SOURCE: Haddad, Fuad Said. “Conclusion.” In Alfarabi's Theory of Communication, pp. 155-69. Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1989.

[In the following essay, Haddad summarizes and analyzes al-Fārābī's theory of language communication as well as its impact on education.]

SUMMARY

We have examined in the previous chapters Alfarabi's theory of language communication and its educational implications by analyzing and interpreting his works on language and logic. In this chapter we will first summarize the theory. Then we will bring forth its prominent characteristics and draw out its significant implications for the purpose of assessing Alfarabi's role in Arabic educational thought.

Alfarabi considers communication and instruction as two intimately related activities. To understand the methods of instruction, one must have a clear vision of how people communicate. The variety of the views on communication has led to various theories of instruction. We have seen that because mystics do not believe in the possibility of communicating certain experiences, in instruction they emphasize contemplation. The same relation between communication and instruction holds in the case of behaviorists. Since behaviorists believe that communication is a matter of similar associations to the same objects, in instruction they lay special emphasis upon drilling and exercising. The relationship between communication and instruction manifests itself also in Alfarabi's theory of language communication.

Alfarabi believes that language communication is the exchange of meanings among human beings. His theory of language communication centers around simple meanings and simple expressions. According to Alfarabi, an expression must signify meaning. The meaning which the expression signifies must be agreed upon by the group who use that expression. The acquisition of meaning, according to Alfarabi, begins with experience. He conceives the human mind to be so structured that people acquire the same meanings or intelligibles, as he calls them, as a result of the act of perception.

When a person speaks to or communicates with another one, Alfarabi claims that this person first constructs simple intelligibles in his mind and then conveys the composite intelligibles in a linguistic form. Communication, therefore, according to Alfarabi, begins on the level of intelligibles. At this level meanings are composed first into a certain kind of structure whose standard form Alfarabi calls “proposition.” Then propositions are composed so as to constitute an argument. The standard form of composing propositions Alfarabi calls “syllogism.” We have therefore, a simple meaning, or, an intelligible, such as, “man,” “mortal,” and “Socrates.” Then the simple intelligibles are composed into a proposition such as, “Man is mortal.” The third step is to structure the propositions into a composite form, such as, “Man is mortal” and “Socrates is a man.”

To communicate these meanings, either the simple intelligible or the proposition or the composite propositions, we have to find first the simple expression that signifies the simple intelligible. Then we compose expressions into sentences so as to convey the propositions and then compose the sentences into a form that conveys the composite propositions. The value of expressions, simple sentences, and composite sentences lies in that they are chosen to convey the simple intelligibles, propositions, or arguments respectively.

The laws that govern the structure of simple intelligibles into propositions and the structure of propositions into a composite form are the laws of logic. The rules that govern the structure of a sentence or a composite of sentences are the rules of grammar.

The intelligibles are universal; they are the same for all human beings. The laws of logic are also universal. Simple expressions that signify the intelligibles are particular. English speaking people call “book” what Arabs call “kitab,” and the French call “livre.” The rules of grammar are particular; each language has its own grammatical rules.

Alfarabi maintains that communication is possible because of the universality of the intelligibles and the laws of logic. It is because the expressions of the various languages refer to the same intelligibles and because the various grammatical rules of the various languages correspond to common laws of logic, that communication is rendered possible.

Alfarabi realizes that the various languages have their own grammars. But he maintains that, whatever grammatical rule one takes, that rule is agreed upon to correspond to a logical one. Thus, in Alfarabi's point of view, several aspects of logic are related to language and language communication.

The parts of logic that pertain to communication are the ways by which propositions are structured, kinds of propositions, kinds of premises, the various figures of the syllogism, the rules of valid inference, and the ways of obverting and converting propositions. But our concern with these aspects of logic is limited to their function of presenting ways of establishing relations among simple intelligibles and among propositions.

Alfarabi distinguishes five levels of communication. These levels are differentiated by the degrees of certainty of the cognitions that are produced in the mind. Each degree is produced by an art of communication. The highest degree is manifested by “certain conviction”; it is produced by the art of demonstration. The other degrees are manifested by “belief,” which is produced by dialectic; “persuasion,” produced by sophistry and rhetoric; and “imagination,” produced by poetry.

Besides the function of producing cognitions of various degrees of certainty, the arts of communication are used as means by which the various cognitions are verified. Verification is a key process in Alfarabi's theory of communication; it determines whether two persons are communicating and it indicates the level of communication that is taking place.

Insofar as the five levels of communication are used for the exchange of meaning, we call them the logical arts or the arts of communication. Except for poetry, these arts use premises and certain types of syllogism. When they are used in verification, the kind of premises and the syllogistic reasoning are examined. Except for poetry, communication and verification are based on premises and some kind of syllogistic reasoning.

Instruction is a kind of discourse that aims at producing cognitions which were not previously known by the learner and of whose lacking the learner is aware. To achieve this aim, instruction has no arts to use other than the logical ones, because, according to Alfarabi, they are the only arts of language communication that produce cognitions.

But some of these arts, like demonstration, require strict reasoning and the use of certain premises. Such an art of communication cannot be used with beginners who are not mature enough to reason according to strict laws of logic. The teacher faces the problem of choosing a suitable art of communication of which the learner is capable. In determining which art to use, Alfarabi recommends that teachers consider the following: (1) readiness and maturity of the learner; (2) the background of the learner; (3) building new experiences of the learners on the old ones; and (4) making the learning process center around the learner.

Having determined the art of communication to be used in instruction, the teacher must attend to other problems; he should establish common understanding of expressions with learners. To clarify the meanings of expressions and to explain certain concepts, Alfarabi recommends the use of teaching aids. He lists the following aids: synonyms, definitions of things or parts of their definitions, the thing itself or parts of it or its similitude. Besides these aids, Alfarabi recommends the use of division, induction, and syllogisms.

Instruction, as conceived by Alfarabi, is a process of interaction between teachers and learners. This process is initiated and activated by the use of questions. Alfarabi considers questions as an essential device in communication and instruction. When learners ask questions, teachers must provide as much explanation as learners are capable of comprehending.

Besides the use of oral expressions, instruction uses books. In writing books, Alfarabi advises authors to consider the level of instruction and the achievement and maturity of readers for whom they are writing. As to the readers, Alfarabi urges them to be critical in using books. He demands that they acquaint themselves with the author's name, date of the book, its content, purpose, and method of instruction.

MAJOR FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS

As one examines Alfarabi's theory of language communication, one finds that Alfarabi's conception of instruction is intimately bound up with this theory. One of the major features of Alfarabi's theory as developed in this study is the connection between the five arts of communication and the art of instruction. This feature has a significant implication and a considerable impact on the process of instruction. The implication is that Alfarabi's theory of language, language communication, and instruction cannot be understood without also understanding that, for Alfarabi, logic provides the bases of these theories. The impact of this feature is that instruction becomes a process based on logic whereby ideas are associated by establishing logical relations among them. This view stands in sharp contrast with the views of certain philosophers and psychologists, such as David Hume and Guthrie, who account for the association of ideas on purely psychological grounds. David Hume, for example, gives three principles for the association of ideas: similarity, causality, and contiguity in space and time. Guthrie, on the other hand, accounts for association by the law of contiguity of cue and response.¹ In contrast to these points of view, Alfarabi's theory of association and learning is derived from his concept of human nature and from that of the nature of things. Insofar as the latter is concerned, he maintains that things are related to or differentiated from each other by their essences and accidents; if two things are essentially related to each other, Alfarabi would claim that their relationship is a necessary and causal one; non-essential relationships are accidental. In Alfarabi's opinion, association becomes a matter of establishing the essential relationships among things. Causality, for example, would not be interpreted as a psychological expectation, as Hume maintains, but rather as an inherent characteristic in the nature of things. Instruction, according to this latter view would be concerned primarily with essentials.

As to the concept of human nature, Alfarabi postulates that man is endowed by nature with a mind which has certain “powers” such as reasoning, remembering and imagining. These powers enable man to know. Alfarabi's view of these powers is not to be confused, though, with that of faculty psychologists as they have been interpreted by some educationists, inspite of certain similarities that exist between the two. In describing faculty psychology, Hilda Taba says: “The central idea of this theory is that the mind inherently contains all the attributes, or faculties, and the task of education is to bring them forth by the exercise of acquiring knowledge. The harder the knowledge is to acquire, the better its acquisition trains the mind … In this theory practice and drill are important not so much to induce proper responses but for their disciplinary value. Motivation does not matter, and individual differences are irrelevant.”² Alfarabi differs from faculty psychology as described by Taba on a number of points.

First, Alfarabi believes in individual differences and that they are relevant to instruction. He accounts for individual differences in two respects, innate and acquired differences. The former is due to the fact that people are born with a different physiological setup and different mental abilities. The latter does not mean, though, that people are born with different mental “powers” or faculties. All human beings have the same mental structure. But, by birth, the different “powers” of faculties are not equally capable of being developed by education to the same degree. This kind of differences cannot be overcome; it does postulate a limit on the level of education a person is capable of attaining.

The second kind of differences is due to environmental factors. The physical and social milieus bear their mark, according to Alfarabi, on the various individuals. But such differences that are caused by environmental conditions could, in principle, be controlled and the difficulties they present are surmountable.

In instruction, Alfarabi takes individual differences into consideration. Where differences are innate, in the sense that mental powers are of varying degrees of development, Alfarabi would provide differential programs of instruction. It is these basic differences that led Alfarabi to divide learners along various lines of study. Moreover, it is on the bases of such differences that Alfarabi classifies people into various social strata. Where differences are accidental, Alfarabi attempts to overcome these differences by various means. He recognizes that people who belong to various backgrounds have different significance of expressions and they have different premises that underlie their various attitudes, cognitions, and interests. Concerning the different significances of expressions, Alfarabi requires of teachers to establish common understanding of meanings between them and learners. The differences in the premises are not so easy to change. Alfarabi attempts to effect changes by instruction and by building up new habits that replace the old ones. If learners resist the change, then Alfarabi would be inclined to recommend compulsion.

The second point on which Alfarabi differs from faculty psychologists lies in his belief in the worthwhileness of motivation. His faith in motivation is derived from his understanding of human nature. Man, believes Alfarabi, is motivated by pleasure and pain. Consequently, he uses the principle of reward and punishment as means of motivation. Reward, he remarks, becomes the dignity of man and he urges teachers to use it. Punishment, however, he does not exclude; but it is to be used only sparingly, when rewarding proves futile.

The second major feature of Alfarabi's theory as developed in this study is that Alfarabi's account of the arts of communication matches these arts with the various fields of knowledge in the sense that each art of communication is used for dealing with certain arts or sciences. This matching is suggested by his view of knowledge.

Each art and science, according to Alfarabi, has three characteristics: (a) it has at least one subject; (b) it has its own premises which, in a learning situation, Alfarabi calls principles of instruction; and (c) it has its own fund of information. In general, Alfarabi divides knowledge into two major categories, theoretical and practical. The distinction between these two categories is based on the three characteristics we have mentioned. The theoretical category is characterized primarily by universal and permanent premises; the premises and the fund of information of the second category are subject to change. The arts of demonstration and dialectic are used in the theoretical sciences; the other arts of instruction are used in the practical arts. The use of an art of instruction in a certain art or science is determined by the nature of that art or that science. But Alfarabi realizes that beginners in the study of certain arts and sciences are not capable of using demonstration or dialectic because of the strict reasoning that these two arts require. With beginners, therefore, Alfarabi recommends the use of other arts of instruction.

The use of an art of instruction, however, does not mean the same as the use of a method of instruction or investigation. The various arts of instruction are differentiated from each other by the nature of their aims, premises, and by the use of syllogisms. Demonstration aims at certainty of conviction; its premises are true and certain and it follows the strict rules of reasoning. Dialectic aims at producing “belief”; its premises are generally accepted opinions and it follows strict reasoning processes. Sophistry and rhetoric aim at producing “persuasion.” The premises of the former seem to be generally accepted opinions but in fact they are not, whereas the premises of the latter are generally accepted opinions. Both sophistry and rhetoric do not follow strict rules of reasoning. Poetry aims at arousing imagination in the similitudes of things; it neither uses premises nor rules of reasoning.

Every art of instruction may have a number of methods. The methods used in each art or science are differentiated from each other by the particular subject of that art or that science and by the particular premises that belong to each art or science. This means that each art or science has a logical structure of its own determined by its subject, principles, fund of information, and the relations that hold among them. Even though the art of rhetoric may be used in teaching history and civics, for example, yet, we do not use the same method in teaching both, because each of history and civics has its own subject, premises, and fund of information that differ from those of the other. The same method of approach cannot be transferred from one art or science to another. This point of view is in harmony with modern methods of investigation. In an article on the relationship between the behavioral sciences and education, Tyler warns that education cannot draw directly upon nor is it to be confounded with these sciences because each behavioral science has a logical structure of its own that differs from that of the others. “Concepts, generalizations, and methods of inquiry in the behavioral sciences are valid in terms of the logical structure from which they are derived … The behavioral sciences contribute concepts, generalizations, and methods of inquiry that have developed in terms of the logical structures of these sciences, and can be properly understood only in these contexts,”³ says Tyler. Alfarabi's emphasis on the logical structure of each art and science is essentially a quest for being clear about the nature of each of them so as not to confuse them with each other, and so as to use the proper method in investigating and in teaching them.

As we enumerated the arts of instruction we noticed that certainty of conviction is produced only by the art of demonstration. Since the premises and conclusion of a demonstration are universal, and since demonstration uses syllogisms of the first figure, two points may occur to one's mind: (a) that certainty is achieved only on the level of the universal and not on that of the particular and (b) that certainty is a function of the relations of the terms of a first figure syllogism and not also of the reality of the terms.

Concerning the certainty that can be achieved about the particular, Alfarabi does not deny it. The particular is real in Alfarabi's scheme. He does not view the universal as a concrete entity that has an independent existence in and by itself. Its reality is that it is manifested in the particular. Hence, the fact that the universal is certain reflects on the particular that it is certain, but not vice versa. We may conclude, therefore, that the quest for the certainty of every particular necessitates, in Alfarabi's opinion, an approach from the universal. This means that it necessitates a deductive approach. This is in perfect harmony with Alfarabi's other views. He explicitly states that induction, which is an examination of particulars, never yields certain results because, for various reasons, we cannot exhaust the examination of all particulars.

But Alfarabi observes that the quest for the certainty of the universal is not conditioned solely by the method of investigation, but also by the nature of the subject investigated. This observation provides a clue to the problem of whether certainty is a function of relations or not. If certainty is a result of method only, then it would be a function of relations. The following example illustrates this point:

All men have three noses
X is a man
Therefore, X has three noses

The major and minor premises are so related that no other valid conclusion except the one we have drawn follows from them. On the level of pure relations, the conclusion is quite certain, because it is necessitated by the type of relations that exist among the terms of the syllogism. But Alfarabi does not condition certainty only by the relations that exist among the premises; he is just as much concerned about the truth of each of the premises and of the conclusion. He would ask whether it is true that all men have three noses and whether it is true that X is a man.

The examination of the truth of premises led Alfarabi to distinguish between two types of premises. The first type is known without our being aware how we acquired them. “The whole is greater than any of its parts” is an example of such premises; they are premises which seem as if we were born with their knowledge. These premises are self-evident and they are eternally true. The second type of premises is acquired by experience. To investigate, for example, whether it is true that all men have three noses, we will have to examine all the population of human beings, past, present, and future. But it is obvious that this is an impossible task. Inductively, therefore, the absolutely certain truth cannot be determined.

On the basis of this distinction, Alfarabi examined the various fields of knowledge and classified them into various categories. Top in the list of his classification are the sciences which do not admit of matter; in other words, the sciences whose subjects are permanent and never undergo any kind of change. These are the theoretical sciences. Philosophy and mathematics rank highest in this classification. He holds that the premises of these sciences are self-evident and that they are eternally true. Since these sciences are based on true premises and since their investigation is conducted by use of syllogisms of the first figure, absolute certainty about them can be achieved, but not about others.

To get to the level of the theoretical sciences, one will have to go gradually through all the others. Alfarabi observes that only a small number of people can achieve the level of these sciences. Consequently, the overwhelming number of people will have to be content with a lower level of certainty about knowledge and practically all will have to be content about the uncertainty of non-theoretical studies. This analysis leads the writer to a conclusion quite dear to Bertrand Russel: one of the aims of instruction is to train people to accept and to live in uncertainty.

The third major feature of Alfarabi's theory as revealed in this study is his empirical approach to the acquisition of knowledge. Such knowledge is characterized by a gradual process of abstraction that begins with the concrete and particular objects of sense. This view has an important impact on the instructional process; it requires that in the early stages of learning, the teacher must see to it that the learners are provided with enough particulars and concrete instances so as to provide them ultimately with a good variety of experiences. A variety of similar experiences helps the learner in abstracting qualitites which particulars belonging to the same class have in common.

The significance of abstraction in the process of acquiring knowledge has a further considerable importance; it implies that the learning activities must be organized according to the principle of beginning with the concrete and gradually developing into the abstract. This would mean that Alfarabi's theory of instruction bears also on the structure and organization of the curriculum, that is on the principles of choosing the proper activities to be included in the curriculum and the organization of the activities in terms of the maturity of the learners and the nature of the subject matter so as to lead the learners ultimately to the theoretical sciences.

Besides these features and implications which we have discussed, there is one important feature that does not bear directly on education but which deserves mentioning in our concluding chapter. This feature is that Alfarabi conceives language communication as being fundamentally a conceptual activity and not a linguistic one. His emphasis on the conceptual nature of communication implies that language is not in and by itself an adequate means of communication. The inadequacy of language, considered in and by itself, is manifested in the nature of simple expressions and in the rules of grammar. The simple expression is defined by Alfarabi to be a sound. The sound is agreed upon by a group to signify an intelligible. It is the agreement among the members of a group that raises the sound into the status of an expression. Indeed, it is this agreement that accounts for the development of language. But, the various groups in a society may use the same expression to signify different intelligibles. Thus, the significance of an expression becomes a function of the social milieu that uses the expression.

There is another practical reason that reflects on the general significance of expressions. Because of the relatively limited number of expressions, some of them are chosen to signify a number of different intelligibles. Moreover, there are certain simple expressions that do not signify a simple intelligible; instead, they assume an underlying set of logical relations. This quality is manifested in derivative expressions. “Takātaba” is a simple Arabic expression derived according to standard rules from the root expression “kataba.” The root expression roughly means “he wrote”; the derivative expression means “he exchanged writing with someone else.” It is clear that the meaning of the derivative expressions is a structural one. The structure assumes a number of intelligibles and relations that link the intelligibles together. Thus, unless an expression is defined in terms of intelligibles which it signifies or assumes, its specific significance cannot be established.

As to the rules of grammar, they are basically devised to compose expressions for the purpose of conveying composite intelligibles. The rules of grammar are concerned with the patterns of linguistic structures. Specifically, they are concerned with the position of an expression in a grammatical structure and not with the semantic function of the expression in that structure. To determine what expression should occupy a certain position in a pattern of grammatical structure, we have to refer to the meaning of the expression and to the relation that this meaning has to other ones in that pattern.

This view of communication and language definitely means that instruction must always aim at a level of abstraction. Unless learners are trained to think in an abstract way, their instruction, according to Alfarabi, is not of much use. In teaching numbers to beginners, for example, Alfarabi would insist that the learners must be trained to develop a number concept. Two would be applied to apples, eggs, books. The concept is developed inductively. Once the basic concepts have been developed, Alfarabi would be in favour of using a deductive approach.

The inadequacy of language is supplemented by logic. The reason is that communication is the exchange of meanings among human beings. The art that deals with meanings and their relationships is logic; it gives all the possible ways to establishing relationships among simple intelligibles and propositions. But meanings must be conveyed in a linguistic medium. In order that language may be capable of performing this function, the rules of grammar are subordinated to the laws of logic, in the sense that the choice of any grammatical structure is validated by its capacity to convey meanings related to each other according to the laws of logic. Consequently, the criterion by which the validity of a grammatical rule is judged is a logical criterion. Without reference to a logical setup, the rules of grammar would not be understood.

The subordination of the rules of grammar to the laws of logic reduces languages into an instrument of logic for the purpose of communication. Simple expressions, according to this view, become “carriers” of meanings and sentences become patterns devised so as to embody and convey meanings.

This feature has a special significance in teaching language and particularly grammar. According to this view, language teaching must be given prime concern. Furthermore, this view necessitates that in teaching grammar, teachers must supply the logical bases upon which the rules of grammar are based. Unless the logical relations that underlie grammar are clarified, genuine communication among human beings, and particularly instruction, are considerably hindered.

ASSESSMENT

If we take Alfarabi's works on language and logic separately, without considering their relationship to each other, we find that they do not provide a new line of thought in Arabic. On the whole, his works that deal with these two topics are commentaries on Aristotle's studies. Other Arab philosophers were quite familiar with Aristotle. Al-Kindi is known as the first Arab Aristotelian. But the interest of Arab philosophers before Alfarabi was, on the whole, mostly concentrated on metaphysics and logic. Alfarabi's philosophy, in contrast with earlier ones, is characterized by its broad view that included almost all the areas of philosophy known at that time. Alfarabi did not limit his studies and writings to one aspect of philosophy; instead, he dealt with all the various fields, attending to the various intellectual issues and problems of his age. In certain cases, the solutions he provided for some of the issues and problems started a tradition that was carried on by all subsequent Arab philosophers. In this sense he has been described as the formulator of the Islamic philosophy as it came to be known in the West through Avicenna and Averroes.

But in many other cases, his treatises on certain issues and problems constituted the foundation of new philosophies in Arabic literature. In his doctoral dissertation, Fawzi Najjar established the fact that Alfarabi is the founder of political philosophy in Arabic thought and that in this field he had no immediate predecessor.⁴

Insofar as his theory of language communication and its educational implications are concerned, Alfarabi is singled out as a unique philosopher in the history of Arabic thought. His uniqueness lies in his analysis of language (particularly grammar) and logic and in the relationship he established between them. Both of these topics provoked controversial issues among Arab grammarians and logicians, particularly in the schools of Kufa, Basra, and Baghdad. But the distinctions between the science of language and the art of logic, the nature of each, and their relationships were not clearly drawn by these schools. In his investigation of these problems, Alfarabi examined the nature of man, and traced the origin of language, laying special emphasis on meaning, the way meaning is acquired and the way by which it is expressed in language. This analysis of these three problems provides the ground of his theory of language communication, instruction, and the solutions he gave to the problems of relating language to logic. As a matter of fact, his account constitutes the classical statement of these issues in Arabic literature.

His account of the relationship of grammar to logic, and his view that the logical structure underlies the grammatical one, is a very significant point and contribution not only to Arabic thought; Alfarabi claims that this characteristic is universal in that it is true of any language at any time.

Alfarabi's claim is justified. The very problem of the relation of grammar to logic is an issue which has been frequently discussed in contemporary linguistics, especially at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The tendency now is to lean to a point of view similar to Alfarabi's in examining grammatical structures. The logical structure that underlies the grammatical one is being emphasized.

As far as we know from the available literature of the works of Alfarabi's predecessors in Arabic literature, not one of them gave education special attention in his writings. We have seen that Alfarabi recognized the complex nature of instruction. To deal with the art of instruction as an important field of study, and to relate it clearly to his understanding of the natures of the learner, cognitions, various fields of knowledge, and to language and logic, establish Alfarabi as the father of educational philosophy in Arabic thought.

Notes

1. E. R. Guthrie, The Psychology of Learning (New York: Harper, 1935).

2. Hilda Taba, Curriculum Development: Theory and Practice (New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), p. 79.

3. Ralph W. Tyler, “Application of the Behavioral Sciences,” in Teacher Education: Reappraisal, ed. Elmer R. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 41-50, taken from a mimeographed copy, pp. 1, 2.

4. Fawzi Najjar, “The Political Philosophy of al-Farabi as a Rationalistic Interpretation of Islam” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 1954).