SOURCE: "Politics and Principles," in Adam Smith's Science of Morals, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971, pp. 205–20.

The thesis that Smith's theory of morality is essentially a scientific one should not be taken to imply that he does not endorse any moral and political principles of his own. By and large he accepts, as morally justified, the norms which it is his main purpose to explain. His own moral convictions can be seen in the arguments which he uses to justify his confidence in the judgments of the impartial spectator. These convictions are also apparent in the moral assumptions he brings to bear on the political issues of his day and in the recommendations he makes concerning the general conduct of politics. This is not to say that the arguments which he uses to justify his moral and political principles are the same as those which he uses to explain why certain principles are generally accepted. At least they do not correspond to the efficient causes of moral and political principles; although, as we shall see, they do often correspond to the final causes of such principles, or, in other words, to the purposes which are unwittingly served by these efficient causes.

Despite all that Smith has to say against utility as the explanation for the ordinary person's moral and political attitudes, his own normative moral and political philosophy turns out to be, in the end, a form of utilitarianism. It is because men, by following their spontaneous moral sentiments, play their part in a system which is conducive to the happiness of mankind, that Smith recommends that these moral sentiments should continue to serve as guides for conduct. They find their justification in the fact that they are a means towards the production of general happiness. Similarly, when it comes to giving political advice, he relies on the principle of utility to provide the basis on which political decisions ought to be made. For the most part utility dictates that politicians should leave well alone, but this is by no means always the case. Sometimes it is necessary for them to intervene in the natural social processes for the benefit of human happiness. Utility, or the production of happiness, is thus the principle by reference to which he judges that both the natural moral sentiments and the system of natural liberty are desirable. It is also the principle behind his suggestions for refining these sentiments and correcting such defects as may remain even when the condition of natural liberty has been established. We may, therefore, say that, with respect to his own normative philosophy, utility is his supreme moral and political principle.

I. THE THEORY OF GOVERNMENT

Smith's theory of government is the meeting place for his scientific theory of society and his own practical recommendations; it is, therefore, a good point from which to start a consideration of the normative and metaphysical beliefs which lie behind his science of society. The four functions which Smith allocates to government are 'justice, police, revenue and arms'; 'The object of justice is security from injury, and it is the foundation of civil government. The objects of police are the cheapness of commodities, public security and cleanliness'; revenue concerns taxes raised to defray the expenses of government, and the fourth purpose of government is to maintain an army for external defence.¹ The powers of government are legislative, judicial and federal (the power of making war and peace);² its main method of operation is, therefore, the law, which Smith defines as the command of the sovereign.³ He has a deep interest in the development of different types of government in different societies, which he explains partly by economic and partly by military factors.⁴ He himself favoured a type of mixed government, corresponding to the constitution of Britain in his own day, which combined a representative legislature, on a limited franchise, with a hereditary monarchy. The descriptions which he gives of the development of government in its various functions are of great sociological interest in themselves, but, from the point of view of the discussion of the relationship between his sociological theory and his normative philosophy, they are only a background for his analysis of political obligation. It is in his analysis of the reasons why men do obey, or ought to obey, their governments that we can discern his own political philosophy.

Government exists where there is law; a law is a commandment whose observance can be enforced; whenever one person or group of persons can successfully get their decisions accepted as law, they constitute a government.⁵ Smith sees that this makes the question of the citizens' obligation to obey the commands of the sovereign central to the study of politics, and, in order to answer this question, he finds it necessary to discuss the duties of the sovereign towards the subject. When Smith asks why men 'enter into' civil society, he is still primarily asking a factual question: he wants to know what 'induces men to obey'⁶ their government. Because he treats it as a factual question he has no difficulty in rejecting the theory that men obey because of some contract entered into either by themselves or their forbears, for, as he says, (1) men obey where the contract is unknown, (2) they do not give the contract as the reason why they obey, (3) they are not aware of giving their consent, and (4) in those instances where there is a contract, as in the case of resident aliens, this does not result in any trust being placed in the persons who have made the contract to obey.⁷ However, it becomes clear that it is not only a factual question which he is asking when he includes amongst the objections to the contract theory the moral argument that a person ought not to be bound by a promise made by his ancestors: he goes on to ridicule the notion of tacit consent by saying that most people have no real chance to leave their country and:

To say that by staying in a country a man agrees to a contract of obedience to government is just the same with carrying a man into a ship and after he is at a distance from land to tell him that by being in the ship he has contracted to obey the master.⁸

In concluding, therefore, that 'the foundation of a duty cannot be a principle with which mankind is entirely unacquainted'⁸ Smith appears to be making the psy chological point that we cannot have a motive of which we are totally unaware, and the moral point that a man cannot be obliged to obey a contract into which he did not explicitly enter.

His own theory of political obligation is, likewise, a mixture of descriptive and normative theory. Men obey, he argues, because of 'the principles of authority and utility';⁹ the first relates to those characteristics of men which make others accept them as superior and worthy of being obeyed, and the second to the subjects' awareness of the private and public utility of the functions of government. It is the principle of authority which has most in common with the doctrine of the Moral Sentiments where Smith tends to play down the importance of utility and rely on laws of social psychology to explain men's behaviour.

The four characteristics which give authority are age, long possession of power, wealth, and mental or physical abilities. The first is explained by arguing that the imagination connects the ideas of age with those of wisdom and experience which, to some extent, makes age just as effective as the possession of ability in obtaining authority. In so far as these qualities are admired in themselves, rather than as means to fulfilling the useful functions of government, they come under the principle of authority. But of more importance than either age or wisdom is the long possession of power; this is explained by the association of ideas, and, in particular, by relating it to the expectations and resentments of mankind: we have seen how many rights, especially property rights, arise out of the expectations which an established practice or possession forms in men's minds and the consequent resentment which is aroused by the frustration of these expectations. This is applied to the possession of political power; men are prepared to accept the commands of those who have always given them orders but will reject those of the 'upstart'. Wealth is the fourth, and most important, authority-conferring characteristic; this we have already examined in detail when considering the 'origin and distinction of ranks',¹⁰ and it is necessary, here, only to add that Smith considers the possession of wealth to be the main factor which attracts the respect of other men and to remind ourselves that this is not primarily a matter of the subject's economic dependence on the rich but of the ability of the rich to obtain the admiration and sympathy of the poor on account of the ease with which men sympathize with the imagined pleasures of the wealthy. This source of authority alone is, according to Smith, 'upon ordinary occasions, sufficient to govern the world'.¹¹

If the principle of authority is the one which leads men to obey rulers without question, then that of utility induces them to obey because they appreciate the purposes which government serves, particularly its role in maintaining justice and peace in society, for not only does government protect the rich against the poor, but 'by civil institutions the poorest may get redress of injuries from the wealthiest and most powerful'.¹² This is not primarily a sense of private or individual utility, since political obligation may oblige men to act against their own interests:

It is the sense of public utility, more than of private, which influences men to obedience. It may sometimes be for my interest to disobey, and to wish government overturned, but I am sensible that other men are of a different opinion from me, and would not assist me in the enterprise. I therefore submit to its decision for the good of the whole.¹²

This does not, in fact, contradict Smith's view of the minor place which benevolence holds in the pantheon of motives, since he hints that private utility would hold more sway if the individual was in a position to conduct an individual rebellion.

The principle of utility is on a par with that of authority as an explanation for obedience; it acts as a further support for the principle of authority and may, indeed, incorporate the principle of authority in so far as men become aware of the utility of blind obedience to rulers.¹³ Smith even suggests some sociological generalizations about the relative weight of the two principles in different types of civil society:

In all governments both these principles take place in some degree, but in a monarchy the principle of authority prevails, and in a democracy that of utility. In Britain, which is a mixed government, the factions formed some time ago, under the names of Whig and Tory, were influenced by these principles, the former submitted to government on account of its utility and the advantages which they derived from it, while the latter pretended that it was of divine institution, and to offend against it was equally criminal as for a child to rebel against its parent.¹⁴

But, from the philosophical point of view, the principles are not on the same level, since the principle of utility is used to evaluate the principle of authority. It is clear that Smith does not consider that the principle of authority is self-justifying. He notes, for instance, that it is irrational because it depends on an illusion, created by the imagination, which runs counter to our ordinary moral judgments:

That kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public conveniency may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine of Nature. Nature would teach us to submit to them for their own sake, to tremble and bow down before their exalted station, to regard their smile as a reward sufficient to compensate any services, and to dread their displeasure, though no other evil were to follow from it, as the severest of all mortifications,¹⁵

On the other hand he points out the usefulness of the principle of authority in promoting the stability and hence the happiness of society.

It would appear, therefore, that Smith elevates the principle of utility into the principle of his normative theory of political obligation. Men ought to obey their rulers in so far as their government is effective in producing public happiness by sustaining the internal and external peace of a country; in the end, this is the standard by which all governments must be judged. Such a principle, of course, entails that when a government fails to fulfil these purposes it should cease to command men's obedience (although the principle of authority may still produce de facto obedience), and Smith is willing to allow that 'Whatever be the principle of allegiance, a right of resistance must undoubtedly be lawful, because no authority is altogether unlimited.'¹⁶ However, this right of rebellion is severely limited; frequent rebellions lead to instabilities which make it difficult to re-establish de facto authority, presumably because it makes it impossible to rely on the principle of long possession. Therefore, on the basis of the principle of utility itself, Smith concludes that, while 'no government is quite perfect', nevertheless 'it is better to submit to some inconveniences than make attempts against it'.¹⁷ But the right to rebel does exist, and Smith argues unequivocally for the justice of the Revolution against James II on the grounds that he ignored the rights of Parliament. Yet even in this case he is primarily concerned to explain why the Revolution occurred, namely because James aroused 'the most furious passions, fear, hatred, and resentment',¹⁸ and 'plainly showed his intention to change the religion of the country, which is the most difficult thing in the world',¹⁹ so that men overcame their 'habitual sense of deference'¹⁸ and rose in rebellion.

II. UTILITY AND THE STATESMAN

The principle of utility does not only determine the limits of obligatory obedience to political authority, it is also the principle which Smith uses, in conjunction with his sociological theory, to guide the decisions of statesmen. Rulers ought to act so as to secure the happiness of their citizens. It seems to have been Smith's own conviction that 'All constitutions of government … are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the happiness of those who live under them.'²⁰ This may be demonstrated by looking in turn at what he has to say about the four purposes of government.

The most important function of government is to enforce the rules of natural justice. In Chapter Nine we saw that Smith does not consider that men in general seek justice for its utility. But it was also noted, in the same chapter, that Smith does not deny that justice has utility. In his final explanation of the sentiments on which the sense of justice is based, Smith emphasizes that justice is essential to the security and thus to the happiness of society:

Justice … is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems in this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms. In order to enforce the observation of justice, therefore, Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safeguards of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent, and to chastise the guilty.²¹

Thus resentment is useful because it accomplishes 'all the political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and the example to the public'.²²

Smith's definition of justice is particularly suited to utilitarian interpretations (especially the negative formulation of utilitarianism which advocates the minimization of pain), since it is to do with the prevention of harm or injury, and it is clear that, for all he has to say against utility as the immediate ground of the sentiments of justice, he regards the government's duty to enforce justice as a particular case of its duty to promote the happiness, or at least to ward off the unhappiness, of its subjects:

The wisdom of every state or commonwealth endeavours as well as it can, to employ the force of the society to restrain those who are subject to its authority, from hurting or disturbing the happiness of one another.²³

Smith expects that, even in the case of politicians, it will always be immediate resentment against injustice which leads men to support the laws of justice, but in so far as it becomes a matter of debate as to whether or not the state should enforce the rules of natural justice, it is to the principle of utility that Smith considers all men, and especially statesmen, will have recourse. We have seen, in the last chapter, that in certain aspects of justice, such as the infliction of punishment after due judicial processes,²⁴ and the enforcement of laws of military discipline,²⁵ Smith notes, probably with approval, that considerations of utility have a place. When it comes to the general philosophical justification of all sentiments of justice, this appeal to the production of happiness and the prevention of pain is used to validate all the rules of natural justice. Apart from the immediate injuries which the administration of justice prevents, it has other, less direct but extremely important, consequences. It is indicated, in the Wealth of Nations, that justice is useful in promoting prosperity; indeed it is an essential requirement for the development of commercial society:

Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.²⁶

It is, therefore, the principle of utility that lies behind Smith's recommendation that all governments should enforce the laws of natural justice. And the same principle explains his willingness to allow that, under certain circumstances, it is even right for the government to compel acts of positive benevolence; in some cases, if it is necessary for 'promoting the prosperity of the commonwealth',²⁷ the magistrate may make laws concerning conduct which was neither right nor wrong before these laws were made. Moreover, Smith frequently insists that it is the statesman's duty to revise the law when it is hindering social development.²⁸

It is less clear whether Smith thought that justice, in the sense of fairness, could conflict with utility in the sense of the maximization of happiness and the minimization of pain. The immediate moral sentiments prompt men to feel resentment at injuries being inflicted on anyone, which seems to imply that justice protects the happiness of all men equally.²⁹ Apart from the sentinel example, Smith does not give much consideration to clashes between fairness and utility; he tends to assume that there is no conflict between them: the sovereign owes 'justice and equality of treatment' to 'all the different orders of his subjects',³⁰ but there is no suggestion that this equality is incompatible with the useful consequences of enforcing the rules of justice. Although his arguments in favour of aristocracy would seem to suggest that he considers that the few should be preferred to the many, it should be remembered that he justified the division of society into ranks because of the contribution this makes to the stability of society³¹ and thus to the happiness of all its members. Moreover, we have seen that Smith does not believe that prosperity does bring great happiness, whatever men's imaginations may indicate to the contrary. He seems to think that the essential requirements of a happy life are open to all and clearly approves that this should be so.³² On the other hand, while he accepts a limited equality of distribution as inevitable and desirable,³³ he is more concerned with equality of opportunity, the removal of restrictions on the individual's chances to make the most of his own abilities and virtues.³⁴ In this process considerations of merit and demerit lead to justified inequalities. This is part of justice in so far as a person rightly resents being deprived of the fruits of his labours. It is possible therefore, to argue that Smith would put considerations of fairness above the production of greater quantities of happiness as such, but he himself did not feel that he had to choose between these two goals.

The second function of government, namely police, is mainly concerned with the 'cheapness of commodities', and is the central topic of the Wealth of Nations. It is, of course, Smith's most famous doctrine that all governments should allow the natural workings of the economy to operate without state intervention. This thesis is partly supported by saying that restrictions on the economic liberty of the subject are unjust, but Smith's main argument is along the lines that government inaction, outside the sphere of justice, is the best means to promote high consumption and therefore the general happiness.³⁵ For, although Smith realizes that in some ways commercial society reduces men's opportunities for self-development,³⁶ he is in no doubt that, on the whole, it is greatly beneficial. His advocacy of the system of natural liberty is ultimately based on an assessment of its utility in increasing per capita consumption. The fact that this is so can be seen in his willingness to consider exceptions to the policy of non-intervention.³⁷ On the whole he distrusts governments as inefficient and self-interested, but he sees that in certain matters some government action is necessary for the general welfare; for instance, every government has 'the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain'.³⁸

Smith is prepared to consider each case for government intervention in economic life on its own merits; in discussing certain regulations concerning banking, for example, he concludes that:

Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the most free as well as the most despotical.³⁹

In fact the system of natural liberty is not so much an absence of all state-supported institutions as the presence of those institutions which are best adapted to make the self-interested actions of individual men work to the advantages of all.⁴⁰ Laws which prevent the self-interest of particular groups, such as merchants, from thwarting the checks and balances of open competition are justified.⁴¹ Some state aid for education,⁴² and control over religion,⁴³ are deemed advisable to counter the adverse effects of the division of labour and religious fanaticism. Despite the difficulties inherent in such a task, the statesman has the duty of doing everything in his power to promote the prosperity of the nation. In particular he has to keep laws relating to economics up to date. Restrictions and practices which were useful in their day, such as monopolies and inheritance according to the rules of primogeniture, had, in Smith's time, ceased to fit the changed economic conditions and he therefore recommends their abolition.⁴⁴

The third function of government, the collection of revenue, is subordinate to its other functions in that the revenue is required in order that these other activities can be carried on. But even here utility comes in when he recommends that taxes be gathered in such a way as to raise the maximum revenue while doing as little harm as possible to the economic life of the nation,⁴⁵ although he also stresses that taxes should be 'equal', by which he means a proportional equality according to which those who have most at stake in the successful functioning of government, that is, those with most property, should pay most.⁴⁶ The final purpose of government is that of seeing to external defence by the provision of an army. This is an end to which Smith was prepared to sacrifice economic freedoms,⁴⁷ as he considered it to be a necessary condition of all justice and prosperity that each country should be secure from invasion and defeat in war.

It is not difficult to draw up a list of the many different ways in which Smith's advice to statesmen is governed by his utilitarian presuppositions. In addition to the clear tasks of administering justice and seeing to the security of the nation, there are numerous instances where he is anxious to see governments act in order to correct the defects of the natural order. Yet it should still be remembered that Smith sets strict limitations on the extent to which far-sighted human action can 'turn away the arrow which is aimed at the head of the righteous'.⁴⁸ Many of the malfunctionings which he mentions are not such as can be remedied. In the case of government action there is, in addition, the danger that attempts to improve the lot of mankind may lead to disaster because politicians do not realize the intricacy of the mechanism with which they are dealing. Smith comes out strongly against what he calls the 'spirit of system' which leads men to change the constitution and laws of society according to some elaborate plan of their own; he realizes the constant temptation for politicians to hold out schemes for the dramatic improvement of society:

The leaders of the discontented party seldom fail to hold out some plausible plan of reformation which, they pretend, will not only remove the inconveniences and relieve the distresses immediately complained of, but will prevent, in all time coming, any return of the like inconveniences and distresses.⁴⁹

Moreover,

The great body of the party are commonly intoxicated with the imaginary beauty of this ideal system, of which they have no experience.⁴⁹

Such plans, Smith believes, always under-rate the natural forces at work in society and over-estimate the power of government to alter the natural course of events.

In contrast to the man of system, he sets out a picture of the wise statesman which is an eloquent and balanced statement of Burkean conservatism, and shows that Smith's alleged complacent optimism is sometimes mixed with more than a tinge of pessimism:

The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence, will respect the established powers and privileges even of individuals, and still more those of the great orders and societies, into which the state is divided. Though he should consider some of them as in some measure abusive, he will content himself with moderating, what he often cannot annihilate without great violence. When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue them by force … He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people; and will remedy as well as he can, the inconveniences which may flow from the want of those regulations which the people are averse to submit to. When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear.⁵⁰

This is not to say that statesmen are never to make radical changes in the law or even in the constitution of the state. In normal times the loyal support of the constitution is the best means to make 'our fellowcitizens as safe, respectable and happy as we can', but in disturbed times,

even a wise man may be disposed to think some alteration necessary in that constitution or form of government, which, in its actual condition, appears plainly unable to maintain the public tranquillity. In such cases, however, it often requires, perhaps, the highest effort of political wisdom to determine when a real patriot ought to support and endeavour to re-establish the authority of the old system, and when he ought to give way to the more daring, but often dangerous spirit of innovation.⁵¹

The ordinary politician cannot be expected to rise to these heights and act purely with regard to the general interest of society. Men's desire for power and selfish interest, together with normal human short-sightedness, make them unable to act effectively from humanity and benevolence. However, Smith thinks that there is one motive which may indirectly lead men to promote the general welfare. This takes us back to his own peculiar theory of utility, namely that men are fascinated by any machine or system which shows a nice adjustment of means to ends; in the realm of politics it is possible to rouse men to great political and administrative tasks by interesting them in intricate means rather than beneficial ends. This motive accounts for a good deal of the useful acts of politicians.⁵²

Even if it is admitted that in the sphere of politics utility is Smith's over-riding moral principle, this does not automatically establish that this is so in non-political matters. But the whole weight of his discussion of final causation would suggest that, in all matters of individual and social morality, utility is the ultimate ground on which he approves of the ordinary moral sentiments. Justice, of course, is part of morality, and this we have already discussed. Prudence is a virtue which clearly promotes the happiness of the individual, and given that each person is best suited to look after his own interests, the practice of prudential behaviour throughout a society would undoubtedly promote the general happiness.⁵³ Smith makes a point of stressing that benevolence is naturally felt most strongly for those whom we are best able to help and gets weaker and weaker as the persons concerned become more and more remote from our sphere of influence.⁵⁴ The restricted nature of the benevolent affections which are approved of by the impartial spectator is ultimately justified by the fact that society is benefited most by each endeavouring to promote the welfare of those whom he is in the position of being able to help. Here, as elsewhere, Smith notes, and approves, the fact that 'Nature' intends the happiness of mankind.⁵⁵ Because Smith's statements about final causation reveal his own moral principles, this does not imply that he did not regard these statements as primarily assertions of final causation; he clearly regarded it as explanatory to say that a particular causal process exhibits the purpose of God. But, having demonstrated this, he took a certain satisfaction in being able to sit back and admire the handiwork of God, and this admiration includes approval of the principle on which God is seen to act; it is because God is a utilitarian⁵⁶ that we can say that Smith's own moral presuppositions are utilitarian.

III. CONTEMPLATIVE UTILITARIANISM

To argue that Smith is a utilitarian seems paradoxical in view of his recurrent criticism of utilitarianism. But these criticisms are all directed at those who argue that utility can explain the origin of moral judgments or that it ought to be the principle by which men make their day-to-day moral choices. Those who fail to distinguish between Smith's theory of the causes of moral judgments and his practical advice to the ordinary moral agent on the one hand, and his own normative philosophy on the other, inevitably misrepresent his ultimate moral principles.⁵⁷

It is true that he did not think that utility is the basis of everyday moral judgments; for while these judgments take into account the immediate consequences of acts, even this is secondary to the assessment of the appropriateness of an act to its situation. Nor did he think that utility ought to be the conscious basis of ordinary moral judgments; men's calculations concerning future consequences are too inaccurate, and they would tend, especially where their own interests are involved, to use considerations of utility as excuses to make exceptions in their own favour.

Sometimes it does appear that Smith commends a form of rule-utilitarianism, in that, although particular acts are to be judged by whether or not they conform to the appropriate moral rules, the rules themselves are to be assessed according to their consequences. For instance, he says that, in assessing the utility of justice, we should consider the consequences of a certain type of behaviour becoming general throughout a society.⁵⁸ But he considers that the origin of general rules is to be found in judgments concerning particular acts and that appeal to such judgments is a more effective way of justifying these rules than presentation of calculations about their utility. Such calculations may provide ultimate justification for moral rules but they are uncertain everyday supports for these rules.

Utility is, however, the principle which is necessary for the guidance of those who have to consider the total system of society, whether as scientists, philosophers, or statesmen.⁵⁹ It is the principle which provides many final explanations, and which enables us to make ultimate assessments concerning the soundness of ordinary moral judgments and the value of the whole mechanism of society; it is also the principle according to which political reforms ought to be conducted, and on which the citizen ought to base his decisions about political obligation, when this is in doubt.

Utility is, therefore, very much the meta-principle for Smith. It is to be found at the basis of his whole moral outlook, but it operates most typically at the level of contemplation, when men adopt a God's-eyeview of society, enter into His universal benevolence and feel admiration and approval for what they observe. At this level of reflection utility provides the key to the interpretation of God's creation. For, as we have seen, Smith considers God to be a utilitarian⁶⁰; probably a rule-utilitarian. God considers the general consequences of types of conduct and arranges it so that men habitually act in such a way as to maximize the general happiness. But, of course, God is a utilitarian whose situation is so unlike that of men that it is difficult to compare His utilitarianism with that of human beings. For instance, God does not, presumably, have to choose between His own happiness and that of other beings, and therefore many of the problems of justice versus utility, or private versus public utility, do not arise.

But we can ask whether it is only happiness that God wishes for men. Here the relevant quotations are equally divided between those that speak of the 'happiness and perfection of the species', and those that mention only human happiness.⁶¹ It seems, therefore, that there is some hint of ideal utilitarianism present in what is predominantly a hedonistic utilitarian theory. 'Perfection' may simply mean the multiplication of the species, but it is much more likely to refer to the Stoic idea of man's place in the total system of the universe. It is at this point that Smith's moral ideals merge with his aesthetic or contemplative principles. The 'perfectly virtuous' man acts in accordance with 'the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence',⁶² and it is this 'perfection of human nature' which 'can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety'.⁶³ The perfection of the species thus serves to promote the harmony of society as an integral part of the total system which God has created. It is through virtuous behaviour that men become completely adapted to the workings of the social mechanism, a mechanism which they can, to some extent, appreciate and admire. It is clear that Smith did not consider that this concept of perfection conflicted with the ideal of human happiness, since the essential elements of human happiness include the approval of society and of conscience, which can only be obtained by virtuous conduct.

It will be remembered that Smith's analysis of utility includes the aesthetic appreciation of a well-functioning machine in which more attention is paid to means than to ends.⁶⁴ This applies to man's appreciation of God's human creation:

When we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine.⁶⁵

This brings out the extent to which Smith regarded utility as a principle for directing contemplation rather than an immediate moral guide; it involves an aesthetic appreciation of the design as well as approval of the product. In practical terms it may involve making small improvements in the machine, thus rendering it even more pleasing to behold, and also more beneficial to mankind, but, for most people, its logical implications are that they should concern themselves with their own affairs and adopt an attitude of detachment, even resignation, with respect to the wider world. It certainly does not mean that they should be utilitarians in the manner in which God is a utilitarian, acting in order to achieve the happiness of all men; it is the lot of relatively weak and powerless human beings to look to their own happiness and the welfare of a few close friends and relations; by so doing they promote God's plan for bringing about the general happiness in the manner for which they are best equipped. As politicians, and occasionally as subjects, they may be called upon to transcend this limited outlook and act according to their estimation of the happiness of a whole nation. But to reflect on the happiness of all mankind is something that should almost always be reserved for the social scientist, and the philosopher.

Notes

¹L.J., [Lectures on Jurisprudence, edited by Edwin Canaan, Oxford: Clavendon Press, 1896], pp. 3f.

²L.J., p. 17.

³T.M.S. [The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 6th ed., London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, and W. Creech and J. Bell and Co., 1790], III.5 (I.413).

⁴L.J., pp. 14–55.

⁵L.J., p. 15.

⁶L.J., p. 10.

⁷L.J., pp. 11ff.

⁸L.J., p. 12.

⁹L.J., p. 9; cf. W.N. [Wealth of Nations, 5th ed., edited by A. Cannan, London: Methuen, 1961], V.i.l (II.232ff.).

¹⁰ Cf. p. 172.

¹¹T.M.S., I.iii.2 (I.131).

¹²L.J., p. 10.

¹³T.M.S., I.iii.2 (I.127).

¹⁴L.J., p. 11. This quotation reveals Smith's preferences both for Whigs against Tories and for utility against authority.

¹⁵T.M.S., I.iii.2 (I.128).

¹⁶L.J., p. 68. Here the word 'authority' is clearly used in a de jure sense.

¹⁷L.J., p. 69.

¹⁸T.M.S., I.iii.2 (I.128).

¹⁹L.J., p. 71.

²⁰T.M.S., IV. 1 (I.468).

²¹T.M.S., II.ii.3 (I.215f.).

²²T.M.S., II.i.1 (I.166).

²³T.M.S., VI.ii (II.66f.).

²⁴ Cf. p. 201.

²⁵ Cf. p. 202.

²⁶W.N, V.iii (II.445).

²⁷T.M.S., II.ii.1 (I.201).

²⁸W.N., III.ii (I.408).

²⁹ Cf. p. 172.

³⁰W.N, IV.viii (II.171).

³¹T.M.S., I.iii.2 (I.127).

³²T.M.S., III.3 (I.369): 'In the most glittering and exalted situation that our idle fancy can hold out to us, the pleasures from which we propose to derive our real happiness, are almost always the same with those which, in our actual, though humble station, we have at all times at hand, and in our power.'

³³W.N., I.viii (I.88).

³⁴ Cf. W.N., I.x.2 (I.136) and IV.ix (II.208).

³⁵ IV.ii (I.478).

³⁶ Cf. W.N., V.i.3 art. 2 (II.303).

³⁷ Many examples of this are given by Jacob Viner, 'Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire' in Adam Smith, 1776–1926, pp. 138–54.

³⁸ Cf. W.N., IV.ix (II-209).

³⁹W.N., II.ii. (I.344f.).

⁴⁰ Cf. Nathan Rosenberg, 'Some Institutional Aspects of the Wealth of Nations', Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVIII, pp. 557–70.

⁴¹ Cf. W.N., I.xi (I.278).

⁴² Cf. W.N., V.i.3. art.2 (II.302).

⁴³ Cf. W.N., V.i.3. art.3 (II.317).

⁴⁴ Cf. W.N., III.ii (I.408).

⁴⁵ Cf. W.N., V.ii.2 (II.351).

⁴⁶ Cf. W.N., V.ii.2 (II.350).

⁴⁷ Cf. W.N., IV.ii (I.484).

⁴⁸T.M.S., III.5 (I.421).

⁴⁹T.M.S., VI.ii.2 (II.107).

⁵⁰T.M.S., VI.ii.2 (II.108ff.).

⁵¹T.M.S., VI.ii.2. (II.104f.).

⁵² Cf. W.N., IV.i (I.469ff.).

⁵³ Cf. pp. 178ff.

⁵⁴ Cf. pp. 182ff.

⁵⁵ Cf. T.M.S., VI.ii.Intro. (II.68).

⁵⁶T.M.S., VI.ii.3 (II.118): 'The administration of the great system of the universe … the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God'.

⁵⁷ Cf. A. L. Macfie, The Individual in Society, pp. 45–8. Macfie, having pointed out that Smith criticizes Hume's theory of utility, concludes that 'Utility for him [Smith] was not basic'

⁵⁸T.M.S., II.ii.3 (I.223).

⁵⁹ It is because the ordinary person is unable to make accurate utilitarian calculations that Smith considers politics to be a specialist occupation and does not favour a universal franchise.

⁶⁰ Cf. T.M.S., III.5 (I.413f.): 'The happiness of mankind, as well as of all other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the Author of nature.'

⁶¹ Cf. T.M.S., II.iii.3 (I.267): 'Man was made … to promote … the happiness of all'; T.M.S., III.5 (I.421): 'The same great end, the order of the world, and the perfection and happiness of human nature'; and T.M.S., II.iii.3 (I.265).

⁶²T.M.S., Vl.iii (II.120).

⁶³T.M.S., I.i.5 (I.47).

⁶⁴ Cf. pp. 116ff.

⁶⁵T.M.S., VII.iii (II.356).