Nicholas Cusanus 1401-1464
(Also known as Nicolaus of Cusa and Niclas Krebs) German philosopher and theologian.
Nicholas Cusanus is most famous for his anticipation of the Copernican theory of the motion of the earth. Over a century before Copernicus, he argued that the earth moved, and that it was not the center of the universe. Scholars maintain that his theory derived not from astronomical observation but from metaphysical speculation; the German philosopher's contribution to the history of ideas lies not in his cosmology, but in his creative theology, independence of thought, and ability to assimilate several kinds of knowledge. Though never very influential, his ideas about conjecture and the mind prefigure those of Leibniz and Kant, leading many critics to consider him among the first modern thinkers. Moreover, his blend of intense intellectualism and contemplative mysticism have provoked the interest of both Catholic philosophers and existentialists into the twenty-first century.
The birth of Nicholas Cusanus coincides quite closely with the birth of the European Renaissance. He was born in the town of Kues to Johann Cryfftz (or Krebs), a prosperous boat owner and ferryman, and Katharina Römer. In 1416 he went to study at the University of Heidelberg, and the next year attended the University of Padua, where he earned a doctorate in canon law in 1423. He then went to the University of Cologne where he lectured on law and furthered his philosophical and theological studies. At Cologne Cusanus befriended Heimericus de Campo, who introduced him to the Neoplatonic thinkers Pseudo-Dionysius and Raymond Lull, both major influences on his later thought. In 1426 Cusanus began his career in church politics and administration. He came to prominence in 1432 during the Council of Basel. His involvement with the Council led to his first major work, De Concordantia Catholica (1433; On Universal Concord) a defense of the conciliar movement, which sought to assert the authority of the Council over the pope to assure ecclesiastical unity. In 1437 the Council sent Cusanus to Constantinople to help reconcile the Greek Church with the Roman Church. The mission was a success, at least temporarily, but the division it produced within the Council led Cusanus to doubt the conciliar movement as the basis for unity within the church, and he soon changed his position to support the papacy—a move that generated much controversy. This shift to the papal cause coincided with a shift in focus in his literary work; he stopped writing about politics and religion and began to write about philosophy and theology. His most important work, De Docta Ignorantia (1440; Of Learned Ignorance), marks this shift. Influenced by both the rise of Renaissance humanism and an earlier mysticism, the work provided a foundation for Cusanus's later writings in speculative philosophy. Many of these works, like De Docta Ignorantia, were written during Cusanus's travels in Germany, where he was a papal legate. In 1449 Pope Nicholas V made Cusanus a cardinal. His first work after this promotion was a defense of De Docta Ignorantia, a response to the criticisms of the theologian John Wenck, whose apparent misunderstanding of Cusanus's philosophy led him to call Cusanus a heretic. Cusanus's response, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (1449; A Defense of Learned Ignorance), takes the form of a letter, composed by a fictional student of Cusanus's, and a dialogue, allowing Cusanus a broader field for attacking Wenck. He would continue using the dialogue form in three works on learned ignorance written during his 1450 summer in Rome: Idiota de Sapientia (The Layman on Wisdom), Idiota de Mente (The Layman on Mind), and Idiota de Staticis Experimentis (The Layman on Experiments with Weights). The character of the “Idiota,” or unlettered layman, proves himself wise in comparison with the learned men who question him. Also in 1450, Cusanus was named Bishop of Brixen, although he did not actually move to Brixen until 1452. In the meantime he traveled through Germany again as a papal legate, urging reform and helping to celebrate the jubilee of 1450. In terms of church and local politics, his time in Brixen was tumultuous: he was a forceful administrator determined to bring about reforms and wrest control of the diocese away from secular leaders, and his strong-arm tactics did not sit well with either the local nobility or the local religious. Cusanus was nonetheless characteristically prolific during this period. Many of his sermons still exist, as well as several mathematical treatises; however, the most significant works written from Brixen are his De Pace Fidei (1453; The Peace of Faith) and De Visione Dei (1453; The Vision of God). The latter work was written for the Benedictine monks at Tegernsee, at the request of their abbot, as was a later work, De Beryllo (1458; The Beryl). Cusanus's relationship with the abbey at Tegernsee was strong enough that he requested a cell where he could retire as a contemplative, but this was not to be. He continued to be active in church administration under Pope Pius II; Cusanus became the vicar general of the papal states and returned to Italy, where he continued his reform efforts, largely without success or support. At the request of the pope, he wrote Cribratio Alcorani (1461; A Scrutiny of the Koran), emphasizing the commonalities of the Muslim and Christian religions. His other late works, however, tend toward the summation of his earlier texts: among these are Trialogus de Possest (1460; On Actualized-Possibility), Directio Speculantis seu de Non Aliud (1462; On Not-Other), De Ludo Globi (1463; The Game of Spheres), and De Venatione Sapientiae (1463; The Hunt for Wisdom). The latter work is somewhat autobiographical, placing his work in a larger historical context and providing an overview of the major themes of his work. His last work, completed shortly before his death in 1464, concludes a series of works discussing the problem of naming God: De Apice Theoriae (1464; The Summit of Contemplative Vision) brings together the ideas of De Possest and De Non Aliud to offer Cusanus's final statement on the nature of God and humanity's imperfect capacity to perceive it. Cusanus died traveling in the service of Pope Pius II; despite the tolerance of his philosophical writings, he was assisting with the preparations for a crusade against the Turks. He was buried in Rome at St. Peter-in-Chains, and at his request his heart was buried beneath the hospital he had established in Kues, which continues to operate.
Cusanus wrote on a wide range of themes, and his work can be characterized by his tendency to blend those themes together in original ways. His philosophical works span his writing career, beginning with De Docta Ignorantia and De Coniecturis, in which he explicates the concepts that would be central to many of his other works. Chief among these is the idea of learned ignorance, which stresses that knowledge of God—and therefore knowledge of the universe—is inescapably restricted: although we can approach knowledge through analogy and symbol, we are wise only when we recognize the limits of this method. Similarly, Cusanus's notion of the conjectural nature of knowledge stresses our dependence on mental images and sensory experience. These concepts, as they are elaborated in his works, reflect Cusanus's deep interest in mathematics and empirical science. He produced several mathematical treatises throughout his career, often focusing on geometrical questions. More often, however, his scientific thought infused his other works, from the blend of cosmology and metaphysics in De Dato Patris Luminum (1446; The Gift of the Father of Lights) to De Ludo Globi, which addresses those topics as well as mystical theology and the geometry of spheres and circles. The Idiota dialogues follow a similar pattern, bringing together Aristotle, Plato, Boethius, and Pythagoras in a discussion founded on Cusanus's epistemological standards of learned ignorance and conjecture. Cusanus's religious writings fall into two groups: those addressing ecclesiastical concerns and those of a more spiritual nature. De Concordantia Catholica and De Pace Fidei are his primary works on church issues, and though in the time between those works Cusanus changed his position on the conciliar movement and papal authority, both evidence his commitment to unity both within the Catholic church and among other world religions. His other purely religious work, De Visione Dei, is more devotional in nature, offering what Cusanus called “an easy way unto mystical theology,” and written in a personal style similar to Augustine's Confessions. In it, the speculative philosophy developed through De Docta Ignorantia and the Idiota dialogues extends beyond epistemology to the experience of God and Christ's role as the ultimate Image of God. Cusanus's philosophy after De Visione Dei continues this synthesis, merging the quest for accuracy of the Renaissance empiricist with the mysticism of a Medieval contemplative in the search for the name of God. Through De Possest, De Non Aliud, and De Apice Theoriae, Cusanus undertakes an ongoing process of naming God in order to reflect God's immanence and transcendence at once. These works, along with De Venatione Sapentiae, reflect both a culmination and a summation of Cusanus's broad-based “hunt for wisdom.”
Though modern scholars generally consider Cusanus important in the history of philosophy and ideas, his influence was comparatively small and the staying power of his reputation fairly weak. Four editions of his collected works were published in the century following his death, but the end of the Renaissance marked a temporary end to Cusanus's status as a leading Platonic thinker of his era. His modern reputation was significantly revived by the German scholar Ernst Cassirer in his 1927 study Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927; translated in 1963 as The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy). Cassirer maintained that “any study that seeks to view the philosophy of the Renaissance as a systematic unity must take as its point of departure the doctrines of Nicholas Cusanus.” Later scholars have alternately categorized him as a Medieval mystic, a humanist, and a transitional figure between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Other scholars have criticized Cusanus as a philosopher, arguing that the ambiguity and vagueness of his statements lead to specious reasoning, and that within his writings Cusanus lacks consistency. In an overview of Cusanus's philosophy, Jasper Hopkins charges that Cusanus “does not reason rigorously,” adding that his cryptic style makes it easy to misunderstand him. Cusanus's use of his sources and the various philosophical traditions from which he drew are central themes in modern research. Scholars often emphasize his originality, as he begins within a particular school of thought but then moves beyond it. As M. L. Führer has argued, an important background for Cusanus's thought was the school of Albertus Magnus, who was also a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas. More generally, Cusanus was deeply influenced by Neoplatonism, although, as Donald F. Duclow suggests, he also demonstrates his debt to the mystical theology of Pseudo-Dionysis and Meister Eckhart. His skill at bringing together different philosophical traditions as well as apparently opposing ideas is also a focus of contemporary scholars. Clyde Lee Miller describes Cusanus's method as a dialectical approach, enabling him to bring together the concepts of oneness and otherness. Similarly, Louis Dupré characterizes Cusanus's work as an effort to unite both transcendence and immanence—an effort that, Dupré notes, ran counter to the nominalist tendencies of modern thought.
De Concordantia Catholica [On Universal Concord] (treatise) 1433
De Docta Ignorantia [Of Learned Ignorance] (treatise) 1440
De Coniecturis [Conjectures] (treatise) 1443
De Filiatione Dei [The Divine Sonship] (treatise) 1445
De Dato Patris Luminum [The Gift of the Father of Lights] (treatise) 1446
Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae [A Defense of Learned Ignorance] (treatise) 1449
Idiota de Sapientia [The Layman on Wisdom] (treatise) 1450
Idiota de Mente [The Layman on Mind] (treatise) 1450
Idiota de Staticis Experimentis [The Layman on Experiments with Weights] (treatise) 1450
De Pace Fidei [The Peace of Faith] (treatise) 1453
De Visione Dei [The Vision of God] (treatise) 1453
De Beryllo [The Beryl] (treatise) 1458
Trialogus de Possest [On Actualized-Possibility] (treatise) 1460
Cribratio Alcorani [A Scrutiny of the Koran] (treatise) 1461
Directio Speculantis seu de Non Aliud [On Not-Other] (treatise) 1462
De Venatione Sapientiae [The Hunt of Wisdom] (treatise) 1463...
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SOURCE: Gómez, Luis Martínez. “From the Names of God to the Name of God: Nicholas of Cusa.” International Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 1 (February 1965): 80-102.
[In the following essay, Gómez reviews Cusanus's efforts to find or create an accurate name for God, tracing his progress from De Docta Ignorantia through the last years of his life.]
If they should say to me: What is his name? what shall I say to them? God said to Moses: I am Who Am.
Ex. 3: 13-14.
THE THEORY OF THE NAMES OF GOD
The Middle Ages had no problem about God. This has been affirmed and denied time and again, and, as usual, there is much to be said on both sides. If the problem is posed in modern terms that is, starting from doubt or question as to belief in God, it must be judged alien to the great Western medieval writers, whether Christian, Moslem, or Jewish. If, however, it is a question of analysis of the proofs of God's existence drawn from natural reason (lumen naturale), of His attributes, His creativity, providence, and attainability by the intellect and heart of man, then not only does such a problem exist, but it is the one great problem of medieval knowledge, since all the speculation of this period, expressed in theological Summas, focuses on God as its object and goal.
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SOURCE: Biechler, James E. “Nicholas of Cusa and the End of the Conciliar Movement: A Humanist Crisis of Identity.” Church History 44, no. 1 (March 1975): 5-21.
[In the following essay, Biechler discusses Cusanus's role in the conciliar movement and examines his treatise on the subject, De Concordantia Catholica. Biechler argues that personal concerns and the influence of Italian humanism, which tended toward the creation of a cultural elite, were key factors in his move away from more democratic ecclesiastical reforms.]
The ignominious end of the conciliar movement in the mid-fifteenth century strikes many contemporary historians and theologians as one of the tragedies in the history of western civilization. Having shown great promise as an instrument of ecclesiastical reform and credited with ending the scandalous Great Western Schism in 1417, the movement for all practical purposes reached an inglorious end with the signing of the Concordat of Vienna in 1448. Though the tragic dimensions of the movement's demise are somewhat diminished by the truth of Tierney's conjecture that “the merely constitutional reforms emphasized in the conciliar programme could not have produced the much-needed regeneration in the whole life of the Church”,1 one is nevertheless inclined to view with sadness the neutralization of the mascent democratic aspirations which conciliarism represented....
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SOURCE: Hopkins, Jasper. Introduction to Nicholas of Cusa on Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, pp. 1-43. Minneapolis, Minn.: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981.
[In this excerpt from his edition of De Docta Ignorantia, Hopkins explicates the Cusan concept of “Maximum Absolutum.” Hopkins also provides a brief introduction to the whole work and its emphasis on the human inability to know any given thing perfectly, although limited knowledge is possible.]
A mélange of intellectual tension and excitement pervaded the Universities of Heidelberg, Padua, and Cologne, where Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) studied in the early fifteenth century. The ecclesiastical clash between the competitive claimants to the papacy—a rivalry adjudicated by the powerful Council of Constance (1414-18)—had badly divided the faculties of law by engendering the dispute over the Conciliar Movement. Moreover, the theological faculties had scarcely adjusted to the prolonged debate between Ockhamism and Thomism, nominalism and realism, when the very underpinnings of Scholasticism were weakened by the rise of Jean Gerson's version of the devotio moderna and by the renewed spirit of Eckhart's speculative mysticism. At Padua advances in the study of mathematics and of natural philosophy fostered the promulgation of new hypotheses about the scope of the universe and the movements...
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SOURCE: Miller, Clyde Lee. “Perception, Conjecture, and Dialectic in Nicolas of Cusa.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 35-54.
[In the following essay, Miller explicates Cusanus's theory of perceptual knowledge, particularly as found in De Coniecturis and Idiota de Mente, in order to argue that the idea of multiple perspectives was the foundation of his search for God. Miller describes Cusanus's method as a dialectical approach encompassing both oneness and otherness.]
Nicholas of Cusa's thought has an extraordinary power and resourcefulness still relevant to our contemporary concerns and our own thinking. In this paper I propose to demonstrate his importance by exploring two areas related in his ideas, though not often connected today. In part I, I will discuss perception (and implicitly all knowledge) as conjectural and perspectival—important Cusan doctrines. Particularly his ideas about knowing suggest fruitful ways to take account of partial viewpoints while working beyond them to a unitary if provisional synthesis of the whole. In part II, I turn to the heart of Cusan concerns—philosophical theology—and explore how Nicholas capitalizes on conjectural perspectives, employing them and moving beyond them in his own dialectical quest for the divine.
One of Cusanus's central doctrines is his...
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SOURCE: Duclow, Donald F. “Mystical Theology and Intellect in Nicholas of Cusa.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 111-29.
[In the following essay, Duclow discusses how Cusanus uses the notion of learned ignorance to link mystical thought and intellectual thought. Focusing on De Docta Ignorantia, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae, De Visione Dei, and De Filiatione Dei, Duclow shows how Cusanus moves beyond the mystical theology of Dionysius and Eckhart.]
Mystical theology and intellect may seem ill matched, if we limit mysticism to emotional rapture and visionary experience. Yet they form a consistent—indeed, inseparable—pair for many medieval thinkers. Nicholas of Cusa places intellect at the center of his mystical theology, as he links learned ignorance with mystical vision and filiatio or sonship. This essay will trace these themes in De docta ignorantia, in Nicholas's response to Johannes Wenck's criticism, in De visione Dei's discussion of mystical theology, and in De filiatione Dei's account of Christology and sonship.
I. DE DOCTA IGNORANTIA AND DIONYSIUS'S MYSTICAL THEOLOGY
Because of its vast influence in the medieval West, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite's Mystical Theology provides a useful background for our discussion. Nicholas, ever the book collector and...
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SOURCE: Dupré, Louis. “Nature and Grace in Nicholas of Cusa's Mystical Philosophy.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 153-70.
[In the following essay, Dupré outlines Cusanus's efforts to bridge the gap between immanence and transcendence, a divide driven by the rise of nominalist thought in the late Medieval era. Observing Cusanus's debt to Meister Eckhart and Neoplatonism, Dupré finds that Cusanus's understanding of nominalist theology anticipated its modern consequences: the absolute separation of the natural and the supernatural.]
Hans Blumenberg in his influential The Legitimacy of the Modern Age insists that modern culture is not to be interpreted as merely transforming the theological concepts of an earlier age, as the so-called secularization thesis posits, but rather as introducing a radically new mode of self-assertion which reoccupies the available religious concepts while endowing them with a wholly different meaning. This thesis of radical novelty needs to be seriously qualified. During the period beginning with early Italian humanism and concluding around the middle of the seventeenth century, a religious vision continues to determine much of modern culture and thus to link it to the past. It is true, of course, that the cosmological syntheses of the previous epoch had disintegrated. But the new ones that soon took their place, often inspired by...
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SOURCE: Biechler, James E. “A New Face Toward Islam: Nicholas of Cusa and John of Segovia.” In Nicolas of Cusa: In Search of God and Wisdom, edited by Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. Izbicki, pp. 185-202. New York: E. J. Brill, 1991.
[In the following essay, Biechler situates Cusanus's position on Islam in the context of earlier Christian thinkers, particularly his friend John of Segovia. Biechler finds that Cusanus, like Segovia, had a more ecumenical view of Christian-Muslim relations than most of his contemporaries.]
Whether or not one sides with R.W. Southern in considering the label “Renaissance of the twelfth century” a term of “sublime meaninglessness,”1 there is not much room for doubt that substantial, even radical, innovations took inspiration during that creative century. A major factor in that inspiration was, of course, the infusion of books and treatises into European culture through the mediation of the Muslim world. Marshall McLuhan's dictum that “the medium is the message” surely finds application in this case, for along with the translations of scientific and mathematical works from the Arabic, a new appreciation of Islamic culture and, therefore, of the religion of Islam as a subject worthy of serious study, began to develop. Although that study did not always lead to results that Christians today can cite with pride, there were occasional moments of...
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Bett, Henry. Nicholas of Cusa. London: Methuen, 1932, 210 p.
Part I includes a substantial biography detailing Cusanus's church career; Part II focuses on his writings.
Beck, Lewis White. “Nicholas of Cusa.” In Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors, pp. 57-71. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
Places Cusanus between Medieval mysticism and post-Reformation humanism in German thought, and reviews the major themes of his works.
Biechler, James E., and H. Lawrence Bond. Introduction to Nicholas of Cusa on Interreligious Harmony: Text, Concordance, and Translation of De Pace Fidei, pp. ix-xlviii. Lewiston, N. Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
Provides a historical context and summarizes the content of Cusanus's work. Also discusses the implications of his unusually inclusive theology for defining Christianity and Christ.
Bond, H. Lawrence, Gerald Christianson, and Thomas M. Izbicki. “Nicholas of Cusa: ‘On Presidential Authority in a General Council.’” Church History 59 (1990): 19-34.
Provides the historical context to a translation of one of Cusanus's contributions to the conciliar movement.
Christianson, Gerald. “Cardinal Cesarini and Cusa's...
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