English translation by Muhsin Mahdi in Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 13-67.

16. Main Arabic edition by Uthman Amin (2d ed., Cairo, 1949). Other Arabic edition along with a Spanish translation and the edition of two Latin versions by Angel Gonzalez Palencia: Al-Farabi, Catálogo de las ciencias, 2d ed. (Madrid, 1953).

17. Arabic edition and English translation with commentary by Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Abu Nasr al-Farabi's Mabadi’ Ara’ Ahl al-Madina al-Fadila (Oxford, 1985).

18. Arabic edition by Fauzi M. Najjar, Alfarabi's Political Regime (Al-Siyasa al-madaniyya also known as The Treatise on the Principles of Beings) (Beirut, 1964). There is a full German translation by F. Dieterici, but it is based on a poor and incomplete text: Die Staatsleitung von Alfarabi (Leiden, 1904). English translation of nearly the whole political part by Fauzi M. Najjar in Medieval Political Philosophy, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), pp. 31-57. There is a full English translation available at the Translation Clearing House, Department of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater (ref. a-30-50 d), by Thérèse-Anne Druart, The Political Regime or The Principles of Beings.

19. The Selected Aphorisms, which presents al-Farabi's own views though purporting to offer selected aphorisms from the ancients, does not use technical emanationist language but provides a metaphysical outlook consonant with the emanationist texts. Arabic edition by Fauzi M. Najjar, Al-Farabi's Fusul Muntaza‘ah (Selected Aphorisms) (Beirut, 1971). English translation from an earlier incomplete Arabic edition by D. M. Dunlop: Al-Farabi, Fusul al-madani. Aphorisms of the Stateman (Cambridge, 1961). For my purpose paragraphs 68-75 and 94 of Najjar's edition, corresponding to paragraphs 64-70 and 89 of Dunlop's translation, are particularly relevant.

20. Arabic edition by Muhsin Mahdi, Alfarabi's Book of Letters (Beirut, 1970). There is an interesting discussion of the meaning of the title Book of Letters by Rafael Ramón Guerrero, “Al-Farabi y la ‘Metafísica’ de Aristóteles,” pp. 212-25. The chapter on being analyzes shades of meaning but does not refer to the first cause or to a cause of existence. A good summary of the content of this chapter is presented by Amina Rachid under the rather misleading title “Dieu et l'être selon al-Farabi: le chapitre de ‘l'être’ dans le Livre des Lettres,” in Dieu et l'être. Exégèse d'Exode 3, 14 et de Coran 20, 11-24 (Paris, 1978), pp. 180-90. At the end Rachid concludes: “this ontological and logical analysis of being in which the first cause appears only discreetly and by allusion will be taken over and expanded by Ibn Sina” (p. 190; my emphasis).

21. Cf. ch. 32, nn. 238-43, pp. 217-20. This passage wonders how the question “Does it exist?” or “Is it an existent?” can be answered when asked about the divinity. Al-Farabi then contrasts the way one answers these questions about the divinity with the way one would answer them if they were asked about natural beings. This passage contains interesting views on the uncaused cause's essence and attributes but nothing about emanationism.

22. Cf. his edition and translation of al-Farabi's Fusul al-madani. Aphorisms of the Stateman, pp. 9-17.

23. Al-Farabi on the Perfect State, pp. 1 and 20.

24. Dieterici's ed., p. 34, ll. 6-13.

25. An English version of the Arabic version of this text may be found in Plotini Opera, vol. II, ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer. The translation of the Arabic version is by Geoffrey Lewis (Paris, 1959).

26. Dieterici's ed., p. 38, ll. 2-4.

27. Hellenistic commentators too had not been very satisfied with Aristotle's prime mover. Charles Genequand shows this in “L'objet de la métaphysique selon Alexandre d'Aphrodise,” Museum Helveticum 36 (1979), pp. 48-57.

28. Mahdi's trans., n. 20, p. 99; Arabic, p. 92.

29. Trans., n. 74, p. 115; Arabic, pp. 112-13.

30. Trans., nn. 97-98, pp. 126-28; Arabic, pp. 127-29. The Opinions, section VI, ch. 13, also claims that it is the Agent Intellect which gives the first intelligibles and explains what these first intelligibles are (pp. 198-207). See also The Political Regime, p. 71, l. 14-p. 72, l. 4. In the same way he had claimed in n. 87, p. 121 (Arabic, p. 121) that the soul and nature, i.e., form and matter, are “insufficient to explain the dream-vision that warns of future events. This requires other principles with a rank of being higher than that of the soul.” (Note the expression “rank of being.”) In The Opinions, this principle is the Agent Intellect. Cf. Walzer's edition and translation, section IV, ch. 14, nn. 6-11, pp. 218-27.

31. Trans., n. 34, p. 103; Arabic, p. 97.

32. Trans., n. 49, p. 107; Arabic, p. 103.

33. Trans., n. 7, pp. 84-85; Arabic, p. 75. One can find an application of this theory to natural science and metaphysics in The Selected Aphorisms, Dunlop's trans., n. 89, pp. 72-74; Arabic, n. 94, pp. 95-98, l. 8.

34. Trans., n. 99, p. 128; Arabic, p. 130.

35. “Whether the Agent Intellect is also the cause of the existence of nature and natural beings and of the soul and animate things” (n. 99, p. 128; Arabic, p. 129).

36. That the categories limit themselves to natural beings which are attested by sense perception has already been affirmed in n. 4, pp. 82-83; Arabic, pp. 72-73. The need for a cause which is a being of a kind not included in the categories is also expressed in The Book of Letters, n. 17, p. 69; n. 72, pp. 104-5; and n. 92, p. 119.

37. Trans., n. 99, p. 129; Arabic, p. 130.

38. Trans., n. 99, p. 129; Arabic, p. 130.

39. Trans., n. 99, p. 130; Arabic, p. 133.

40. Trans., n. 99, p. 130; Arabic, p. 131.

41. Trans., n. 99, p. 130; Arabic, p. 133.

42. Hyman's trans., p. 221; Arabic, pp. 35-36.

43. Trans., p. 218; Arabic, p. 24. It is curious that al-Farabi here calls an immaterial being a separate “form.” In The Political Regime, he refuses to use such a terminology and reserves this word for an enmattered form, i.e., form as correlative to matter in natural beings (p. 37, l. 4-p. 38, l. 1).

44. Trans., p. 218; Arabic, pp. 24-25. Note that previously (trans., p. 216; Arabic, pp. 16-17) al-Farabi had explained that the categories do not apply very well to intelligibles. He wonders whether the categories when applied to intelligibles are meaningless or simply used metaphorically. Here again we find the theme that there is something beyond the categories, since they deal only with sensible beings.

45. Hyman's English trans., p. 219; Lucchetta's Italian trans., pp. 103-4; Arabic, pp. 28-30. The passage is very obscure. I have preferred Lucchetta's translation to Hyman's. Herbert A. Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,” Viator 3 (1972), pp. 150-51, underlines the obscurity of this passage and tries to interpret it.

46. Trans., p. 219; Arabic, p. 31.

47. Lucchetta interprets this passage as meaning that the Agent Intellect is a dator formarum but points to the ambiguities of al-Farabi's philosophy of mind, pp. 68-79 (about the Agent Intellect as dator formarum, see particularly pp. 71-73). This interpretation runs counter to what al-Farabi says in other texts, particularly the popular political ones, which are probably late. In those texts al-Farabi claims that the natural forms are given by the celestial bodies. The Agent Intellect's only function is to bring man's intellect from potentiality to actuality (cf. Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Al-Farabi's Causation of the Heavenly Bodies,” in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. Parviz Morewedge [Delmar, N.Y., 1981], pp. 35-45). Herbert A. Davidson had already noticed this discrepancy, pp. 136-37. The eventual discrepancies between al-Farabi's views in this text and his views in the late emanationist works could be explained by J. Finnegan's hypothesis that this is an early text (cf. “Al-Farabi et le ‘Peri Nou’ d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise,” in Mélanges Louis Massignon, II [Damascus, 1957], p. 136; Bouyges, p. vii, and Lucchetta, p. 16, on the other hand, suggest that this text is a “mature” work).

48. Trans., pp. 220-21; Arabic, pp. 32-34.

49. Trans., p. 220; Arabic, p. 33.

50. Trans., p. 221; Arabic, p. 35. Cf. also The Book of Letters, n. 242, pp. 219-20.

51. Trans., p. 221; Arabic, p. 36. The description of divine science in The Enumeration of the Sciences gives the same attributes to the First or ultimate principle.

52. The number of pure intelligences is not given. The “emanationist” Opinions, section II, pp. 100-105, tells us that from the First emanate ten intelligences, including the Agent Intellect.

53. Mahdi's trans., n. 2, p. 13; Arabic, p. 2.

54. Trans., n. 5, p. 15; Arabic, pp. 4-5.

55. Trans., n. 16, p. 15; Arabic, p. 5.

56. Trans., n. 19, p. 24; Arabic, p. 15.

57. Trans., n. 6, pp. 15-16, and n. 16, p. 21; Arabic, pp. 5 and 12.

58. Trans., nn. 8-9, pp. 17-18, and n. 15, p. 21; Arabic, pp. 6-8 and pp. 11-12.

59. Trans., nn. 16-17, pp. 21-22; Arabic, pp. 12-13. Note the term “metaphysical” applied to beings and meaning immaterial.

60. Trans., n. 16, p. 22; Arabic, pp. 12-13.

61. The Book of Letters also claims that the divinity is uncaused, n. 239, p. 218.

62. Trans., n. 19, p. 23; Arabic, pp. 12-13.

63. The Selected Aphorisms speaks of this same ascent in n. 94, p. 95-p. 98, l. 8; Dunlop's trans., n. 89, pp. 72-74.

64. Trans., n. 19, p. 24; Arabic, p. 15.

65. Ibid.

66. Trans., n. 63, p. 49; Arabic, p. 47.

67. Trans., n. 99, p. 130; Arabic, p. 133.

68. The Arabic text for the whole section can be found in Amin's edition, pp. 99-101; Spanish translation in Gonzalez Palencia, pp. 63-65; Medieval Latin version by Gerard of Cremona also in Gonzalez Palencia, pp. 163-66. The formulation “beings qua beings,” instead of the more common Aristotelian “being qua being,” is typical of Metaphysics VI, 1. In his Commentary on the “De Interpretatione” (ed. Wilhelm Kutsch, S.J., and Stanley Marrow, S.J. [Beirut, 1960]), p. 84, 14 f., al-Farabi makes the point that the study of beings qua beings is no part of logic but rather part of metaphysics. See F. W. Zimmermann's English translation and introduction, Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's “De Interpretatione,” Classical and Medieval Logic Texts, III (Oxford, 1981), pp. xxxix and 78. This work again refers us back to the claim that metaphysics deals with what is beyond the categories. Yet al-Farabi does not hesitate to study the meaning of “being” as a concept in his reflections on the categories in ch. XV of his Book of Letters, pp. 110-28.

69. See supra, text at note 51.

70. That the First is an intellect is also emphasized in the Book of Letters, n. 242, p. 220. One should keep in mind that discussion of God's attributes is a very important theme in Islamic Theology (Kalam).

71. See supra, text at note 33.

72. The Political Regime, Najjar's trans., pp. 53-56; Arabic, p. 104, l. 7-p. 108, l. 19. The Opinions, section VI, chs. 18-19.

73. Arabic by Najjar, nn. 72-75, pp. 79-82; English by Dunlop, nn. 67-70, pp. 59-61.

74. Cf. Najjar's ed., pp. 13-16; 24-25; 31, n. 1.

75. Cf. Moritz Steinschneider, Al-Farabi. Des Arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften (Saint-Petersburg, 1869; repr., Amsterdam, 1966), p. 217.

76. Cf. S. Munk, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, last ed. (Paris, 1955), p. 344.

77. Najjar's ed., p. 31, ll. 2-3.

78. Arabic, p. 31, ll. 3-5.

79. Arabic, p. 31, ll. 5-7.

80. Arabic, p. 31, ll. 7-9.

81. Metaphysics VI, 1, 1026a8-32.

82. In The Enumeration of the Sciences, the study of the principles of other sciences, such as natural science, is the second division of metaphysics or divine science.

83. Arabic, p. 31, ll. 9-11.

84. Trans., n. 99, pp. 128-29; Arabic, pp. 129-30.

85. Arabic, p. 34, ll. 1-3, and p. 41, ll. 3-6.

86. The Political Regime, Arabic, p. 55, ll. 5-12; The Letter concerning the Intellect, Hyman's trans., pp. 220-21; Arabic, p. 32, l. 8-p. 34, l. 3.

87. Section II, ch. 3 and ch. 4, n. 1, pp. 100-107; section III, ch. 6, pp. 112-19.

88. Arabic, p. 34, l. 4-p. 35, l. 11; cf. supra, text at note 70.

89. Hyman's trans., p. 221; Arabic, p. 34, l. 4-p. 35, l. 11.

90. Section II, ch. 3, pp. 100-105. Al-Farabi substitutes for Aristotle's Eudoxean multiplication of spheres the more recent and economical scheme of Ptolemy. Cf. Walzer's commentary on this chapter, pp. 364-66.

91. About al-Farabi's conception of the Agent Intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson's detailed account, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,” pp. 134-54.

92. Trans., n. 99, p. 128; Arabic, p. 130.

93. Najjar's index to his edition of The Political Regime curiously omits such terms: p. 40, l. 4; p. 41, ll. 10 and 14; p. 42, ll. 7 and 12; p. 47, ll. 13 and 14; p. 48, ll. 11, 14, and 15; p. 50, l. 3; p. 52, ll. 7 and 8; p. 53, ll. 5 and 15; p. 57, l. 2; p. 65, l. 1; p. 79, ll. 15 and 17; p. 80, l. 1. In The Opinions such terms are found: p. 88, ll. 15 and 16; p. 92, ll. 8 and 16; p. 94, ll. 2, 4, 7, 8, and 16; p. 100, l. 11; p. 220, l. 2; p. 244, ll. 10 (twice), 12, and 13; p. 278, l. 1. See also Walzer's commentary on these terms, pp. 354-55. About specific and original features of al-Farabi's emanationist scheme, see Herbert A. Davidson, “Al-farabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,” p. 136.

I would like to thank Professor Thomas P. McTighe for his helpful comments on this paper.