Dec 16, 2009
Tobacco companies spend more than $5 billion annually to advertise and promote cigarettes and other tobacco products. Tobacco companies claim that the purpose and desired effect of marketing are merely to provide information and to influence brand selection among current smokers, although only about 10 percent of smokers switch brands in any one year. Since more than one million adult smokers stop smoking every year and almost half a million other adult smokers die from smoking-related diseases, the tobacco companies must recruit an average of 3,300 new young smokers every day to replace those who die or otherwise stop smoking. Tobacco companies contend that smoking is an "adult habit" and that adult smokers "choose" to smoke. However, many medical researchers assert that cigarette smoking is primarily a childhood addiction or disease and that most of the adults who smoke started as children and could not quit.
Unlike the pharmaceutical companies, which are tightly regulated as to their advertising and promotion, the tobacco industry has had few regulations. The basic restrictions have been that companies cannot use paid advertising on television or radio, they cannot claim what they cannot prove (e.g., that low-tar cigarettes are less hazardous to health), and they must include one of four warnings on cigarette packages and ads. The fact that warning labels are printed on a pack of cigarettes has been successfully used by the tobacco companies as a defense against tobacco victims' lawsuits.
The whole picture changed when Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas were able to reach an agreement in 1997 and early 1998 with the major tobacco companies and won compensation for the effects of smoking on their health-care expenses. Minnesota was able to obtain copies of long-secret memos, reports, letters, and other documents that were made public as part of the $6.6 billion settlement reached in their lawsuit against cigarette makers.
On November 23, 1998, the major tobacco companies entered into an agreement with the other forty-six states. This agreement, which is known as the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), settled litigation brought by the states and other entities that were seeking the reimbursement of expenditures related to smoking and health. Under this agreement, the states and tobacco companies jointly agreed to concrete provisions to reduce youth smoking, new public health initiatives, and important new rules for governing a tobacco company's way of doing business.
The cigarette companies agreed to pay $368.5 billion over 25 years. Of this, $246 billion goes to the states, and they have started to receive payments under this agreement. The state of Florida receives $450 million each year under this agreement, Iowa $54.9 million, and the other states differing amounts. Iowa, Kansas, and Washington have agreed to set aside this money entirely for health care. Iowa has passed a law that their money shall go to three areas: access to health care, public health and smoking prevention, and substance-abuse treatment and prevention. In other states, this new-found money has created hot political battles over how much of their tobacco settlement to spend on tobacco prevention programs.
A two-year education effort and ad campaign has lowered the number of teen smokers in Florida. The campaign reduced middle-school smoking by more than half and lowered smoking among high-school students by 24 percent. This multimillion-dollar campaign was financed by Florida's $11.3 billion tobacco settlement, of which Florida has already received $2 billion.
The MSA has changed the way cigarette companies can market, advertise, and promote their cigarettes. The agreement specifically includes the following:
The previous voluntary cigarette advertising and promotion code rules are also still in effect:
All the agreed-on advertising and promotional restrictions spelled out in the MSA should be very helpful in curbing underage smoking, but the tobacco companies have always found ways to bypass the bans and advertise in other venues. Billboard advertising is now banned but tobacco companies have increased their level of advertising in magazines, many of which are read by teenagers. Seventy-three percent of teens (aged 12 to 17) reported seeing tobacco advertising in the previous 2 weeks, compared to only 33 percent of adults surveyed. Since billboards were banned, 61 percent of teens who recalled tobacco advertising saw it in magazines, compared to 50 percent the year before.
A survey also revealed that 77 percent of teens say it is easy for people under the age of 18 to buy cigarettes and other tobacco products. Many displays of cigarettes in convenience stores are at waist level, making them plainly available to children. The campaign to restrict access by youths under the age of 18 to cigarettes has not been too successful.
A California suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, filed on May 11, 2000, charges that the company has violated the legal settlement with state governments by improperly distributing large quantities of free cigarettes by mail. This case marks the first time an attorney general has taken a cigarette company to court to enforce the terms of the MSA. Reynolds said it was part of a program of "consumer testing" and was therefore allowable under the agreement. The attorney general alleges Reynolds mailed the free cigarettes "under the guise of consumer testing or evaluation in order to market and advertise its products." According to the suit, Reynolds sent more than 900,000 multipack cigarette mailings to more than 115,000 California residents during 1999, some receiving as many as ten packs at a time.
In his memoirs, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop said this about the tobacco industry, "After studying in depth the health hazards of smoking, I was dumbfounded—and furious. How could the tobacco industry trivialize extraordinarily important public-health information: the connection between smoking and heart disease, lung and other cancers, and a dozen or more debilitating and expensive diseases? The answer was—it just did. The tobacco industry is accountable to no one."
Almost all smokers started before the age of 21—most before the age of 18—many before the age of 14. Young people who learn to inhale cigarette smoke and experience the mood-altering effects from the inhaled nicotine quickly become dependent on cigarettes to help them cope with the complexities of everyday life. Having developed a nicotine dependence, they find they must continue smoking to avoid the downside of nicotine withdrawal. The earlier they start to smoke, the more dependent they seem to become—and the sooner they start to experience smoking-related health problems. Six years of research at the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University reveals that a child who reaches age 21 without smoking, using illegal drugs, or abusing alcohol is virtually certain never to do so.
A survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services among high school students who smoked half a pack of cigarettes a day found that 53 percent had tried to quit but could not. When asked whether they would be smoking 5 years later, only 5 percent said they would be—but 8 years later, 75 percent were still smoking.
The tobacco companies are very adept at using advertising and different kinds of promotional programs to help them accomplish several major objectives:
Tobacco companies' advertising, before restrictions were implemented, was focused on television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. The advertising was represented by ads such as "I'd walk a mile for a camel" or the "Call for Phillip Morris" or "More doctors smoke Camels" or "Not a cough in a carload." This evolved into the "Joe Camel" ads, the "Kool Penguin" ads, and the "Newport Menthol" cigarette ads.
Tobacco advertising and promotional expenses have steadily increased. In 1997, the tobacco companies spent $5.66 billion to promote their products, up from $5.11 billion in 1996. The largest category of spending was for promotional allowances to wholesalers and retailers, $2.4 billion, more than double their spending in 1990. Next were expenditures for retail value added. At $970 million, this category includes non-cigarette items given away with cigarettes. Coupons and multiple pack offers were an additional $552 million, followed by specialty item distribution, $512 million; point of sale advertising, $305 million; outdoor advertising, $295 million; magazines, $236 million; public entertainment, $195 million; and $130 million for all other forms of advertising.
There were no restrictions on cigarette advertising in the United States until the first Report of the Surgeon General was released on January 11, 1961. Because of the health hazards described therein, the report led to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and, beginning in 1966, Congress mandated that a health warning appear on all cigarette packages, although not in advertisements. On June 2, 1967, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that the Fairness Doctrine in advertising applied to cigarette ads on television and radio and required broadcasters who aired cigarette commercials to provide "a significant amount of time" to citizens who wished to point out that smoking "may be hazardous to the smoker's health." This rule went into effect on July 1, 1967. The FCC required that there be one free public-service announcement (PSA) for every three paid cigarette commercials. During the three-year period of 1968 to 1970, in which the PSAs were mandated by the Fairness Doctrine, per capita cigarette sales decreased by 6.9 percent.
In January 1970, the cigarette industry offered voluntarily to end all cigarette advertising on television and radio by September 1970—a move that would also eliminate any PSAs, which were hurting sales. Ultimately, Congress approved the Public Health Cigarette Act of 1969, which prohibited cigarette advertising in the broadcast media as of January 1, 1971.
In September 1973, the Little Cigar Act of 1973 banned broadcast advertising of little cigars (cigarette-sized cigars). During the three-year period of 1971 to 1973, following the end of the PSAs required by the Fairness Doctrine and the beginning of the broadcast advertising ban, cigarette sales increased by 4.1 percent.
More than a decade later, smokeless-tobacco advertising in the broadcast media was banned by the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986. This ban took effect on August 27, 1986. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Consumer Protection ruled in 1991 that the Pinkerton Tobacco Company violated the 1986 statute banning the advertising of smokeless tobacco and prohibited it from "displaying its brand name, logo, color or design during televised (sports) events" of its Red Man Chewing Tobacco and snuff. This was the first action of its kind by the FTC.
STAT (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco), at their 1991 STAT-91 Conference, addressed the problem of tobacco companies' efforts to encourage tobacco addiction in young people. It was learned that the RJR Nabisco cartoon camel was at the center of the most extensive advertising campaign ever created to influence the values and behavior of young people. Camel's share of the teenage market rose from almost nothing to almost 35 percent in just three years by "this sleazy dromedary."
CHARLES M. RONGEY
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