Milhizer, the author of this article, states that the current exclusionary rule (by which evidence obtained while breaching someone's constitutional rights is not allowed in court) has serious jurisprudential concerns, relies on a narrow utilitarian premise, and is too simple to achieve its purpose. The author discusses the current rationale that the Supreme Court has given for the exclusionary rule, which is deterrence of police misconduct. In discussing what he calls the rule's "tortured history" (page 749), the author states that the rule was originally intended to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system and to vindicate the rights of individuals. The author claims that the rationale for the exclusionary rule today is too utilitarian and not sufficiently nuanced with regard to its principles or its use. He also believes that the exclusionary rule does not consider the threat of excluding evidence to public safety. He considers the case Herring v. United States, in which he states that the exclusionary rule was used too broadly and too simplistically.
In his conclusion, the author calls for the Supreme Court to consider whether the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated. If it is not, he suggests that the court repeal the rule and leave legislative bodies to pass laws to protect suspects against police misconduct.