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Who can be considered as a person belonging to a minority? Is the definition of minority essential to a regime protecting a minority?

On the one hand, the more precisely the target group is defined, the more effective the international rules on protection and promotion may be. On the other, an overall definition of minority is not only impossible but it would also lead to a deadlock: No precise rules could be internationally developed because of the differences in situations, needs, traditions, economies, and so on.

Several scholars (e.g., Francesco Capotorti, the United Nations [UN] rapporteur on the topic in the 1970s) have attempted to propose a definition for the term minorities (at least for the purpose of formulating an international legal instrument). Here is Capotorti's definition:

A minority is a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (1979, p. 96).

Nonetheless, it seems impossible at a universal or even a regional level to arrive at a definition that is operative for and at the same time acceptable to all member states. As a consequence, the related instruments in this field have been adopted without international organizations advancing any precise definition of minorities.

It is clear, however, that for theoretical and practical reasons it would be useful to make a distinction between linguistic, national, or religious minorities on one side, and sexual, political, and social minorities on the other. Even if the principle of nondiscrimination and tolerance should equally apply to both groups, the concrete needs of each (e.g., in case of the first group, the use of a special language in different private and public settings, and the exercise of belief) are motivated and satisfied in a different manner with different financial consequences for the states involved.

For the same reasons it is easier to formulate separate regulations for "traditional/historical minorities" (who often become minorities because of historical retribution, border changes, etc.) and "immigrant workers, refugees, and other new minorities" (whose status in a given state is a result of their personal choice). The attitude vis-à-vis assimilation or the use of language in public varies between these two groups.

In the same way facilities for the physically challenged are regulated separately according to both national and international laws. Even if nondiscrimination is equally applied, concrete rules and needs are promoted in a manner that is partly similar, partly different.

All this does not suggest that such overlap is unimaginable or erroneous. This can be proved, for example, by the complexity of the Romani problem facing contemporary Europe, in which a real mixture of historically rooted ethnic, linguistic, and especially social handicaps exists.

Historical Birth of Minority Issues: Interdependence with the Nation-State

Even if almost all states are composed of different linguistic communities throughout their history, a minority issue (as a legal and political problem) is closely linked to a definite historical period. In the early twenty-first century the basic problem underlying most minority issues is that for various reasons, partly resulting from intolerance but also from the insensitive policies of governments, persons belonging to a minority (and generally their whole community as such) are linguistically, socially, and politically disadvantaged. This has not always been the case during the history of human-kind. One can link modern minority problems to the nation-state concept due to its reductionist tendencies and the temptation it creates to perpetuate linguistic and cultural hegemony. When Central and Eastern Europe embraced the concept and applied it on a broad scale, more tensions than existed in Western Europe soon developed, and border changes and the establishment of new states incited local politicians to take revenge on history by establishing nation-state structures favoring their own linguistic community over others. This particularly occurred following the breakup of empires.

The Lessons of the League of Nations

When U.S. president Woodrow Wilson advanced his ideas about the reconstruction of the world after World War I, he was full of idealism. It was his belief that "open diplomacy" and a golf-club-like international organization could prevent the outbreak of such conflicts that had earlier transformed an act of retaliation against a form of state-sponsored international terrorism (e.g., the murder of Austro-Hungarian archduke and heir Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914) into a genuine world war. Wilson also realized that his ideas about the self-determination of peoples were not actually the deeply held beliefs of political interest groups who had spoken a similar message in their attempts to dissolve a particular government structure, for instance, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Ottoman Empire. During the final delineation of state boundaries after those events, strategic, economic, and alleged historical factors were taken into account much more seriously than the given ethnic data of the annexed territories. Wilson's ideas about true international cooperation were maintained, however, in the minority protection system of the League of Nations, the first international organization to claim general (and not only sectorial) competencies in this area.

The League of Nations (the de facto predecessor of the UN) was charged with a supervisory role in implementing international commitments for the protection of minorities in defeated states and territorially enlarged or newly created (recreated) states. The commitments outlined in conventions (or in the case of the Baltic states, Albania, and Iraq in unilateral statements) enjoyed constitutional value in national laws and could not be altered without the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. Violations could be deferred by states to the Council, but individuals were also entitled to directly submit petitions to the League of Nations. If these survived several filters (including the so-called committee of three procedure), they could be placed on the Council's agenda. The Permanent Court of International Justice (the predecessor of the International Court of Justice) also had the right to intervene in any such matters, providing advisory opinions at the request of bodies such as the League of Nations (in fact the Council) or judgments in interstate disputes when both states previously fell under the jurisdiction of the Hague World Court—this occurred quite often, contrary to twenty-first-century tendencies. The complex of rules and international proceedings was referred to as procedural or formal minority law.

Material law was embodied in the abovementioned conventions or unilateral declarations. Most of the rules were virtually identical (prohibition of discrimination, free use of language in private intercourse, adequate facilities for the use of minority languages before tribunals or other authorities, and some guarantees for teaching the minority language, mainly in private schools). Despite such unified rules, it is interesting to note that some regions were put under international control, for instance, in the case of the territorial autonomy of the Swedish-speaking Aaland Islands (belonging to Finland) and Ruthenia (belonging to Czechoslovakia at that time), or the personal autonomy of certain subgroups of the Hungarian- or German-speaking minorities of Romania.

In the end no one was satisfied with the League of Nations' mechanisms. Minorities complained about the lengthy nature of the uncertain, endless process, whereby in contrast to governments party to a complaint, their claims were not made in person but only through submitted documents. Respondent governments decried the assymmetry of minority protection: The League of Nations' commitment mostly applied to Central and Eastern European states but not Western European nations. Modern scholars laud some landmark statements of the Permanent Court of International Justice (e.g., those pertaining to the merits of socalled positive discrimination, or affirmative action to use the American term) and some technical details of rulings and procedures that can be construed as precursors of modern international human rights systems (the admissibility criteria of petitions and, in particular, the exhaustion of local remedies, polite and deferential language, etc.). Nevertheless, the system became paralyzed in the mid-1930s when more and more states failed to reply to petitions after Germany's withdrawal from the League. Even though Germany officially departed from the League after Adolf Hitler's rise to power, the collective memory of several states (unjust it may be countered) is that the League of Nations' system was more or less supportive of Nazi subversive or revisionist policy. Despite its merits, the minority protection system of the League of Nations disappeared along with the organization itself, and after World War II the UN chose not to continue on the same path.

The UN and the Protection of Minorities

The UN has presented decidedly different attitudes visà-vis the protection of minorities. The first period of activity may be associated with Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of president Franklin D. Roosevelt and the first U.S. ambassador to the UN. She played a very active role in the negotiations on the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the UN General Assembly, and an important part in formulating the UN's human rights concept as such. It stated that the promotion of traditional civil and political rights, with the prohibition of genocide and a strict nondiscrimination policy, is in itself sufficient and neither special social or cultural rights or a group-oriented approach is required, the latter being either useless or even dangerous.

This reductionist approach, combining the American melting-pot concept with the lessons learned from the crimes committed by Nazis and their collaborators, was not adequate for genuinely multicultural countries in which the presence of different ethnicities could be traced not to voluntary immigration but historical phenomena, namely changes in borders. The harrassment of certain ethnic groups because of their difference, the residual role of their language in public life and schooling, not to mention political and legal condemnation on the basis of collective culpability for alleged collaboration with the Nazis, all contributed to the recreation of well-known tensions. Often, legislative acts directed against some minorities may be regarded as being based on purely racial considerations (see, e.g., the Benes' decrees adopted in Czechoslovakia against Germans and Hungarians or the deportation of the Volga German, Chechen, Ingush, and Crimean Tatar population in the Soviet Union by Joseph Stalin).

During its first decade of existence the UN did not insist on the inclusion of clauses protecting minorities in the peace treaties of former Axis powers. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General, when pressed about the legal validity of the League of Nations' rules protecting minorities, concluded that they should be extinct for several legal reasons, most linked to the principle of rebus sic stantibus (i.e., a fundamental change in circumstances). (See the UN's 1950 Study on the Legal Validity of Undertakings Concerning Minorities.)

It is true, nonetheless, that the most evident assault on minorities was codified as a crime against humanity when the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted. The Convention is based on the five main categories of indictment, as outlined by the Nuremberg International Tribunal in its well-known statute, the 1945 London Agreement:

[K]illing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Article 2).

The General Assembly rejected proposals (submitted by Denmark) that attempted to add to the Universal Declaration a minority clause, or to the Genocide Convention the category of so-called cultural genocide. The former Soviet Union backed the proposals as they perfectly complemented its ideological campaign during the cold war. In 1948 politicians apparently considered the clauses of the Genocide Convention as being qualitatively different from "minor" violations of minorities' interests. The end of the 1990s, however, saw the tragedy of the Balkans and that of Rwanda, and examples of ethnic cleansing as a method of warfare surfaced, the cruelty of which its perpetrators tried to justify in terms of their own harassment and humiliation as a former minority. The international community then witnessed the proper codification and punishment of these horrifying acts by different international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, and so on.

In the 1950s, nevertheless, the UN took steps toward the adoption of some specific rules to protect minorities. Beside the nondiscrimination conventions in general, and its efforts in the area of global education, the UN adopted a special clause for minorities in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). Its Article 27 stipulates: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion or to use their own language."

Moreover, since the 1970s (and on a Yugoslav initiative, however strange that may seem after the southeast European tragedy of the 1990s), efforts have been made within the UN General Assembly to pass a comprehensive resolution on the inherent rights of minorities. These efforts have generally met with hostility, not only on the part of some influential European states but also many newly independent countries, former colonies. The number of member nations opposing an international measure of protection for minorities has only increased. Because the boundaries of these countries as inherited from the colonial period did not take ethnic configuration into consideration and as the divide-and-conquer policy of the former administrative power often favored the minority population in terms of the makeup of the local administration, police, and army, the new tribal majority frequently harassed, punished, and intimidated this minority, and only because of the past, national pride, and shortsightedness. Africa's modern history, for the most part, may be tragically linked to ethnically colored pogroms and bloody civil wars. The governments of these countries emphasized economic and social rights and the so-called right to development over civil and political rights. If they were not in favor of comprehensive control, they were even less supportive of adopting new rights. Within the context of American-Soviet rivalry characterizing the world before the 1990s, nepotism and tribal corruption were also forgiven by these close allies.

The collapse of the Soviet empire, the recognition of the United States' unquestionable military omnipotence, and the ethnic tensions and bloody civil wars of the 1990s in the former Soviet territories and Yugoslavia all contributed to the UN General Assembly's adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Resolution GA 47/135).

This document, conceived by several high-ranking politicians as an example of the prevention vs. cure policy, unfortunately could not prevent the tragedy of the Balkans, although it is a worthwhile reflection of the collective opinion of early-twenty-first-century's international community about the importance of a legally guaranteed place for minorities and their languages. It is the greatest achievement of the otherwise not too successful Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that formulated it.

Even if the General Assembly's declaration focuses mostly on classic political and civil rights tailored slightly to serve the needs of minorities, it is worth emphasizing the political and pedagogical importance of the multiple refererences to the use of minority language in worship and administration, as well as the effective participation of minorities in public and economic life. The UN also took a historic step when referring to affirmative actions in its Article 8: "Measures taken by States to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights set forth in the present Declaration shall not prima facie be considered contrary to the principle of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." This reference is slightly more generous than that of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

The real merit of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities may be observed in the impact it has had on otherwise inactive UN organizations, inspiring them to play a more assertive role. The Human Rights Committee on Civil and Political Rights (the monitoring organ of the 1966 Covenant) suddenly realized in 1994 that the previously cited Article 27 of the Covenant stipulates not only passive but also active obligations. In addition, it emphasized at the time that the article's scope of application concerns persons belonging to a minority irrespective of their citizenship and does not depend on an earlier recognition of minorities by the state. (See CCPR General Comment No. 23.) The Human Rights Committee has also contributed to the evolution of the concept of minority protection in its examination of some individual applications. Most of them have concerned, however, indigenous problems, for example, the claims of Native Americans (see the Lovelace, Ominayak, and Connors cases), Samis (see the Kitok, Sara, and Länsman cases), and Maoris (see the Mahuika case).

The applications made to the Human Rights Committee have generally dealt with the alleged negative impact of some major industrial or agricultural interventions on the fishing and hunting rights of indigenous peoples. The complaints have been rejected if the governments in question could offer a sufficient amount of water, land, or forest to the aggrieved parties. The Lovelace v. Canada case was particularly interesting in the sense that the state was condemned because it had failed to grant adequate protection to a Native-American woman against the actions of her own tribe. (The case was linked to the fact that marriage outside one's tribe could deprive a woman of her tribal membership, and that a return to tribal territory after the end of such a marriage did not automatically confer on that woman the right to renewal of tribal membership.)

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the UN organization monitoring the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, also wrote several comprehensive reports, including one on some aspects of reporting minorities and another on the right of self-determination. (See CERD's General Recommendations No. 8 and 21.)

In addition, the specialized institutions of the UN formulated some related instruments of treaty law. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the 1960 Convention on Discrimination in Education, applied in the area of education, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) elaborated Conventions 107 (1957) and 169 (1989), both addressing the rights of indigenous laborers and obligations of governments and employers. Article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child is in its language almost identical to the already cited Article 27 of the 1966 Covenant, and it also promotes the use of minority language in the media and education.

It is a well known that making international law is hostage to the smallest common denominator principle. In the case of the nearly two hundred member states of the UN, reaching an acceptable but at the same time serious and truly comprehensive treaty law is manifestly impossible. Is the situation any better in regional terms?

International Minority Protection: European Results

The nondiscrimination principle is embodied in the three main regional conventions, namely the European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The basic international treaty of the Council of Europe, an organization established on the initiative of Great Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill to promote international cooperation based on the rule of law, the European Convention of Human Rights is considered to be the most widely used and effective mechanism for protecting human rights. As of 2003 the European Court of Human Rights had reviewed and pronounced judgment on approximately 3,800 cases. Few of them were related to classic national or linguistic minority issues. Scholars mainly attribute this fact to the formulation of Article 14 that—contrary to the UN approach (manifested in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)—may not be applied by itself but only in conjuction with another article of the Convention. (The same can be said about the nature of nondiscrimination clauses in the Inter-American Convention and the African Charter.)

Because the other articles of the European Convention of Human Rights do not in fact address the traditional needs of minorities (e.g., the use of languages in schooling or before an administration), minorities have had practically no chance of submitting a succesful claim on the basis of a current or future discrimination.

Political efforts and endeavors to supplement the European Convention with an additional protocol covering minority rights were consequently rejected in the 1960s and 1970s. Only in 1999 did the Council of Europe adopt a twelfth additional protocol putting nondiscrimination in a larger perspective, prohibiting discrimination as a right secured by "law."

The same development may be observed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, whereby the Court's hesitation to tackle minority problems during the second half of the twentieth century (see the judgment in the Belgian linguistic case in which the Court recognized the admissibility of affirmative action; see also Mathieu-Mohin & Clerfayt v. Belgium, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, and Gillow v. United Kingdom concerning legislation and the practice of some special territorial autonomies) was followed by a deeper desire to address these issues at the start of the twenty-first century.

Still in this new phase, the European Court of Human Rights seems poised to examine the problems of minorities within the interrelated context of religious freedom or the right to the integrity of family life. When the freedom of religion of ethnic or linguistic minorities was involved in recent cases (see Serif v. Greece, Hassan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, and Orthodox Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova), the Court decided in favor of the applicants. In 2001 a minority organization won a case linked to freedom of association (see Stankov and Ilinden United Macedonian Organization v. Bulgaria).

On the other hand, the applications submitted by Romani were unsuccesful either because of lack of evidence (Assenov v. Bulgaria) or because of the Court's limited authority over governments in regulating a nomadic way of life and squatting (unlawful settlement) (Buckley v. United Kingdom, Chapman v. United Kingdom).

The most important theoretical breakthrough occurred, however, in a legal dictum delievered by an ad hoc tribunal, the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on ex-Yugoslavia. This organ, also known as the Badinter Arbitration Commission (named after its chairman, Robert Badinter, the president of the French Constitutional Court), pronounced several advisory opinions in 1992 emphasizing that the protection of minorities falls within the peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens).

The decision on whether or not to supplement the European Convention on Human Rights was not only a political issue but also a legal one. Opponents of an additional protocol generally based their arguments on solid legal grounds, namely the fact that the Convention's control mechanism is based on the existence of an individual victim whose precise right has been violated. Such a philosophy works well when contemplating classic civil and political rights, that is, individual rights. However, mostly everything that is important for minorities is of a collective nature (or at least requires a collective approach), and in these cases, some states are apparently not ready to accept precise norms. As these obligations cannot be deferred to a court, there is no need to envisage such a procedure of complaint.

Within the Council of Europe, the repeated rejection of proposals aiming to complement the European Convention on Human Rights with an additional protocol resulted in a change of attitude among those who were open to a minority breakthrough. Their view was that if the adequate protection of minorities was not possible through traditional human rights safeguards, a fresh approach must be chosen. Defining the obligations of states instead of the rights of minorities became the new watchword.

The Council of Europe benefited from this new approach when drawing up two international treaties, namely the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The aim was to prepare an adequate and effective, but—and this is always the big challenge for those codifying international law—widely acceptable instrument of treaty law.

In the 1992 case of European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the novelty consisted of an optional (à la carte) system of commitments operating in harmony with the real needs of minority languages. The assumption was that by allowing sovereign states to choose from different commitments according to the real situation surrounding minority or regional languages spoken in their territory, and according to the specific uses of those languages (in schooling, administration, the judiciary, economic and social life, the media, culture, and transboundary cooperation), they would demonstrate more willingness to accept them. These options vary from the lowest to the highest level (e.g., teaching all subjects in a minority language, teaching a substantial part of the curriculum in a minority language, or teaching the minority language as such). States, the contracting parties to the Charter, are not obliged to apply these options to all the languages spoken in their territory, only those that are chosen explicitly in the instrument of ratification. For the other languages, general principles enumerated in the Charter are to be applied. Even if the title of the Charter itself seems slightly redundant, according to the original drafters, the wording allows states that do not recognize "minorities" as a distinct category of public law in their constitution to accept it. The Charter was drafted before the admission of Central and Eastern European "new democracies"—but it was approved in their presence and with the active participation of Hungary and Poland.

The 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is the fruit of the second wave of minority codification in the 1990s. This convention addresses not only language issues, but also other aspects of day-to-day minority life. The hot button of minority codification, that is, how the convention or statute might reflect collective interests when several states who must be party to it oppose the recognition of collective rights for minorities, was mollified in three ways: (1) Some classic individual rights were formulated in a minority-friendly style (as also occurred in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities). (2) Instead of the rights of persons or groups, the Convention refers to obligations of states. (3) General legal premises and programmatic norms were formulated.

In this complicated and sometimes very obscure way, the Framework Convention contains rules concerning the use of a minority language in education, the judiciary, and administration; the prohibition of gerrymandering; the protection of minority identity; the promotion of minority culture; and the effective participation of minorities in the decision making of public authorities. It is worth noting that affirmative action is proclaimed here, too, moreover not only as an eventual possibility but as a rule whose application may even be mandatory in certain cases.

The control mechanism of both the European Charter and the Framework Convention is based on periodic reports submitted by states. Even if no possibility of submitting individual or collective applications exists, the independent experts' committees can organize hearings where not only governments but also minority representatives may have their say. In addition, experts can visit the countries concerned: Apparently, governments invite such individuals quite often, on their own initiative. The reports prepared by these expert committees are used to formulate recommendations and resolutions by the Committee of Ministers, composed of ministers of foreign affairs for the member states of the Council of Europe. Despite the genuinely intergovernmental character of this organ, its resolutions closely follow the criticisms developed by the expert committee. Even if such a process concludes without any binding decision, these soft-law-type resolutions enjoy considerable moral and political authority.

It is worthwhile to note the identity and number of contracting parties in an international treaty. More than half the member states of the Council of Europe are contracting parties to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and a good dozen are bound by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was created within the context of the so-called Helsinki process, the series of follow-up conferences since the 1975 summit meeting in Helsinki on security and cooperation in Europe. A landmark of 1970s détente policy, the ad hoc 1975 summit conference of East and West became progressively institutionalized, and the end of bipolar rivalry resulted in a new impetus for this process, composed of followup conferences. From the so-called three baskets (with the first basket signifying disarmament and confidencebuilding measures; the second basket a reduction in the number of obstacles to commerce between capitalist and Marxist economies; and the third basket an emphasis on "human dimensions," a euphemism for human rights), the third was used to establish a code of conduct for the trans-Atlantic protection of minorities. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe and especially the Final Act of the 1990 Copenhagen Conference are considered basic documents. Even if the documents do not enjoy a legal value, they repeat legal norms already stipulated elsewhere or proclaim political commitments. This is especially true of the Copenhagen Document, which contains a long list of principles supporting the rights minorities.

The Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was established after the 1992 OSCE Conference in Stockholm. Its original mandate concerns fact-finding and early warnings vis-à-vis minority-related tensions (with the exception of international terrorism). In reality the High Commissioner generally mediated between states or states and minorities. With a very small staff but backed by the international scientific community, the Office of the High Commissioner launched an interesting standard-setting activity: Instead of creating new rules, it attempted to compile existing international documents (on both treaty law and soft law). The documents issued are mostly recommendations of a commendable nature, but to a certain extent they also merely reflect the existing customs in the areas of education, use of language, and effective participation (see the Hague, Lund, and Oslo Recommendations).

In the 1990s the OSCE adopted important instruments such as the 1992 Stockholm Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration and the 1995 Pact on Stability in Europe, whose aim was to settle interstate disputes related among other issues to minority protection.

Bilateralism and Unilateralism in Minority Protection

Multilateral instruments on minority protection may be complemented by bilateral agreements. These are generally more comprehensive than multilateral treaties, which nonetheless often encourage states to enter into complementary bilateral treaties.

When regulating minority issues, national law may simply be implementing an already contracted commitment, but it need not be based exclusively on international law. It can be generous beyond that obligation, even also within itself, without any interstate commitment. Besides a nondiscrimination clause and some requirements concerning language, which are specified in the constitution of most European states, certain countries have gone as far as regionalization (Spain) or the recognition of the autonomy of local authorities, as happened recently within the context of devolution in the United Kingdom.

In Central and Eastern Europe, one may observe how the links between kin-state and kin-minority have greatly multiplied. States are offering educational or social opportunities to persons belonging to a minority living in another state but speaking their language. As the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission's Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-States) put it, these legally institutionalized contacts may be matched by current international law when they are restricted to items closely linked to national and cultural identity. The observance of the nondiscrimination rule, reciprocity, and cooperation with one's state of citizenship are, however, important in avoiding interstate conflicts (see the European Commission's Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-States).

Conclusion

The basic principles of minority protection in the modern world may be summarized as follows: Respect for and the protection of the identity of persons belonging to a minority presuppose the free choice of identity, that is, despite any alleged outside characteristics, one cannot be considered as legally belonging to a group against one's will. International law (in its universal, regional, and bilateral forms) and national law are getting closer to not only sanctioning diversity but also promoting the concrete expression of the most important aspects of minority life, often by affirmative actions necessary for genuine equality. Minority participation in decision making is emphasized in a wide range of legal documents, especially within national legal systems where one can find different forms of self-government or a home rule system, based on territorial or personal approaches. The legal systems of states vary greatly, and the adaptability and tangible expression of the aforementioned legal principles are very different as a result.

It is thus evident that with tolerance of and respect for another's identity, language, religion, and culture and by providing the opportunity for all individuals to have a good life in the contemporary world, countries draw closer to eliminating the animosity, suspicion, and national arrogance that characterized a certain period of history.

SEE ALSO Disabilities, People with; Economic Groups; Ethnic Groups; Political Theory; Racial Groups; Religious Groups

Péter Kovács