Context (World Philosophers and Their Works)
In all probability, credit for the fundamental ideas of the atomic theory—Greek speculation’s greatest achievement—should go to Leucippus of Miletus rather than to his pupil, Democritus. However, almost nothing is known of Leucippus.
Rational speculation about the nature of the world began not earlier than the sixth century b.c.e. Four or five generations later it had progressed, in Democritus, to an essentially correct account of the nature of matter. This amazing fact has led to both exaggeration and underestimation of the Greek achievement. Some people conclude that science stood still until the revival of the atomic theory in the seventeenth century. However, scientists point out that modern atomic physics rests on evidence derived from careful quantitative experimentation of which the Greeks knew nothing; therefore, it is said, the ancient theory was merely a lucky guess—and the Greeks made all possible guesses. A brief review of the development of early Greek physics will show that while Democritus did not have English chemist and physicist John Dalton’s reasons for asserting that the world consists of atoms moving in the void, he nevertheless had some very good ones.
Early Assumptions (World Philosophers and Their Works)
The men of Miletus, especially Anaximander, who made the break with mythological world accounts in the early sixth century b.c.e., took over from previous creation myths two important assumptions. First, Milesians accepted the belief that there was a creation, or rather a development: The world was not always as it is now but had in the beginning been something simple and homogeneous, like the “chaos” of the myths. Differentiation, complexity, and organization have a history. Second, the Milesians accepted the theory that there exists an impersonal force making for order and “justice” in the universe at large. The Milesians were the first philosophers; they dispensed altogether with the “will of the gods” as an explanatory principle because they assumed that the natural forces that made the universe what it is were still operative. The problem, as they conceived it, was to identify the original simple world stuff out of which all things had come and to describe the process that had differentiated and organized it into the present world. Not “divine” inspiration but ordinary human reason, they thought, was capable of solving the problem. Because conclusions based on reasons invite criticism and modification, unlike revelations, which can be only accepted or rejected, the history of rational speculation was progressive.
In addition to the ideas of ultimate oneness, development, and “justice” inherited from religion, the earliest philosophers assumed with “common sense” that nothing can come out of nothing or be absolutely destroyed and that our senses reveal directly the constituents of the world, at least as it is now. We feel heat and cold; we taste sweetness and bitterness; we see red and green. Heat, cold, sweetness, bitterness, red, and green are therefore parts of the objective world; together they make it up. These are now regarded as qualities of matter, but early Greek thought does not make this distinction; “the hot,” “the cold,” “the wet,” “the dry,” and so on, in various combinations, are the stuff of things. One must simply find out the unity underlying this diversity. For example, Anaximenes, the third of the Milesian “physicists,” held that the fundamental stuff is mist. Everything is really mist; the things that do not appear to be mist are mist that has been thickened or thinned. Very thin mist is fire; mist somewhat thickened is water; thickened still more, mist is stone.
Parmenides’ Objections (World Philosophers and Their Works)
There is an inconsistency here that Parmenides (in effect) pointed out. No doubt the theory of Anaximenes squares with observation, for fire, when cooled and “thickened,” becomes smoke and smoke is easy to regard, at this stage of thought, as a kind of fog or mist. Condensed mist is water, and water thickened still more becomes ice, a solid, a kind of stone. However, is the theory compatible with logic? Fire is (identical with) “the hot and dry”; water is (identical with) “the cold and wet.” How, then, can the one be transformed into the other without violating the fundamental principle that nothing can come from nothing? Where did the cold come from? Where has the hot gone? If cold and hot are thought of as substances, it seems that there can be no satisfactory answer to this question. Something has come out of “nothing”; something has disappeared into “nothing.” Worse still, as Parmenides saw, if there is ultimately just one stuff, that stuff must be just the kind of stuff it is, so that it cannot logically be both hot and cold, both wet and dry. Therefore change is impossible. If things seem to change (as they do), this must be mere illusion, for logic pronounces it contradictory.
It is important to see that Parmenides was right, given his assumptions of monism, nothing from nothing, and identity of things and qualities. Parmenides had another argument (a fallacious one) to show that the kind of change called motion cannot really occur. Parmenides said that if a thing moves, there must be room for it to move into—that is, there must be empty space. However, there cannot be any empty space, for empty space would be just “nothing,” “that which is not,” and the assertion that there is empty space amounts to saying “That which is not, is,” a statement of contradiction.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras Respond (World Philosophers and Their Works)
The philosophers Empedocles and Anaxagoras tried to develop systems that would meet the logical objections of Parmenides without flying in the face of common sense. They argued that motion could occur without empty space if the moving thing displaced what was in front of it, as a fish swims in water. For the rest, they abandoned monism. Empedocles said that there are six basic stuffs, while Anaxagoras held that the number of stuff is infinite—that there are as many stuffs as there are sensible discriminations—and all things are made by the mixture and separation of these stuffs.
The philosophy of Anaxagoras successfully met Parmenides’ criticism, but at too high a price. Although it is hard to say precisely just what it is that we are asking for when we demand an explanation of something, at any rate it is clear that an explanation is not satisfactory unless in some sense the ideas used in the explanation are simpler, or more unified, than the thing to be explained. However, if one’s explanatory principles are as diverse as the things to be explained, the requirement cannot be met. “Flour is a mixture in which flour-stuff predominates, and water is a mixture in which water-stuff predominates, and the two make bread because when they are mixed and baked the bread-stuff in both of them comes to the fore.” This may be true, but it is too easy and it does not explain anything.
Leucippus and Democritus Respond (World Philosophers and Their Works)
Leucippus and Democritus discovered a better way of answering Parmenides. As to motion, Leucippus flatly declared that “nothing” does exist; Democritus more appropriately dismissed Parmenides’ quibble with another: “Hing’ exists no more than not-hing,’“ the point of the joke being that if “Nothing’ does not exist” is a truth of logic, elimination of the double negative must also produce a logical truth: “Hing’ does exist.” However, “hing,” so far from existing, is not even a word. (Greek for “nothing” is mden, of which m means “not,” while den has no meaning in isolation.)
There is, then, a void, and things that move in it. These things are atoms—”uncuttables.” Each separate atom is like the “reality” of Parmenides, uncreated, indestructible, unchanging. The matter in an atom is homogeneous, and nothing can happen to one internally; that is, each atom is infinitely hard. Atoms differ from one another in size and shape—that is all. They do not differ in color, for instance, but not because they are all the same color. They do so because they have no color at all (not even black or gray). Similarly for heat, moisture, taste, and odor. Atoms have always been (and always will be) in motion—”like the motes in a sunbeam.” They jostle one another, and in their jostlings, two kinds of processes occur that result in the “coming-into-being” of the large-scale aggregates with which we are familiar. One is vortex motion, the effect of which is to separate random aggregates according to likenesses, the heavier—that is, the bigger—atoms going to the center, the lighter ones to the periphery. The other process is the hooking on to each other by atoms of like configurations.
One atom can affect another only by colliding with it; and the outcome of a collision (hooking, or change of direction or speed) is determined by the sizes, shapes, and velocities of the atoms involved in the collision. However, the sizes and shapes are eternal, and the velocities in their turn are outcomes of previous collisions. Therefore, there is no such thing as “chance” in nature; “Nothing happens at random,” Leucippus pronounced in the one sentence of his that has survived, “but everything from a rationale and by...
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Qualities and Sensations (World Philosophers and Their Works)
“By convention color, by convention sweet, by convention bitter; but in reality atoms and void.” Thus Democritus states his theory. The atoms alone are real, and their only inherent qualities (Democritus distinguished clearly between thing and quality) are size, shape, and solidity. Then what about color, sweet, bitter, and the rest? They are “by convention.” What does this mean? Democritus held that a person’s soul consists of particularly fine and spherical, hence mobile, atoms. When certain “images” from the external world—the images being, of course, themselves assemblages of atoms—impinge on the soul atoms, a sensation is produced. The sensation occurs only within the ensouled body; hence, it is not “out...
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Bibliography (World Philosophers and Their Works)
Brumbaugh, Robert S. The Philosophers of Greece. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981. An important interpreter of Greek philosophy discusses the place of Democritus, atomism, and materialism within Greek philosophical theory.
Burnet, John. Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato. London: Macmillan, 1953. Burnet’s overview contains a brief but helpful account of Democritus’s philosophy.
Cartledge, Paul. Democritus. New York: Routledge, 1999. An excellent biographical introduction to the thoughts of the philosopher, clearly presented and requiring no...
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