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The destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE ended the Third Punic War (149–146). It the violent anticlimax to more than a century of conflict between Rome and Carthage, the two most powerful states in the western Mediterranean. Rome's grim treatment of the Carthaginians and their city, while not entirely unprecedented as a postscript to Roman conquest, stands out as an extraordinary and calculated act of brutality.

Rome and Carthage had not always been enemies, but conflicting Roman and Carthaginian imperial interests resulted in the First Punic War (264–241) and the Second Punic War (218–201). In the latter war, the Carthaginian general Hannibal invaded Italy and brought Rome to the brink of defeat. However, Rome's ultimate victory left it the unrivalled power in the western Mediterranean. Carthage was forced to accept severe terms, including a large indemnity paid annually for fifty years and the loss of all overseas territories. Moreover, Carthage agreed not to wage war outside of Africa and, within Africa, only with Rome's permission.

Carthage also agreed to restore to Masinissa (the king of neighboring Numidia and a Roman ally since 206) all the territory that he or his ancestors had once possessed. Masinissa consistently raided or seized Carthaginian territory, claiming that the lands once belonged to his family. Each time, Carthage either acquiesced or dutifully sought Roman arbitration, and each time, the Romans sided with Masinissa.

Despite the loss of territory and military power, Carthage remained a prosperous city. A Roman embassy, which included the powerful senator, Cato the elder, visited Carthage in 153 and returned home impressed by the size and wealth of the city. After this visit, Cato reportedly began concluding all of his speeches in the Senate with the phrase "Carthage must be destroyed." In one speech Cato presented a number of Carthaginian figs to the senate. He warned his audience, amazed at the figs' size and freshness, that the country that produced them lay only a short distance from Rome. Cato's views probably reflected the popular Roman sentiment that Carthage was to be feared. This fear may have grown stronger after Carthage paid off its indemnity in 151.

Rome's justification for the Third Punic War came when the aging Masinissa again invaded Carthaginian territory in 150 and Carthage chose to resist the invasion without first seeking arbitration from Rome. The Carthaginians may have simply grown frustrated with Rome's consistent support of Masinissa over the previous half-century and decided to risk war rather than concede more territory to its enemy. Alternatively they may have believed the war indemnity stipulated by the treaty of 201 was paid, that they were no longer bound by the treaty and could pursue independent foreign policy. Whatever the case, the Numidians badly defeated the Carthaginian army, which fought under the command of Hasdrubal. The Carthaginians immediately condemned Hasdrubal to death, then sent an embassy to Rome to publicly disavow the actions of Hasdrubal and to seek arbitration over the dispute with Masinissa.

The Roman response was calculated and duplicitous. In fact, the Roman historian Appian claims that the Roman senate had had begun to seek a pretext to attack Carthage soon after Cato had returned from his visit to the city three years earlier, though the veracity of the statement is questionable. In any case, the Roman senate had already begun to prepare for an invasion of Africa by the time the Carthaginian embassy arrived. The senate blamed Carthage for the impending war and warned that it could be avoided only if Carthage "satisfied the Roman people" (Appian, 1972, p. 74). The next year (149), the Roman senate declared war and ordered a fleet and army to gather in Sicily, preparatory to invading Africa. The Carthaginians sent another embassy to the Roman senate in a desperate attempt to avoid conflict. The Romans responded that the Carthaginians could retain their lands in Africa and would be allowed to live under their own laws. To gain this concession, however, they were ordered to hand over 300 hostages—children from aristocratic families—within thirty days to the Roman generals in Sicily and obeyed Rome "in other ways" (Appian, 1972, p. 76).

The Carthaginians were suspicious, but they complied with this demand. The Roman generals then sent word that they would provide further conditions once the Roman army landed in Utica (a harbor town in north Africa). Carthage sent an embassy to meet the Roman generals in Utica, at which point the generals demanded that the Carthaginians turn over all stockpiled weapons and siege machines. Only after the Romans collected these weapons did they reveal their final conditions for peace: the Carthaginians must abandon their city and resettle at least ten miles from the sea. The city itself would be razed, except for its shrines and graves. Carthage rejected these terms, and the Romans began to prosecute the war.

The Third Punic War lasted longer than Rome expected, though there was little doubt as to the outcome. After a lengthy siege the Romans, under the command of Scipio Aemilianus, forced the city to surrender, but only after a great many women, children, and elderly had been killed or wounded when Scipio ordered residential buildings set on fire to clear a path to the citadel. Fifty thousand men, women, and children were sold into slavery. Roman soldiers looted the city for several days, after which a board of ten Roman senators oversaw the systematic destruction of the city. Carthage was burned to the ground and buildings were razed. The story that the Romans sowed salt on the fields to prevent crops from growing is a later invention.

What drove the Romans to extreme barbarity in this case is a matter of debate. Cato's speech about the wealth of Carthaginian territory, Carthage's economic resilience, and Rome's demand that the Carthaginians resettle away from the sea all suggest that commercial factors may have influenced Rome's policy toward Carthage. After the war, Carthaginian territory was reorganized as the province of Africa, and in 122 the Romans tried to establish a colony on the site of Carthage. However, this decision was reached long after the destruction of Carthage and was very controversial, suggesting that colonization had not been the foremost reason for Roman actions in 146.

Roman politics and the desire for glory certainly contributed to its treatment of Carthage. After the war, Scipio Aemilianus's popularity soared and he was awarded the title Africanus for defeating Rome's rival. Finally, one should not underestimate Roman hatred of Carthage, fear (even if unfounded), and desire to avenge the destruction wrought by Hannibal in the Second Punic War. According to Appian, the Romans who poured into the streets to celebrate the news of Carthage's destruction were still mindful of Hannibal's war.

Finally, it is worth considering to what degree the treatment of Carthage was typical of contemporary Roman military and diplomatic procedure. On the one hand, Roman brutality throughout the Mediterranean appears to have increased in the second century BCE. For example, in 146 Rome razed the city of Corinth and enslaved its population. On the other hand, Rome's apparent long-term policy of weakening Carthage and its calculated manipulation of the treaty of 201 are not typical of its treatment of other conquered rivals. This underscores the degree to which Roman fear, hatred, and desire for revenge may have been important motivating factors in the decision to wipe out Carthage both physically and symbolically.

SEE ALSO Ancient World

Michael P. Fronda