Interventionism | Introduction
The end of history, as defined by Francis Fukuyama, an analyst at the RAND Corporation and author of The End of History and the Last Man, was the end of the conflict between the ideologies of Soviet-promoted communism and Western-style democracy, inevitably leading to “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Western liberal democracy—characterized by free and fair elections, the rule of constitutional law, and respect for human rights—emerged from the Cold War as the only acceptable and viable form of government, in Fukuyama’s view. However, the uncontrolled spread of ethnic and nationalist conflict in many parts of the world made some people question the inevitability of the victory of democracy. In the words of Max M. Kampelman, a lawyer formerly with the Department of State, “The question may well be asked: Are we entering an age of democracy or an age of disorder?”
The “universalization” of democracy has been less than the smooth process that Fukuyama’s thesis seemed to predict. The promise of democracy in countries formerly under authoritarian rule has prompted many subnational ethnic groups to clamor for official recognition and representation, seek redress for discrimination, and press claims to historic lands, according to New Yorker writer Robert Cullen. Many have discovered, writes Cullen, that “transitions to democracy, rather than ameliorating conflicting claims to collective rights, can exacerbate them.” Ethnic war, the breakdown of government, and the rise of military dictatorship—typified by the cases of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti— stand out as stumbling blocks on the road to the “end of history.”
In former Yugoslavia in 1991, the republics of Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia declared independence, precipitating a war between Croatia and what was left of the federal Yugoslav government in Serbia. As a UN-brokered cease-fire was signed in January 1992, European governments quickly extended diplomatic recognition to these newly independent countries. Following the others’ lead, in 1992 the republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina also declared independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs who wanted to remain part of Yugoslavia then began a civil war and rapidly took control of more than twothirds of Bosnian territory. The Bosnian Serbs defend their action in the civil war by asserting their right to live in a nation-state that unites all of Yugoslavia’s Serbs. Others perceive their campaign as an especially violent instance of nationalist extremism. Los Angeles Times reporter Carol J. Williams, for example, describes the civil war as a “nationalist quest to force an ethnic division with bombs and bullets.” UN forces entered the country in May 1992 to protect civilians and relief efforts, but as of October 1994 had been unable to negotiate a lasting settlement.
In Somalia, the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre, who ruled from 1969 until 1991, plunged that country into anarchy, with so-called warlords from various clans vying to succeed Siad Barre as dictator. According to Michael W. Doyle, writing in Dissent, “Three hundred thousand Somalis died in 1991–1992 in a famine brought about by the murderous competition of the Somali warlords.” Throughout 1991 and 1992, the United Nations attempted to mediate a cease-fire and resolution. The failure of the cease-fire and the worsening of the famine caused by the civil war prompted the United States to intervene in December 1992 to protect the flow of relief supplies. In October 1993, U.S. forces clashed with Somalis, resulting in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and hundreds of Somalis. U.S. armed forces departed Somalia in March 1994, leaving UN-led forces in their place. As a result of the warlords’ struggle for power and the subsequent U.S.–UN intervention, writes Doyle, “the population was divided into rival clans and united only in their rejection of foreign rule.”
In Haiti in September 1991, military generals deposed President Jean- Bertrand Aristide, who had been elected the previous December. Fearing that the military would execute him, Aristide fled Haiti and formed a government in exile in the United States. The United States and the Organization of American States implemented an embargo against Haiti, with the aim of restoring the democratically elected government. But because the embargo failed to produce results, in January 1993 the United Nations imposed trade sanctions on Haiti. Under pressure from the United States, the military rulers of Haiti signed the Governor’s Island Accord in June 1993, agreeing to allow Aristide to resume his presidency. The military broke the accord, however, and in October 1993 new, stronger sanctions were imposed. According to Randall Robinson, director of the human rights organization TransAfrica, the military then “unleashed a reign of terror in Haiti,” assassinating supporters of Aristide and other political opponents and tightening their grip on power. This political repression prompted thousands of refugees to flee Haiti and seek political asylum elsewhere. However, on September 18, 1994, under the threat of invasion by U.S. military forces, the military rulers once again agreed to observe the Governor’s Island Accord. As of October 1994, 17,000 U.S. and multinational troops were monitoring Aristide’s resumption of the Haitian presidency.
While there are signs that democracy may succeed in Haiti, conflicts like those in Bosnia and Somalia continue to simmer in many countries, making the spread of disorder sometimes seem more likely than the “universalization” of democracy. Francis M. Deng, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, attempts to explain the post–Cold War contradiction between the hopes for Western-style democracy and the spread of conflict in the Third World. Those countries that were already internally democratic are moving toward a more cooperative, democratic world order with more active international organizations, Deng asserts, while nations emerging from the control of oppressive, totalitarian regimes are struggling to assert self-determination independent from outside interference in their internal affairs. The solution Deng proposes for both a democratic world order and resolution of Third World conflict is “a third party as mediator, moderator, peacemaker, and lawgiver.” The most obvious institution to play this role, according to Deng, is the United Nations.
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also supports this new role for the United Nations and envisions expanded duties for UN peacekeeping forces. The traditional role for these peacekeepers involves lightly armed troops from UN member countries who observe agreed-upon cease-fires and separate the combatants, but only use force to protect themselves. Boutros-Ghali believes that UN troops should be prepared to take on a more assertive role, forcibly intervening to impose cease-fires and protect civilian populations. In his words, “Protecting the flow of relief supplies, preventive deployment, and sanctions on commerce and communications are only part of what may be involved in the future. Beyond these measures, when established rules of engagement are no longer sufficient, United Nations forces may need authorization to use force.”
Many of those writing on foreign policy are opposed to such an expanded role for UN forces. Among them is Stephen John Stedman, assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, who sees a danger in the “new interventionism.” According to Stedman, new interventionists “believe that active international intervention is necessary to bring about a semblance of order to the post–Cold War world, based on the dubious presumption that the Cold War’s end makes internal violence somehow more tractable.” In his view, those who call for interventions lack an understanding of ethnic war, government breakdown, and military dictatorship and how to resolve these conflicts. Intervention through aid to civilians or imposed cease-fires, according to Stedman, by protecting and feeding weaker groups, may simply prolong resistance to an inevitable military or political solution, and may cost more lives. In his words, “Most civil wars become amenable to settlement only after they have played themselves out with ferocity. . . . There are no panaceas for internal conflicts.”
There is strong debate over Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that the end of the Cold War has resulted or will result in the “universalization” of Western-style democracy, with its emphasis on law and human rights. Western countries have attempted to promote democracy by intervening to uphold human rights and constitutional law in some Third World countries but have had mixed results so far, as exemplified by the cases of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Whether Western countries should intervene to promote democracy and protect human rights is among the issues debated in Interventionism: Current Controversies.
