One way to conclude a research paper on the Cuban Missile Crisis is to reiterate what most historians and scholars agree was the outcome:
"The Cuban Missile Crisis represented the closest the world has ever come to a full-scale nuclear war. Its successful resolution was the result of negotiations and political maneuvering on both sides, and of the skills of President Kennedy in knowing not just how to act, but, more importantly, how not to act."
There have been many well-researched, thoughtful studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, some of which are listed below. Early studies of the crisis, for example, the one written by the president's brother, then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy, tended to romanticize the role of the president and to simplify the process by which the crisis was ultimately defused. Others have sought to portray the president in a more negative light, with the Soviet decision to secrety place nuclear weapons in Cuba being the result of Kennedy's inexperience. One thing these early studies had in common was that they were published before the fall of the Soviet Union.
Following the end of the Cold War and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's loss of political power, Russian archives were opened to the public for the first time. Many documents of great historical importance illuminating how decisions were made in the Soviet Union were suddenly available to researchers. The result has been a resurgence of scholary studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a resurgence that produced the following books:
Michael Dobbs, "One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War"
Dino Brugioni, "Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis"
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis"