paradox of voting
paradox of votingThe fact that there is no reason to expect committee decisions to show transitive preferences. This is best shown by an example: suppose there are three members, 1, 2, and 3, and three policies, A, B and C. Their preference patterns, in descending order of preference, are for 1, A, B, C; for 2, B, C, A; and for 3, C, A, B: this pattern is known as cyclical preferences. In a vote between A and B, A wins since 1 and 3 prefer A to B. In a vote between A and C, C wins since 2 and 3 prefer C to A. In a vote between B and C, B wins since 1 and 2 prefer B to C. Thus there is no stable committee equilibrium: any proposal can be defeated by some other. This is an application of Arrow's impossibility theorem.
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