Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, Søren Kierkegaard
Either/Or: A Fragment of Life Søren Kierkegaard
The following entry presents criticism of Kierkegaard's Enten/Eller (1843; Either/Or: A Fragment of Life). See also Søren Kierkegaard Criticism
One of Kierkegaard's most acclaimed works, Either/Or (1843; Either/Or: A Fragment of Life) has variously been categorized as a philosophical treatise, a collection of essays, and a novel. The two-volume text was written under the pseudonym Victor Eremita, who purportedly found two manuscripts in an antique secretary and decided to publish them. The title refers to the choice individuals must make between living within the aesthetic sphere or the ethical sphere.
Kierkegaard was born in Copenhagen shortly after the marriage of his parents in 1813. His father Michael, a widower with six children, was a wealthy retired merchant, and his mother had been a domestic servant to Michael Kierkegaard's first wife. Kierkegaard was a frail child, slightly disfigured, but with great intellectual promise. He spent most of his childhood indoors, in a solitary environment dominated by his deeply religious father who believed in a stern method of education. Five of his siblings died in childhood, adding to the general solemnity of the boy's life. Kierkegaard attended a local school, graduating with honors in 1830, and enrolled in the University of Copenhagen Theological Seminary with plans to become a Lutheran minister. In 1834, his mother died and Kierkegaard spent a period of about six months in frivolity and neglect of his studies. Four years later, his father died, leaving Kierkegaard an inheritance on which he lived for the remainder of his life. In 1840, Kierkegaard passed his theological examination with distinction, but decided against entering the ministry. That same year he became engaged to Regine Olsen, but shortly after his dissertation defense in 1841, he broke his engagement and traveled to Berlin, where he began writing. He published Either/Or in 1843, followed by several other important works including Gjentagelsen (1843; Repetition), Frygt og Baeven (1843; Fear and Trembling), and Stadier paa Livets Vej (1845; Stages on Life's Way). Kierkegaard gained a reputation as an eccentric which was fueled by an ongoing dispute with the editors of the satirical journal Corsair, and by public reaction to a series of pamphlets he produced attacking the hypocrisy of Christians. In 1855, Kierkegaard suffered a paralyzing stroke and died several weeks later.
Plot and Major Characters
Either/Or begins with an elaborate foreword by the pseudonymous author, Victor Eremita, who explains that he found two manuscripts, each in a different hand, in an antique secretary he had purchased. The first, “Either,” was written, or rather edited, by “A” who is never identified; the second, “Or,” written by “B” who is also known as Judge William or Judge Wilhelm. A is characterized as an aesthete and a philanderer, while the Judge is a happily married man who fulfills his responsibilities willingly.
Volume one begins with “Diapsalmata,” a set of pessimistic aphorisms on life's meaninglessness, followed by a collection of essays on a variety of subjects. These include critical essays on Mozart's Don Giovanni, on Eugène Scribe's The First Love, and on ancient tragedy. These appear to be aesthetic papers delivered before the membership of a men's club to which A belongs. Another essay involves A's prescription for avoiding boredom, called “Rotation,” in which the author applies the principles of agricultural crop rotation to intellectual pursuits. The final, and perhaps the most famous, essay in the first volume is “The Diary of a Seducer,” written by A's alter ego, Johannes, who reminisces on his various seductions of a number of young women, most particularly one named Cordelia, whom he delights in ruining.
Volume two consists of a series of didactic letters written by Judge William indirectly in answer to the material written by his friend A in volume one. His first letter is actually an essay on the “Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” in which he expounds on the satisfactions of marriage, commitment, and duty, warning A of the danger of lapsing into melancholy and despair if he continues a life devoted to the pursuit of pleasure. The second essay is entitled “Equilibrium Between the Aesthetical and the Ethical in the Composition of Personality.” A character firmly grounded in an ethical life, the Judge lectures his friend on the importance of choice in the formation of human character, and on the importance of self-appraisal in determining that choice. Finally, volume two ends with a section entitled “Ultimatum,” consisting not of an ethical ultimatum, but rather of a sermon preached by a country parson on the fall of Jerusalem and on the possibility of belief in a moral order.
In Either/Or Kierkegaard identifies three categories or modes of living: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious; the text concentrates on an illumination of the first two with a fleeting glimpse of the third. The aesthetic is associated with the constant search for novelty and pleasure, while the ethical is associated with marriage and responsibility. Either/Or, as the title implies, is obviously about choice, but it is also about the possibility of change, not only from the aesthetic to the ethical, but also about change that aims at achieving the equilibrium necessary for moving on to the religious sphere.
According to George Pattison, the text was well received by Kierkegaard's contemporaries. Some readers were apparently overwhelmed by the complexity of the work and many focused on the more titillating sections such as “Diary of a Seducer.” Nonetheless, Pattison contends that a number of reviews reflected thoughtful, intelligent appraisals of the work as a whole, and that “Kierkegaard himself could well be accused of doing as much as anyone to encourage the discussion of the more trivial aspects of Either/Or in articles he himself published on it.” Many scholars have suggested that the aesthetic and the ethical represent two progressive stages on the individual's journey to becoming a Christian. John D. Mullen, however, disagrees with that canonical reading of the text insisting that it “depicts the most general features of the two life views predominant (in Kierkegaard's mind) in nineteenth-century Europe, and thus the two modes of life from which one would be likely to enter the religious mode.” Mullen further claims that “there is no ranking of the two modes; and in particular, that the ethical is not a stage through which a former aesthete must, will, or even is likely to pass, before realizing the religious.” Critics have also disagreed on the extent to which Judge William acts as a spokesperson for Kierkegaard's own views. Mullen believes that the Judge's criticisms of A are based on Hegelian philosophy which would be at odds with Kierkegaard's own beliefs. Edward F. Mooney also contends that the Judge and the author have their differences, claiming that “although the Judge is an examplar for the esthete, this rather stuffy and conventional bureaucrat falls short of Kierkegaard's later articulations of a fully moral-religious self.” Mooney wonders whether the country parson's sermon at the end of volume two was perhaps directed at the Judge himself rather than at A, in order “to take the Judge, whose own ‘sermons’ have filled far too many pages, down a peg or two.”
Either/Or has recently come under the critical scrutiny of feminist scholars, among them Wanda Warren Berry, who examines Cordelia's letters in “The Seducer's Diary,” and the various characters in “Silhouettes.” These characterizations of women, according to Berry, are “images of women's experience as created by men and filtered through several screens constituted by the imaginations of men. Wittingly or not, Kierkegaard has constructed an essay that represents the problematics of women's studies within patriarchal history and culture; those who seek to know women's experience often have available only the ‘shadowgraphs’ formed by both light (ways of knowing) and screens (particular minds) that may well be alien to the lives that are pictured.” Scholar Céline Léon points out paradoxes in the approach Judge William takes to women's issues. On the one hand, according to Léon, he “praises women and declares himself against altering them for self-enjoyment or self-aggrandizement.” On the other hand, however, Judge William's praise of women changes little with regard to gender stereotypes. “Even when ethically inscribed,” states Léon, “masculine praise continues to enfold woman within representation. By reiterating cultural myths that negate her autonomy and deprive her of intellect, it sustains and remakes patriarchy which, retroactively, satisfies itself that it did not err in the choice of predicates it initially attributed to her.” Léon cautions against assuming complete congruence between Kierkegaard's own beliefs and those of the Judge, although she points out that the author “definitely appears to be in agreement with his Judge both on the antagonism manifested toward women's liberation and on the assumption of the existence of essential differences between the sexes.” Clayton Koelb maintains that neither of Kierkegaard's narrators in Either/Or represent the author himself. Rather, Koelb claims, the text is based on “ironic deception,” in its treatment of Eugène Scribe's The First Love: “The inappropriateness of both ‘A's and ‘B's approaches to The First Love serves as the thread by which the deception of Either/Or unravels. … Scribe's play becomes a kind of measuring stick against which to test the theories of the judge and the aesthete.” Marc Katz also believes that the text's “embrace of the mid-century bourgeois literary idiom is actually a deception from start to finish,” whereby Kierkegaard sought to disavow the views of both narrators. According to Katz, “Each of the book's purported authors tries writing his way out of his epigonism, first by personifying, then by second-guessing, or upstaging, his creative powers. A. tires of his pseudonyms. Judge Wilhelm damns A., and Kierkegaard implicitly mocks the effort as a whole.”
“Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens hoie Anlæg” [“Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities”] (essay) 1834
Af en endnu Levendes Papirer [From the Papers of One Still Living] (essay) 1838
Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates [On the Concept of Irony, with Special Reference to Socrates] (treatise) 1841
Enten/Eller [as Victor Eremita; Either/Or: A Fragment of Life]. 2 vols. (treatise) 1843
Frygt og Baeven [as Johannes de Silentio; Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio] (treatise) 1843
Gjentagelsen: Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi [as Constantin Constantius; Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology] (essay) 1843
Opbyggelige Taler [Edifying Discourses] (essays) 1843-44
Begrebet Angest [as Virgilius Haufniensis; The Concept of Anxiety] (treatise) 1844
Forord. Morskabslæsning for Enkelte Stænder efter Tid og Leilighed [as Nicolaus Notabene; Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require] (essays) 1844
Philosophiske Smuler [as Johannes Climacus; Philosophical Fragments; or, A Fragment of Philosophy] (essay) 1844
Stadier paa Livets Vej [as Hilarius Bogbinder;...
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SOURCE: Mullen, John D. “Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical: Kierkegaard's Either/Or.” Philosophy Today 23, no. 1/4 (spring 1979): 84-94.
[In the following essay, Mullen questions the usual reading of Either/Or that positions the aesthetic and the ethical as two progressive stages of life.]
In the following paper I would like to call into question what seems to be the accepted way of reading S. Kierkegaard's Either/Or. () This interpretation can be developed in the following way. First, Either/Or depicts the first two stages of a journey of the spirit similar in logical structure to Hegel's Phenomenology, with the exception of the “leaps” between stages. Second, that the ethical is the second stage and is therefore “closer” to the “final” religious stage than the aesthetic. Third, that since Kierkegaard's own views coincide with (a version of) the religious stage, the views of the ethicist are “closer” to those of Kierkegaard than those of the aesthete and thus Judge William's diagnosis and criticism of A in Either/Or represents the correct (meaning Kierkegaard's) diagnosis and criticism of the aesthetic life. Fifth, that it is unequivocally accurate to claim that the life of the aesthetic is lacking in freedom, spirit, self-discipline, self-knowledge, willed-despair, a concept of good and evil, and...
(The entire section is 5502 words.)
SOURCE: Smyth, John Vignaux. “Erotic Aesthetics.” In A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard, and Barthes, pp. 223-59. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986.
[In the following excerpt, Smyth explores Kierkegaard's concept of irony as well as his inclusion of philosophy and science within the realm of aesthetics.]
The aesthetic is always hidden; insofar as it expresses itself it is coquettish.
The basic error of sophistic aesthetics is to consider beauty merely as something given, as a psychological phenomenon.
Purposelessness and caprice in and of themselves can never have a place in the activity of the beautiful. There must be a higher order recognizable and this is only to be understood through irony.
The accidental is just as absolutely necessary as the necessary.
EROS AND BEAUTY
Aesthetics can hardly be called an ancient discipline, and one of its foremost pioneers—Emmanual Kant—is known to have regarded the term itself as a source of potential equivocation. In chapter 6, I attempted to develop the relation...
(The entire section is 29894 words.)
SOURCE: Mehl, Peter J. “Moral Virtue, Mental Health, and Happiness: The Moral Psychology of Kierkegaard's Judge William.” In International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or, Part II, edited by Robert L. Perkins, pp. 155-82. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1995.
[In the following essay, Mehl examines the moral personality of Judge William within the context of recent writings on the relationship between psychology and ethics, particularly invoking the work of Owen Flanagan.]
Philosophical discussions about relationships between ethics and psychology are undergoing something of a revival. Not only is there considerable discussion about character and virtue, but many philosophers have begun to renew the classic philosophical discussion of the self and the nature of personhood, a discussion that has significant implications for how we do moral philosophy. A number of major works have appeared in this vein: Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self, Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy and Owen Flanagan's recent Varieties of Moral Personality.1 Flanagan's work is less well known than the others but, I think, equally worthy of wide consideration. Varieties of Moral Personality is a careful, analytic consideration of relations between ethics and the psychological sciences...
(The entire section is 10954 words.)
SOURCE: Pattison, George. “The Initial Reception of Either/Or.” In International Kierkegaard Commentary: Either/Or, Part II, edited by Robert L. Perkins, pp. 291-305. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1995.
[In the following essay, Pattison discusses the contemporary reception of Either/Or, suggesting that although some readers were apparently overwhelmed by its complexity, others produced thoughtful, relevant commentary on the work.]
Either/Or was made available to the Danish reading public on 20 February 1843 by C. A. Reitzel, University bookseller and publisher in Copenhagen, at a cost of four dollars, four marks and eight shillings, per copy. Within two years the entire edition of 525 copies had been sold, making it (by the standards of the day) a literary success.1 A second edition followed in 1849, and since then it has been translated into a wide variety of languages, riding the fame of its now acknowledged author, Søren Kierkegaard. In the beginning, of course, it had appeared under the name of its pseudonymous editor Victor Eremita, and although there were some of Kierkegaard's contemporaries who had a good idea as to the identity of the “real” author, those first readers were not influenced (for better or for worse) by their preconceptions as to the significance of Kierkegaard's life and work. This does not, of course, mean that they were without...
(The entire section is 5903 words.)
SOURCE: Mooney, Edward F. “Self-Choice or Self-Reception: Judge Wilhelm's Admonition.” In Selves in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard's Moral-Religious Psychology from Either/Or to Sickness Unto Death, pp. 11-26. New York: Routledge, 1996.
[In the following excerpt, Mooney discusses the concepts of autonomy, rights, and responsibilities inherent within Judge Wilhelm's advice to “A” that he accept himself.]
The I chooses itself, or more correctly, it accepts itself.
What is crucial is not so much deliberation as the baptism of choice by which it is assumed into the ethical.
—Judge Wilhelm, Either/Or II1
“Choose yourself!” is the admonition delivered by Judge Wilhelm to his friend, identified only as “A,” in an avuncular, terribly wordy letter. The editor of Either/Or, one Victor Eremitor, provides an imposing title for this second letter from the Judge: “The Balance Between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality.”2 Although Judge Wilhelm disclaims any standing as a trained or knowledgeable philosopher, he nevertheless presents an important contribution to moral and religious psychology. There are reflections on freedom, responsibility, choice, and despair; thoughts on the contrast between...
(The entire section is 9627 words.)
SOURCE: Berry, Wanda Warren. “The Heterosexual Imagination and Aesthetic Existence in Kierkegaard's Either/Or, Part I.” In Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, edited by Céline Léon and Sylvia Walsh, pp. 25-49. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.
[In the following essay, Berry examines Either/Or within the context of modern concepts of sexual identity and sexual orientation.]
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship is populated with “fictive lover figures” who Kresten Nordentoft says share the concept of erotic love which is formulated in the essay on “The Immediate Erotic Stages” in Either/Or, 1. Nordentoft characterizes this view of eros as “now fixed upon sexual differentiation, that is (from the essay's masculine point of view) upon ‘the idea of the feminine.’”1 This analysis encourages us to look at Either/Or, 1 in terms of the questions we have been learning to raise about fixed or stereotyped ideas of masculinity and femininity. It also implies that we might improve our understanding of this volume by placing its “masculine point of view” more inclusively, emphasizing what I am calling “the heterosexual imagination” which it expresses. By claiming that Either/Or, 1 expresses “the heterosexual imagination” I am calling for courage to enter the very controversial space surrounding...
(The entire section is 10209 words.)
SOURCE: Léon, Céline. “(A) Woman's Place within the Ethical.” In Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, edited by Céline Léon and Sylvia Walsh, pp. 103-30. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997
[In the following essay, Léon discusses Judge William's paradoxically negative views on women and women's liberation.]
Unlike an aesthete who oscillates between envy and commiseration, Judge William (B), in the second volume of Either/Or (1843) and in Stages on Life's Way (1845), praises women and declares himself against altering them for self-enjoyment or self-aggrandizement. In effect, not only does Kierkegaard's paradigmatic ethicist and married man invest women with new strengths, he finds them just as capable as men of realizing the universal human: “My brief and simple opinion is that woman is certainly just as good as man—period. Any more discursive elaboration of the difference between the sexes or deliberation on which sex is superior is an idle intellectual occupation for loafers and bachelors” (SLW, 124). Having probed elsewhere the favorable aspect of William's attitude regarding woman, I concentrate here on the negative sentiments he concomitantly and paradoxically expresses on this issue and on that of liberation (Léon 1997). It is indeed surprising—albeit not atypical of his century—that William should compliment woman for...
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SOURCE: Koelb, Clayton. “Wrestling with Proteus: Irony in Kierkegaard's Either/Or.” In Narrative Ironies, edited by A. Prier and Gerald Gillespie, pp. 21-31. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997.
[In the following essay, Koelb explores Kierkegaard's use of irony in Either/Or, particularly in his discussion of Eugène Scribe's The First Love.]
The love of recollection is the only happy love, says an author who, so far as I am acquainted with him, is sometimes rather deceitful.
Irony prefers oblique refraction. It says not so much the opposite to what is meant as something other than. …
Lilian R. Furst
The first quotation is an example of the oblique, refractive irony Lilian Furst refers to in the second.1 The irony resides in the fact that the “rather deceitful” author being quoted in these opening lines from “Repetition” is none other than Søren Kierkegaard himself, so that the judgment offered turns out to be far more accurate than we might have expected. It is a complicated bit of involution that must have amused the writer, the author of a learned treatise on irony. But there is something surprisingly revealing in Kierkegaard's deliberately coy game of self-concealment, for it suggests a sincere...
(The entire section is 4786 words.)
SOURCE: Katz, Marc. “Confessions of an Anti-Poet: Kierkegaard's Either/Or and the German Romantics.” In Cultural Interactions in the Romantic Age: Critical Essays in Comparative Literature, edited by Gregory Maertz, pp. 227-45. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.
[In the following essay, Katz discusses Kierkegaard's sense of his own marginality in relation to German Romanticism.]
What seems less the picture of a living person than a silhouette? And yet, how much it tells us!
[Was kann weniger Bild eines ganz lebendigen Menschen seyn, als ein Schattenriß? Und wie viel sagt er!]
—Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente
Although Søren Kierkegaard began Either/Or in Copenhagen, he wrote the bulk of it in an apartment on Gendarme Square in Berlin, where he spent the better part of 1841 escaping the public fallout from his breakup with Regine. As a Bildungsreise [journey of education] the trip was unusual, in that he fed off and collected only negative impressions. The newly expanded avenues of pre-revolutionary Berlin seemed to him inhumanly wide. Faust's Wintergarten, an elaborate glass exhibition hall to which he was lured by advertisements in the local newspapers, offered “little to see.” He heard F. W. J. Schelling speak at...
(The entire section is 8183 words.)
Croxall, T. H. “Choice.” In Kierkegaard Studies, pp. 23-40. London: Lutterworth Press, 1948.
Provides an explanation of Kierkegaard's concept of choice involving the three stages of life: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
Hall, Ronald L. “Don Giovanni, Music, and the Demonic Immediacy of Sensuality.” Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age, pp. 90-117. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Discusses Kierkegaard's treatment of Mozart's Don Giovanni in Either/Or.
Mackey, Louis. “Some Versions of the Aesthete: Either/Or and Others.” In Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, pp. 1-38. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
Examines Either/Or's “A” as a representative of an aesthete whose life appears to be centered around desire and gratification.
Makarushka, Irena. “Reflections on the ‘Other’ in Dinesen, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.” In Kierkegaard on Art and Communication, edited by George Pattison, pp. 150-59. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.
Discusses Dinesen's treatment of the ‘other’ as a representation of the difference between competing theories of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
Salvatore, Anne. “Socratic Midwifery: Green and...
(The entire section is 383 words.)