Iraq | The War Proves the Need to Seek Political Alternatives to Military Force
About the Author: Harold H. Saunders is a visiting
fellow athe Brookings Institution, a Washington,
D.C. think tank that performs research and analysis
on foreign and domestic policies and events. Saunders
has served on the National Security Council Staff
for thirteen years, and later held several posts in the
U.S. State Department, including director of intelligence
and research and assistant secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian affairs.
This policy essay examines the concept of political
settlement in the context of the crisis that
began when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August
1990. Its purpose is not to second-guess policymakers,
although I do not hide my views. Its purpose
is rather to reflect on the political alternatives
to war and on the foundations for building
peaceful relationships in our changing world.
Soviet and U.S. leaders and citizens have concluded
that nuclear war is not a usable instrument
of policy. However, the next crisis that occurs
may pose the real possibility that nuclear or
chemical weapons could be used. If war with
weapons that are increasingly prevalent cannot
be fought, we need to give at least as much attention
to developing and honing political instruments
for blocking or turning back aggression
as we do to military planning.
Harold H. Saunders, \"Political Settlement and the Gulf Crisis,\"
Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1991. Reprinted with the
permission of Mediterranean Quarterly, published by Duke
University Press under the editorial direction of Mediterranean
Affairs, Inc. Copyright © 1991, Mediterranean Affairs, Inc.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, policymakers had
a choice between two possible approaches. They
became the focus of debate in the United States
until war began on 16 January 1991.
The first option can be described initially by
recounting what the United States and other key
members of the United Nations did in August
and September 1990, with some exceptions.
That course included the initial action of the
UN Security Council condemning Iraq\'s invasion
and calling for Iraqi withdrawal. It further
included the prompt deployment of military
forces at the request of the government of Saudi
Arabia to bolster its defenses against a continued
Iraqi advance. This approach included UN-approved
and militarily enforced economic sanctions
against Iraq, blocking both imports and
the exports on which most of Iraq\'s income depended.
Underlying these actions was an intensive
political effort to build a broad international
coalition to support them, both militarily
and financially.
Some Arab friends complained that the U.S.
moved to quickly and foreclosed the possibility
of an \"Arab solution.\" President George Bush
had to weigh the possibility that the world would
be confronted with dislodging Iraqi forces not
only from Kuwait but from the key oil centers of
Saudi Arabia as well. He felt this was an unacceptable
risk.
\"When Iraq invaded Kuwait,
policymakers had a choice
between two possible
approaches.\"
Carried to its logical end, this approach
would have differed from what was done—even
before November—in several important respects.
It would have established a longer time
frame—twelve to twenty-four months—to allow
time for economic and international pressures
to take their full toll. It would have avoided
deadlines. It would have maintained a more flex-
150 Current Controversies
ible military posture for developing an offensive
military capability at any time without locking
leaders into the self-imposed irreversibility of an
early buildup.
Most relevant to the concept of political settlement,
this approach would have given priority to
creating a climate in which mediators could
work by avoiding personalized confrontation
and name-calling, while firmly opposing aggression.
It would have addressed aggressively the
political issues—such as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict—that Saddam Hussein exploited to
strengthen his political constituency across the
Arab world.
In short, not creating a short time frame and
the self-constructed trap of irreversible military
deployment and a deadline, and avoiding an atmosphere
of personal confrontation, would
have worked actively to develop a political climate
in which third parties could try to work toward
a political settlement.
The Bush Approach
The second approach—building from but altering
the first—is what the United States eventually
did. When by the end of October the combination
of UN resolutions, economic sanctions,
and military deployments did not produce a
change in Iraqi policy, President Bush began to
express personal impatience and announced a
near doubling of American forces without rotation
to create an offensive military option. Coupled
with this move was U.S. pressure in the UN
Security Council to pass a resolution in effect authorizing
the use of military force to liberate
Kuwait if Iraqi forces did not withdraw by 15 January
1991. The military buildup then focused
on that deadline.
Although experience indicated that economic
sanctions take time to work, this approach
set a short time frame eventually defined
by the 15 January deadline. It came to rely
mainly on the threat of force to produce Iraqi
withdrawal. Its attitude toward attempts at mediation
and political settlement was voiced by the
White House press spokesman before Iraqi foreign
minister Tariq Aziz and U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker met in Geneva in early January
when he said: \". . . no negotiation, no compromises,
no face-saving measures.\"
Although the war began on 16 January, analysis
of these two approaches remained as relevant
for the postwar as for the prewar period. Before
the war, political settlement was posed as an alternative
to war. In the wake of war, political settlement
must be central to building the peace.
While circumstances changed, the elements of
the political agenda remained the same—although
perhaps even more compelling.
\"Old concepts such as state and
power . . . do not fully explain
what we se going on around us.\"
The purpose here is noto argue what would
have worked. That debate is highly relevant, and
there are cogent arguments on both sides. The
purpose here is to use this experience to understand
what the elements of a workable political
option are. If the judgment in a future crisis is
that the military option is to costly, policymakers
must have a political alternative. In addition,
how we deal with political settlement of the issues
raised during this conflict will determine
the course of the Middle East and the U.S. position
there.
Explaining the U.S. interests in turning back
Iraq\'s aggression, President Bush told the
Congress and the American people that a principal
U.S. interest lay in using the crisis to establish
a new world order. The Congress in giving
qualified support to the president\'s use of force
stated that he must report to them that he had
exhausted al peaceful means before launching
military action.
It was not apparent that President Bush—
working from World War II experience—clearly
pictured how our profoundly changing world
works when he spoke of the new world order.
Nor was it clear, given the political instruments.
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