Iraq | Introduction
The 1991 Persian Gulf War, involving more than a half million U.S. troops, was the largest U.S. military action since the Vietnam War, and the largest ever in that part of the world. But it was not the first time the U.S. had become militarily involved in the Persian Gulf, and it might not be the last. The interests that motivated the U.S. to wage war in 1991 remain, and could possibly spur future U.S. military involvement in the region.
Oil was and is a primary motivation for U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf. Oil is a vital part of the U.S. economy, accounting for 43 percent of U.S. energy use. In 1990 the U.S. imported half the oil it consumed, with much of this oil coming from nations ringing the Persian Gulf. The eight countries in the region—Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf states including Kuwait—possess more than two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. Millions of barrels of oil are loaded and transported aboard tankers in the Persian Gulf every day.
To protect the flow of oil, the U.S. has worked to ensure that the Persian Gulf countries are both politically stable and willing to cooperate with Western nations in developing and selling their oil. To achieve these goals, the U.S. has had to face different challenges and threats to its interests. As these threats have changed over the years, so have U.S. allies and strategies in the region.
One such threat that dominated U.S. thinking during the 1950s and 1960s was its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. The U.S. feared losing access to the oil-rich Persian Gulf nations to the Soviet Union, and consequently attempted to establish long-standing allies in the region. These attempts had mixed results. During the 1950s Iraq and the U.S. were closely aligned, but in 1958 Iraq's pro-Western monarchy was overthrown by a military dictatorship that opposed the U.S. and established close ties with the Soviet Union. The U.S. responded by forming an alliance with Iraq's historical rival, Iran. This relationship was mutually beneficial to both governments. From the U.S., Iran was able to buy billions of dollars of sophisticated military equipment, modernize its armed forces, and obtain technical assistance to develop its economy. The U.S., in turn, viewed Iran as a bulwark against communism, a check on Iraqi influence, and a dependable supplier of oil.
In 1979, however, the U.S. found itself confronted by a new threat—Islamic fundamentalism. The government of Iran was overthrown by Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, and Iran's pro-American monarchy was replaced by an Islamic republic that was highly antagonistic to the U.S. The emergence of Islamic ideology was also a potential threat to the pro-Western governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf countries. Khomeini called on the people of these nations to revolt against their governments, which had cooperated with the U.S. and other Western nations and had violated Islamic principles. The U.S. became fearful that such Islamic revolutions could spread in the Persian Gulf, and so sought ways to check the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
Supporting Iraq
Consequently, when Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, attacked Iran in 1980, the U.S. did not seriously protest the action. The U.S. saw the conflict as a way to keep Iran occupied. While the U.S. proclaimed neutrality in the eight-year Iran- Iraq War, its actions were increasingly aimed at helping Iraq, and relations between the two countries improved. As evidence of this improved relationship, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq were restored in 1984. In addition, U.S. intelligence agencies shared military intelligence with Iraq, and the U.S. extended the nation billions of dollars in credit to buy grain and other goods.
Iraq's invasion of Iran was also welcomed by other Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These countries' regimes also feared the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and provided billions of dollars of financial aid to Iraq. Because of this international support, Saddam Hussein grew in importance and strength in the Persian Gulf. In fact, according to some analysts, this support may have even led Hussein to feel confident that he could later invade Kuwait with little fear of U.S. retaliation.
Some Americans objected to U.S. support of Iraq. These critics argued that Hussein was a repressive, militaristic dictator who had used chemical weapons against Iranians and his own people, was developing nuclear weapons, and was not to be trusted. "Our de facto alliance with Iraq makes little sense," argued history professor Nikki R. Keddie in 1987 during the war. Nevertheless, the U.S. government continued to view Iraq as a useful partner deserving of U.S. support. Under President George Bush, the U.S. government's policy toward Iraq was perhaps best summed up by the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John Kelly in an October 27, 1989 speech: "Iraq is an important state with great potential. We want to deepen and broaden our relationship." In spite of clear signs that Saddam Hussein was a potential military danger to his neighbors, the focus of U.S. policy remained, as Kelly testified in April 1990, "to attempt to develop gradually a mutually beneficial relationship in order to strengthen positive trends in Iraq's foreign and domestic policies."
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, however, the U.S. paid the price for not heeding Saddam Hussein's increased military buildup. The invasion clearly established that Hussein and his ambitions were a prime threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf. If Hussein could attack Kuwait, U.S. leaders reasoned, he may attack the other oil-producing, sparsely populated Arab states—especially Saudi Arabia. The threat that a militaristic dictator could control such a vast oil-rich region was deemed sufficient to warrant U.S. military intervention.
After Iraq's defeat, the U.S. still faces the dilemma of finding partners in the region while maintaining political stability and ensuring the availability of oil. Iraq: Current Controversies examines the issues raised by Iraq's invasion and retreat from Kuwait, and U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. It examines the debates before, during, and after the 1991 conflict, and aims to give a better understanding of the war and whether future wars in the region are possible. 14 Current Controversies
